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ABSTRACT
Since the commencement of post-war reconstruction in 1991, Beirut has
been radically transformed through a series of large development projects that
seek to reconcile the war induced fragmentation of both city and national
identity whilst reclaiming its "historic" position as one of a global network of
cities. These changes are grounded in a series of historiographic approaches to
memory, architecture, and urbanism. This dissertation argues that a critical
approach to the city in this context has to come to terms with the omissions
that constitute its history and the ambiguities of its multiple political locations.
It contends that these ambiguities are grounded in two specific events
unleashed by the historic transition of Beirut from a thriving cosmopolitan port
city and capital of an Ottoman province carrying its own name and spanning
over a vast territory into the capital of a smaller new nation state under French
mandate (1888-1943). The first is the ambivalence that characterized the
projection and formation of national identity under mandate (as opposed to
colonial) rule and the second is the superimposition of a capital city on the site
of a cosmopolitan port city during this same period. This overlap between the
messy cosmopolitanism of the port city, with its own antithesis, the
universalism associated with modernism in the capital city generated a
condition of architectural and urban impossibility that continues to haunt its
making. Based on a diverse body of primary imperial, colonial and local
archival research, 19th and 20th century literature and memoirs, travelogues and
visual material such as photographs, post cards and maps, as well as the
insights of recent work on orientalism, colonialism, nationalism this study
offers the first critical examination of the connections between political change
and modern architectural-urban production in Beirut.
Thesis Co-Supervisor: Mark Jarzombek
Title: Associate Professor of History and Architecture
Thesis Co-Supervisor: Philip S. Khoury
Title: Professor History, Kenan Sahin Dean
3
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
With so many years in the making, the intellectual and personal debts to be
acknowledged are numerous. I came to MIT in search of new ways to transgress the
boundaries of knowledge and better understand the connections between the personal,
the political, the historical, the intellectual and the urban. In retrospect I realize it was
one of the most lasting decisions that I would make, not only for the intellectual worlds
that were opened up to me but for the multitude of remarkable individuals I met, learnt
from, exchanged with and forged lasting and enduring friendships.
My first thanks go to my advisors who have been unfailing in their intellectual and
moral support over the years, when I was physically present at MIT and when I left on
different life journeys. Mark Jarzombek was a constant source of inspiration and
encouragement, his desire to challenge long accepted boundaries in the production of
knowledge and his ability to identify the most relevant thoughts and half baked ideas
transformed this project constantly. His belief in my work, especially at the moments
when I had suspended my own belief in its making was critical to its completion. From
Philip Khoury I learnt of the precisions of history and the need to move between
archival and theoretical spaces systematically. As he would tell me, "I need to see the
details Maha." His support long before I became his student provides a memorable
example in mentoring. Sibel Bozdogan's intellectual imprint can be found all over this
thesis. I first discovered the works of Edward Said and the politics of Architecture-
culture in her course on colonialism, nationalism and the production of architecture.
From her I learnt how to mold my physical suspension between places, my in-
betweeness within political and cultural spaces into an intellectual journey that shed
light on the complex realities of the discipline and of the region that continues with me
far beyond this thesis. With John Rajchman I indulged in my passion for political
philosophy. Through long and seemingly endless discussions and coffees I learnt how
to see more rigorously and imaginatively beyond disciplinary and intellectual
boundaries. With Michael Hays I got my first exposure to architectural theory and learnt
how to carefully navigate between the histories of ideas and edifices and unravel
hidden connections and ideologies.
In the earliest stages of studying at MIT and the initial phases of working on this thesis, I
learnt a great deal from the informed insights and the passions of teaching from Leila
Kinney, Akos Moravensky, Peter Galison at Harvard University and from stimulating
work with Gewndolyn Wright during her semester at MIT and ongoing conversations
ever since. My initial TA-ship with Nasser Rabbat developed into a cherished friendship
marked by continued thought provoking discussions that often breach the assumed
boundaries between intellectual rigor, political involvement and friendly camaraderie.
During the years of writing this dissertation I benefited from several grants and
fellowships. The first was the Aga Khan Foundation scholarship that helped me come to
4
MIT. I am deeply grateful for the opportunity. In 1996 I was the recipient of the Graham
Foundation, Carter Manny Citation of Honor award that enabled me to carry some of
my research and writing forward. My previous doctorate also opened other unlikely
doors to me. In 1997 I was the recipient of a Mellon Post-doctorate fellowship at the
American University of Beirut. I am grateful to the support of Samir Khalaf, a long time
friend for the warm environment of the center and the friendships forged. In 1998-1999
I was the recipient of the Rockefeller Humanities fellowship at the International Center
for Advanced Studies at NYU where I was introduced to an impressive array of ideas
and disciplines. The remarkable support of Thomas Bender, the director of the center,
his sharp insights and constant questioning are an engaging model of a truly
cosmopolitan intellectual. Discussions with my colleagues and friends at the center Alev
Cinar, Abideen Kusno, Xudong Zhang, Camilla Fojas and Ben Lan Goh amongst many
others would help reshape different aspects of this work as would the countless corridor
conversations and endless discussions with Tim Mitchell, Harry Hartounian and the
wide array of invited scholars that came through the center's doors.
The logistics of archival research can be quite daunting and is often facilitated by the
kindness of dedicated individuals who see some value in what one is doing. This is
especially the case in Lebanon where the destruction of a large portion of material and
buildings during the civil war meant countless hours and months camped out in the
offices of various individuals. In particular I would like to thank Mohamed Serhal at the
Beirut Municipality, Farah Farah at the Beirut Port and Mr. Sukkar at the Muslim Waqfs
for putting up with my presence in their offices over extended periods. I would also like
to thank Adnan Daher, the Director General of the Lebanese parliament and Ghassan
Tueini former minister and editor/owner of An-Nahar newspaper for giving me access
to various material, Jamila Cousti and Lulu Saibaa at the Roman Orthodox Waqfs, Dr.
Aftimous and Rana Haddad for making what exists of the Aftimous archives available,
William O'Reilly at the Aga Khan Foundation in Geneva for sending me much of the
Ecochard archives available to them, Samar Rizkallah for locating material at the AUB
library and Ahiram Corm for work related to his father Charles Corm. Pierre Fournie
provided invaluable access to photographic collections of the Mandate period at the
MAE in Paris and facilitated access to their archives. I am grateful to Asher Kaufman for
discussions related to the Phoenicians and for sending me material he came across
while doing research in the USJ archives in France because he thought it would be of
interest to me. I would also like to thank Andreas Riedlmeyer and Jeffery Spurr at the
Aga khan program at Harvard, the staff at the IFEAD in Damascus, the Basbakanlik
library in Istanbul, the IFA in Paris and at the MAE in Nantes for all their help. Rene
Caso at the Department of Architecture at MIT has provided friendly and logistical
support over the years far beyond the bounds of duty.
Archival research can also be a tedious and sometimes mind numbing activity while
writing can be an incredibly isolating journey. Conducting it with friends transforms it
into an entertaining and often inspiring activity. Jens Hanssen has been the best
5
been the best comrade in arms through the drudgery of research in Istanbul, the
translation of Ottoman documents and exchange of shared ideas and historical gossip
that continues to defy geographical distance. Walid Raad has been my friendly
interlocutor for so many years. Jad Tabet guided my initial research on his father
architect Antoine Tabet and read the first draft of the section related to him in 1993.
Nawaf Salam, also a long time friend, whose interest in history transformed him into an
unfailing resource for the exchange of information and material. The late Fouad Debbas
kindly spent hours with me in his office in Paris and in hotel lounges in New York
sifting through his collection of photographs, maps and postcards, and sharing his
insights into historical facts.
No work is ever completed without the intellectual exchange and warm support of
friends. In Cambridge, Edward Eigen, Valeria Koukoustia, Jorge Otero Pailos, Rudolph
el Khoury, Nelida Nassar, Samira Attalah, Sadek and Suzy Wahba, Rajeev Deheija, Terry
Burnham and Jamil Baz made Cambridge a particularly delightful place to be. In New
York Tim Mitchell and Lila Abu Lughod provided a warm and welcoming environment
to an unknown newcomer to the city. Salim Tamari, Sherif Lotfi, Sana Odeh, Walid
Raad, Joseph Masaad, the late Magda al Nowaihi, and my friends at ICAS transformed
the city into home for me. In Beirut, the energy and warmth of Lana Dalloul, Rania Ala
Eddine, Rima Abu Rahmeh, Roula Majdalani, and Nada al Nashif eased the transition
home. Various friends also read different sections of this work. Bashar Haidar the
introduction and section 111, Jens Hanssen Part 2 of Section I and Walid Raad Section III.
In the last months of writing my dear friend Zalfa left this world. Just as her presence
left a lasting imprint on so many, her absence has left an incommensurable void in me.
Last but certainly not least my thanks go to my family, always there through every
unexpected joumey. My sisters Rola and Rana and my brother Salman are my invisible
lifeline that only siblings can be. Hani, Teta, and my Mroue clan, are there always. Jad,
Maya and Dina make the world a better place to be. My parent's in law Amin and Leila
el Hafez have brought more love and joy into my life in the last few years. My husband
Ramzi was an immense source of emotional and moral support especially in the difficult
last months of dissertation writing. He smiled through my scattered papers and thoughts
and lovingly acted as my sounding board as he learnt more than he ever wanted about
the intricate connections of politics to urban-architecture.
From my father I learnt the value of education and from my mother the will to
persevere. No words can ever convey the depth of my love, awe and gratitude for what
they have given me. I am what I am today because of them. To them I dedicate this
work.
6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 4
LIST OF FIGURES 10
LIST OF MAPS 12
ACRONYMS 13
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION 13
INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A CRITICAL
HISTORIOGRAPHY 14
ON WRITING HISTORY 21
LOCATING THE CITY 26
BECOMING MODERN, BECOMING NATIONAL 33
UNNAMED MODERNISMS: CANONIC HISTORIES OF ARCHITECTURAL AND URBAN
MODERNISM 37
THE VIOLENCE OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE POLITICS OF ERASURE 48
THE VIOLENCE OF WAR AND THE ERASURES OF PLANNING 50
WRITING OUT THE COLONIES 57
COLONIALISM, NATIONALISM AND LEBANESE ARCHITECTURAL/URBAN
H1STORIOGRAPHY 60
OBJECTIVES AND OUTLINE 69
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 72
SECTION I: TRAVELING CHRONICLES AND THE
CULTURAL PRODUCTION OF LEBANON: HISTORY AS A
CONTEXT FOR ACTION 78
IMPERIAL ARCHITECTURE IN THE SHADOW OF MODERNISM: THE MAKING OF A
CAPITAL-PORT CITY 82
BEIRUT: A BRIEF HISTORY 84
BEIRUT VILAYATI 89
NEW CARTOGRAPHIES OF EMPIRE 91
IMPERIAL OR COLONIAL 110
TRAVELING HISTORIES: "IMAGINING" THE NATION INTO BEING 112
HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY AND THE DENSITY OF TIME: THE LIMITS OF A HISTORICAL
IMAGINARY 119
BEIRUT: RUH EL ASR 128
UNEARTHING THE "PAST": TRAVELERS AND DIPLOMATS 134
BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE PROCUREMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 139
TRAVEL GUIDES AND CITY NARRATIVES: HISTORY IN A TIMELESS ORIENT 144
NATIONALISM, PARTICULARISM, PLURALISM AND THE MEDITERRANEAN: LEBANON
IS A COUNTRY THAT RESEMBLES ONLY ITSELF 147
NATIONAL AND COSMOPOLITAN: IDEOLOGIES OF THE MOUNTAIN AND THE CITY 152
HISTORY OF THE CITY/HISTORY OF THE NATION: A FEW REMARKS 158
7
SECTION II STAGING MODERNISM ARCHITECTURAL
NARRATIVES AND HISTORICAL IMAGINARIES 161
THE FRENCH MANDATE: WAR, PLANNING AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 166
FAYCAL AND FRENCH/BRITISH RIVALRY 171
BETWEEN MANDATE AND COLONY 172
MISSION CIVILISATRICE AND REPUBLICAN IDEALS 177
REGIONALISM AND ORGANIC NATIONALISM 182
ECONOMICS AS AN ANTIDOTE TO POLITICS 189
BEIRUT 1921 196
MODERNIZING BEIRUT: BUILDING CITY AND NATION 215
BUILDING THE CITY: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE INITIATIVE 216
Planning Beirut: Looking East 220
THE BEIRUT MUNICIPALITY: THE POLITICS OF URBAN MANAGEMENT 224
ORIENTAL COSMOPOLITANISM, ARCHITECTURAL AESTHETICS AND IMAGE MAKING
IN THE CITY 231
DOMESTICATING MODERNISM: TOWARDS A NATIONAL SYMBOLIC 242
CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNISM AND NATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 247
Ottoman onto French: 1915-1926 248
Physical Planning 258
STAR OF THE NATION: THE 1926 PLAN FOR THE CITY CENTER 260
ARCHITECTURAL FANTASIES AND COLONIAL EXPOSITIONS 271
Paris 1931 271
New York, 1939 282
UNEARTHING THE PAST, CASTING THE FUTURE: THE MAKING OF A NATIONAL
MUSEUM 291
PHOENICIAN BEIRUT: A MEDITERRANEAN, ISLAMIC PORT CITY 300
BEING NATIONAL, BEING MODERN: THE WORK OF ANTOINE TABET 307
On Language and Architecture 309
On Architecture and Nation Building 312
Differing Modernisms: The Architecture of Antoine Tabet 320
MAKING PLACE FOR THE NATION: CADASTRAL REFORM AND URBAN PLANNING
324
FROM CITY TO NATION: PROPERTY REFORMS AND THE SPACE OF VIOLENCE 325
Cadastral Reform and Alternative Histories 329
The place de L'Etoile: An incomplete Modernity? 335
NEW PLANS, NEW CITIES, NEW CITIZENS 335
MEDITERRANEAN BEIRUT: RENE DANGER AND COERCIVE CIVILITY 337
MICHEL ECOCHARD AND ENLIGHTENED MODERNITY 346
8
SECTION 3: POST? MODERNITY: MEMORY,
ARCHITECTURE AND URBAN NARRATIVES IN POST-CIVIL
WAR NATION BUILDING 359
OFF WITH THEIR HEADS 361
SAVAGE CONCORDANCE OR AL-AMN-BI-L-TARADI (SECURITY THROUGH
CONCILIATION) 363
RECONSTITUTING CITY AND TERRITORIALIZING IDENTITIES 365
PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC, PUBLICIZING THE PRIVATE 369
CITY OF FANTASIES: POST-(COLONIAL) CONQUEST AND MICRO-HISTORIES OF
RESISTANCE 371
QUESTIONS OF HISTORY AND THE POLITICS IN MEMORY: BUILDING CITY AND
NATION 374
Urban Actors 377
The Plan: Colonial Imperatives and National Politics 379
LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL: THE TWIN FACES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 384
ARCHITECTURE, REPRESENTATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF HISTORY 391
GHOSTLY SPECTERS AND ALTERNATE MEMORIES 398
WHOSE CITY IS THIS ANYWAY? 406
BY WAY OF SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 412
APPENDIXI: GEOGRAPHY OF HISTORIC
EXPERIENCE 414
APPENDIX II: MODERNIZING BEIRUT: BETWEEN THE OTTOMANS AND THE
FRENCH 425
APPENDIX III: MUNICIPAL FINANCES AND EXPROPRIATIONS IN 1931 430
APPENDIX IV: MISCELLANEOUS INDICATORS OF GROWTH IN BEIRUT: 1923-1929
432
APPENDIX IV: CHARLES CORM: L'ART PHINICIEN 433
APPENDIX VI: ANTOINE TABET 436
BIBLIOGRAPHY 446
9
LIST OF FIGURES
Number Page
Figure 1 Bird's eye view of Beirut, end of the 19 th century (Source: author's collection) ...................... 102
Figure 2 Place des Canons and Ottoman Petit Sdrail - 19 th century (Sources: author's collection
& Ylidiz Palace) .................................................................... 114
Figure 3: Grand Srail overlooking the city: Upper right- 1 9th century postcard, upper left,
Military Barracks Hospital in Istanbul, lower right entrance to the barracks 1920's,
lower left the barracks today, the prime ministry's headquarters. The last floor was added
during post-war reconstruction in the 1990's (Source. in order cited, author's collection,
Ylidiz archives, MAE Paris, author's photograph) .................................................................... 114
Figure 4: The Arab Clock Tower with the Grand Srail in the background (Source: Jens
H anssen) ..................................................................... 119
Figure 5: From Flat to Pitched Roofs: Late 19th to early 2 0th century city (Source: author's
collection) .................................................................... 125
Figure 6: Port of Beirut 1876- the crusader castle visible on the background was destroyed by the
port authorities in the expansion of the port (Source: Ylidiz Archive Collection) ................... 128
Figure 7: Lebanon as a retarded child (Source: AlAhrar alMosawara May 28, 1926. p.1) .................... 132
Figure 8: Sobhi Bek Haidar declaring Baalbek an independent city-state.(Source: Al Ahrar al
Mosawara March 8, 1926, p. 1) .................................................................... 134
Figure 9: First image of Beirut taken by Goupil-Fesquet, in 1839 (Source: Debbas Des
PhotographiesA Beyrouth 1840-1918, (Paris: Marval, 2001), p.22 ) ......................... 165
Figure 10: Am6nagement de Beyrouth, R: Delahalle (Source: L Architecture Franfaise, 1941) ...............195
Figure 11: The arrival of General Allenby to Beirut, 1919 (Source author's collection) ......................205
Figure 12: Maarad street/Rue Allenby during demolitions and with Fair Stores (Source: La Syrie
et Le Liban) ..................................................................... 250
Figure 13 Beirut Fair, Al Borj Square and the city pavilions (Source: ibid) ................................................. 250
Figure 14: Entrance to the Fair (Source: Debbas, Beirut, p. 241) ................................................................. 252
Figure 15: Beirut Fair, Damascus Pavilion (Source: HCFSL, La Syrie et Le Liban ) ..................................257
Figure 16 Beirut Fair, Beirut Pavilion (Source: Debbas, Beirut, p. 241) .....................................................257
Figure 17: Villa Eucalypta- constructed by Hercule Morel- circa 1900 (Source: Debbas, Beirut, p.
166) .................................... ................................. 258
Figure 18: Interior of the Beirut Pavilion (Source: ibid) ..................................................................... 259
Figure 19: Illustration of Beirut Municipality. Fagade (Source: Saliba, City Center Recovery) ................... 290
Figure 20 Beirut Municipality, YusufAftimous Architect (Source: author's photographs) ....................291
Figure 21 Fourth municipal Building completed in 1926-1927 (Source: author's Collection) ................291
Figure 22: Al Maarad street, (the site of the 1921 Beirut fair- see Figure 12) and today considered
as the French mandate quarter of the city. (Source. author's photographs) ..................................294
10
Figure 23: Winning Design by Igor Pitlenko, 1932 (Source: Igor Pitlenko, Annuaire, 1934) .................297
Figure 24: The parliament building (Source: Left MAE Paris; Right author's photographs) ....................327
Figure 25: Parliament Clock tower and Phoenician heritage. Left: the clock tower constructed
infron of the parliament. Right: Phoenician Architecture, "Historie de L'habitation
humaine, construction difie par Charles Garnier" Exposition de Paris, 1889,
supplement no. 7, p. 50-56., in Davie, Beyrouth, 2000, p. 81 . ....................................... 329
Figure 26: Abed's designs for the Clock tower (Source: AIMaarad October, 1931) ................................330
Figure 27 'The Grandiose Parliament Copula" (Source: AlMaarad, June 14, 1934) ...............................332
Figure 28 Pavilion of the Levant, 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris (Source. Andre Geiger, "Les
Etats du Levant" in Illustration special issue, July 1931, n.p.) .......................................................343
Figure 29 Beiteddine and Azem Palace (Source: Edna L: Nicoll A Travers L 'Exposition Coloniale
(Paris: 1931, p. 182) ..................................................................... 343
Figure 30 Reconstruction of Baalbek by Jean Debs ...................................................................... 348
Figure 31: Corm's Home: A Phoenician Skyscraper (Source: author's photograph) ..................................353
Figure 32: The 1926 Archeological Conference in Beirut ...................................................................... 367
Figure 33: Beirut Museum (Source: Author's photograph) ......................................... ............................. 372
Figure 34: Amdnagement de Beyrouth, Delahalle, 1934 (Source: La Revue du Liban, 1934) ...................377
Figure 35: Amdnagement de Beyrouth, Delahalle, 1934 (Source: L Architecture Franfaise, 1941) ........... 377
Figure 36 Amdnagement de Beyrouth, Bird's Eye View, Delahalle, 1934 (Source: La Revue du
Liban, 1934) ...................................................................... 379
Figure 37: St. George Hotel, August Perret and Associates, Beirut, 1932 (Source: author's
collection) ...................................................................... 399
Figure 38: Orient Palace Hotel, Damascus, Antoine Tabet (Source, author's collection) .........................400
Figure 39: Rene Danger Master Plan for Beirut (Source: IFA) ..................................................................... 425
Figure 40 The New administrative center on the site of the Ottoman Srails, Michel Ecochard,
(Source: author's collection) ..................................................................... 443
Figure 41 Michel Ecochard Elevation- New Adminstrative Center, Beirut (Source: IFA) ........................444
Figure 42 bn Arraq Mausoleum, Beirut City Center, 1992 (author's photograph) .................................448
Figure 43 Barricades between different neighborhoods in and around Beirut, 1990 (author's
photographs) ...................................................................... 456
Figure 44: The green line through Beirut's city center, 1990 (author's photographs) ..............................457
Figure 45: City Center, Wadi Abu Jamil, 1990, with displaced populations- now demolished
(author's photographs) ..................................................................... 471
Figure 46: Solidere Project, The Grand Axis, 1992 (Source: Solidere Newsletter) .....................................476
Figure 47: Solidere Project: Conservation and Saifi Urban Village (Solidere Newsletter) ........................477
Figure 48: Solidere Project: Saifi Urban Village (author's photographs) .................................................... 478
Figure 49: Solidere Project, 1992 Champs Elysee and Manhattan (Source: Solidere) ...............................492
Figure 50: Ouzai, 1990 (author's photographs) ............................................................................................510
LIST OF MAPS
Map 1: Beirut Vilayati (Source: Kassir, Beyrouth, p. 116) .................................................................... 89
M ap 2: Beirut 1841 (Source: Davie, 1996) .................................................................... 99
Map 3: Expansion of the Beirut Port with original coastline in brown and new landfills (gridded
areas) .................................................................... 129
Map 4: Beirut Fair Layout (Source: HCFSL, La Syrie et Le Liban) Blue areas mark the location of
the fair in the center ..................................................................... 248
Map 5: Plan of Beirut's Historic core 1921. Demolitions undertaken by the Ottomans during
WWI are marked in the dotted areas. The new Fosch and Allenby roads are visible in
the same areas and the Plan de L'Etoile would be constructed on the site of these
demolitions. The outline of the Grand Srail is also visible to the right of the plan.
(Source: Archives de L'Armee Francaise du Levant, in Tabet el al, Beyrouth, Portrait de
Ville (Paris: IFA, 2001), p. 14 ..................................................................... 301
Map 6 Place de L'Etoile, 1926, signed by Louis Tabet. Black areas indicate the new axis of the
plan and the grey areas the existing fabric and landownership patterns that were
reconstituted by the plan. The two axes to the right were never built since they would
have entailed the expropriation and demolition of two existing churches. Refer to map 5
for location in the city center (Source: MAE Paris) ..................................................................... 323
Map 7 Regularizing the Urban Fabric through expropriation, replanning and Cadastral
Modifications, The etoile and the 2 Churches- the existing urban fabric is visible
beneath the extension of the Etoile in the middle (Source: Lebanese Cadastral Services) ...........417
1%
ACRONYMS
AKF Aga Khan Foundation, Geneva
AO Archivum Ottomanicum
AUB American University of Beirut
BJMES British Journal of Middle East Studies
BLA British Lebanese Association
BMM Beirut Municipality Minutes
BPA Beirut Port Archives
CSSH Comparative Studies in Society and History
COWA Christian Orthodox Waqfs Archives
GTL Gold Turkish Lira
HCRFSL Haut Commissariat de La R6publique Franaise en Syrie et au Liban
IFEAD Institut Franqais d' Etudes Arabes de Damas
IJMES International Journal of Middle East Studies
IRCICA Ylidiz Photographic Library, Istanbul
JAE Journal of Architectural Education
JSAH Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians
JUH Journal of Urban History
LPR Lebanese Parliament Records
LSL Lebanese Syrian Liras
MAE Ministre des Affaires Etranger
MSWA Muslim Sunni Waqfs Archives
NLR New Left Review
OBA Ottoman Bank Archives, Istanbul
OIB Orient Institute Beirut
PWL Public Works Ledger
USJ Universit6 St. Joseph
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND
TRANSLATION
The English transliteration from Arabic generally follows the rules of the
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. For the sake of consistency,
Arabic names, common in French were kept in their French form. For
example, the name Charles Corm was not transliterated into Sharl al-Qurm.
All translations from Arabic and French are mine, unless otherwise noted.
13
Introduction: Towards a Critical
Historiography,
voking history and the past in the projection of identity, leads to
an immediate confrontation with "theoretical" questions about
memory, diversity and spatial politics especially in capital cities.
As the etymology of the word suggests, the city has always been
intimately connected to politics and to the political and in the case of capital
cities to the process of projecting and consolidating the idea of the citizen and
the nation.2 Furthermore, as a 'site' for the elaboration and implementation of
a body politic, architecture and urbanism are part of the construction of a
social 'reality' which extends beyond the geographic and territorial
boundaries of the city.
I borrow the term from Mark Jarzombek who uses it to index an approach for identifying
problems that are common to different disciplines, in his case, the "unconscious"
incorporation of psychology into various domains, as opposed to the more common system of
interdisciplinary work. See Mark Jarzombek The Dialectic of the Innocent Eye, Commentaries
on the Psychologizing of Modernity in Art and Architectural Theory, (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997).
2 This connection between city and politics is both etymological and historical. Historically,
the development of city-states is connected to the development of the concept of citizenship.
While I will not go into the details of the overlap between citizenship and political
participation in public life, it is worth mentioning that the term for citizen was derived in
classical times from the word civitas giving rise to the Roman civiatus and eventually the
French term citoyen from cite, meaning namely an ensemble of persons enjoying limited
rights within a city-context Bryan Turner, "Outline of a Theory of Citizenship" in Sociology
(May, 1990, Vol. 24), p.189-217. Paul Virilio traces the origins of bourgeois power to this
"strategic implantation that establishes the "fixed domicile" as a social and monetary
value...which redefines]...real estate speculation as the sale and trading of fixed property, the
right to reside within the ramparts of fortified cities, the right to security and preservation."
Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics Mark Pilozzotti (trans), (New York: Semiotext, Columbia
University Press,1986), p. 9
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Nowhere is the legacy of this confluence between nationalism and modern
urbanism more palpable than in non-Western cities today, where delineating
the contours of both modernity and national identity is intricately intertwined
within a colonial political framework. As forcefully argued by recent critical
theories the politics of identity, particularly national identity, is double-edged.
On the one hand, the insurgence and liberation of previously marginalized and
stereotyped people, demands the articulation of clearly defined identities. On
the other hand, nationalist identity politics, especially in a post-liberation era,
often instate exclusionist practices based on essentialist conceptions of a
homogeneous national community. Ample evidence from various parts of the
non-Western world indicates that the principles of modern urbanism and
architecture were used to delineate both colonial identity and national or post-
colonial liberation. At the same time, reference to a select cultural past prior
to colonial intervention and domination -discursively as well as in urban-
architecture- was critical to the assertion of these identities.
Using a diverse body of primary imperial, colonial and local archival
research, 1 9 th and 2 0 th century literature and memoirs, travelogues and visual
material such as photographs, post cards and maps, and the insights of recent
studies in colonialism, nationalism, orientalism, and post colonialism this
dissertation is concerned with the relationship between the politics of
urbanism and those of architecture as they relate to identity making in the city
of Beirut. Since the commencement of post-war reconstruction in 1991,
Beirut has been radically transformed through a series of large development
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projects that seek to reconcile the war induced fragmentation of both city and
of national identity whilst reclaiming its "historic" position as one of a global
network of cities. These changes are grounded in a series of historiographic
approaches to memory, architecture, and urbanism. This dissertation will
argue that a critical approach to the city in this context has to come to terms
with the omissions that constitute its history and the ambiguities of its
multiple political locations. It contends that these ambiguities are grounded in
two specific events unleashed by the historic transition of Beirut from a
thriving cosmopolitan port city and capital of an Ottoman province carrying
its own name and spanning over a vast territory that included areas in present
day Lebanon, Syria, Palestine/Israel and Turkey, into the capital of a smaller
new nation state under French mandate (1888-1943). The first is the
ambivalence that characterized the projection and formation of national
identity under colonial rule and the second is the superimposition of the
capital city on the site of the cosmopolitan port city during this same period.
The formation of the modern nation-state of Lebanon lead to the forced
"annexation" of a series of geographic regions, including the city of Beirut,
and thus the integration a large portion of unwilling individuals into a new
national entity. The plethora of conflicting political and national imaginaries
that followed intersected in a variety of ways within the urban architecture of
the city. At the same time, and unlike many other post colonial or post
imperial contexts, such as India or Turkey, the capital of the newly created
Lebanese nation state under French mandate in 1919 was not constructed on a
new geographic site. Rather the existing cosmopolitan port city was declared
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the capital of the newly created nation-state as well as the capital of the
colonizing power and thus a showpiece of French accomplishment. This
overlap between the messy cosmopolitanism of the port city, with its own
antithesis, the universalism associated with modernism in the capital city,
dictated a specific approach to the politics of identity and transformed Beirut
into a unique site for interrogating the ambiguities that mark architectural and
urban modernism and their manifestations in the capital city. From this
perspective, Beirut went against the grain so to speak. Attempts to categorize
different aspects of urban living, characteristic of modern urbanism and
planning could not be implemented in the city creating a situation of constant
negotiation and contentious cohabitation between its diverse elements.
This confluence also generates questions regarding the proclaimed "failure"
of architectural modernism or its impossibility in the city. By foregrounding
the visual in the process of projecting identity in Beirut, a tension was created
between urban plans that had to reflect the trappings of state authority and an
architecture meant to embody historical continuities. This tension brings up a
series of issues such as how do colonial processes underwrite contemporary
politics and how are competing narratives refracted in the city?3 What kind of
statements do architectural/urban practices make about citizenship and
belonging in the city? In what ways does the double sided character of
3 This particular question was the topic of a three day conference entitled Building City and
Nation: Space, History, Memory and Identity, that I co-organized with Samir Khalaf at the
American University of Beirut in 1999. What was evident from the varied readings and
papers presented was the diversity of understandings of the built environment and the
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nationalism- that is its need to project outwards as well as inwards- redefine
the boundaries of city and nation? What are the politics of erasure that are
employed in this process? How does the global take on local form in culture
and in the built environment and what is its impact on the politics of memory
and rights to the city? What are the mechanisms through which non-
metropolitan or non-urban populations identify with modernism in the city, if
at all? Does the city in this case invent both the modern and the non-or anti-
modern? If so how does a national culture emerge out of these contradictions?
What is the role of architecture as opposed to planning, in the articulation of
this "national symbolic?" 4
Drawing on works conducted in the fields of nationalism, orientalism, and
colonialism for they generate the specific kind of concerns that structure this
work, this dissertation will demonstrate that the specificities of Beirut's site
generated a specific condition where architecture attempted to register
continuities that could not be implemented at the urban level. It takes as a
base assumption that architecture and urbanism have a distinct political
history that can be traced through the spatialization of their particular historic
relevance of history to contemporary politics especially in the post-colonial south such as
Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, Morocco and Libya
4 Lauren Berlant developed the concept of the "national symbolic" as the "tangled cluster" of
official texts that mediates a national public. Using Hawthorne, author of The Scarlet Letter,
she investigates the discursive practices that reconstitute the local resident as a citizen of an
abstract entity called America. In an effective tour de force Hawthorne is transformed into an
expert on "the mechanisms by which individual subjectivities get caught up in progressively
more abstract collective identifications" mapping "a communally held collection of images
and narratives.. a field force" that she terms as the "national symbolic." See Lauren Berlant
The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia and Everyday Life (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991) p. 5 & 55
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constructions especially in capital cities. It also assumes the centrality of the
capital city to conceptions of citizenship and identity making. This condition
in turn raises a set of parallel concerns regarding the ways in which we read
and write the material history of a city and of a nation.
To respond to these issues, this dissertation will examine this transition from
Ottoman to French as one from an urban based to a national based communal
imaginary and investigate the implication of architectural and urban reform in
the formation of a "national symbolic" during three distinct intervals in the
making of the city and its urban architecture. Each of these "moments" was
ruptured by episodes of violent conflicts or war, through which the identity of
both city and citizen were negotiated anew. The dissertation argues that all
three periods form part of the sedimented history of the contemporary city;
the "ghosts" that haunt its making. It is divided into three sections.
Section I examines the remaking of a small port city into a cosmopolitan
capital city and the locus of modem Ottoman citizenship through changes in
architectural syntax and reform of property rights. It argues that these reforms,
part of a much larger concern with creating the bounded space of the Empire
and depicting the modernity of the "nation" overturned existing hierarchies
between the public and the private. Property reform was instrumental to this
process with a long lasting impact on the city's built environment. In parallel
it examines the centrality of Beirut to the constitution of a local and
transnational imaginary that set the scene for what would come to mark
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Beirut's unique position as both cosmopolitan and capital. These
reconstitutions of the city also highlighted the contentious relationship
between the city and the adjacent Mount Lebanon leading not to the
dominance of the "ideology of the city over the mountain" but rather to a
constant friction between them.
Section II explores attempts to create a "national symbolic" through urban-
architecture. It contends that the particular political circumstances of mandate
politics as opposed to colony, the multi-sectarian composition of the new
nation-state and the city's dual position as capital of both a new nation state
and of a colonizing power paralyzed the formation of national identity and the
implementation of urban-architectural politics. More poetically it proposes
that the conflict between its cosmopolitan identity as a port city and its
position as a capital city generated a condition of architectural and urban
impossibility that attempted to camouflage the fissures of national identity.
This process intersected with 1 9 th century oriental, biblical and archaeological
discourses.
Section III undertakes a long temporal jump into the post-civil war
reconstruction process to question the location of post-civil-war national
identity in the city and the dislocations that continue to haunt its making. This
move in time opens up the possibility for reflecting on certain issues
specifically the ways in which colonial politics continue to continue to
underlie contemporary approaches to urban architecture and the constitution
20
of national identity especially at moments of radical crisis. It explores the
ways in which post war reconstruction efforts in Beirut's historic core and its
southern suburbs are trying to recreate the city's identity and in the process
redefine rights to the city. It argues that despite drastically different
conditions, the reconstruction of the city center of Beirut and of creating a
national symbolic continued in line with the French/Lebanese approach to
rebuilding the areas demolished by the Ottomans during the mandate. The
main contention here is that the denationalization of urban space entailed an
equally radical deterritorialization of citizenship rights through property
reform in the center of the city that effectively concluded the Ottoman/French
reconstitution of the city center and created a powerful rupture in the city's
social memory.
On Writing History
"World History travels from East to West, for Europe is the
absolute end of history, just as Asia is the beginning...for
although the earth is a sphere, history does not move in a
circle around it, but has a definite extremity, i.e., Asia. It is
there that the external and physical sun rises, and it sets in the
West, but it is in the West that the inner sun of self-
consciousness, which emits a higher radiance, makes it further
ascent"5
The relationship of the past to the present, its impact on historical writing and
the writing of history, its significance for understanding present day events
and future challenges are but some of the issues that have plagued historians,
5 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, (London: Cambridge University Press,
1975), p. 197
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policy analysts cultural critics, activists, and other academics. The works of
various scholars had already shaken several of the foundational paradigms by
which we approached the legacies of modernism, the history of the state and
its institutions, the history and theory of the non-West and by implication
Western history, social and cultural history and legacies etc. While the work
of Foucault forced us to rethink the categories in which we 'see' history- that
is the spatiality of history- what John Rajchman termed as Foucault's Art of
Seeing, the scholarship of Edward Said, especially his seminal Orientalism
and later Culture and Imperialism exposed the entanglements between culture
and politics; the 'imaginative geographies' of history and their continued
relevance today.6 The end of the cold war, the wave of democratization and
the eruption of ethnic conflicts in different parts of the globe that swept
through much of Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America generated a
more profound crisis in the discipline leading some like Francis Fukuyama to
declare the end of history.7 Even though no major Western thinker has shared
Fukuyama's edict, these and earlier inquiries and events eroded the view of
European history as the history of all human beings. Works exposing the
centrality of the colonies in the foundational myths of Europe's modernity
6 John Rajchman "Foucault's Art of Seeing" in Philosophical Events, Essays of the '80s (New
York, Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 68-104
7 Francis Fukuyama maintains that after the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Berlin
wall the United States and the capitalist free market are the only possible model of society and
polity and thus they present the "end" of history. Francis Fukuyama The End of History and
the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992). Dussel traces this idea to Hegel's projections of
Europe as the "beginning" and "end" of history and the ensuing Eurocentrism that followed.
Enrique Dussel "Eurocentrism and Modernity" in Boundary 2, Volume 20 no. 3 1993, p. 65-
76.
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and others displacing Europe as the center of modernity are steadily
increasing and expanding geographically through various disciplines.8
The post September 11th world, which is witnessing an almost complete
overhaul in long established international and national relations has generated
more intense investigations attempting to wrestle with issues of
historiography and their moral, political and ethical implications. How does
one narrate the past and suggest venues for the present? Is this an individual
effort of historians with unfettered freedom to narrate the past or should it be
as historian Martin Jay once suggested "an institution of historians, now more
credentialed than not, trying to convince each other about the plausibility of
their reconstruction." 9 Is such an effort to be undertaken solely by historians
examining a particular event in time or place or should it really be as Timothy
Mitchell recently suggested an interdisciplinary effort that brings together
previously unthought-of of connections, between incidents, places and
peoples, and that may have significant implications on the way we view,
8 There is a plethora of work in various disciplines especially philosophy and cultural studies.
In addition to Enrique Dussel see Martin Bernal Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of
Classical Civilization (New Jersey: Rutgers University press, 1987, 1991); Fredrick Cooper
and Ann Laura Stoler (eds) Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World,
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1997) especially their introduction; Anne Mclintock,
Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Conquest (New York:
Routledge, 1995); Timothy Mitchell (ed) Questions of Modernity ( Minneapolis, London:
University of Minnesota Press, 2000), Gyan Prakash (ed) After Colonialism: Imperial
Histories and Postcolonial Displacements (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
9 Martin Jay, "Of Plots, Witnesses and Judgments," in Saul Friedlander, ed., Probing the
Limits of Representation: Nazism and the Final Solution (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992), p. 105.
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understand and even narrate our contemporary circumstances.'° Dipesh
Chakrabarty pushes these questions further turning them upon the historian
herself. He asks what kind of "houses" do historians find it "proper" to dwell
and what is the constitutive absence around which a work revolves." As he
argues the insistence on alternative forms and practices whether of
nationalism, state building, modernity, history etc. has to be grounded in a
larger theory-building approach that seeks to "Provincialize Europe." Rather
than treat the "non-modern" or "traditional" elements of Indian society in his
case, as residuals fragments of the past in an "incomplete" project of
modernity, we need to recognize that "modernity is constituted by tensions
that relate to each other asymptomatically."'2 In other words, what is
important is to articulate the sustained import of the "non-West" to political
modernity whilst acknowledging the contributions of the West to this process.
Building on this work and its 'view' of history, this study in interested in
exploring some of the "constitutive absences" that have categorized the
'' Timothy Mitchell, The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernities (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2002).
" In his Provincializing Europe Charkrabarty considers the possibilities of thinking political
modernity in places like India. He argues that, it is impossible today to think of concepts used
to critique socially unjust practices and to discuss political modernity such as citizenship, the
state, civil society, the public sphere, democracy, human rights, equality before the law, the
individual, the public/private distinctions, social justice, scientific rationality and so on
without what he terms as "burden of European thought and history." As such the reading of
various cultural and social practices in India through these concepts involves their translation
into categories and self understandings of modernity [and capitalism]. Building on this
argument he calls for a politics that considers other narratives about modernity, communities,
family, progress etc. as legitimate forms of knowledge. Dipesh Chakrabarty Provincializing
Europe (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000)
12 Dipesh Chakrabarty "The Difference-Deferral of a Colonial Modernity: Public Debates on
Domesticity in British Bengal," in Tensions of Empire p. 81.
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historiography of architectural and urban modernism in the city of Beirut.
Following Michel de Certeau, it is interested in "speaking through the silences
of history""3 by exploring the violence and erasures, what Enrique Dussel has
termed as "the underside of modernity." As Dussel argues, the confusion
between abstract universality and concrete world hegemony allowed the
coexistence of rationality with an irrational praxis of violence that constitutes
modernity and allows it to constitute the rest of the world in the name of
progress. Consequently, the spatial politics of modernity entailed
asymmetrical assertions of power that resulted in domination, exclusions,
expulsions and forced incorporations that have yet to be thoroughly
acknowledged.14 In this sense Foucault's disruption of the unilinear trajectory
of history is invaluable even though his focus on the internal institutional
grids of modernity obscured his "peripheral vision" of what occurred outside
of those boundaries; namely in the colonies and their role in constituting
modernity.
13 Michel de Certeau Heterologies Discourse on the Other translated by Brian Massumi and
Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)
14 See in particular Enrique Dussel The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricouer, Rorty, Taylor
and the Philosophy of Liberation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996) who
highlights the violence that underwrites modernity in and of itself. As he argues modernity
can only be constituted through the violent denial of its "other." More recently Derek Gregory
in The Colonial Present has pushed this argument to contemporary sites of domination
investigating the ways in which the structural violence instated through the modern project of
18'h-19th century imperialism in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine/Israel continues to underlie
contemporary conditions. Derek Gregory The Colonial Present (Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishing, 2004). For spatially grounded arguments see James C. Scott Seeing Like a State:
How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven and
London, Yale University Press, 1998). Jeffry Herf's Reactionary Modernism offers a parallel
view of modernity gone awry in Nazi Germany. He argues that the grandiose visions of social
engineering and mapping, characteristic of modernism took on particularly virulent and
disastrous forms under Nazi Germany. Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology,
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Acknowledging these asymmetrical assertions of power requires what Walter
Benjamin viewed as a concept of history that could accommodate the
spasmodic interruptions of multiple pasts into a condensed present; that is the
recognition of multiple temporalities that exist and sometimes collide within
the present. Beirut, with its multiple and often conflicting identities is an ideal
space from which to explore this underside of modernity. However, this
requires a more "critical historiography" at two discursive levels; history of
the connection/interaction between the city and the nation and the
historiography of urban/architectural studies. By working through questions
of architecture, public space and citizenship I hope to open up the particular
experience of modernity in Beirut and the cultural politics of identity making.
In turn the issues explored transcend the boundaries of empire, nation and city
and pose questions regarding the centrality of the city and its physical spaces
to the construction of community and citizenship.
Locating the City1 5
"I have also thought of a model city from which I deduce all
others," Marco answered. "It is a city made only of
exceptions, exclusions, incongruities, contradictions. If such a
city is the most improbable, by reducing the number of
abnormal elements, we increase the probability that the city
really exists. So I have only to subtract exceptions from my
model, and in whatever direction I proceed, I will arrive at
one of the cities which, always as an exception, exist. But I
Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993).
15 This title is borrowed from a conference I participated in at Bilkent University, Antalya and
which is also the title of a forthcoming collection that includes the conference participants.
See Locating the City: The Idea, Place, Politics, and Everyday Practice of the Urban Thomas
Bender, Alev Cinar (eds) forthcoming, 2005
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cannot force my operation beyond a certain limit: I would
achieve cities too probable to be real. ,,"16
The interpolation between identity politics, cultural histories, modernism and
planning in and through the city makes it the ideal local from which to
examine various issues. For a wide variety of scholars cities have been the
place from which to try and understand the impact of modernity on the social,
political and cultural fabric of society. While various works have pointed to
the ways in which modernism was used to mask the unevenness of national
development in different contexts, the uneven spread of modernity itself (both
national and international) has seldom been discussed. Cities certainly bring
this question to the fore. In various cities around the world, the iconography
of modernity seems to be located in select sites and areas whilst displacing
(from discourse and view) the material realities of the other city- the
"unintended city" that is never part of the official history/story. 17 This
unevenness does not imply incompletion as Habermas argues.' 8 Rather it lies
at the heart of the experience of modernism.
16 Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.1974), p. 69
17 Ashis Nandy uses this term to refer to the informal settlements located in many cities
around the world today especially the developing or third world. These unintended cities as he
terms them are considered outside of history, areas that simply do not appear on any map of
the city. The work of urban sociologists has been at the forefront of this discourse for the last
three decades and is too numerous to cite here. See for example, Henri Lefebvre, The
Production of Space Donald Nicholson-Smith (trans), (Oxford: Basil Blackwell ltd, 1991);
Manuel, Castells The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social
Movements (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); David, Harvey, Social Justice
and the City (Great Britain: T.J. Press (padstow) Ltd, 1973) amongst many others.
18 Jurgen Habermas, The Incomplete Project of Modernity (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, )
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In postcolonial contexts, the choice of the city as the place from which to
represent national culture and its modernity is quite widespread. Sukarno's
Jakarta, Nehru's Chandigarh, Ataturk's Ankara are but some of the cities that
have been developed so as to celebrate the symbolic and practical power of
the nation. "Designing" national identity or becoming national through
architecture was first proposed by Larry Vale where he examined the means
by which the construction of capital cities was used in the projection of a
national identity.' 9 This theoretical framework was subsequently expanded
upon by Nezar el Sayyad who explored the connections between architectural
production and forms of domination in a variety of contexts through an edited
collection of essays.20 More recently, the "socialization" of individuals in the
forms of national culture to paraphrase from Etienne Balibar has taken center
stage.2' Following Hobsbawm and Ranger's "Invention of Tradition" thesis
and Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities both of which addressed the
constructed nature and fictionality of national cultures, these studies are
taking up his challenge and the insights offered by postcolonial scholars to
investigate the ways in which nations are invited to creatively construct and
imagine themselves and the cultural inventions they employ to do so.22 One of
the most significant books is Sibel Bozdogan's Modernism and Nation
'9 Lawrence J. Vale Architecture, Power, and National Identity (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992)
20 Nizar Al Sayyed, (ed.) Forms of Dominance: The Architecture and Urbanism of the
Colonial Enterprise, (Aldershot, Brookfield: Avebury Press, 1992)
21 Etienne Balibar "The Nation Form: History and Ideology" in Race, Nation, Class
Ambiguous Identities Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (editors), Verso, New York
(First published by Editions La Decouverte, Paris, 1988).
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Building where she explores the role of architecture and planning in the
constitution of a modem, secular and national identity in Kemalist Republican
Turkey. In this work architecture is discussed as part of a larger process of
cultural production whereby modernism was nationalized in the process of
projecting this identity.23 Of similar interest is the work of Vikramaditya
Prakash on the construction of Chandigarh as the regional capital of the
Indian portion of a now divided Punjab, and the role given to architecture and
planning in Nehru's project of defining modem Indian identity.24 More
recently the work of Abidin Kusno on Indonesia demonstrated the ways in
which the spatial deployment of asymmetrical power results in violent
exclusions that disrupt city and citizen.25
These essays augmented a growing field in the study of the impact of French
colonialism on cities of the colonies inaugurated by Anthony King and Janet
Abu Lughod both of whom traced the relationship between planning and
racial politics. 26 These were followed by two critical works by Gwendolyn
Wright and Paul Rabinow on French colonialism in North Africa and South
East Asia, and British colonialism in India by Robert Metcalf and Mark
22 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.1-14; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities
Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, (London: Verso, 1991)
23 Sibel Bozdogan Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architecture Culture in the
Early Republic (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 2001)
24 Vikramaditya Prakash, Chandigarh's Le Corbusier, The Struggle for Modernity in Post-
Colonial India, (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 2002)
25 Abidin Kusno, Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Culture in
Indonesia (London: Routledge, 2000)
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Crinson amongst others.27 In particular, the work of Gwendolyn Wright and
Paul Rabinow emphasized the ways in which colonial contexts formed an
experimental terrain for a variety of architectural and urban experiments that
could not be implemented in the Metropolis. 28 The work of David Prochaska
published a year earlier was instrumental in highlighting the role of urbanism
in violent territorial reformulation and colonial identity making in Algeria.29
The subsequent work of Zeynep Celik examined the history of building in
Algeria through plans and architecture. Even though she does not engage with
the vastly growing literature on colonialism and its implications for our
readings of architectural/urban histories, her work is valuable for its broad
sweep and comprehensive overview of the architectural projects and plans
both constructed and imagined for the country.30 Italian colonialism has also
become a topic of interest through the work of Mia Fuller and Brian
Mclaren.31 In tandem earlier world systems interest in the economic growth of
Ottoman cities and their spatial manifestation has expanded to address the
urban transformations of cities in connection to cultural innovations through
26 Anthony King, Colonial Urban Development; Culture, Social Power and Environment,
(London: Routledge, 1976); Janet Abu-Lughod, Urban Apartheid in Morocco, (Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1980)
27 Thomas Metcalf, An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain's Raj (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989); Mark Crinson Empire Building: Orientalism and Victorian
Architecture (London and New York: Routledge, 1996)
28 Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991); Paul Rabinow, French Modern Norms and Forms of the
Social Environment (Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press, 1989)
29 David Prochaska, Making Algeria French Colonialism in Bone, 1870-1920, (New York,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
30 Zeynep Celik Urban Forms and Colonial Confrontations: Algiers Under French Rule
(Berkeley and California: University of California Press, 1997).
31' Brian Lloyd Mclaren Mediterraneita and modernitd : architecture and culture during the
period of Italian colonization of North Africa (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, MIT, 2001).
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works exploring the impact of the tanzimat or 19th century reform specifically
on the cities of the provinces.3 2
In parallel the last decades of the 20 th century have seen a renewed scholarly
and academic interest in cities and citizenship. The brief displacement of the
city by the nation as a form of imagining social processes seems to be in
question. As national states have been weakened by the assaults of
globalization, the eruption in ethnic conflicts, transnational politics and the
expansion of world wide markets, city-region have been asserted as the place
from which new national and global politics would be enacted. These
phenomenon have generated increased calls for rethinking questions of cities
and citizenship particularly through the spaces of the city.33 This literature has
argued that the conflation between citizenship and nation, as the manner in
which citizenship regulates belonging to a national community, obscures the
ways in which cities "with their concentration of the nonlocal, the strange, the
mixed and the public, [...] engage most palpably in the tumult of
citizenship."34 Central to this discussion is the recognition of both the
32 Zeynep Celik, The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of An Ottoman City in the Nineteenth
Century, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1986); D. Preziosi, R. El-Haj and I.
Bierman (eds.) The Ottoman City and its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order (New
Rocchelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991); Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman and Bruce Masters
The Ottoman City between East and West: Aleppo, Izmir, and Istanbul (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,1999); Jens Hanssen, Thomas Philpp, Stefan Weber The Empire
in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late Ottoman Empire (Beirut, Orient-Institut der
DMG Beirut, 2002) For earlier work on cities of the empire undertaken by economic
historians working within a world systems view see below.
33 James Holston ed. Cities and Citizenship (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Engin F.
Isin (ed.) Democracy Citizenship and the Global City, (London, New York: Routledge, 2000).
34 Holston, ibid, p. 2
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importance of place and the relevance of citizenship as a process rather than
as simply a category that regulates belonging.
Drawing on these approaches and works on nationalism,3 5 citizenship and
colonialism this study is interested in identifying the ways in which
architecture and planning were to create a space for the citizen and the nation.
The transition of Beirut from Ottoman to French control inculcated a
transformation in its identity politics from urban citizenship to national
citizenship. While the former allowed for the cosmopolitan mix inherent to
port cities, the latter assumed a homogenous identity meant to distill and
instill a national entity. The contemporary post-civil war reconstruction drive
has seen an amalgam of national-urban citizenship that is being played out
within global conditions. My concern then is how did modifications in notions
of citizenship and belonging materialize in the fabric of the city and how did
it impact the process of identity formation? How were the disciplinary
operations of architecture and planning meant to intervene in the
cosmopolitan landscape of the city and identify the elements of a new national
entity? How was architecture's mandate of integrating unwilling individuals
into the larger national community articulated? Architecture and planning are
taken as cultural products through which the form and content of identity
making is located and contested. Underlying these questions is the idea that
national culture, as a historically specific supplement to the state, attempts to
35 Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds) Becoming national: a reader (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996) Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities; Partha Chatterjee,
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inculcate particular subjectivities in a territory as a prerequisite for
participation in the state or nation. Historically contingent, these have no
specific relationship to modernism. Through culture the fictionality of the
nation become visible. Therefore, while the fictionality of the nation and its
constructs can be easily uncovered its subjects are not as easily exposed. Here
I will try to go beyond the limitations of postcolonial theory that more often
than not sees architecture as a representation of power. The theoretical
precedence for this approach is the work of Francoise Beguin, my own 1994
dissertation, Mark Crinson and Brian Mclaren.36 In all these works, the
authors read architecture and urbanism as part of a larger set of negotiated
practices that involved local populations and practitioners as well as colonial
powers.
Becoming Modern, Becoming National
The power of national loyalty requires some transcendent
appeal... invoking "the links between the dead and the yet
unborn, the mystery of regeneration... a combined
connectedness, fortuity, and fatality in the language of
continuity. ,3 7
Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A derivative Discourse (Minneapolis, University
of Minnesota Press, 1986)
36 Crinson, ibid; Mclaren, ibid; Franois B6guin Arabisances: Decor Architectural et trace
urbain en Afrique du Nord, 1830-1040 (Paris, Dunod, 1983). Maha Yahya Forbidden Spaces
Invisible Barriers: Housing in Beirut (unpublished PhD dissertation, Architectural
Association, London, 1994). This study focused on the role of military confrontations,
population displacement and housing tenure in the reconstitution of Beirut's urban
environment during the civil war (1975-1990) and in the post-war period (1990-1994). The
basic premise of the thesis was that planning is a process of negotiation between different
political interests and that the territorial practices of both state and citizens are grounded in the
contestation of specific spaces in the city that in turn impact the eventual planning and
architectural solutions that are adopted.
37 lauren Berlant, ibid, p. 20, quoted in Eley and Suny, Becoming National, p. 24.
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A basic premise of this thesis is that central to the act of imagining a
community is a visual representation through which bodies interact with
institutions and spectators with discourses. In this framework, architecture and
planning inhabit a very public and political world- rather than a hermetically-
sealed off domain of aesthetic contemplation. Not merely visual, architecture
and planning play a principle role in the everyday life of individuals in the
city and partake in the formation of what Lauren Berlant calls the national
symbolic. She defines this "national symbolic" as
... the order of discursive practices whose reign within a
national space produces, and also refers to the law in which the
accident of birth within a geographical/political boundary
transforms individuals into subjects of a collectively-held
history. Its traditional icons, its metaphors, its heroes, its
rituals, and its narratives provide an alphabet for a collective
consciousness or national subjectivity; through the National
Symbolic the historical national aspires to achieve the
inevitability of the status of natural law, a birthright...38
What Berlant is concerned with is how the idea of the nation works, how it
creates a landscape of promise that inculcates individuals. By fantasy she says
"I mean to designate how national culture becomes local- through the images,
narratives, monuments, and sites that circulate through personal and collective
consciousness."3 9 Basically she is examining how an "iconography of the
nation" is created and then assimilated into everyday life and consciousness
so much so that its constructedness is no longer visible.
38 Lauren Berlant, ibid, reprinted in Eley and Suny, Becoming National, p. 493.
39 Ibid, p. 5.
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Visual culture, particularly art and architecture as well as urban projects are
central to the formulation and dissemination of this iconography. Architecture
functions here not only as the means through which the state constructs
national identity and the means through which individuals may then imagine
or perceive their community; they mediate that imagination and help construct
the sensibilities that underpin it. The question here becomes how is the nation
represented? How was national identity negotiated visually? How are its
origins and claims narrated through new urban edifices and spaces? How do
these edifices, in the process of constructing the nation as an idealized or
imagined community bind diverse groups and elements into a single whole
that is then presented as natural? And since, as many scholars argue, national
cultures are constructed around systems of negative distinctions, where the
positivity of the nation presumes the existence of a variety of unassimilated or
perhaps inassimilable others, what are the exclusions, inequalities, patterns of
domination and exploitation that are perpetuated? In this context, architecture
and planning form part of a larger visual culture that is understood not as a
mirror that reflects national identity but rather as an intricate setting for its
interpretation.
In the case of Beirut, architecture and urban practices are part of a much
larger visual vocabulary of the nation that emerges in the Ottoman and
mandate periods. The transformation of Beirut into the capital of a Vilaya
under the Ottomans and of a nation-state under the French assumed the need
for discursive practices that would ground citizens and territories within a
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now 'national' home. However these practices of grounding differed within
different periods. For the Ottomans, the creation of this national culture
depended to a large degree on the inculcation of Ottoman citizenship or Hubb
el Watan (love of the homeland) through a series of reforms that were
undertaken in the 1 9th century. In addition to centralizing, modernizing and
Westernizing the empire these reforms "invented" a series of public rituals
and instated a culture of visuality that would allow citizens to see the state.40
In parallel, as I will show, they instated a series of property reforms that not
only overhauled the physical fabric of the city and transformed its visual
image but profoundly altered the public/ private distinction within its spaces.
During the French mandate, seeing the state took on the additional burden of
transforming a thriving cosmopolitan city into the capital of both mandate and
nation. The search for means to achieve this contradictory objective created a
tension between the urban and the architectural, one that continues to be felt
today. The failure of planning efforts transformed architecture into the means
through which the discontinuities of the urban would be registered vertically.
Modern architecture was nationalized in a variety of ways bringing with it an
eclectic and diverse built environment that reflected competing visions of
national citizenship and the boundaries of the modem nation. In urban terms,
the reconstruction of the city center by the French mandate as capital to both
nation and colonial authorities inscribed the city within its colonial context
and reformulated citizen access to their city. In the post-civil war era,
reconstruction has focused on reinstating state authority and reconsolidating
4" Selim Deringil The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the
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the city as a national capital to both its war torn communities and to global
financial capital. Architecture was once more mandated with the task of
registering the historical continuities that urbanism was in the process of
disrupting. However changes in each of these periods should not be read as a
straight forward narrative history but rather, to paraphrase Benjamin, as
constellations of the past in the present. For, Beirut is a city that is steeped in
"ideological archaeologies.'"' Transformations in urban-architecture are not
taken as a progression of events but rather moments in which the acts of
making and contesting meaning and the situations that brought these
meanings forth are investigated in relation to their longer histories.
Unnamed Modernisms: Canonic Histories of Architectural and Urban
Modernism
The unnamed modernisms that pervade the architectural scene in Beirut, point
to a major lacuna in the study of architectural and urban modernism. One of
the last frontiers to a "spatialized history" of modernity where historians need
to speak through the "silences of history" and propose a more "critical
historiography" are canonic architectural and urban historiographies. These
historiographies are constituted by two significant absences; the geopolitical
context and the role of the non-West in the constitution of modernity and the
reciprocity between violence and planning and their joint creation of the city.
Ottoman Empire 1876-1909, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998)
41 Sunil Manghani "Picturing Berlin Piecing Together a Public Sphere" in Invisible Culture.
An Electronic Journal for Visual Culture, Issue no. 6, 2003, p. 8,
http://www.rochester.edu/in_visible_culture/Issue_6/manghani/manghani.html
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However before getting into a discussion of these absences a quick detour into
the value of this approach is necessary. A spatialized history implies its
grounding in specific contexts, times and places so as to draw attention to the
particular political, social, economic and cultural arrangements that are
implicated it the construction of this history. It also allows us to better
historicize different interpretations and manifestations of modernity, its
unnamed modernisms that are at the core of the experience of modernity. This
view from below so to speak may also alert us to different spaces of
contestation, interactions, exchange and communication where boundary
definitions were drawn and redrawn in ways that could be easily overlooked
when our understanding of architectural and urban history is focused on
hegemonic discourses and forces. It may also open up new and interesting
ways of bringing together the spatial and the political. While it is beyond the
scope of this dissertation to address all these issues, what follows is a
discussion of two constitutive absences in canonic historiographies.
Canonic/survey historiographies of Western/universal architecture and
urbanism embrace what Enrique Dussel terms as a "unilineal diachrony" of
history- that is the Greece-Rome-Europe axis now taken as a standard
traditional sequence that pervades the discourse of modernism.4 2 Tracing it
back to late eighteenth century German Romanticism, Dussel argues that few
consider this to be an ideological invention that first kidnapped Greek culture
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as exclusively Western and European and then posited both Greek and Roman
cultures as the centers of world history.43 Amongst those academics are
architectural and urban historians such as Sigfried Gideon, William Curtis,
Spiro Kostof44 and others who have employed this specific 'unilineal
diachrony' in their presentation of modern architectural/urban history. Most
"surveys" of architecture follow the same trajectory beginning with Egypt and
moving to the classical period (Greco-Roman), medieval, Renaissance, etc.
with some excursions into the "Asian" or "Islamic" world through a focus on
particular cities (Kostof) or the more recent inclusion of a few architects such
as Hassan Fathy, Charles Correa, Balkrishna Doshi amongst "the world
masters" as token representations. These histories overlook the
interconnections, the exchange, the exclusions between diverse bodies across
42 Enrique Dussel "Europe, Modernity and the Eurocentrism" in Nepantla: Views from South
(2000) 1.3 pp 465-478. He also discusses the continued slippage between Western (or
European) and universal history. See also in this respect Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe.
43 He goes on to argue that this ethnocentrism was historically impossible not only because of
the existence of other local histories of communities that extended over vast geographic areas
but also because the geopolitical location of Latin Europe at the periphery of the Euro-Afro-
Asian markets up till the 15'h century. He presents two concepts of modernity; the first he
terms as Eurocentric, provincial and regional that focuses on emancipation from immaturity
through reason thus affording humans the chance at development. The spatial and temporal
dimensions of this modernity followed Hegel's teleology in which nations are placed in a
narrative progression of development. This concept, as articulated by Habermas assumes the
three key historical events for the creation of modern subjectivity are the enlightenment, the
reformation and French revolution" to which he later suggested the addition of the English
parliament. The second concept adopts a world perspective that sees the transformation of the
world into one universal history with Latin Europe at its center so much so that by the 1 9 th
century this "modern Europe" now defined all cultures as its periphery. To overcome the
dichotomy between "abstract universality and the concrete world hegemony" and between
"rationality with an irrational praxis of violence" and "deny modernity's denial of an ethics of
responsibility" Dussel calls for a politics of what he terms as "transmodernity" a worldwide
liberal project with political, economic, ethical, erotic, religious, political and pedagogic
dimensions.
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space and time. Like the grids of modern institutions discussed by Foucault
and mocked by Borges, these histories reinforce the established hierarchies:
First the West and then the rest.
These divisions and exclusions are further reinforced in the characterizations
and discussions of modern architecture. While European modernism is
discussed in contemporary and canonic historiographies through functionalist
or avant-garde categories, imaginary geographies, myths and place images are
used to address "non-Western" modernism.4 5 In most of these canonic
historiographies, the history of colonized territories is presented as having
been tremendously influenced by imperial politics, whereas developments in
Europe are assumed to be independent of colonial processes. The icons of
modern architecture are not placed in the larger geopolitical context in which
they are produced,4 6 while the influence of the non-West on modern
architecture is not considered. In one such example, canonic historiographies
44 See Panayiota Pyla, "Historicizing Pedagogy: A Critique of Kostofs A History of
Architecture," in Journal of Architectural Education: JAE. 52, no. 4, (1999): 216 for an
insightful discussion of the problematics of "inclusion."
45 This is the case despite successive revisions of the history of architectural modernism.
Whereas first wave historians projected the architects of the Weissenhof Siedlung exhibition
as emblematic of the modem movement, second wave historians questioned the unity of this
group and of other protagonists of the period as well as the machine. Third wave historians
have certainly problematized the political connections of architecture. Perhaps now with the
fourth wave of upcoming historians this problematic may be addressed. It is certainly taking
place through the focus on exclusive cities.
I6 n one telling example, Ritu Bhatt uses the crystal palace to demonstrate the multiple
readings one can have a structure based on their subject position and their capacity for rational
evaluation. While I agree with the general gist of her argument, against the nihilism proposed
by postmodern positions that make all interpretations equally valid, I am uneasy with the
ethical implications of an argument that inadvertently justifies ignorance of repressive policies
based on the status of knowledge at the time. See Ritu Bhatt "The significance of the
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of architectural and urban modernism do not discuss the relation of
Mediterranean and Arab architecture to the Weissenhoff siedlung exhibition
which took place in Germany in 1927, as a potential source of contribution to
ideas about modernist forms.4 7 Rather than acknowledge the impact of the
"primitive" and "exotic" forms located outside the West on travelers and
artists (such as the simple white walls of the Moroccan medina on Le
Corbusier amongst others or his fascination with African masks) the
exhibition is historicized through the cilvilizational/political tug of war
between the liberals and the Nazi's who labeled it an "Arab Village" or
alternatively "a suburb of Jerusalem" and subsequently initiated a counter
exhibition across the street of pitched roof houses.4 8 Alternatively it is
presented as the moment of birth of the international style of modern
architecture.4 9 The non-Western in this context is placed in a different
Aesthetic in Postmodern Architectural Theory" in Journal of Architectural Education Volume
53, Issue 4, 2000: 229-238
47 Well into the 1950's Mediterranean architecture was considered as anonymous peasant
architecture, simple and immemorial in its landscape. See R. Banham, The New Brutalism:
Ethics or Aesthetic? (New York: Reinhold, 1966). The political uses of the Mediterranean in
architecture culture have come under close scrutiny in the last few years. See Mia Fuller
"Mediterraneanism" in Environment Design VIII no. 9/10 (1990) for a quick and an insightful
summary of its deployment in architecture culture; See Brian Mclaren Mediterraneita and
modernita ibid, for a more in-depth discussion of its use and abuse during the Italian
colonization of Libya. See Alona Nitzan Shiftan, Israelizing Jerusalem: The Encounter
Between Architectural and National Ideologies (1967-1977), (Unpublished PhD Dissertation,
MIT, 2001) p. 186-188, for its use to by Israeli architects and planners to "displace" the Arab
as custodian of the land in Israel/Palestine.
48 Pommer, Richard (summer, 1983) "The Flat Roof: A Modernist Controversy in Germany"
in Art Journal, Vol 43; See also Richard Pommer and Christian Otto, Weissenhof 1927 and
the Modern Movement in Architecture (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1991); Jordy,
William H. (Oct. 1963) "The Symbolic Essence of Modern European Architecture of the
Twenties and Its Continuing Influence" in JSAH, Vol. XXII, no.3:177-187
49 Hitchcock, H.R. and Philip Johnson (1932) The International Style, W.W. Norton, New
York; Gideon, Siegfried (1941) Space, Time and Architecture Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA; N. Pevsner, Pioneers of the Modern Movement from William Morris to
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temporality, a state of infantile consciousness in the developmental march of
history and time.
Another illustration of these essentialist categories is the orientalist city
paradigm that sought to read, interpret and write the cities of the east through
labels such as Islamic, Arab, Oriental often used interchangeably. 50 Based on
the Weberian ideal type of ancient and medieval cities, the qualities of place
in this literature was assumed to be grounded in characteristics inherent to
their "non-Western" condition such as the mosque, the suq, or the madrasa
[Islamic school]. Similarly, and prompted by the work of Gustav Von
Grunebaum, 51 dead ends and winding alleys were claimed to be a reflection of
the particular demand for privacy as outlined by the Islamic Shari'aa or
Walter Gropius, London, 1936 reprinted in 1960 as Pioneers of Modern Design, (London:
Penguin. & Harmondsworth). Successive revisions of theories of modern architecture from
the impact of technology to its relationship with nationalism etc, have yet to account for its
imperial sites of production. Amongst others see Reyner Banham, The New Brutalism: Ethics
or Aesthetic? New York: Reinhold, 1966); Theory and Design in the First Machine Age,
(Cambridge: MIT Press, Banham, 1960, 1988); Benevolo, Leonardo History of Modern
Architecture, Vols I & II, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, (1966, 1977, 1980); Peter Collins
Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture (Faber and Faber;, 1965); Charles Jencks, Modern
Movements in Architecture, (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday 1973); Theodor Adorno,
"Functionalism Today" in Oppositions 17, 1979, p.31-41; Tafuri, Manfredo Theories and
History of Architecture (New York: Harper and Row, 1980); Modern Architecture, (New
York: Rizzoli, 1986)
5" Serjeant, Robert Bertram (ed.) (1980) The Islamic city selected papers from the colloquium
held at the Middle East Centre, Faculty of Oriental Studies, (Cambridge, United Kingdom, 19
to 23 July 1976); Wirth Eugen << Villes Islamiques,villes arabes, villes orientales? Une
Probl6matique face au changement >> in Bouhdiba A., and Chevallier, D La Ville Arabe dans
L'Islam Tunis, 1982; Ira Lapidus "Muslim Cities and Islamic Societies" in Middle Eastern
Cities Ira Lapidus (ed.) (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press,
1969)
51 Islam was described as an all encompassing faith that affected all aspects of cultural and
social life including the built environment. Gustave von Grunebaum, "The Structure of the
Muslim Town," in Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition
(London: 1961), p. 141-58.
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jurisprudence, and thus an inherent characteristic of all cities placed under that
category.52 As such those studies also extrapolated qualities that were
assumed to be representative of the larger worlds they were investigating; that
is the Islamic world, the Middle Eastern world or the Arab world. As Andre
Raymond suggested through an inability to account for the particularities of
their legal, political and administrative attributes, the Arab or Islamic city is
"essentially characterized by what it is not."53 The two recent exceptions to
this trend are the Empire in the City and The Ottoman City Between East and
West. In both volumes the authors criticize the normative values taken to
imbue cities of the Arab, Islamic and/or Ottoman worlds and choose instead
to focus on specific cities of the Empire (the Arab provinces for the former
volume and Aleppo, Izmir and Istanbul for the latter) as interconnected sites
related to each other through commerce, religious, family and professional
networks, and to other civilizations and ethnicities depending on specific
historical periods (Byzantine to Ottoman). In both these volumes the cities are
52 Andre Raymond for example shows how this particular element was a feature of all
Levantine cities and not an Islamic heritage. See Andre Raymond, The Great Arab Cities in
the 16th-18th Centuries An Introduction, (New York and London: New York University
Press, 1984).
5 Andre Raymond, "Islamic City, Arab City: Orientalist Myths and Recent Reviews" in
British Journal of Middle East Studies (BJMES) 21, 1994, p. 17. Hanssen, Philpp and Weber
criticize Raymond for replacing one essentialist paradigm for another. See Hanssen et al
Empire in the City, p. 14. For further critiques of these paradigms see Samuel Stern, "The
Constitution of the Islamic City," in Albert Hourani and S. Stem, The Islamic City: A
Colloquium, (Oxford, Cassirer; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 1-30; Robert
Ilbert, "La ville islamique: ralit6 et abstraction," Les cahiers de la recherche architecturale
10/11 (1982): 6-13; Janet Abu-Lughod, "The Islamic City- Historical Myth, Islamic Essence,
and Contemporary Relevance," IJMES, 19 (May, 1987) p.155-76; Preziosi, El-Haj and
Bierman (eds.) The Ottoman City and its Parts; Eldem, Goffman and Masters The Ottoman
City between East and West
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read as repositories of hybrid cultures, claimed as a distinct feature of
Ottoman regional centers.
The Western/non-western binary is further problematized in the port city. As
part of the non-Western world these cities are also classified under the
essentialist labels of Arab, Middle Eastern or Islamic. As places for the
international exchange of goods and services, of communication and
transition, and often of ethnic and religious plurality, port cities undermine
such assumptions. Much of the dialogue on port cities in the Mediterranean,
has thus far examined these cities from a world systems perspective focusing
on the economic exchange within and between them in the 19 th century
whereby they emerge as privileged locals in a world capitalist economy. 54 As
"a subsystem of the world-economy," the Eurocentric bias of these studies
also robbed Ottoman cities of agency.55 While the specific characteristics of
different port cities are lost in this process, the perpetuation of certain myths
about the relationship of urban form to social formation becomes possible. As
"bridgeheads" to European and international capital, and as provincial centers
54 These studies have been undertaken primarily by members of the Fernand Braudel Center
for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations. See also Resat Kasba,
Caglar Keyder and Faruk Tabak, "Eastern Mediterranean Port Cities and Their Bourgeoisies:
Merchants, Political Projects, and Nation States" in Review, 10, 1(1986), p. 121-135; Caglar
Keyder, Eyup Y. Ozveren,., Donald Quataert and Gul Cagali-Guven, "Port Cities" in Review,
v. 16, 4 (Fall 1993).
55 For this criticism which emanated from within the Binghamton school see Farouk Tabak,
"Local Merchants in Peripheral Areas of the Empire: the Fertile Crescent during the long 1 9 th
century" in Review 11:2 (1988), p. 179-214. See also Janet Abu Lughod Beyond European
Hegemony: the world systems AD 1250-1350 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
For further elaboration on the role of port cities under the Ottoman Empire and criticism of
the Review group approach see Hanssen et al "Introduction" in Empire in the City p. 15-18
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to the Ottoman Empire, these cities acquired unique characteristics that
distinguished them from their surroundings.56
Examining Beirut in this context can shed some light on how cities in the non-
West need to be examined beyond essentialist labels. Described
systematically as Ottoman, Mediterranean, Port, Arab and Western, Beirut
indicates the extent to which the classificatory systems of urban
representation are unable to discuss the complexities of modernity as they
inscribe and are inscribed in cities of the region. These very same categories
are now being used to "sell" cultural heritage sites and promote international
tourism. Beirut in this context raises the question of whether the notion of the
port city as an inherently cosmopolitan city, can provide another model for
discussing cities? If so, then what are the implications when this very same
city becomes a national capital; the very embodiment of a consolidated
political entity? In architectural terms, what does the overlap between the
messy cosmopolitanism of the port city, with its own antithesis, the
universalism associated with high modernism in the Capital city, imply for
our thinking about the proclaimed "failure" of architectural modernism or its
impossibility in the city?
The longevity of this Eurocentric approach was enabled by ignoring the
geopolitical context of the development of architecture and urbanism as
56 For the specific case of Beirut see, E. Ozveren, The Making and unmaking of an Ottoman
Port-City: Beirut in the I 9th Century, (Binghampton: unpublished PhD Thesis, 1990).
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disciplines. Despite their status as "laboratories"57 canonic narratives of
architectural and urban modernism have practically written out the non-West
as one of the sites through which a modernist discourse on architecture and
urbanism was negotiated literally and metaphorically. To paraphrase from
Timothy Mitchell, the concept of historical time, the teleology of a march in
history, recaptures the histories happening overseas and returns them to the
historical home of the West. Modernism, is assumed to have a single
parentage and a unique abode; that in the West. However, since Edward
Said's seminal Orientalism and as much recent work of critical post-colonial
and subaltern studies is showing, the identity claimed by modernism is in fact
influenced by too many other sources upon which it depends and denies. To
overlook these sources requires a constant representing of the homogeneous
unity of modernity in space and time.58
Consequently, whilst canonic histories of modernism celebrate a certain idea
of history, namely the triumph of a modernist subject and the universal forms
of international modernism, they, at the same time, obscure the fundamental
geographic and political reality empowering that idea, that is the colonial sites
in which they are articulated and the full political context in which they are
elaborated, namely imperialism. 59 As Said and others have shown, the non-
West or in this specific case the colonial, is a necessary absence which in this
case allows the constitution and spatialization of a certain teleological
57 See Wright Politics of Design; Rabinow, The French Modern
58 Timothy Mitchell "The Stage of Modernity" in Questions of Modernity p. 12-13.
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narrative of architectural and urban modernism. In other words, the
imperative to constitute modernism as the highest form of cultural and
political development emanating from the West requires the suppression of its
imperial sites of production.0
More recently postmodernist and feminist theorists have also begun to take
historiographies of modern architecture to task for their exclusive focus on the
formal and aesthetic aspects of architecture whilst neglecting its less visible
role in furthering political ideologies. They argue that "architecture is not
simply a platform that accommodates the viewing subject, but rather a
viewing mechanism that produces the subject. '"61 They contend that the vision
of an autonomous architecture has been achieved through a multifaceted
approach that first de-contextualized the object from its political, social,
economic, cultural and physical context and then re-contextualized it as a
visual representation of specific formal and aesthetic characteristics. As Bhatt
59 Even as the methodologies and ideologies of architectural and urban modernism are
explored, they are not placed in the political framework from which they emerged.
60 One illustration is the rarely discussed relationship between Haussmanian planning and the
quelling of the Algerian uprising against the French occupation. The first special manual on
urban warfare, La Guerre des Rue et de Maison was produced in 1847 by the leader of the
French Forces trying to crush the insurrections in Algeria. The seven-year urban warfare that
ensued left its imprints in the wide avenues that were carved through the city of Algiers to
sustain military surveillance and movement. These principles enacted in the colonies formed
the basis for the modem planning strategies used by Baron Haussman in the 1870's as he
violently razed large parts of the city with wide boulevards and canon firing arcs in part to
consolidate the state's grip on its volatile capital. Stephen Graham, "Postmortem City:
Towards an urban geopolitics" in CITY, Vol. 8, no. 2, August, 2004. I would like to thank
Stephen Graham for making his article available to me prior to publication. See also Eyal
Weizman, Rafi Segal A Civilian Population: The Politics of Israeli Architecture (Israel, UK:
Babel, London, 2003); Scott; Seeing Like a State; Berman, M All the is Solid Melts into Air:
the experience of modernity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982)
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argues, this "complex maneuver" meant that "the conflation of the rationality
of the autonomous architectural form with utopian social agendas... has
helped mask the operation of ideological forces, such as those of capitalism
and colonialism." 62 Recent monographs focused on particular cities have
begun addressing some of these absences.63
The Violence of Development and the Politics of Erasure
The politics of erasure in canonic historiographies of modern architecture and
planning is further extended to the practice itself. The large scale destruction
entailed by modernist planning in cities around the world has been widely
discussed by a large variety of scholars from different disciplines. However,
since Marshall Berman's seminal All that is solid melts into air the impact of
architectural and urban modernism and the large-scale erasures and requisite
destruction inherent to planning, have rarely been discussed as a constitutive
element in the process of identity and place making.64 State led planning
61 "The Split Wall: Domestic Voyeurism," in Beatrice Colomina, ed., Sexuality and Space
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992), p. 83.
62 Bhatt, The significance of the Aesthetic
63 Some of the works that explore the interconnections between colony and metropole include
Jean Louis Cohen and Monique Eleb Casablanca: Colonial Myths and Architectural
Ventures (New York: Monacelli, 1998, 2002); Anne Laura Stoler and Fredrick Cooper
"Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda," in Tensions of Empire:
Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World Anne Laura Stoler and Fredrick Cooper (eds.)
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997: 1-56)
64 Marshall Berman All that is Solid Melts into Air From today's perspective this book which
seemed incredibly wide when it first came out more than 20 years ago now seems rather
constrained. Despite its continued valuable insights and the originality of its arguments, the
book ignores the connections between urban modernity and national culture it neglects the
reciprocal relationship between the shaping of cities in the colonial system and the shaping of
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whether rural or urban often entails the erasure of large tracts of land and
population resettlements in the name of renovation, modernization,
improvement of economic competitiveness etc. commonly identified as
processes of 'creative-destruction.' In colonial contexts, the economic
extraction of the territories wrought havoc on both urban and rural landscapes.
It was epitomized in Albert Sarrault's "Faustian" model of development that
gave top priority to gigantic energy and transportation projects on an
international scale and that aimed less for immediate profit than for long
range development of productive forces.65
In the city, often the site par excellence where the state would exercise its
control by any means, urban development or redevelopment is frequently
accompanied by significant urban devastation of entire places and
neighborhoods or what Anthony Vidler has termed as the "war ideology of
the plan."66 To quote Robert Moses whilst working on New York: "when you
operate in an overbuilt environment you have to hack your way through with
a meat ax. '"6 7 This planning based demolition or what has recently been
termed urbicide, or place annihilation continues in various guises in different
parts of the world; whether in the large scale demolitions of informal
urban life and culture in the modem metropole and overlooks the gender dimension of
urbanity.
65 Albert Sarrault La Mise en valeur des colonies franfaises, (Paris: Payot, 1923)
66 Anthony Vidler, "Photourbanism: Planning the city from above and below" in G. Bridge
and S. Watson (eds.) A Companion to the City, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001) p. 35-45
67 Moses quoted in Berman, ibid, p.307
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settlement, the construction of massive dams and highways.6 8 It constitutes
the seldom recognized grid of demolition that lies at the heart of our
infrastructural connectivity.69 The post-civil war reconstruction of the city of
Beirut and plans for the informal settlements in the southern suburbs of the
city are emblematic in this respect. While the city center was erased for the
second time in the twentieth century, new plans were proposed for its
southern suburbs which entail the displacement of some 50,000 individuals.
The Violence of War and the Erasures of Planning
"It is now clear that the days of the classical, Clauswitzian
definition of warfare as a symmetrical engagement between
state armies in the open field are over. War has entered the
city again-the sphere of the everyday, the private realm of
the house. "7 0
Long neglected in canonic urban and architectural histories is the reciprocal
relationship between war, cities and planning. Cities are the site of politics
6 See Stephen Graham 'Lessons in urbicide', New Left Review 19(January/February 2003), p.
63--78 for a genealogy of the word and its contemporary uses.
69 L)evelopment literature has been the most explicit about making these connections between
modernization efforts, modern planning techniques and the massive physical and social
devastation that usually follows. Amongst many others see Arturo Escobar Encountering
Development: the making and unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, c1995); Arundhati Roy, The cost of living (New York : Modem
Library, 1999); Schneider, Jane and Susser, Ida Wounded cities: destruction and
reconstruction in a globalized world (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2003); Andy Merrifield, &
Erik Swyngedouw The urbanization of injustice (Washington Square: New York University
Press, 1997) More recently artist Sze Tsung Leong visually explored and documented the
spatial consequences of rapid development in China under the title History Images at the
Storefront Gallery in New York. The images presented document the simultaneous
disappearance and appearance of entire areas sometimes even cities. As Leong says of his
images, "They are about urban erasure, historical absence, and new development of which
China may currently have some of the clearest and perhaps most extreme manifestations."
The site was accessed August 15, 2004
(http://www.storefrontnews.org/archives/2004 07_06index.html )
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while war, to quote the often touted phrase by Von Clauswitz, is a
continuation of politics by other means.7 As Paul Virilio argues "The city, the
polis, is constitutive of the form of conflict called war, just as war itself is
constitutive of the political form called the city.7 2 Lewis Mumford has argued
that the institutionalization of war, the modernity of war, was made possible
by the emergence of the city as a societal institution. It necessitated the
transformations of rituals and ceremonies into rationalized and regimented
projects of "mass extermination and mass destruction." In the process and
with increased material wealth the city also became the target of war and
imperial conquests; part and parcel of the theater of war.n3 He writes, the city
is both "the container of organized violence and a transmitter of
violence...[war continues even as it destroys because] ... the city itself in its
structures and institutions continued to give war both a durable concrete form
and a magical pretext for existence." 74
One of the first pieces to consider the destruction visited upon cities as a form
of place annihilation, was by geographer Kenneth Hewitt. In a long article
published in 1983 Hewitt considered the "mortality of places" or the impact
of the destruction visited upon European and Japanese cities during WWII.
He argued "there is . . . a direct reciprocity between war and cities... The
70 Paul Virilio, Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light (London, Continuum, 2002) p. 4
71 One of the few exceptions is Andre Picon La Ville et La Guerre (Paris: Editions de
l'inprimeur, 1996)
72 Paul Virilio Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light (London, Continuum, 2002), p.5
original emphasis
73 Lewis Mumford The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and its Prospects
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), p. 42.
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latter are the more thoroughgoing constructs of collective life, containing the
definitive human places. War is the most thorough-going or consciously
prosecuted occasion of collective violence that destroys places." 75 He went
on to show how the area bombing visited upon these cities transformed them
in the words of technicians who surveyed them into "ghost town" and lunar
landscapes."
This violence visited upon cities during wars also points to another lacuna in
the literature on modem urbanism; the connections between planning and
war. While cities are the nexus for imperial designs and civilizational
imaginaries; their institutions, buildings, industries, infrastructures etc. have
also been explicit targets for a wide variety of violent acts and orchestrated
74 [bid, p. 45&46
75 Kenneth Hewitt K. (1983) 'Place annihilation: area bombing and the fate of urban places',
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 73(2), p. 257-284. Arguing that many of
the cities bombed during WWII were not bombed because they were strategic targets but
because "they could be bombed" and that there was a deliberate targeting of the civilian
infrastructure and congested working class neighborhoods Hewitt cornered the term "place
annihilation." He also contended that the impact of "place annihilation" remains a terra
incognita across much disciplines. While post-war literature, especially of German cities, has
focused on the historic aspects of the city and not on the physical and psychosocial
discontinuity between the urban geography before and since the war, post war reconstruction
has been so astonishing that it is hard to discern the extent of the damage visited upon them
especially given the significant percentage of physical destruction in primary and secondary
cities (for example- In Germany: 33% of Berlin was destroyed and 49,000 civilian deaths;
75% of Hamburg was demolished with 55,000 civilian deaths; 59% of Dresden destroyed
with more than 100,000 civilian deaths; 89% destruction of Wurzeg and 4,200 civilian deaths;
In Japan: 44.1% of Kagoshima destroyed with 190,250 civilian deaths; 40% of Kure with
277,000 civilian deaths etc.. ). Two recent publications examining on the impact of war on
cities are Jay Winter, Jean-Louis Robert, Paul Kennedy, Antoine Prost, Emmanuel Sivan
(Editors) Capital Cities at War: Paris, London, Berlin, 1914-1919 Cambridge University
Press; New Ed edition (1999) and Hermann Knell To Destroy a City: Strategic Bombing and
Its Human Consequences in World War II (Da Capo Press; 2003). The former tries to draw a
social history of the war while the latter focuses on the history of strategic bombing and its
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attacks since antiquity. The illegibility of cities, as Scott discusses made them
targets of military surveillance, while the need to quell urban revolts coupled
with an "enlightenment aesthetic" fostered an overwhelming enthusiasm for
the straight lines and visible order of a Cartesian geometry. As Descartes
would state "These ancient cities that were once mere straggling villages and
have become in the course of time great cities are commonly quite poorly laid
out compared to those well ordered towns that an engineer lays out on a
vacant plane as it suits his fancy... " 76 Historically Mumford traces the
emergence of this aesthetic to Baroque replanning schemes that demolished
entire zones with complete disregard for social makeup or the functioning of
the city. "Long before the bulldozer... the Italian military engineer developed
through his professional specialization in destruction, a bulldozing habit of
mind: one that sought to clear the ground of encumbrances, so as to make a
clear beginning on its own inflexible mathematical lines." 7
This connection between war and the city was further elaborated upon in the
aftermath of WWI and WWII where the total bombing of total war served as
a massive accelerator of modernist urban planning, architecture and urbanism.
Architects and planners such as Le Corbusier and others saw in the damage
inflicted by WWI and WWII as unprecedented opportunities to reconstruct
impact especially in Germany and Japan. For the social history of WWI in the Middle East
see the forthcoming publication from the Orient institute.
76 Descartes, quoted in Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 55.
7 Mumford, ibid, p. 387; see also Scott, Seeing the State p. 52-83 for further discussion of the
connections between military planning and public thoroughfares. The association between
geometric precision in planning with rationality and civilization and the chaos of winding
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entire cities. In the aftermath of WWI and in consultation with former military
officers Le Corbusier drew various diagrams for his "Ville Verte" or "Green
City" where he argued that the vertical structures of his proposed skyscrapers
and the smaller plot sizes they occupied were less susceptible to aerial
bombardments. "What a gift it is to be able to sow death with bombs upon
sleeping towns" he wrote in 1935. For in the destruction of these old cities,
the modem city would rise victorious.7 8 In the face of the immense number of
homes destroyed, post war reconstruction was standardized in France. The
regionalist movement that grew in the post WWI period argued that the
destruction of the war presented an opportunity to renew local French
spirit. " 79 While regionalist ideas were to have a considerable impact on the
construction of post WWI Beirut, Michel Ecochard, a disciple of Le
Corbusier would call for an urbanism that could accommodate military needs
during WWII. Luis Sert would sound even more ominous than Le Corbusier
in his 1941 book Can our Cities Survive?, originally called Should our Cities
Survive? For others such as Walter Gropius, Lewis Mumford and other
regionalist planners in Britain and the US in the post WWI and post WWII
period respectively it was an opportunity to promote an anti-urban discourse.
They argued that the best post war reconstruction strategy would be to break
up cities into smaller communes. Many scholars even saw the bombings as
beneficial for they created unprecedented opportunities for the reconstruction
streets with the barbarity of the indigenous has been traced by Richard Sennett The
Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities (New York: Norton, 1990).
78 Le Corbusier, Aircraft, (Milan: Abitaire Segesta, 1935), p. 8-9.
79 Jean-Claude Vigato, L'Architecture Rgionaliste, (Paris: Norma editions, 1994), p. 127.
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and modernization of these cities.80 As Heweitt suggests "by referring
primarily to matters of function, system, economic theory and planning, by
working largely with government collected statistics, by abandoning the
historical emphasis of urban geography in favor of a futuristic perspective, we
have been able to ignore the destruction of WWII. The result has been to
create essentially a geography of reconstruction."81
In the last two years a small body of work namely by scholars "outside" the
field in Geography and the History of Science have begun exploring the
impact of WWI and WWII on planning as a discipline and on the re-planning
of entire regions and cities in the United States and Canada. As two articles
published in 2001 argue, lessons from the allied bombings of German and
Japanese cities and concern with the potential of a nuclear attack by the USSR
prompted American planners to advocate de-urbanization and de-
centralization as a defense mechanism. 82 The inevitability of war in the city
has been augmented by an even more pervasive militarization of urban
' For the example see Junichi Hasegawa "Governments, consultants and expert bodies in the
physical reconstruction of the City of London in the 1940s" in Planning Perspectives, 14
(1999) 121-144; see also Phil Hubbard and Lucy Faire "Contesting the modem city:
reconstruction and everyday life in post-war Coventry" in Planning Perspectives, 18 (October
2003) p. 377-397 for a revisionist view of post-war planning efforts.
Xl Hewitt, ibid, p. 277 my emphasis
- Peter Galison, "War Against the Center" in Grey Room 04, Summer 2001:6-33; Michael
Quinn Dudley, "Sprawl as Strategy: City Planners Face the Bomb" in the Journal of Planning
Education and Research 21, 2001:52-63 (the latter is an urban researcher). See also Stephen
Graham, Postmortem City. Interestingly what emerges from Galison's article is that planners
most concerned with the threat of attack were those that never experienced these attacks,
namely in North America.
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space.8 3 As Robert Warren suggests, the September 1 1 th attacks on the World
Trade Centers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington and the
subsequent "war on terrorism" has served as a prism to further intensify and
legitimize tactics that had turned vast urban areas into zones of video and
electronic surveillance.84
More recent theoretical works is expanding on these arguments to illustrate
the complicity between war [ideology] politics and planning. The work of
Stephen Graham, 85 Eyal Weizman and Rafi Segal86 has made a significant
and important contribution to this debate. While Graham takes up Virilio's
various arguments regarding the connections between cities, warfare and
violence to weave a new and interesting narrative regarding the connections
between urban renewal, the military- industrial complex and war machines
and the extent to which a military mindset is invading the everyday planning
83 See Daryl G. Press, Urban Warfare: Options, Problems And The Future, January 1999,
http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/confseries/urbanwarfare/urbanwarfare.html (Accessed
August 22, 2004) for a 1998 discussion of the inevitability of warfare in the cities.
84 Robert Warren "Situating the City and September lth: Military Urban Doctrine, 'Pop-Up'
Armies and Spatial Chess" in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research Volume
26.3 September 2002: 614-619. Since the end of the cold war a significant revision of military
urban doctrine has been taking place with the recognition that warfare would take place within
rather than above cities. This has increased efforts in the development of Military Operations
in Urbanized Terrains (MOUT) that in part have lead to the construction of miniature models
of "Islamic" cities to train soldiers for urban combat in Kabul, Baghdad, Mogadishu, perhaps
even Tehran and Damascus.
85 See Stephen Graham, Postmortem city; Stephen "Graham, Lessons in urbicide
86 This book is based on an exhibition prepared to represent Israeli Association of United
Architects at the Berlin Union Internationale des Architectes congress held in July 2002 that
was subsequently rejected by IAUA as un-Israeli. See Eyal Weizman, Rafi Segal A Civilian
Population. While this work draws out detailed outlines of the physical characteristics of the
colonization of Occupied Palestinian Territories it does not address the ways in which some of
the planning mechanisms are re-imported into Israel proper, nor does it question the
implication of such as incorporation on our study of contemporary urbanism and its histories.
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of our cities, Weizman and Segal render these connections "visible" in their
recent publication A Civilian Occupation which traces the complicity of urban
planners and architects in the colonization and settlement of Occupied
Palestinian territories.
Writing out the Colonies
The transformation of land and geography into a mobile territory that could be
made an unmade or one which is produced in the process of its destruction
was even more dramatic in colonial contexts. The devastation engendered by
the intersection of war, planning and development was more far reaching for
it not only demolished homes and urban fabrics but it also eradicated entire
ways of life. The conquest of overseas territories entailed the planned
bulldozing of indigenous cities and the large-scale appropriation of
indigenous lands so as to underpin settler control over these territories.8 7 This
devastation was further ingrained into the urban and social fabric of these
territories though extensive property reforms in which measurement
competed with memories. Mapping the land in these territories, hence
simplifying and codifying the terrain meant confronting the very aspects of
the landscape they were meant to erase; overlapping jurisdictions and use
rights, myriad property regimes, ambiguous borders based on shifting place
87 This not to say that the same processes were not employed in the West- rather the marriage
of property reform with racism in colonial contexts lead to far more devastating consequences
than ever before and whose effects continue to be felt today in various contexts, the most lucid
of which are the Palestinian territories same arguments are being made for the confiscation of
indigenous lands in the northern United States and Canada.
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names with local conceptions of history and territory. By "fixing" the
landscape military and state cartographers not only eradicated individual and
familial social memories but disconnected individuals from their own
communal histories."88 Similar arguments can be made for a wide panoply of
cities and countries across the formerly colonized world.
In more contemporary times, neo-liberal policies advocated by the World
Bank, WTO etc. have caused what Appadurai has termed in his discussion of
Karachi as the site of urban warfare, as the "implosion of global and national
politics into the urban world."8 This has lead to a series of bloody wars that
have left around 50 million displaced persons and refugees in their wake
living in what anthropologist Michel Agier terms as "between war and city."9
These refugees and internally displaced populations, predominantly from
formerly colonized countries in the third world are now part of the formation
of a novel, spatial form of city-camps that are initially created as an
8' See for example the case of Algeria in David Prochaska Making Algeria French, p. 85. See
also Janet Abu Lughod, Urban Apartheid in Morocco; Nicholas Blomley, Unsettling the City:
Urban Land and the Politics of Property (London, New York: Routledge, 2004).
89 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization Minneapolis,
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) p.152. He writes: "The situation in Karachi
today has grown both more inviolate and more implosive since 1985, and in 1995 Karachi is a
scene of civil war and ethnic violence on a par with Mogadishu, Beirut in the 1980's, and one
step short of Kabul in the past decade."
9' Michel Agier, "Between war and city: Towards an urban anthropology of refugee Camps"
in Ethnography, 2002, Vol. 3(3): 317-341. He writes, "of this number 13-18 million are
refugees in the strict sense, i.e. living outside their own country. Six million are concentrated
in Asia and 7-8 million are located in Africa to which the three million Palestinian refugees
need to be added. Another 3 million are in the process of repatriation while an estimated 25-
30 million have suffered forced displacement within their own countries as a result of internal
wars and violence. While these figures are approximate, they do not include the considerable
number of undeclared refugees (such as illegal immigrants caught as they enter Europe etc. or
Somali, Ethiopian or Rwandan refugees described as self settled..." p. 318-320.
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emergency response and generally last far beyond the phase of emergency.
They are the embodiment of a systematic global segregation in which these
"non-cities" are excluded, subjected to special laws and regimes while those
of the city withdraw into their 'gated communities.' 9
In essence what all of this is pointing to is the ways in which wars, urban
unrest and cities are defining and redefining each other in complex but not
well explored ways. However, the point of this discussion is not to
incorporate "excluded" architecture and urban histories into the canon but
rather to highlight what Said has termed as their "intertwined histories." The
aim is to show that contrary to the assumptions of Eurocentric
historiographies, the Western canon and cultural production outside the West
are not separate entities. To do so it becomes critical to underscore the
coexistence of the emancipatory gesture or potential of modernity and from a
postcolonial perspective (but also European) its mythical culture of violence.
In other words this is a call to reflect on the geopolitics and spatialization of
the production of a particular kind of knowledge 92 that guides the disciplines
of' planning and architecture and to question the meanings and modes of
cultural exchanges and interactions that shaped them. It is also a call to
91 For impact on US cities see Mike Davis, Dead Cities and other tales (New York: New
York Press, 2002). See also Teresa Caldeira, City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and
Citizenship in Sao Paulo (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). For analysis of this
inequality see Amatrya Sen Development as Freedom, (New York, Anchor, 2000); Inequality
Reexamined, (New York, Harvard University Press, 1992) For figures on disparities across
the globe and within specific nations see United Nations Development Programme; Human
Development Report 1998; Human Development Report 2000; Human Development Report
2001, (New York: Oxford University Press)
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recognize the political responsibility and complicity of architects and planners
in contemporary geopolitical strategies. At the same time, we must highlight
the coexistence of different temporalities within the present that allow for the
existence of "invisible" or "unintended" cities whilst acknowledging the
presence of the past in the present. What is of particular concern in these
instances is the slippage between the work of architecture and its politics-
between what is critical within the discipline itself and what is critical to the
cultural, political and societal environment at large. In a city like Beirut that
has witnessed 15 years of civil war these questions gain a tremendous
urgency.
Colonialism, Nationalism and Lebanese Architectural/Urban
Historiography
Beyond the immediacy of its concerns, this research will also fill several gaps
in the existing scholarship. Situated between larger disciplinary interests, this
study binds various independent strands of inquiry together through an
interdisciplinary approach that seeks to place the artifacts it is examining
within the cultural discourses in which they were conceived and proposed.
The methodology followed here is based on the belief that to write of
nationalism or even of post nationalism, hence to understand the
9 See Nelson Maldonado-Torres "The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge
Modernity, Empire, Coloniality" in CITY, VOL. 8, NO. 1, April, 2004: p. 29-56
9For example see Roger MacGinty "The pre-war reconstruction of post-war Iraq" in Third
World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 4, 2003:p. 601-617 for a critique of humanitarian development
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contemporary inscription of identity into the urban scene, demands that we
articulate the ambivalence which informs modernism, that we speak of its
dissonant inscriptions into its capital cities. It asks that we examine critically
the historic conditions in which modernism as a cultural phenomenon and
modernity as a socio-political condition emerged. These statements are not
about the crisis of the nation-state nor its history or prospects- rather it is
about the relation of this crisis to the capital city, through a reading of its
historic narratives. It is about the relationship of certain categories such as
nationalism, development, and modernization to the history of colonialism
and their contemporary possibilities.
At the theoretical level, as the question of social and cultural diversity became
more acute in contemporary politics a new approach to decolonization and the
writing of history, especially Indian history has flourished especially in
subaltern and area studies. These investigations have provided invaluable
insights into the process of colonization, decolonization, nationalization and
their concomitant identity politics. In the Middle East region at large, the
distinctions between the mandate and colony and its impact on the process of
decolonization and national identity formation in the past and today has yet to
be taken into account. 94 Much focus has been placed on the political
activities labeled alternatively as "pre-emptive reconstruction." No comparable criticism
exists to my knowledge regarding the role of planners and architects in this process.
94 One of the most recent endeavors to examine mandate politics more seriously and in a
comparative perspective is the volume produced by Nadine Mouchy and Peter Sluglett
(editors), The French and British Mandates in a Comparative Perspective (Leiden, Boston:
Brill Publishers, 2004) However it falls short of identifying the distinct characteristics of
mandate as opposed to colonial politics.
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implications of the Islamist discourse (often seen as another "global"
phenomenon) without much attention paid to its differing historical socio-
political contexts.
By positioning itself at the cusp between politics, history and
architecture/planning, this study intends to critically examine these themes
and their location in the city. Theoretically, this research will address the
scarcity of scholarship on the distinction between mandate and colony and its
impact on the constitution of the urban environment. Historically it will
benefit from the cultural turn in scholarship to present the first historiography
of' Beirut's modern urban architecture in connection to nationalism and
colonial politics. In the process it will explore the sedimented history of the
city as one "a constellation of the present in the past."
Writing on Lebanon, the constitution of Lebanese national identity and the
impact of mandate politics on its state formation has come into its own in the
last few decades. These ranged from works focused on the political, social
and economic history of Lebanon95 its establishment as an independent nation
95 Leila Fawaz's Merchants and Migrants provided one of the first monographs of the city and
quickly became an influential model for examining the urban history of cities along the
Eastern Mediterranean. She argues in this book that the relative stability of the city and its
prosperous growth during the 19th century was due to the horizontal connections between its
notables of varied religious backgrounds, thus echoing the many of the self representations of
the city by local intellectuals of the period. The eruption of sectarian violence was interpreted
through class politics and thus focused amongst the lower classes. Fawaz, Leila Tarazi,
Merchants and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1983); See also Ozveren, E., The Making and unmaking of an Ottoman Port-City:
Beirut in the 19. Century, (Binghampton: unpublished PhD Thesis, 1990) Amongst others see
also Albert Hourani, Lebanon and Syria: A Political Essay (London, 1946); Massoud Dahir,
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state under French tutelage,9 the struggle over its history97 and the history of
territories that would form this entity in the 1 9 th century. 98 More recently new
works have emerged addressing the "invention" of Lebanon as a nation99and
the interaction of sectarianism and modernism in the eventual formation of
Lebanese national identity. While Kais Firro's recent book Inventing Lebanon
delves into the role of local notables, intellectuals and historians in the
creation of this identity, Carol Hakim's unpublished dissertation The Origins
of Lebanese Nationalism is an innovative reexamination of how Lebanese
identity was cast through what she terms as mirror games; that is where ideas
were proposed by one groups, adopted and reflected by another. Asher
Kaufman's recent Reviving Phoenicia is singular in the sense that it focuses
on one group in particular and their inordinate influence on national identity
formation. ° ° Ussama Makdisi's The Culture of Sectarianism is a novel
"Some Remarks on the Growth of Beirut," in Urbanism in Islam, edited by Y. Takeshi,
(Tokyo, 1989)p. 489-512; Beirut wa Jabal Lubnan 'ala masharif al-qarn al-'ashrin, [Beirut
and Mount Lebanon on the threshold of the 2 0t'h century (Beirut: Dar al-Mada, 1986); Marwan
Buheiry Beirut's Role In The Political Economy Of The French Mandate 1919 1945 (Oxford:
Center for Lebanese studies, 1987)
96 Mir Zamir The Formation of Modern Lebanon (Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1985); Lebanon's
Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926-1939 (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997)
97 Ahmed Beydoun's Identite Confessionnelle et Temps Social chez les Historiens Libanais
Contemporains, (Beirut: Publications de l'Universit6 Libanaise, 1984); The Struggle Over
Lebanese History (Beirut: Lebanese University Publications, 1989) and Kamal Salibi's A
House of many Mansions, the History of Lebanon Reconsidered, (Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1988) remain the most significant histories on the political and social
formation of the country.
98 Leila Fawaz An occasion for war: civil conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Engin Deniz Akarli The Long Peace;
Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1920, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993)
99 Kais Firro, Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate (London,
I.B.Tauris, 2003); Carol Hakim The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea 1840-1914,
(Unpublished PhD dissertation, St. Anthony's, Oxford University, 1997).
I"Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for an Identity in Lebanon (unpublished
PhD dissertation, Brandeis University, 2000)
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examination of how contrary to current beliefs, religious sectarianism was not
a regressive reaction to the project of modernity but was rather a constitutive
part of its implementation in the region.0"' Elizabeth Thompson's Colonial
Citizens is a broad and engaging assessment of the social and political history
of the period and the constitution of a colonial civic order by both nationalism
and colonial authorities.0 2 Yet with the exception of Hourani, none of these
works have examined the place of the city in these political imaginaries. 0 3
While several historians have focused on the struggle between different
versions of history, the role of the city in constituting this "national symbolic"
and fabricating a national identity has been neglected. I will be taking his
insights on the relationship between the city and the Mountain and elaborating
upon them.
In Beirut, no theoretical investigation that places modern urban-architecture in
its political and socioeconomic context has been undertaken to date. Studies
addressing the urban and architectural history of the city can generally de
divided in three types.' 4 The first "type" of studies are those that attempt to
"read" the history of the city; that is interpret the morphological evolution of
urban space through its topographical, typological and formal dimensions.
Included in this category is the valuable work of Robert Saliba who examines
"" Ussama Makdisi The culture of sectarianism: community, history, and violence in
nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000)
1"o Elizabeth Thompson Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege and Gender
in French Syria and Lebanon (New York: Columbia University Press; 2000)
'03 Albert Hourani "Ideologies of the Mountain and the City: Reflections on the Lebanese
Civil War" in The Emergence of a Modern Middle East, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1981).
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the evolution of residential housing types in Beirut during the mandate period
and more recently the physical development of Rue Fosch and Allenby in
Beirut's historic downtown. 0 5 The paucity of material addressing the legacy
of modern architecture in Lebanon has also been recently addressed in the
much needed work of George Arbid who has produced the first analytical
examination of modern architecture in Lebanon since independence.'06
The second "type" is urban history where authors attempt to interpret the
practices of society and their impact on the physical fabric of the city. Some
of these works also try to examine patterns of representation and their
intersection with "official" ideas about the city. My own 1994 dissertation
falls within this category as it examined the territorial struggles of the state
and militias during and after the war and those of local inhabitants and their
impact on the more recent urban environment of the city.` °7 Sofia Shwayri's
examination of the urban reconstitution of the city during the war also
attempts to connect the remaking of the urban environment to the territorial
tactics of competing factions thus examining the role of disenfranchised
groups in the development of the war and its spaces.'08 Recent works that
"' This typology is modified from the one proposed by Jean Louis Cohen in his paper entitled
"Writing Urban History" at the Building City and Nation conference.
'
05Robert Saliba, Beirut 1920-1940: domestic architecture between tradition and modernity
photography by Michel Assaf, (Beirut: Order of Engineers and Architects, 1998); Beirut City
Center Recovery: The Fosch Allenby and Etoile Conservation Area, (Germany: Steidl; UK,
Thames and Hudson, 2004)
'06George Arbid Practicing Modernism in Beirut : Architecture in Lebanon,1946-1970
(unpublished dissertation, Doctorate of Design, Harvard University : 2002)
"'7 Yahya, Forbidden Spaces, Invisible Barriers
' Sofia Shwayri Beirut 1975-1990: The making and remaking of a city during civil war
(unpublished PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2002)
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address Beirut's architectural and urban heritage were written by Jad Tabet
and by May Davie. Tabet focuses on drawing a broad picture of the urban
development of the city109 while Davie's two books explore the chronological
development of Beirut's spaces and architecture." 0 While providing a wealth
of' novel and valuable information about the growth and development of
Beirut during the Ottoman and French periods, Davie does not pay sufficient
attention to the theoretical implications of this development for the city's
history and present and often attempts to read this past through the country's
more recent civil war. The influence of this work was such that Thompson,
referencing Davie would claim in her book that "French planners in
cooperation with local elites destroyed the old city and inscribed their
sectarian view of Lebanese society into quarters segregated by religion.""' A
more recent and far more ambitious attempt to write out a history of the city
has been undertaken in Samir Kassir's Beyrouth." 2 Both in a sense are trying
to create an operative history through which the causes for 2 0 th century
conflict in the country could be understood." 3 Jens Hanssen's The Effect of
Ottoman Rule on Fin de Si&cle Beirut is a richer and informative exploration
109 Jad Tabet Beyrouth, Collection "Portrait de ville" (Paris: Institut Francais d'Architecture,
2001)
O0 May Davie, L'Espace Communautaire Orthodoxe dans la Ville de Beyrouth, 1775-1850, in
Du Priv6 au Public, (Beirut: Cahiers du CERMOC 8, 1994); Beyrouth: de la Ville Ottomane
a la Ville FranCaise (Beirut: Syndicate of Architects and Engineers, 2001); Beyrouth et ses
faubourgs (1840-1940): une integration inachevie (Beirut: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches
sur le Moyen-Orient Contemporain, 1996)
"''Thompson Colonial Citizens, p. 65
112 Samir Kassir Histoire de Beyrouth (Paris : Fayard, 2003)
113 Davie infact partially attributes the civil war of Lebanon in the 1 9 th -2 0 'h century ethnic
distribution of the Beirut.
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of Beirut's social and urban history. 14 Hanssen weaves various narratives
together to give us a vivid representation of urban life in turn of the century
Beirut, historically grounded in a wide selection of primary archival research
and secondary readings.
The third type is one that attempts to place the development of the city within
a larger history of Urbanism or city/urban planning. Marlene Ghorayeb's
work on mandate Beirut falls into this category as she focuses on the theories
and methods of self conscious attempts by French urban planners to transform
the urban space of the city. Her interesting discussion of a wide range of
primary material falls short of describing the dynamics at play in the context
they were being implemented. Like May Davie, she reads the plans drawn up
for the city as a pure response to the need for "Western" models of planning
in the region. Her focus on institutional archives, specifically those of the
French mandate provided a wealth of new information of planning attempts in
the city during that period. Yet her neglect of local resources by necessity
robbed her work of a more dynamic framework through which she could
examine the implementation and implication of the projects and proposals she
was examining.' 15 More recent work by Eric Verdeil examines the modem
planners of the city since independence. Urban histories of specific areas of
the city also exist. In the aftermath of the Solidere project a series of works
114 Jens Hanssen The effect of Ottoman rule on fin de siecle Beirut: the province of Beirut,
1888-1914 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Oxford University, 2001)
15 Marlene Ghorayeb La Transformation des Structures Urbaines de Beyrouth pendant le
Mandat Francais (These de Doctorat IIIe Cycle Urbanisme et Am6nagement, Universit6 de
Paris VIII, Institut Francais d'Urbanisme, Paris, 2000)
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examining the urban, architectural and social history of the city center
emerged. 116 Of particular interest is the anthropological work of Aseel
Sawalha which even though is not an urban history, provides important
insights into the role of memory in the post-war reconstruction of the city." 7
At the same time, a few unpublished dissertations and short articles have
appeared about the development of the southern suburbs of the city by Mona
Harb, Valerie Clerc and Mona Fawaz. While Harb focuses on the southern
suburbs of Beirut and investigates plans for the development of the area
through an institutional perspective," 8 Clerc's impressive narrative of the
development of the suburbs, historically and in modern times does not reflect
on the theoretical implications of this history." 9 Fawaz examines the
interaction between informal developers and local citizens in the making of an
"informal" neighborhood Hay el Sullum also in the southern suburbs.12 0 This
study will be navigating between theses three "types" of discourses so as to
address the different theoretical gaps identified earlier.
116 Nabil Beyhum, Assem Salam, Jad Tabet 'Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah (Rebuilding
Beirut and the Lost Opportunity), (Beirut: Rami al-Khal, 1992)
"7 Aseel Sawalha Remembering the Good Old Days: The Reconstruction of Urban Space in
Post-war Beirut (Unpublished PhD dissertation, The City University of New York, 2002)
118 Harb El Kak, M 'Politiques Urbaines dans la Banlieue-Sud de Beyrouth, (Beirut: Centre
d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Moyen Orient Contemporain, 1996); Harb El Kak, M (2000)
'Po)st-War Beirut: Ressources Negotiations, and Contestations in the Elyssar Project' In: The
Arab World Geographer, Vol 3, n°4 (2000) Pp 272-288
119 Valerie Clerc, Les Principes d 'action de l'urbanisme: Le projet Elyssarface aux quartiers
irrdguliers de Beyrouth (unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Universit6 Paris 8, IFU, 2002).
120 Mona Fawaz Developers and the State: housing supply in an informal settlement of Beirut
(Unpublished PhD dissertation, MIT, 2004)
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Objectives and Outline
This dissertation will be divided into three sections that will examine the
confluence between architecture/urban culture and identity making and their
implications for our understanding of modernity in non-Western contexts
from different perspectives. In particular my inquiry focuses on the uses of
history and the modes through which it is evoked or suppressed through the
urban architecture of modern nation building in the capital city. It tries to
highlight the tensions between urban planning, the favored instrument of
national consolidation and architecture a key medium for the visual projection
of this identity in a context like Beirut where the past and present, the national
and the cosmopolitan intersect in unexpected ways. This is by no means a
claim to an objective historiography or conversely an instrumentalized
(operative) history. Rather it is an acknowledgment of a city, where more than
any other city, history is always already inscribed in a dialogical relation with
the present.
Section one of the dissertation will discuss the capitalization of Beirut and its
transformation from an insignificant port into the capital of its own Vilaya
involved in orchestrating a wide array of relationships to other parts of the
empire. It will discuss the aesthetic constitution of the "modem" Ottoman
citizen was grounded in the Empire's provincial cities, especially its port
cities. It will also explore the radical impact of changes in property rights on
the urban fabric, on the urban landscape and on redrawing the public/private
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boundaries. Set against this physical background, the second part of this
section examines the cultural and imaginative constitution of city and of
nation through the confluence of nationalist, biblical and archaeological
discourses in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. These set the scene
for the role projected for the city as both the site and medium for the
projection of national identity.
Section II will investigate the efforts instigated during the French mandate to
build city and nation and to establish the historicity of certain ideas and tropes
that continue to permeate the urban and literary imaginary of Beirut today. It
will argue that particularities of mandate as opposed to politics, the multi-
sectarian context of Lebanon and the overlapping identities of Beirut
coalesced to dictate a particular approach to urban architecture. It will contend
that despite the varied attempts to domesticate modern architecture, the urban
projects proposed and/or implemented attempted to hide the conflicts and
contradictions inherent to the formation of a national project in a
cosmopolitan context like Beirut. These generated a condition of architectural
and urban impossibility, one that continues to permeate the urban
environment today. These will be placed within the larger context of the
French mission civilisatrice.
Section III will examine the recent episodes in the urban and architectural
history of Beirut, currently the site of massive re-building efforts following
seventeen years of civil war (1975-1991). The aim of this section is not to
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discuss why a civil breakdown happened. There are too many political, social,
economic, geo-strategic conjectures (as in the creation of the nation itself).
Rather the concern is how the nation is being recreated after this breakdown
and the role that urban-architecture was seen to play in this process. It will
explore two of the urban [re]construction proposals put forth for Beirut
between 1991-1994: the first for the city center of Beirut and the second for
the southern suburbs of the city. It will contend that the exigencies of post-
civil-war nation building made evident the complex intersection of several
issues and highlighted once more the contradictory roles accorded to urban-
architecture. On the one hand, the attempt to consolidate and project a vision
of Lebanese national identity that could include different sections of the
population, and to propose urban and architectural plans reflective of this
nation state, was critically hindered by the ambivalent origins of Lebanese
nationness itself. In this instance, colonial practices and nationalist endeavors
form a specific platform from which to understand how particular paradigms
for addressing the role of architecture and urban planning in contemporary
Lebanon continue to be embedded to a certain extent in colonial practices. On
the other hand, the demands of post-civil war nation building in a global eye
generated a specific set of conditions through which the dual sides of national
identity often collided. Endeavors to project the nation, both internally and
externally, as politically and militarily stable, were used to legitimize the
state's monolithic urban interventions in different parts of the city. By
extension this discourse, also de-legitimized demands to the city by various
communities, especially the war displaced and lower income.
71
Methodology and Sources
To investigate these issues, the methodology followed by this dissertation
utilized a diverse body of local, colonial and imperial archival sources that
were cross referenced with press coverage of the period, travel guides, 1 9 th
and early 20 th century literature and memoirs. As anyone who has conducted
research on Lebanon, examining any aspect of its history can be a daunting
prospect. Fifteen years of civil wars resulted in the destruction or looting of a
significant portion of the country's archives. Many other items are only now
being brought out of storage and remain inaccessible. An impressive portion
is in private hands; either families or institutions and access to this material is
more often than not predicated on contacts and sometimes religious
background. In some instances the premises themselves are ill-suited for
archival research. I spent months occupying empty chairs in the offices of
bureaucrats kind enough to tolerate my daily presence in their offices,
specifically at the Municipality, the Port authority, the Sunni Waqfs and the
Service du Cadastre (Ministry of Finance). At the same time research into the
city's urban history requires access to a diverse body of official and unofficial
sources in Arabic, English, French and Turkish.
What further complicated this study was its wide time frame that addressed
two political periods- each of which had its own internal nuances that changed
over time. Broadly speaking the Ottoman Empire between the mid nineteenth
century and its demise at the end of WWI was not a static entity and
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underwent considerable change including the adoption of centralizing reforms
(1836, 1865), the creation and then abolition of the constitution (1876), the
restitution of the Islamic character of the state, the young Turk revolution
(1912-1913), and then its eventual demise at the end of WWI. Each of these
political moments amongst many others generated specific dynamics between
the Porte and cities of the provinces that participated, reacted, negotiated and
contested. The French mandate in Lebanon also had its own varied political
moments, some related to changed in governments and policies in the
metropole, others connected to global conditions such French-British rivalry
in the area or the global economic depression of 1929, and yet others directly
connected to the contestations and negotiations taking place locally- be they
the Syrian revolt (1925), the writing of the Lebanese constitution (1926), the
planning of the municipal elections (1930-1932) the participation or resistance
of' local bureaucrats, notables etc. in decision making or the popular
manifestations that took place in the 1930's for example. While it would be
impossible to discuss all of these changes in depth, they have been addressed
where they impacted the issues being discussed in the dissertation, namely the
role of the urban environment in reflecting, participating and representing
political changes, negotiations or contestations.
To overcome these issues an eclectic and varied number of sources were
innovatively read through and across each other in ways that could do some
justice to the complexities of the city. Institutional sources can be subdivided
in two categories; public and private. While the objectivity of such archives
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should not be taken for granted they remain invaluable for understanding the
process through which policies were implemented, the contestations and
problems faced, the solutions considered and discarded. State archives are a
valuable source of information on state sponsored urban and architectural
projects, the conflicts they generated amongst different state institutions and
their political and economic considerations.
The Prime Ministry and Yilidiz archives in Istanbul, the Archives of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE) in Paris and Nantes, the Municipal and
Port archives in Beirut were instrumental for reconstituting the ideas,
proposals and projects that would mark the city's urban and architectural
histories during the Ottoman and French periods. Imperial and mandate
archives provided a comprehensive overview of the varied concerns that
marked Ottoman and French approaches to planning the city, property reform
and the implementation of a new cadastral system that reconstituted the
physical fabric of the city and social relations within it. The French archives
in particular highlighted the extent to which the political distinctiveness of the
mandate, as opposed to outright colonies, impacted the approach and ability
of its administrators in the implementation of their urban and architectural
projects.
The rarely used municipal archives were critical for reconstituting the manner
in which spaces of contestation and negotiation were opened up in the city. In
the absence of grandiose urban plans for the city, these archives were essential
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for reconstructing the fragmented process by which the planning of Beirut
took place and the manner through which a certain architectural aesthetic was
promoted and institutionalized. They provided critical insights into local
approaches to planning and managing the urban environment, on how to
reconstruct areas demolished by the Ottomans, the difficulties and
contestations that were faced, the specific concerns that plagued attempts to
create a unified image for Beirut, and the different types of "modern"
architectural aesthetics that were considered. Without these ledgers, it would
have been near impossible to fill in the gaps in our knowledge of how Beirut's
central areas, especially the Place de L'Etoile and parliament building were
built, or to reconstruct the detailed struggle for reform of the urban
environment, the particular logic underpinning the modernization of the city,
the ways in which the aesthetic known today as mandate architecture was
propagated, and the piecemeal manner with which it was taking place.
Similarly the Port Authority archives sheds critical light on the process by
which a part of the city was privatized with the creation of the port company
in 1887 and thus on the reconstitution public/private boundaries in the city.
This process I argue set the precedent for the post civil war privatization of
the historic heart of the city. This investigation into changes in property rights
was augmented by research at the Service de Cadastre, for the maps and
documents related to the reconstitution of property rights during the mandate
period, and Archives of the Muslim and Greek Orthodox Waqfs to examine
the ways in which contestations over religious property during the mandate
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era reconstruction of the city center took place. These latter three archives
provided invaluable information on municipal practices in the reconstruction
of the city center and the ways in which this process was contested and
negotiated. Inadvertently it shed some light on the role of religious waqfs in
the constitution of secular space in the city and thus highlighted the precarious
relationship between nation and religion that marks the formation of Lebanese
national and political identity. To date I am the only researcher to have gained
access to the Sunni Waqfs archives and one of two researchers to have
examined the Municipal and Port archives.'21
The private archives of individuals complemented this attempt to understand
efforts to shape the city's urban environment and to project a national
symbolic. The private archives of Rene Danger and Michel Ecochard at the
Institut Franqaise d'Architecture (IFA), in Paris and the Aga Khan
Foundation in Geneva were important not only for yielding the only two
master plans drawn up for the city during the French mandate period, but for
illuminating the slippages between colonial and disciplinary politics that they
exhibited. Similarly, what is available of the private archives of architects
Yousef Aftimous and Charles Corm and the work of architect Antoine Tabet
were essential for elucidating the burden of different political ideas and
national ideologies that architecture was meant to carry, especially as they
related to the place of the city in the projection of national identity. These
were complemented with research at the IFEAD in Damascus and IFAPO in
121 Both researchers focused on the institutional histories of the municipality and the Port
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Beirut for particular documents related to the French mandate or to the
architects in question.
Photographs, postcards, maps, 1 9th and 20th century travelogues and
literature provided insights into the growth of the city, its physical
transformations and its location in local, imperial, national and transnational
imaginaries under Ottoman and French control. Through a discussion of the
cultural or physical environment of the city or of specific architectural and
urban proposals for Beirut, these would prove critical for understanding the
contentious relation of the city to its adjacent Mountains and subsequent
attempts to identify a national iconography. They also provided evidence that
characterizations of Beirut as well as other cities of the region, as Oriental,
Arab and Mediterranean were popularized through the travel literature long
before the discipline of urban history. At the same time, existing maps,
postcards and photographs formed a visual cartography of the city and its self
representation and presented a form of knowledge in and of the city and its
inhabitants at the same time. These images provided visual clues to the
physical transformation of the city and to the construction of public subjects
and allowed the cross correlation of projected designs and their actual
implementation.
respectively.
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Chronicles and the
Cultural Production of
Lebanon. History as a
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Map 1: Beirut Vilayati (Source: Kassir, Beyrolith, p. 116)
I have told you before: to properly see Europe, one must see Asia. All the noise, all
the systems of Paris have a pathetic air when seen from the heights of Lebanon, or
from the middle of the dessert" (Lamartine, Letter to Edward Casalis, Nov. 12, 1832
quoted by Henri Bordeaw: in Voyageurs d"Orient, :75-76 in imagining the middle
East: 149.
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he past is not a foreign country but rather a contested and
colonized domain. 122 Many historians have recognized the
centrality of history to the "idea" of the nation. As Anderson and
others have shown, nations do imagine themselves to exist in
particular relationships to the past or to specific pasts. What is not elaborated
upon is the relationship of this past to specific conceptions of history and the
implication of such conceptions for the existence of the nation.
This section is divided in two segments. The first segment will examine the
material constitution of the city of Beirut as the capital of its own Vilaya in
1888. It will examine the process of Ottomanization and the impact of the
tanzimat on creating a sense of Ottoman citizenship. To do so it will focus on
the reform of property rights, the concomitant transformation in the urban
fabric of the city and overhaul in the public/private boundaries. Using specific
examples it will show how changes in property relations in this context sheds
critical light on transformations in urban forms. These reforms, I will suggest,
laid the ground for late 20 th century urban approaches to the city. This section
will also argue that being modern during this period produced an eclectic
environment that reflected the cosmopolitan identity of a port city and its
dynamic and ever changing landscape as it pointed to its status as a provincial
capital under imperial control.
The second segment will explore the relationship between historical
representations of Lebanon's past and the conditions of their production, and
122 See David Lowenthal The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge Cambridgeshire UK:
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the place of the city, specifically the capital Beirut in these representations.
The basic premise is that the creation of new nation states out of the rubble of
the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI meant that the markers of "national"
identity and citizenship shifted dramatically. No longer citizens of a large
Empire, identities and selves had to be re-mapped onto the smaller territorial
entity and political framework of a newly founded nation state. The cultural
and political production of the nation now depended on a specific reading of
history and geography. Given Lebanon's multi-ethnic and multi-religious
population of 17 officially recognized sects, the Lebanese nation to use
Benedict Anderson's phrase, as an "imagined community," meant that this
imagination had to depend on a necessary distortion of historic "facts" as
much as a creative construction of national "truths."' 23 Without undermining
the physical and metaphorical violence entailed in the process of creating a
national identity, 24 this section will try to historicize the ways in which
disjointed stories/histories were cast into master narratives of Lebanese
identity, and thus the means through which the "historical imagination" was
culturally crafted in the period between 1860-1930.
To follow this process, this segment will trace some of the major historical
trajectories that were drawn up for the country and relate them to the
Cambridge University Press, c1985, repr. 1990).
23 The Lebanese parliament is based on a system of proportional representation of all these
different sects.
124 One of the problems with emphasizing the constructedness of national identity as Anderson
does is that the role of domination is undermined. Rather than the violence (both literal and
metaphorical) enacted in the name of national hegemony, the issue becomes a problem of
national fiction (as a creative enterprise) versus national falsehood- a self-deceptive fashioning
of community.
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conditions of their production. It will argue that in the case of Lebanon, the
past that is "known" was forged by a constellation of events and characters
both local and foreign over a period of some 60-80 years prior to the creation
of an independent nation-state in 1920. Lebanon's identity, like those of many
others depended to a great extent on a particular claim to history, to being the
subject rather than the product of that history. The nation in this context
becomes the framework through which historic events are produced but not
interrogated. What I will try to show is that the stage for twentieth century
presentations and representations of both city and nation were set at the end of
the nineteenth century through a constellation of disparate discourses that for a
variety of reasons sought to forge a distinct identity for Lebanon, as an
immutable "idea" eternally present and for Beirut as a cosmopolitan center
that radiated far beyond its geographic and territorial boundaries. As we shall
see in section II, these ideas were to have a decisive impact on the French
mandate approach to the city post WWI and continue to influence debates on
the country and city even today.
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Imperial architecture in the shadow of
modernism: The making of a capital-port city
Beirut has regained its excellence with its new Vali
And the wide smiles have dawned on its citizens '25I t was March 7 th 1888, a landmark year in the history of Beirut. Ali Reda
Pasha, the city's first governor general stood on the steps of the Grand
Srrail, the Ottoman headquarters in the city to declare the creation of
Beirut as the capital of a new Vilaya bearing its name. 2 6 Resolving
decades of urban rivalries between the cities of Damascus and Beirut based on
a decades long competition for economic resources and a sense of local and
urban patriotism, "le chauvinisme des villes," this declaration also brought to
fruition the extensive lobbying by Beiruti merchants and notables. The
boundaries of the new Vilaya included the contemporary Lebanese coastal
regions, the northern half of Palestine including the ports of Akka and Haifa as
well as a considerable stretch of Syria's coastline and hinterland, including the
port of Alexandretta (map 1).127 Jubilant Beiruti's celebrated the arrival of their
new governor general with parties and poems such as the one cited above. The
influence of the city now extended to areas far beyond the confines of
125 Abdel Ghani Effendi on occasion of the declaration of Beirut as a new Vilaya in Thamarat
al Funun [The Fruit of the Arts], March 9, 1888
126 The separation of Beirut from the Vilaya of Damascus was hotly contested by Damascene
merchants. See Hanssen Fin de Siecle Beirut p. 48-97 for details of local efforts, Ottoman
debates, general economic and political conditions and other intrigues that lead to the
establishment of Beirut as a provincial seat and capital to its own vilaya.
127 Antoine Abdel Nour, Introduction a L'histoire Urbaine de la Syrie Ottomane (XVI -XVIII
sikcle) (Beirut: Lebanese University Press 1982), p. 265-266.
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confessional, geographic, and familial connections within the city and with
Mount Lebanon. A few months earlier on June 19, 1887, a private concession
for the development of the Beirut port was granted to Joseph Mutran, an
Ottoman citizen from Baalbek. Beyond economic and physical development, it
granted Mutran and his associates the rights to own land recuperated from new
landfill operations. A few months later, the city also acquired its own
newspaper Beirut Vialyati that published in both Arabic and Ottoman.'28
Beirut's intellectual and political centrality to its region and its economic
position as a primary Ottoman port on the Empire's eastern Mediterranean
shores was finally consolidated.
The establishment of Beirut as the capital of an autonomous Vilaya under
direct imperial control was part of a larger constellation of events. The
modernizing reforms initiated by the Ottoman government throughout the
nineteenth century and which included legislative, infrastructural, ceremonial
and physical elements played an important part in the establishment of the city
as a provincial capital and in its physical and urban transformation. In tandem
the slow growth of the city itself since 1832 as a political and economic center
for European powers, its demographic expansion and the efforts of local
merchants and notables also impacted its location within the empire.
In what follows this section will draw a brief sketch of the social, economic
and urban consolidation of the city as the capital of its own Vilaya and its
128 The creation of the paper was announced on January 24, 1888 in local newspapers. It's
editor was Ahmed Effendi Pasha, the secretary of the administrative council of the vilaya. See
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position as a local site for grounding new concepts of Ottoman citizenship.
Despite the considerable social, economic and demographic impact that this
transition in the city's identity caused, this section will focus on the
architectural and urban changes initiated as part of the larger project of
Osmanlilik or the creation of Ottoman citizenship. 29 By necessity this will
serve as a sketchy outline and backdrop to discussion of the city's position in
identity debates in the following section.
Beirut: A Brief History
In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the decline in industry, the change and
expansion in traditional trade routes and functions and the global economy opened
the resources of the Ottoman Empire to Western markets. It also led to dramatic
transformations in the spatial organization of its cities. A rapid development of the
Mediterranean basin, more specifically the coastal regions took place. Cities
expanded or appeared at what Tekeli has termed as the "breaking points of the
new transportation networks."' 30 The growth of these cities signaled a change in
the balance of power relationships between cities whereby the traditional
supremacy of the inland cities was brought into question. These port cities became
the gates for French and British colonial penetration into the empire,1 31 the
Thamarat al Funun January 24, 1888.
129 It is beyond the scope of the dissertation to elaborate at length on these aspects of
capitalizing Beirut. For further information on this process see Hanssen Fin de Sicle Beirut
130 lhan Tekeli, "Evolution of Spatial Organization in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish
Republic" in From Medina to Metropolis Heritage and Cahnge in the Near Eastern City Carl
Lewis (ed.), (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1973), p. 260
"' The Growth of an internal transportation system and the delineation of areas of influence for
foreign powers became identical. Typical settlement would be a region in which the port and
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"opulent and cosmopolitan outposts of a European bourgeoisie." 132 One of those
cities was Beirut. 133
A largely insignificant port in 1830 with a population of 6,000, Beirut was a small
fortified town that covered no more than 570 meters from the harbor to its
southern gate and 370 meters from its eastern shore to its Western portal. The
central core of the city was built around its historic port flanked by two towers.
(Map 2) Its old fortifications, some dating back at least to the 10th century were
gradually eliminated during the nineteenth century and the first part of the
twentieth century. People lived and worked in the same area with neighborhoods
regulated through kinship and religious ties. The city was quite congested at a
gross density of about 300 persons per hectare. More importantly the scale of the
neighborhoods or "harat" and the overlap between work space and residential
space offered the urban dweller an intimate scale of relationships and social
networks. Physical space and social space were almost identical. In spatial terms,
houses were built close together so that their flat roofed terraces could
railway track connecting it to the hinterland would be under the control of one foreign power.
As an indication of this growth the tonnage of shipping entering the port of Beirut from 1830-
1913, rose from 40 to 1700 tons respectively. During the period of 1830-1886 alone its rose
from 50,000 to 600,000 tons. Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants p. 61. See also Carolyn Gates
The Merchant Republic of Lebanon (London, New York: Center for Lebanese Studies in
association with I.B. Tauris, 1998); Jacques de Monicault Le Port de Beyrouth et L'iconomie
des Pays du Levant sous le mandat franCais (Paris, 1936). Other cities in this network included
Alexandria, that witnessed an increase from 140 to 3500 tons of shipping through the port and
Izmir; that saw a rise from 100 to 2200 tons of shipping. Resat Kasba, Caglar Keyder and
Faruk Tabak, "Eastern Mediterranean Port Cities and Their Bourgeoisies: Merchants, Political
Projects, and Nation States" in Review, 10, 1(1986), p. 12 7 .
132 Kasba,, Keyder and Tabak, ibid p. 122
'
33Fawaz gives other reasons for the growth of Beirut; "One was security. Napoleon's
occupation of Egypt and his advance northward to Acre had demonstrated the vulnerability of
other coastal towns. Another was that, thanks to the proximity of strong rulers in the mountain,
it was a handy refuge from the corrupt rule of Ottoman governors." (Fawaz, ibid, p.25)
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communicate with one another. Urban life converged around the bazaars and suqs,
public gatherings in the Hamams (or baths) or Khans, a tradition carried through
by the Beirutis well into the twentieth century. 134
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Map 2: Beirut 1841 (Source: Davie, 1996)
With the establishment of Beirut as the political center of Mohamed Ali of Egypt's
expansion into the Ottoman Empire (1831-1840) foreign consulates began to
arrive in Beirut. 135 The first, the French consulate had already arrived in 1822, but
only became established in 1833 (when it became first rank).136 This growing
interest in Beirut was reflected in the infrastructural improvements sponsored by
foreign governments, often with the support or in collaboration with the Ottoman
134 Fawaz, ibid; Khalaf, 1993
135 See Khaled Fahmy All the Pashas Men: Mehmed AU His Army and the Making of Modern
Egypt (American University in Cairo Press, 2(02) for further details on the rule of Mohamed
Ali. See Hanssen Fin de Siecle for his impact on Beirut.
136In1832 there was an American consular representative in Beirut and in 1836 an American
consul, the French consulate officially transferred from Acre in 1837, while by the mid 1840 a
number of other consulates had either been established or upgraded (Fawaz, ibid, p. 26)
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authorities."'3 7 These transformed it into the node in the communication network of
the region.'38 In 1850 the city was described by Reverend Thompson, one of a
score of Protestant missionaries in the following manner:
Thirty years ago, the population was 5,000 and the shops and
markets were dependant for supplies on Sidon. Now there
are not less than 40,000 inhabitants and Sidon is wholly
dependant on Beirut. Thirty years ago, there was scarcely a
decent house outside the walls; now two thirds of the
population resides in the gardens, and hundreds of
convenient dwellings and not a few large and noble
mansions adorn the charming suburbs. No city in Syria,
perhaps none in the Turkish Empire, has had so rapid an
expansion, 39
In 1856, a branch of the Ottoman bank was established in Beirut.'40 French capital
controlled the investments of the bank in the Levant while the bank a key
negotiator in many development projects, would intervene on behalf of French
investors. In 1857-1863, the Beirut-Damascus road was constructed by a French
company, the 'Societ6 Imperiale de La route de Beyrouth a Damas.' Starting from
the Burj area in the city center, this highway introduced rapid communication with
the hinterland. The construction of this road is often quoted by historians as the
single most important reason for the establishment of Beirut as the main port to the
Eastern Mediterranean. By facilitating trade between the port and the hinterland it
'
37The Ottomans and Europeans established a system of "capitulations" through which
concessions to foreign trading communities provided commercial and juridical privileges in
the Empire. French investments however remained by far the largest as French investment
controlled most construction projects; their investment in the port and railways amounted to
about 168.3 million francs. See Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, p.73-76
'38 Details of this section were assembled from Fawaz Merchants and Migrants; Buheiry,
Beirut's Role;; Hallaq, Hassan Beirut el Mahrousah fi Alahd el Othmani [Beirut during the
Ottoman Era] Al Dar el Jameiah (Beirut: Al Dar al-Jami'iyya, 1987); El Wali, Tah Beirutfi al
Tarikh, wa al Hadara wa al Omran [Beirut in history, civilization and buildings] (Beirut: Dar,
el Ilm lil Malayeen, 1993).
139 William Thompson, The Land and the Book (Edinburgh and New York: T. Nelson and
Sons, 1883), p. 37
'4" Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, p.66
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ensured the domination of Beirut. In the same year, the first newspaper of the city
"Hadiqat Al-Akhbar," [The Garden of News] was published and within twenty
years there were more than two dozen journals and newspapers in circulation;
what Buheiry terms as "the pillars of the Nahda or cultural renaissance."'41 In
1870, a private waterworks company was created by a French investor, M. Tenvin,
with Ottoman Bank capital and British government investment.142 Concurrently,
foreign missionaries established schools throughout the country along with two
universities; the French St. Joseph University in 1875 and the American
University of Beirut in 1866. Arabic literature flourished as the appearance of
numerous publications and highly prolific press activity further highlighted the
importance of this new intellectual era (See Appendix I for an urban and socio-
political chronology).'4 3
With the growth of the city the municipality replaced the local administrative
council that had addressed urban development in the area until then.'44 This
council was theoretically the means for instituting a participatory politics at the
local level and reinforce the allegiance of Beiruti citizens to a larger Ottoman
empire. In Beirut, the establishment of its municipal council in 1867, one of
14' Buheiry, Beirut's Role:3
142 Fawaz, ibid, p. 7 8
143 See Marwan Buhairy, (ed.), Intellectual Life in the Arab East, 1890-1939, (Beirut: AUB
Press, 1981); Albert Hourani Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1962, 1984), and Tarif Khalidi Arabic historical thought in the classical
period (Cambridge Cambridgeshire UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
'44 See Malek Shareef Urban Administration in the late Ottoman Period: The Beirut
Municipality as a case study 1867-1908 (unpublished MA thesis, American University of
Beirut, 1998) for a detailed study of the establishment of the Beirut municipality under the
Ottomans. See also Hanssen Fin de Sicle Beirut p. 136-185 for further analysis especially of
its role and characters involved during this period.
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the first in the provinces of the empire, paved the way for its eventual founding
as the capital of an independent Vilaya bearing its name.
Figure 1 Bird' s eye view of Beirut, end of the 19th century (Source:
author's collection)
Beirut Vilayati
The establishment of the city as a provincial seat placed it under direct Ottoman
government control. The city also came to be in charge of a surface area of 30,500
square Kilometers with a population of 533,000 and 3518 villages.145 It became a
cultural, intellectual, and information center of the empire and the princi pal
entrepot of goods and political currents of the area. In 1890, the port was expanded
by the Compagnie Imperiale du Port, a French financed company in which M.
Tenvin was also involved. A Beirut train station was completed near the port in
1895 by a British- Ottoman company. An ever-expandi ng and sophisticated
network of economic, cultural, and political relations with Europe and America
and the rest of the Arab world was taking place. With its modern conlnlunications
145 Some of these villages were administered from the sub provinces of Acre, Balqa, Tripoli,
and Lattakia. See Hanssen, ibid, p. 82. See Bahgat and Tamimi, Vilayat Baina, 2 Vol., (3. cd.)
(Beirut, 1987)
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and infrastructure network, colonies of foreign businessmen and colleges which
attracted students from all over the area settled in the city. At the same time,
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the city experienced a marked
expansion in banking, money - lending, and allied services to take care of
emigrant's remittances, sericulture, the import and growing transit trade,
speculation in international stocks and shares, and ventures in real estate and
agricultural land. French influence in the economic, educational and political
spheres was paramount especially with their infrastructural investments in the
country.
With these transformations came a decisive change in the demographic
structure and the political significance of the city took place. By the end of the
century the city had grown into one of the most important cities on the Syrian
coast with a population of 120,000.' 46 Beirut served as a magnet for a transient
population of traders. New industries mushroomed as did hotels, khans and the
different amenities associated with a growing city.'47 The city was extolled in
the press for its "blessed geography" and its splendid views." It was as Khalil
Sarkis would have it "the jewel in the crown of the Padisha." In 1888, Beirut
also acquired its first guidebook, Dalil Bayrut. This guidebook which on the
surface seemed like a less overt method of registering Beirut's political
autonomy independence facilitated as Hanssen suggests a "new way of
'46 Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants, p.25
147 For example the traveler Cuinet counted in 1896 5 public baths, 10 public fountains, 6
hospitals, 50 doctors, 30 pharmacies, 30 bazaars, 30 caravanserais, 25 hotels, 3 casinos, two
circuses, 55 cafes, two public gardens, 10 public beaches, 23 police stations, 30 clockmakers,
45 jewelers, 12 photographers, 12 printing presses, 12 libraries and around 200,000 private
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imagining, of "reading" the city without actually knowing, seeing or living in
it."'48 As the author of the Dalil itself would state in the introduction to his
book, the aim was to "facilitate the connections of the local, the regional and
the distant in order to connect ... with the rest of the Empire."'4 9 Due to the
large number of Christian immigrants, especially Maronites from Mount
Lebanon escaping the civil conflicts of 1840 and 1860, the religious balance
between Muslims and Christians of the 1830's and 1840's had changed by
1890 into two thirds Christian and one third Muslim whilst Maronite presence
estimated at 10% in 1840 had doubled in the period immediately following the
massacres of 1860.15°
However, to further understand the transformations that the city was
witnessing, the establishment of Beirut as a provincial capital and its
phenomenal demographic, physical and economic growth need to be placed
within the larger reforms being undertaken in the empire.
New Cartographies of Empire
During the long nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire underwent a series of
changes that took place on several fronts simultaneously; the domestic/foreign
and the provincial/imperial. Domestically, in 1839 and 1856 a series of
homes. Vidal Cuinet Turquie d'Asie, Vol. 5 La Syrie, Liban et Palestine (Paris: Ernest Leroux,
1896), p.55-56.
'148 Hanssen, Fin de Siecle, p. 225
'
49Amin al-Khuri and Khalil al Khuri Al-Jami 'a aw Dalil Bayrut (Beirut, 1889), p. 7.
'5" Khalaf, 1993: 24; see also Fawaz, Merchants and Migrants. For details in the civil conflicts
of Mount Lebanon see Fawaz Civil Conflict; Makdisi Culture of Sectarianism
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reforms or Tanzimat were initiated. These reforms, meant to modernize,
Westernize, centralize and integrate the empire and create a sense of Ottoman
citizenship Osmanlilik or Hubb el Watan (Love of the homeland as it was
translated in Arabic),'51 publicly acknowledged the Ottoman state's
commitment to political, economic and social change whilst reaffirming the
new centralizing-Westernizing-modernizing agenda of the state. Government
administrations were reorganized both at the imperial and local levels; new
judiciary and executive councils were formed in the provincial centers creating
a stronger rapprochement between cities and central governments.
Legislations, enforced by central government reshaped cities and daily lives
with a new intensity. Building codes, property laws, health, civil records,
education, were all part of what Deringil termed as the administrative "fine
tuning" of the Empire. 152 In parallel European interest and local
entrepreneurship brought with it a series of technological developments often
financed with foreign capital. These linked different parts of the empire
through the construction of ports and railways, the establishment of regular
shipping services, the building of post and telegraph services throughout the
151 The elimination of the Janissaries in 1826 that resulted in the "beginning or the end of the
guilds" that preceded the announcement of these reforms and the declaration of the Ottoman
constitution in 1876 were equally important in this overall effort to modernize the empire.
However, while the 1839 reforms attempted to decentralize governance, the 1856 recentralized
power in the imperial port in an attempt to assert governmental control over a rapidly shrinking
imperial domain. See Shaw, J. S., Shaw, E., History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern
Turkey, 2 Vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Suraiya Farooqhi, Bruce
McGowan, Donald Quartet and Sevket Pamuk An Economic and Social History of the
Ottoman Empire Volume II 1600-1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994);
William R. Polk and Richard Chambers Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East,
(Chicago and London; Chicago University Press, 1968); Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury and
Mary Wilson The Modern Middle East (Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1993).
152 Selim Deringil The Well-Protected Domains, p. 10.
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cities of the empire, and the promotion of foreign financial institutions. These
also brought various sections of the empire closer to Europe.
One of the most significant aspects of these reforms was the initiation of an
official nationalism that was a project of modernization that strove to cohere
different groups, religious communities, regions and "above all different stages
of progress within a unified Ottoman modernity."'5 3 This official discourse
suggested the creation of an identitarian politics that superseded local, tribal,
religious, familial and other categorizations."54 As part of their overall project
to "nationalize" the empire and emphasize Ottoman citizenship or Osmanilik,
the millet system, which distinguished between members of different religious
communities, was abolished and a secular and centralized system of
administration was put in place.' 55 These were meant to transform the societies
of the different provinces and cities of the empire from ones based on local
customs to uniformly codified entities. The Gulhane Decree of 1839 for
example, gave non Muslims legal status equal to Muslims'56 and expedited the
integration of the Arab provinces into the central administration. These efforts
were exemplified in the 1869 Ottoman citizenship law that produced for the
153 Ussama Makdisi "Ottoman Orientalism" in The American Historical Review Volume 103,
no. 3, Sept, 2004, par. 20.
154 Many members of Beirut's intellectual and literary elites, such as Butrus and Salim al
Bustani who will be discussed at length in the following chapters became firm advocates of the
new Ottoman citizenship. See following chapter. See also Butrus Abu Manneh,
155 Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks; Makdisi Culture of Sectarianism for the impact on
minorities in Arab provinces.
156 Rather than strengthen the allegiance of the autonomous non-Muslim communities, to the
Ottoman state, this concession was quickly exploited by Western powers, using their newly
allocated extra territorial rights or capitulations, to promote Christian merchants as their
prot6g6s and secure tax exemptions and immunity from due process in Ottoman courts. In
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first time a juridical definition of the Ottoman citizen without any overt
reference to religion.'57 However, the projection of a modern identity depended
on its position against a provincial primordial other. Through these reform
initiatives, new cartographies of Empire were created. Fact finding missions
and inspection tours, encouraging local petitions and delegations to Istanbul,
the creation of local councils and the setting up of model provinces were used
by the central government to reorganize the principles of provincial rule and to
order and codify the empire. The world in these surveys was "enframed" as an
a priori world of objects. Put differently, the abstract space of the surveys and
the census represented the world not as a set of social relations and practices
but as a binary order into which individuals are slotted.'58 For example, under
the auspices of Sultan Abdul Hamid photographers were dispatched to
different cities in the Empire to collect photographic evidence of its newly
found modernity.' 5 9 Some of these images were to be included in the Chicago
World Fair exposition of 1893. This production of imperial knowledge about
the empire also classified populations according to religious communities and
provinces.'60 As Deringil argues, the concept of Ottomanism as a state
some of the Balkan provinces, this fact along with local discontent with the Tanzimat fostered
social unrest and the growth of nationalist movements.
157 See Makdisi Ottoman Orientalism for details on this process and its constitution of the Arab
provinces as the primitive other of civilized Ottoman/Turkish identity. See also Hasan Kayali
Arabs and Young Turks
158 See Hanssen, Fin de Siecle
159 See Ryan Picturing Empire on photographic exhibitions and empire building under the
British.
'6o Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this thesis to speculate on the impact of the new
classificatory system on the social and economic structure of the empire. See Appadurai
Modernity at Large for an interesting discussion of the impact of the British census and the
creation of the caste system in the India and Timothy Mitchell Colonizing Egypt (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1988) for the problem of enframing whereby the Western mode
of seeing served to present the world as settled and prior to a disembodied viewer. Another
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ideology tried to both "minimize the exotic" within the empire, while
"othering" provincial groups as "traditional" and "primitive" at world
exhibitions, in imperial museums and travel literature.1 6 The Empire's center
actively invented its own periphery as the non-modem.
Education was also a key component of these reforms as the nineteenth
century Ottoman Empire came into its own as an 'educator state' with a
systematic program of education/indoctrination for subjects it intended to
mould into citizens."'6 2 In the Syrian provinces and in response to the work of
foreign missionaries and schools (mainly, French, British and American) that
had arrived to the area during first half of the nineteenth century; the Ottomans
created a system of national schools that were meant to create a bulwark
against this foreign intervention. These efforts to turkify citizens of the empire
intensified after the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Education in Turkish at
the upper levels became a requirement- a move fervently opposed by Arab
nationalists in the region. However, these efforts to instill Hubb el Watan did
not extend to all sectors of the population. Peasants, laborers and minorities
were either deemed inconsequential to this project or simply outside the reach
of the state. Few non-Muslims attended the national schools; their education
and health care left mainly in the hands of the missionaries or their own
interesting question is the ways in which these issues were molded at their point of origin and
the manner in which they were implemented in the provinces which seldom one and the same
thing. It is also beyond the scope of this chapter to examine this issue.
161 Deringil Well Protected Domains
162 Deringil ibid, 1998, p. 93.
95
religious communities. Peasants and laborers were also deemed
inconsequential to state interests and left under the control of feudal elites.63
Physically, the inculcation of Hubb el Watan was to occur through a series of
"innovations" in the cultural and political landscape of the Empire through
which Ottoman citizenship was enacted, located and performed. While
comprehensive and far-reaching, the main loci for implementing these reforms
were the cities of the empire, especially its port cities. For the Ottomans these
cities functioned as a point of relay and exchange for state power emanating
from Istanbul. For Western powers these cities, especially port cities
functioned as colonial bridgeheads and the locus of trade and personal
networks that extended across the Mediterranean. '64
One of these innovations was the display of ceremonial power vital to the
project of integrating and centralizing the empire. The concept of the sultanate
was reinvented in the late nineteenth century to include many of the
163 Ottoman labor laws for example required workers to join officially endorsed guilds. They
were however forbidden from organizing against their employers. Thompson, Colonial
Citizens p. 75 See also Dringil Well Protected Domain
164 Based on Braudel's notion of the long duree and his seminal work on the history of the
Mediterranean, world systems historians proposed in a special issue of Review the notion of
the port city in the Ottoman Empire as a singular site of networks and encounters distinct form
the cities of the hinterland. They argue "port cities in the periphery emerged as locals of
contact with the capitalist economy." While valuable this view strips both local inhabitants as
well as the Ottoman state of any agency and/or role in economic, social and physical
transformations that followed in each of the port cities discussed. See Braudel, F. (1949), The
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philipp II, Vol. 1, (London:
Fontaine, 1992 (6. ed.); Quataert, D., Kasaba, R., Frangakis-Syrett, E.Gounaris, B., Keyder, C.,
Ozveren, E., "Port Cities in the Ottoman Empire" (Izmir, Patras, Salonica), in Review, op. cit.,
387-557; Martin, W. G., "The World-Systems Perspective in Perspective: Assessing the
Attempt to Move beyond Nineteenth-Century Eurocentric Conceptions," in Review 17:2
(1994), 145-185; and Hanssen, Fin de Siecle Beirut: 15-20
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ceremonials and rituals characteristics of European monarchies. These
included the creation of an Ottoman throne, the 'discovery' of the Ottoman
flag, the creation of Hamidiyeh march, etc. all of which served as "symbols of
the renewed emphasis on royal power and ceremonials"' 65 and aided citizens
in "seeing" their state. A series of commemorative rituals were also
established especially on January 9 th the Sultan's birthday or September 1st the
day of his ascension to the throne.
As part of this larger visualization of the Ottoman state, a series of new public
works project such as schools, hospitals, military barracks etc. were initiated in
diverse cities of the empire. The inauguration of these projects would often
take place on either the Sultan's birthday or the day of his ascension to the
throne. This age of reform also materialized through the increased interest of
Ottoman officials in the public image of the state. In addition to rituals,
commemorations, dress codes, official anthems and emblems etc. state
construction was also promoted around the empire as a way to assert imperial
control over its disparate territories and to reinforce the image of the state as
the source of all authority. Architectural edifices became a primary means for
asserting imperial authority around various provinces in the empire.'66
165 Deringil, Selim "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the late Ottoman Empire,
1808-1908," in Comparative Studies in Society and History 35:1 (1993): 3-29; D. Preziosi, El-
Haj, Bierman (eds.) The Ottoman City and its Parts
'66 See for example Irene Bierman's study of 16'h and 17 t'h century Crete: "The Ottomanization
of Crete" in The Ottoman city and its parts, p. 53-76.
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Figure 2 Place des Canons and Ottoman Petit Serail - 19th century (Sources: author's
collection & Ylidiz Palace)
Figure 3: Grand Serail overlooking the city: Upper right- 19th century
postcard, upper left, Military Barracks Hospital in Istanbul, lower right
entrance to the barracks 1920's, lower left the barracks today, the prime
ministry's headquarters. The last floor was added during post-war
reconstruction in the 1990's (Source: in order cited, author's collection, Ylidiz
archives, MAE Paris, author's photograph)
In Beirut local architects trained in Istanbul incorporated the language of
nationalism into their discourse to express a structurally mobile idiom both
familiar to its context and yet pointed to an allegiance beyond its immediate
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territory. They were employed to design government buildings (the Petit
S6rail- 1883), (Figures 2) military barracks (Grand Srail-1856), (Figures 3)
hospitals (1861) prisons, and secular schools (Art et M6tiers -1907), thus
transforming Beirut's architectural vernacular into one that exceeded its
territorial boundaries.16 7
The monumental size of these buildings and their strategic placements, at the
edge of the largest and most central public space in the city at the time (for the
Petit S6rail), (Figure 2) or on top of the largest hill overlooking the city (the
Grand Serail), (Figure 3) or facing the most important public park in the city
(Art et Metiers) ingrained Ottoman authority into the urban fabric of the city
and signaled the increased incorporation of the city and its identity into the
direct orbit of Ottoman influence. Often, as was the case of the Grand S6rail
they echoed the architecture of similar structures in Istanbul. 68 (Figure 3) New
public spaces, such as Al Sanayeh gardens (1907) were built outside the
historic city. These spaces became the sites for official public celebrations and
for protest as occurred during the popular riots sparked by the construction of
the tramway.
The enactment of these reforms did not mean a one-dimensional relationship
of confrontation and subversion between center and periphery. On the contrary
Ottomanization and localization coincided and mutually reinforced each
167 These architectural edifices were erected in various cities of the Empire from Aleppo to
Izmir, to Baghdad.
'68 The Grand Srail utilized similar architectural elements to the Military barracks hospital in
Istanbul.
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other. 169 "Ottomonization is taken to be "the self-consciously Ottoman process
of modernizing the provincial peripheries of the empire. Localization is the
process of utilizing the new political and architectural field of Ottoman
integration in order to carve out arenas of participation, negotiation and
subversion." 70 Particular public urban spaces came to be invested Ottoman
meanings, through parades, commemorations, military marches, music and
other kinds of state sponsored public displays.
Moreover, as Khoury, Khalidi and others have shown, being an Ottoman
during this period did not preclude the simultaneous assertion of other
identities, such Arab or Beiruti in this case. 17 One example of this process was
the construction of a clock tower near the military barracks to commemorate
Sultan Abdul Hamid's coronation in 1899. The project for this construction
was initiated by the provincial governor of Beirut in a letter sent to the Abdul
Hamid's Yildiz Palace in Istanbul requesting imperial authorization for the
construction to commence. In this letter he argued that the several foreign
institutions had established clock towers in the city (alluding to the American
University of Beirut and USJ). Conspicuously absent was a public clock for
the Muslim population of the city. As such, the letter went on "the Muslim
populations urgently need a public clock to align them within the same time
169 Hasan Kayali and Jens Hanssen make similar arguments with respect to the relationship of
center and periphery. See Kayali Arabs and Young Turks; Hanssen, ibid.
17" Hanssen, Philipp and Weber, Empire in the City, p. 12 See also Makdisi Oriental
Ottomanism
17' Hasan Kayali's Arabs and Young Turks points to the overlap rather than the succession
between notions of Ottomanism and Arabism in the identity politics of the period. See also
Rashid Khalidi, The origins of Arab nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
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frame as the rest of the Empire." After some research, the letter continued, the
municipality had found the "proper place to represent the Sultan."'72 The
construction of clock towers in the Ottoman Empire was nothing new. Since
the 17 th century various clock towers graced the landscapes of different towns
in the Balkans and Anatolia. In the Arab provinces, they were a much rarer
breed that commenced in 1865 with the construction of the Amaysa minaret
clock tower."7 3 Their intensification in the 1900-1901 period in the Syrian
provinces signaled as Hanssen argues a new Ottoman symbol of imperial
homogeneity and urban modernity. 7 4 Designed and constructed by Yusuf
Aftimous, the municipal architect of the time, the faCade of the tower included
an eclectic mix of classical and Orientalist motifs. Above the small oriental
style balconies and wooden laced doors (Musharabbiya) the clock tower
displayed 4 clock faces; 2 inscribed with Arabic numerals and 2 with Latin
numerals heralding the exact same time. It was heralded in the newspaper as
"The Arab Clock Tower "'7 5signaling that the assertion of an Arab identity did
not automatically imply secessionist tendencies.176 (Figure 4)
1991); Philip Khoury, Urban notables and Arab nationalism: the politics of Damascus, 1860-
1920 (Cambridge Cambridgeshire UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983)
172 BBA, YMTV 167/200, Sept 8, 1897 (1315)
73 Kemal Ozdemir Ottoman Clocks and Watches (Istanbul, 1993), p. 165-232.
'74 Hanssen, Fin de Si&cle, p. 247.
'75 Louis Shaykhu "Al-sa'a al-'arabiyya fi Bairut" in Al Mashreq, 2 (1899), p. 769-774.
176 ibid
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Figure 4: The Arab Clock Tower
with the Grand Serail in the
background (Source: Jens Hanssen)
The penetration and control of the daily lives of imperial citizens played an
equally critical role in the consolidation of the empire. Through imperial
legislation addressing building codes, population registration, health
legislation, tax reforms, property rights etc., those reforms reorganized and
shaped all aspects of urban live in the cities of the provinces with a new
intensity and centralized much of the decision making process in the capital
Istanbul. Reacting to mounting European interest in various parts of the empire
and the ottoman erosion of power within specific provinces such as the Syrian
provinces,l77 many of these policies initiated a process of social reform that
included the construction of schools, hospitals, the adoption of Western theater
and music amongst and the channeling of funds focused on the creation of a
In The second sets of reforms were set against the background of sectarian bloodshed in
Mount Lebanon and what he termed as the "ambiguities of the tanzimat". See Makdisi Culture
of Sectarianism for an indepth and novel account of this violence. See also Akarli, The Long
Peace; Fawaz, Civil Conflict.
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civil and bureaucratic elite located mainly in the cities.178 Many of these same
elites were then endowed with other privileges such as land grants and control
of agricultural loans.
The reforms also had a significant impact on the urban administration and
urban environment of provinces of the empire. In the long nineteenth century
the city of Beirut developed physically through a process of constant
negotiation between property owners and the municipality within the
framework of a newly created legislative system. The Ottoman building code,
developed for Istanbul in the 1860's, modified in 1880/1881 was translated
into Arabic in 1896.'79 The implementation of this code in Beirut impacted the
city's physical development particularly along new street alignments and
newly created roads. Within the existing fabric its primary impact lay in its
expropriation of properties for the expansion or realignment of roads. This
process gave a legal definition for the first time to the notion of a collective
public good. At the same time the urban development of various quarters of
the city did not take place according to a grandiose and comprehensive vision
of the municipality. Rather it was affected by the initiatives of elites and
notables.80 The openings of roads for example, especially auxiliary roads
178 See Carter Findely, Ottoman Officialdom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989);
Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire, The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1980) for the creation of a bureaucratic class in the Ottoman
Empire during the tanzimat. See Hanssen Fin de Sicle Beirut for further details on Beirut.
79 Amin Abdel Nour, 1896
18( See Ralph Bodenstein The Making and Remaking of Zoaka el Blat forthcoming for a
fascinating analysis of the development of one sector of the city from the nineteenth century
and well into the 20th. One of the critical components in the urban growth of the city that he
highlights is the long neglected role of the management of family estates in the urban
transformation of the city.
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involved lengthy negotiations between property owners who were undertaking
the construction themselves and the municipality for acquisition of formal
permissions for construction. The resistance of property owners to the
encroachment on their properties by municipal initiatives to widen roads also
resulted in a piecemeal development and challenged the new notion of public
interest under which the municipality attempted to expropriate properties. In
some instances only specific segments of the roads were widened and other
segments continued to be marked with protruding buildings.8"'
In tandem, reform of property laws gave a different institutional expression to
private property and overturned existing spatial public/private hierarchies. The
transformation in land tenure and property rights had been ongoing for the
better part of the century. The Ottoman land code implemented in 1858, was
built on a mix of legal modernization based on the Islamic Shari'a for the
purposes of taxation and regularization and existing local practices. The most
significant aspect of this land code was its "legalization" and guarantee of
existing private property. Connected to this guarantee was the legal abolition
of the musha' system. The particularity of the musha system was that an owner
of' the Musha' system was not the owner of a specific parcel with fixed
boundaries but was the owner of an inherited share or shares in the cultivable
181 According to the law, owners were only compensated if 1/4th of the property was being
expropriated. As a result many owners resisted the demolition of their facades and their
reconstruction according to new alignments. This changed when the municipality began to
compensate owners not for the land it was expropriating but for the demolition of the facades
of their buildings and their reconstruction according to the new road alignments (See BMM).
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land of the village.' 8 The musha itself has been described as "a stage of
transition between the completely communal property system... and the
completely divided property system." 'g3 Under this system, where individuals
owned abstract shares in the total village land, social relations played a crucial
role in identifying and arbitrating property relations. The percentage of these
shares was determined by a collective village decision that was dynamic and
subject to change depending on a variety of factors. Ownership and control of
land and cultivation were attested to by hand drawn bills of sale witnessed by
the local mukhtar, and the collective memory of village elders. Boundaries
were demarcated according to natural landmarks within the landscape. In other
words, notions of property ownership were socially constructed.l84 Under the
new land code article 8 stated
The whole town of a village cannot be granted in its entirety to
all of the inhabitants, nor to one or two persons chosen from
amongst them. Separate pieces are granted to each inhabitant
and a title deed is given to each showing his right of
possession.
Consequently, the implementation of the code necessitated the establishment
of ownership for every piece of property through registration or the tapu sanad
(title deeds). The impact of this act was not only simply the abolition of one
category of property ownership. Rather it was its modification of existing
practices and understandings of collective space and its introduction of a far
stricter segregation between the public and the private than previously known.
The status of land as a collective social resource was undermined.In rural
'82 Omar Razzaz, Law, Urban Land Tenure, and Property Disputes in Contested Settlements:
The Case of Jordan (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1991); Gerber, 1987;
183 Warriner, 1966:75
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areas, and as several scholars have shown, the implementation of this code
varied considerably.8 5 In urban areas, the impact was felt differently.'8 6 As
the records of the court of the Shari'a courts testify, private property
ownership was commonly practiced as early as 1843 [1259] as was the selling
and buying of land, buildings, stores, orchards etc. both within and outside the
city's boundaries.187 In other words, land located outside the cities and which
had been alternatively identified as miri (state owned), tassaruf (leasehold) or
mulk (freehold) seems to also have been accepted under the latter category.
What I would suggest is that rather than radically transform, the code
accelerated the process of privatizing property and with it the physical
transformation of the city's urban fabric and its roofscape.
'84 See also Yahya, Forbidden Spaces Invisible Barriers
'85 Martha Mundy (ed) Law and anthropology (London: Ashgate, 2002); Razzaz, Property
Disputes Cuno, Private Ownership
'6 Little or no work to date has examined the radical shifts it generated in the physical and
social fabric of urban areas. See Cuno "The Origins of Private Ownership of Land in Egypt: A
Reappraisal," in The Modern Middle East Hourani, Khoury and Wilson (eds), p. 195-228;
Roger Owen (ed.) New Perspectives in Property and Land in the Middle East (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
'87 Hassan Hallaq Al Tarikh al-ijtima 'I wa al-iqtisadi wa al-siyasi fi Bayrut wa al-vilayat al-
othmaniya fi al-qarn al tase Ashar [Social, Economic and Political History in Beirut and the
Ottoman Provinces in the 19th century] (Beirut, Al Dar al-Jami' iyya, 1987).
106
nn~ROUTH • Va.. C... trili.
Figure 5: From Flat to Pitched
Roofs: Late 19th to early 20th century
city (Source: author's collection)
Between 1850-1900 Beirut's roofscape was radically transformed from one of
flat shared roofs to a skyline marked with the red tiled pitched roofs
considered today as an index of its local identity. (Figure 5) For example the
Reverend Thompson would describe the city houses in 1850 in the following
manner
The roofs of these houses afford such a delightful promenade,
and the prospect is so beautiful, that I can scarcely keep away
from them, day or night .. .In Syrian cities the roofs are a great
comfort. The ordinary houses have no other place where the
inmates can either see the sun, 'smell the air," dry their clothes,
set out their flower pots, or do numberless other things
essential to their health and comfort. This is particularly true
within the city's walls."l88
IRX Thompson, The Land and the Book, p. 39. Thompson, in missionary fashion reads the flat
roof as an enactments of Biblical commands and a manifestation of specific verses in the
Bible.
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By the 1900's this had changes dramatically. From serving as a public
extension of individual homes Beirut's rooftops became individual entities,
markers of newly asserted identities. As Ralph Bodenstein has suggested, the
urban development of Beirut in the nineteenth century was in part affected by
urban planning and regulations. It was also impacted by the formative role of
landowning families and the micro economy of real estate management,
transforming Beirut into a series of "family townscapes."'89 The change of
Beirut's roofscape was its most striking emblem.
Privatizing the Public
In this context, granting the concession of the port area to a private company
was probably the single most strategic gesture of the imperial government in
the capitalization of Beirut and the growth of the real estate market. To expand
the port the company created landfills thereby augmenting its real estate
holdings and transforming it into a major player on the real estate scene in the
city so much so that it was able to enforce its own rules vis a vis construction
on plots it was selling. In one such incident for example, the contract of sale
between a Mr. Badawi and the port company dated May 16th, 1899 stipulated
that Mr. Badawi, the owner of the journal Al Ahwal was required to construct
on the land he was buying, within the space of 18 months, a building
comprising of a ground floor and two additional floors and to move his journal
'89 Bodenstein The Making and Remaking of Zoaka el Blat
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and its printing press onto the premises.l90 A specific architectural aesthetic
was also popularized through its own buildings and which was either an
eclectic mix of oriental and Western motifs or a purely orientalized structure.
These activities also brought it into conflict with some of the existing property
owners in the area such as Tabet family whose house was affected by these
landfills. In a lengthy exchange between them the family was forced to give up
on part of its property so as not impede access to the new port extension.191
Figure 6: Port of Beirut 1876- the crusader castle
visible on the background was destroyed by the port
authorities in the expansion of the port (Source: Ylidiz
Archive Collection)
1<Xl The area of the property was 150-200 square meters and was sold at 200 FF a square meter
paid in yearly installments over 9 years. The contract also stipulated that should the
municipality enlarge the road adjoining the property the company was not liable to Mr. Badawi
in any shape or form. PA, P6/J/1-9.
191 See PA, P6/J/46
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Map 3: Expansion of the Beirut Port with original
coastline in brown and new landfills (gridded areas)
Imperial or Colonial
The question of whether these reforms should be considered from an imperial
or colonial perspective has been a topic of considerable debate within Ottoman
studies for sometime. Briefly, I would argue that while the Empire exhibited
certain characteristics of colonialism it was nevertheless a distinct system of
rule. As the context of Beirut indicates, one of the distinguishing elements of
the imperial versus colonial context, is that modernizing reforms were
implemented equally across both the metropole and province. In other words
the center periphery relationship did not assume the periphery to be the terrain
for implementing experiments that could not be tried out in the metropole.
Similarly Ottomonization did not assume spatial segregations between
different ethnic and racial groups that occurred in French colonies. To
paraphrase from Hanssen et al rather than constitute a closed, coherent and
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clearly structured system of power, Ottoman imperialism instantiated specific
colonial situations in particular areas of the empire. Echoing Michael Adas
they suggest that one should not automatically "equate colonialism with
European expansion and European domination of overseas peoples and
cultures."' 92 The particular conditions of the Empire, its geographic reach and
different historical trajectories, the nature of center and periphery relations
generated situations where even though Ottoman imperialism did not include
"colonies" it nevertheless generated colonial situations in particular spaces, at
specific moments in time.
This is not to deny the homogenizing grip of the new centralized
administrative system. It created a far reaching order that "represented an ideal
state against which transgressions came to be measured and on the basis of
which the Ottoman state carried out its 'fine tuning.'` 93 Through a long process
of negotiation between city and Port and between the different urban actors in
the city, these reforms also succeeded in radically transforming the urban
environment of the city and with it the identity politics of its own inhabitants.
The dimensions that this took and its impact on the urban and political
imaginaries of city and nation are the topic of the next section.
'97- Hanssen, Philpp, Weber The Empire in the City, p. 7
'93 Deringil, Well Protected Domains, p. 10.
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Traveling Histories: "Imagining" the Nation into
Being
ook what we have done to the East," said Mr. du
Jouvenel, the French High Commissioner in Lebanon in
1926, to the League of Nations members, pointing to the
figure lying in the middle of the table. (figure 7) "The
situation has calmed down in Syria, the dictator is resting and in three days we
created in Lebanon a beautiful, charming republic, a wonder of its time." To
which the members responded "what a republic, well done, well done, this is
what the mandate should be." This cartoon, published in 1926, depicting the
new 6 year old nation state as a deformed child, one of many that were
published in AI Ahrar al Mosawara, a
popular weekly in Beirut, reflected
some of the local cynicism towards
both mandate politics in the newly
created nation-state and its direction.
"
Following the end of World War I, the subsequent dismantling and
subdivision of the Ottoman Empire by the allies, present day Syria and
Lebanon were both placed under French Mandate control whilst present day
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Palestine, Israel, Jordan and Iraq were placed under British control. 94 Viewed
as a compromise between the principle of self-determination and the principle
of partition, mandate authorities were officially required to "guide" all these
nations towards sovereignty, democracy and independence, regardless of their
own interests. France's claim to a mandate in Syria and Lebanon was made
through historic, cultural, economic, and military arguments.9 5 On Sept. 1st,
1920, the formation of Greater Lebanon with its expanded 'natural' frontiers
was declared by General Gouraud, the French High commissioner from the
steps of the Pine Palace in the historic city center. He stated:
It is Lebanon, our oldest and most solid friend in Syria, that we
depend upon. It is therefore in this country that General
Gouraud, in the name of the mandatory powers, wants to create
the first state of the new Syria. '96
194 President Wilson was the advocate of the principle of self determination in his 14 point
program of January 1918, while the major powers, especially Britain, France, Russia, and Italy
had already forged a series of secret agreements to subdivide the Arab provinces of the
Ottoman Empire the most famous of which was the and the Sykes Picot agreement that placed
Lebanon and Syria under French mandate. France officially received its Mandate from the
League of Nations in July of 1922. See amongst others Kamal Salibi A House of Many
Mansions:; Hourani, et al (eds)The Modern Middle East
195 One of the most persuasive factors for French control on the eve of World War I, was that
French capital amounted to 45% of all foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire while French
financiers controlled about 60% of all Ottoman debt. In Beirut, direct French financial
investment was estimated at F200 million. (Gates, Merchant Republic, p.13) The scale of
investment led to the development of an extraverted commercial activity at the expense of
local products.
'96 "L'euvre de La France en Syrie_ Le G6neral Gouraud Organisateur" in Revue Des Deux
Mondes Paris, March, 1921, p. 103
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The creation of this new state which included the semi autonomous Mount
Lebanon and sections of the previous Vilaya of Beirut; the Beqa valley and the
major coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyrel97 caused both approval
and discontent amongst locals. The political aspirations of local populations
ranged from an exclusivist Christian
nation-state to a furious defense of
an Arab Kingdom whose boundaries
included most of the present day
Arab region.
Figure 8: Sobhi Bek Haidar declaring
Baalbek an independent city-state.(Source:
Ai Ahrar ai Mosawara March 8, 1926, p. 1)
In short, at this founding moment at the end of WWI, various groups, both
Muslims and Christians imagined and "narrated" different visions for
Lebanon's future based on particular readings of its past. These ranged from
an independent Greater Lebanon in a larger Syrian federation under French
control, to an independent Arab Greater Lebanon, to simply a Greater Syria, to
even a smaller Lebanon limited to the mountains and the boundaries of the
Ottoman Mutassarifiya, amongst others (Figure 9).198 In all of these
197 Under the Ottomans various administrative divisions were used for different parts of the
provinces. Present day Lebanon was part of two different administrative systems. Mount
Lebanon, maintained its semi autonomous status as an Imara of the 17lh century Imara but its
system was transformed into a Mutassarifiyah after the conflicts of 1861. Beirut, previously
under the jurisdiction of the Vilaya of Sidon and then Damascus, became the capital of its own
Vilaya in 1888, which included territories such as such as Akka, that are divided today
amongst four independent nation states, Palestine/Israel, Jordan, Turkey and Syria (see Akarli,
Long Peace; Hakim, Origins; Salibi, Many Mansions; Zamir, Lebanon's Quest, Hanssen, Fin
de Siecle).
198 See Firro, Inventing Lebanon for an interesting summary of the various nationalisms that
existed during this period.
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alternatives, Lebanon was seen as an integral part of a larger Arab and
sometimes, Muslim entity.9 9 At the risk of gross oversimplification, while
most Maronite Christians and some Greek Orthodox Christians were in favor
of Lebanon as an independent nation-state at the end of WWI, the majority of
the Muslims, and many of the inhabitants of the coastal cities were not.200
Furthermore, as a result of these new boundaries the country now
encompassed three regions with different kinds of population and traditions of
government;
"...the region of mount Lebanon, with a population of mainly
Maronite Christians in the north and mixed Druze and
Christian in the South, the coastal cities with a mixed Muslim
and Christian population, and certain rural areas to the east and
south of Mount Lebanon where the population was mainly
Shi'i Muslim. The first of these had a long tradition of separate
administration under its own lords, and later as a privileged
district if the Ottoman empire; the second and third had been
integral parts of the Empire.201"
'99 At one end of the spectrum, figures like Najib Azury of the Ligue de La Partie Arabe would
state: "From the Tigris to the Isthmus of Suez and from the Mediterranean to the sea of Oman,
there is only one nation, the Arab nation- speaking the same language, possessing the same
historical traditions." At the other end of the spectrum, Ferdinand Tyan, projected Lebanon as
a French protectorate dating back to the period of the crusades with a hereditary Maronite
prince in control of local affairs, while Syria was to be the Algeria of the Levant. Others such
as Nadra Mutran, Shukri Ghanem, and George Samne, all politically active nationalists both
pre-and post WWI, advocated either a Syrian federation or a confederation with France.
Mutran specifically saw Lebanon as an integral part of geographic Syria sharing the same
traditions and ethnicity, a view, which was advocated by most Muslim notables such as Ali
Salam, Riad el Solh, etc. See Nadra Moutran La Syrie de demain (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1916);
George-Samn6 La Syrie prtface de Chekri Ganem (Paris: Bossard, 1920); Zamir, Lebanon's
Quest; Hakim, Origins; Beydoun, Confessional Identities; Salibi, Many Mansions; Firro,
Inventing Lebanon).
20( In declaring the formation of Greater Lebanon the French chose to ignore a 1919 American
fact finding mission that found most Lebanese and Syrian Muslims and a good portion of
Lebanon's Greek Orthodox and Druze communities opposed the French mandate. They also
disregarded the opinion of Christians and Muslims on Mount Lebanon's Administrative
Council, who had called for independence from the French only two months earlier. The
council was dissolved and its members deported (Akarli, The Long Peace, p. 161-183, Zamir
Modern Lebanon, p. 66-69).
2(1 Hourani, Albert A History of the Arab Peoples (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap University
Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 429
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A large number of Muslims had become part of the new state threatening the
objective of groups who wanted to establish Lebanon as a Christian homeland.
As for the Muslims, many, at the time advocated a union with Syria.2 2 This
process, as I shall discuss shortly, also launched what Hourani has termed as
the dominance of the ideology of the Mountain over that of the city.2 ' 3
To imagine the nation into being therefore required a certain approach to the
political, social and cultural history of the area and its population. What many
historians have argued is that Lebanon as a modern nation-state, owes its
creation primarily to the efforts of local Maronite Christians and French
travelers, missionaries and diplomats, many of whom had been seeking to
establish an independent Christian entity in the Levant since 1840.204 Travelers
and diplomats stationed in the area, such as Henri Guys and Alphonse de
Lamartine presented Mount Lebanon, a key site in trips to the Orient and the
Holy Land, as one undergoing an epic struggle for Westernization. The Orient
was constructed as a site of stagnation and despotism whose only redemption
lay in Mount Lebanon and through the Maronite community dubbed by
Lamartine as the "the only ray of light" in the east. Lamartine even went as far
as presenting the Maronites as a historic "people", even a European colony
wherein,
The Maronite people, who are either from Arab or Syrian
descent, partake in all the virtues of their clergy, and form a
2
°2see Zamir, Modern Lebanon p. 113-123 for debates around the territorial boundaries
203 Albert Hourani "Ideologies of the Mountain and the City: Reflections on the Lebanese Civil
War" in The Emergence of a Modern Middle East, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1981).
204 Hakim, Origins, Zamir, Modern Lebanon; Salibi, Many Mansions
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separate people in all of the orient: a European colony, thrown
by mistake into the midst of tribes of the desert.20 5
Through the missionaries these ideas found their way into the discourse of the
Maronite clergy as the myth of the persecuted Christians who needed Western
and specifically French help to be liberated from "Muslim, Ottoman Yoke".206
Lebanon's historiography was re-written, the political role of Lebanon's Druze
community replaced by that of the Maronites. Through the efforts of Bishop
Murad and others these views were circulated both within Lebanese and
French circles.27 As Hakim persuasively argues, "a sort of mirror-game was
established between the Maronites and these French groups whereby an idea
was launched by one of the two sides, adopted and reproduced by the other
and thus gained credibility and authority through this process of mutual
confirmation." 2 g
Imposing a politics of religious nationalism onto an Ottoman social order, lead
to a politics of sectarianism, that would profoundly affect the mountains and
205 Lamartine, 1875:405. The original text reads "Le Peuple Maronite, soit qui' il descende des
Arabes ou des Syriens, participe de toutes les vertus de son clerg6, et forme un peuple apart6
dans tout L'Orient: on dirait une colonie europ6enne jet6e par le hasard au milieu des tribus de
d6sert. "
206 However, even though this view came to dominate Maronite historiography, it does not
mean that all local historians accepted it. Different legacies of historical writing brought forth
differing interpretations of history (see Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism)
207 Nicolas Murad, Notice historique sur l'origine de la nation Maronite et sur ses rapports
avec la France, sur la nation Druze et sur les diverses populations du Mont Liban (Paris:
Cariscript, 1988 1844])
208 Hakim, Origins, p. 72; See also Chevallier, D., La Societe du Mont Liban a l'Epoche de la
Revolution industrielle en Europe, (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1971)
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its immediate regions for decades to come.209 This was reflected in a shift in
historical writing from one concerned with the notable families of the region,
to historiographies reflecting a distinct sense of communal subjecthood.210 It
also meant that Westernization in Mount Lebanon did not bring greater
secularization of public life but it's opposite. While the Ottoman authorities
were in the process of forging a sense of Ottoman citizenship by abolishing all
distinctions between the different religious groups, religion was deployed as a
metaphor for the boundaries between modern civilization and pre-modern
barbarism so as to legitimate French interference in this "backward" Islamic
context. 2 1 '
209 Makdisi, Ussama. "Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in
Lebanon" in Middle East Report, No. 200, 'Minorities in the Middle East: Power and the
Politics of Difference' (Jul. - Sep., 1996): 23-26+30.
210 This shift from a regime of notables to a new sectarian order was reflected in modes of
writing history. The work of Murad is considered one of the first teleological histories of
Mount Lebanon that addressed both foreign and local audiences reflecting an obvious sense of
subjecthood. By proposing a distinct vision of a Christian entity this work contrasted sharply
with the 1857-1859 historiography of the same period; Tannus al-Shidyaq's Kitab Akhbar al-
A'yan fi Jabal Lubnan [The Book of Information about Notable Families in Mount Lebanon],
a historical chronicle and genealogy of the notable families of Mount Lebanon many of whom
were not Christian. Salibi argues that Shidyaq's book "best represents the early stages of a
Maronite lay historiography" and regards it a point of departure for a specifically "Lebanese"
historiography. Kamal Salibi, Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon (Beirut: Nawfal, 1991
[19591), p. 161. see also Hakim, Origins Makdisi Sectarianism
211 Along with the subsequent subdivision of the mountain by the Ottoman government at the
insistence of European powers, particularly the French, into two separate and religiously
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History, Geography and the Density of Time: the limits of a historical
imaginary
While much of 1 9 th century Lebanese historiography was dominated by French
travelers and Maronite historians attempting to "prove" the uniqueness of one
community, 2 0 th century narratives reflected attempts by Lebanese historians
of different denominations to outline Lebanon's physical, geographic, ethnic,
racial, historiographic, and temporal existence in histories that sometimes
expanded beyond its geographic borders and at other times contracted into a
smaller space within this entity. The transformation of geography in the late
nineteenth century from, to quote Curzon, "a dull and pedantic discipline" to
an "essential knowledge necessary for understanding the world," played a
singular role in these struggles over history.21 2 The "origins" of a politically
identifiable Lebanon became one main source of contention- as alternate dates,
events and characteristics, such as a local rather than a foreign ruler, its semi
autonomous status under the Ottomans etc.213 were said to mark the beginning
of' the country's political existence. The formation of a modem national
identity depended on the presentation of Lebanese identity as distinct from
Syria and the rest of the Arab world and hence rooted in the particularities of
place. These demands were sustained by arguing for the continuous history of
Lebanon as a political entity since the 17th century Imara of Prince
Fakhreddine, and whose boundaries, it was claimed, coincided with those of
distinct entities following the 1840 civil war the social order of Mount Lebanon was
transformed from a regime of notables to a new sectarian order.
212 Curzon, quoted in E. Said, Orientalism, (London: Vintage, 1978), p.:215.
213 Semi autonomous here meant regional independence from immediate surrounding but still
under the control of Istanbul, the capital.
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ancient Phoenicia. 2 4 Invented historiographies and an 1861 map drawn up by
French generals following the civil conflicts of the Mountains were used to
argue for the natural boundaries of Lebanon that were "proved" to coincide
with those of ancient Phoenicia.2 1 5 Historical writing shifted from writings on
the uniqueness and singularity of one community to the singularity and
uniqueness of a geographic territory that would integrate the historical
imaginary of the communities contained within it. The geography of Mount
Lebanon, came to occupy a central role in this political and historical
imaginary, uniting or separating different groups and communities and
redefining the "state" and its proper territorial boundaries.
In general, most 20th century Lebanese historians, intellectuals and politicians
have tended to either absorb Lebanese history within a larger Arab or Islamic
context or to turn away from it in its entirety- thus keeping Arab identity and
Islam outside the boundaries of modern Lebanon's history and in the process
stripping different Lebanese areas of the "right" to a history that exceeds the
214 As Hakim persuasively argues in her Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, the re-writing
of Lebanon's historiography had begun in earnest in the aftermath the 1840 conflicts in Mount
Lebanon both in France and Lebanon. In these historiographies, the political role of Lebanon's
Druze community was written out and replaced by that of the Maronites. However, these
discourses became possible at this particular point in time as a result of changing socio-
economic realities that included the migration of Maronite peasants south into Mount Lebanon
in search of labor.
215 Beaufort, the commander in chief of the French forces stationed in Mount Lebanon after the
1860 conflict, and previously of the Egyptian army of 1830 as an aide de camp of Suleiman
Pasa, produced a plan and a map in 1861 in an elaborate report entitles Notes et
renseignements sur le pays qui doit former le gouverment du Liban and in which he argued for
a separate Lebanese entity within natural frontiers and which corresponded roughly to the
eventual boundaries drawn some 60 years later by the French and the British after WWI (see
Hakim, Origins for further details). What is also important is that he circulated this plan in
Mount Lebanon, which also became the basis for much Maronite historiography of the period.
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territorial thus state boundaries of modem day Lebanon. 216For example, Anton
Saade,21 7 argued that geography is the single most unifying factor in Lebanon's
itinerant communities and identities within its present boundaries, while Philip
Hitti2 8, one of Lebanon's foremost historians, saw in the mountains a natural
"explanation" for Lebanon's "evident" Western orientation- for these
mountains hindered connections between its inhabitants and the East leading
Jawad Bulus21 9 to state that Lebanon is an "geographic nation." On the other
hand, Mohammad Bay hum,220 who advocated a "Greater Syria" scenario,
presented the mountains of Mount Lebanon as a negative barrier between the
coast and the Syrian hinterland- "an act which defies nature and geography."
This argument was clearly apparent in a memorandum, of which Bayhum was
one of the authors, presented to the French High Commissioner in Dec. 1925.
In it the inhabitants of the areas "annexed" to Mount Lebanon demanded their
"incorporation into a Syrian Federation, arguing that "It is evident that the
2 16 Beydoun, Struggle.
217 Antun Sa 'ada, a Greek Orthodox established the National Syrian Party in 1932-1933 that
called for a secular state within the boundaries of geographic Syria. These ideas were based on
19'h century Syrian nationalist arguments that challenged both Lebanism and Arabism at the
same time. See Beydoun, ibid; Firro, Inventing Lebanon
218 Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957); idem, A
Short History of Lebanon, (New York, 1965) In additional to teaching at Columbia and
Princeton, Hitti founded the Syrian Educational Society in New York in 1916 and went on to
become one of the most renown advocates of Lebanon's Phoenician heritage. See Asher
Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: for more details.
219 Jawad Bulus a well known Lebanese historian and advocate for an independent Lebanon.
See Jawad Bulus Tarikh Lubnan (Lebanon's History), (Beirut, 1972)
220 Muhammad Bayhum was a Sunni intellectual and politician who supported the Arab
government of Emir Faycal in Damascus in 1918 was a firm exponent of the Arabist
discourse. Basing himself on archaeological discoveries, Christian Arabist intellectuals and
European historians he called for the unification of Syria and Lebanon in a multitude of
writing from the 1920's -1970's. See Muhammad, Jamil Bayhum, Lubnan bayna Musharriq
wa Mugharrib, 1920-1969 (Lebanon between Eastern and Western Orientations), (Beirut,
1969); idem 'Urfibat Lubnan (The Arabism of Lebanon), (Beirut, 1969).
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differences between these (geographic) areas cannot be eliminated... by the
creation of a state, which like its imaginary name, does not respond to either
ethnic or economic needs."221
Central to this endeavor was the question of naming, as one area- Jebel
(Mount) Lebanon- and not Beirut, the Beqa or Jebel (Mount) Amel, was
extended to absorb adjacent territories; an act that was contested by the
occupants of these contiguous territories.2 22 By giving the country its name, the
history and past of Mount Lebanon and by extension the Imara of Fakhreddine
overshadowed the identity of the new nation-state and redefined the
boundaries of historical writing for the inhabitants of regions appended to it.
Identifying the 17th century Imara of Fakhreddine as the historic predecessor
of modern Lebanon, limited the historical narratives of these communities to
their past relationship with this Imara. Furthermore, claiming Phoenician
"origins" to the boundaries of this Imara was but a return to a state prior to the
existence of the different communities that now occupied its territory. This act
of naming accorded primacy to one version of history, whilst the geographic
extension and thus history of all other sects and communities became
contained within its boundaries. Prioritizing this predominantly Maronite
version of history, guaranteed a constant struggle between the history of sect
and the history of nation in all historical writing. As Beydoun powerfully
argues, while a Maronite historian writing about one village was effectively
221 Memorandum presented by the delegation from the Areas annexed to Lebanon, to Henry de
Jouvenel, the High Commissioner, December 1925, in Zamir, Formation, p. 288 (my
translation).
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writing about the country- a Muslim historian had to choose between writing
the history of his sect or community within the territorial boundaries of the
new nation-state- or as part of a larger regional and sometimes global
narrative. In other words, Muslim narratives could only be either a history of
community or of nation- but never of both.22
The time line and density of Lebanon's history expanded and contracted
accordingly. The primacy of one version of history did not eliminate others.
This struggle was most apparent in the histories that were written by historians
and politicians of the different regions appended to Greater Lebanon, and in
which the relationship between Mount Lebanon and these regions took center
stage. 24 In these narratives, varying notions of time- hence "origin" were
played out, each presenting its own version of local identity. In the process
definitions of both state and society became ideologically contested terrains. 225
Of course not all histories of Lebanon fall into one or the other camp.
However a predominant number can be easily classified under one of these
headings. The "effect" of these histories extends far beyond the "limits" of
222 For example, the inhabitants of Jebel Amel to the south saw in this naming a "stumbling
block" in the path of independence- the independence of "geographic Syria."
22 Ahmed Beydoun, Struggle p.164
224 In his seminal The Struggle Over Lebanese History Beydoun contrasts the histories written
by leading historians, politicians and/or intellectuals originally from Mount Lebanon with
others from areas appended to it after the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920. He also
traces the relationship of these histories to the political ideologies that shaped modern
Lebanon. He maintains that historical Lebanon expands and contracts, lengthens and shortens,
not only according to the area under study but also the identity of the historian involved.
225 For example two different Lebanese history school books were written in 1935; the first
emphasizing Lebanon's position as part of the Arab world while the latter focused on the
country's particularities.
123
historical writing to draw particular and often conflicting pictures of
Lebanon's identity and the place that each of these communities has occupied
or will occupy in the future within this entity. At the same time, this struggle
over names and history is but a struggle over definitions that threaten the
existence of this entity and yet at the same time constitute it. Whilst geography
protects, unifies and crystallizes Lebanon's future identity throughout varying
historic events "in time" in one set of narratives- it breaches what is
"naturally" one in others, leaving politics- or political authority- the job of
"unifying" the different constituents of Lebanon in time and space. Here the
unity of the country and its identity is no longer in its history or political
boundaries but in its geographic contours- in nature so to speak- creating an
organic relation between the land and its people. From this perspective, the
question of Phoenician origins represents for its historians and subsequently
for the country the moment of mythological birth, the instant in which the
land's geography and its history were united, in which nature herself is
historicized and politicized, giving both history and politics a legitimacy they
had yet to acquire.
Beirut: The purveyor of modernity and the "Past" of mankind
These metaphors engaged, intertwined and in some cases originated in an
intersection of disparate nineteenth century narratives, both indigenous and
Western that included local discussions or writings about Beirut as well as
biblical and travel literature and archeological expeditions to the "Holy Land."
In most of these narratives the city was presented either as center stage to the
124
region's history of political and military conquests, and a purveyor of civility
in the Empire or as one of many sites in an eternal and timeless Orient.
Locally, the modernization and expansion of the city, discussed earlier, its
rapid incorporation into the world economy generated a discursive re-
configuration of Beirut's geographic location, historic temporality, social
attributes and economic role in both imperial and global histories. Contrary to
the assertions of some historians Beiruti notables actively sought recognition
of their city and played a significant role in shaping its future imaginary.2 26 As
early as 1865, prominent community members started petitioning the imperial
Porte in Istanbul to make Beirut the administrative seat of its own Vilaya.
Signed by more than 200 local notables and religious figures spanning the
entire social spectrum of the city, this petition presented Beirut as "a center for
commercial prosperity" in the empire. Based on its geographic location,
Beirut, it was argued, was both a "door and the commercial key" to its Syrian
hinterland. 227 In these metaphors, Beirut is the site where nature and history are
one and geographic location turns into the city's vocation as the gateway
between an interior Syrian hinterland and an external world.
With the creation of the imperial parliament in Istanbul in 1870, requests to
make Beirut the center of its own administrative entity became more
226 Several historians have argued that the transformation of Beirut into an administrative
capital was due to Ottoman recognition of the city's commercial importance on the
Mediterranean. See for example Fawaz Traboulsi, "De La Suisse Orientale au Hanoi Arabe,
une ville en qu&te des rles" in Beyrouth La Brales des Revers Jade Tabet (editor) (Paris:
6ditions Autrement, no. 127, Septembre 2001), p. 30.
227 My thanks to Jens Hanssen for making a copy of this petition available to me.
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aggressive. Adopting a novel approach, these appeals identified the boundaries
of this new unit as a coastal province, which would overlap with "ancient
Phoenicia" or "Finikye vilayeti namiyle."228 Coming in the aftermath of Ernest
Renan's 1860 Mission en Phenicie, the first serious on site study and
excavation of Phoenician cities (rather than Phoenician colonies in the
Mediterranean basin)229 this argument reflected a wider 19 th century approach
to archaeology, where under the impetus of nationalism, archeologists
abandoned their primary focus on evolution and began to concentrate on
locating the history of specific peoples through the interpretation of found
artifacts and which lead to what became known as a cultural-historical
archaeology. Unearthed archaeological sites were identified as pre-historic
manifestations of historically known people. The development and movements
228 Haqqi, T. Us (ed.) Meclis-I Mebusan Zabit Ceridesi, 1293-1877,Istanbul, 1939-1945,
quoted in Hanssen, 2001:74. Beirut however, was to wait another 10 years before it would
become the capital of its own administrative province. In the meantime, the city's progressive
incorporation into the network of primary Ottoman cities and into the orbit of an emerging
world economy and trade routes between Europe and Asia transformed it irrevocably (see
Section I and Hanssen, 2001, see appendix for details Beirut's of urban growth during this
period and its economic incorporation into European capital).
229 Ernest Renan, the author of the celebrated What is a nation? article was a celebrated
philologist and Orientalist. Taking advantage of the presence of the French Army in Mount
Lebanon following the 1860 civil unrest, he set out to compile a two volume Mission en
Phenicie. As in Egypt, the French army was put at the disposal of Renan and its soldiers
helped in the excavations. However, his excavations in the Levant differed from other French
excavations in Egypt in that he was not trying to recover an imagined imperial heritage, rather
he was attempting to unearthing a race inferior, and distinct to his own. By laying claim to the
Phoenician past, archaeological findings were used to discredit the Ottoman present and thus
laid the groundwork for "nationalistic" appropriation of this past by the future Maronites
historians. Furthermore, even though his study of Phoenician civilization was preceded by
German and French scholars such as Jean Jacques Barthelemy (1716-1795), Arnold
Heeren'(1760-1842), Francois-Charles Mover (1801-1856), his work was the most influential
in publicizing Phoenician civilization whereby his image the Mediterranean coast as an arena
that was progressively civilized from east to West by the Phoenicians came to dominate. As
Kaufman suggests, the subsequent publication of Salammb6 by Gaustave Flaubert, based in
the Phoenician colony of Carthage in 1861, a year after the return of Renan from his
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of entire groups could now be traced, studied and analyzed through
archaeological records. This activity also became closely intertwined with
biblical expeditions and missionary work.
Within Ottoman discourse, this contention by Beiruti notables came at a time
when interest in archaeological remains signified an imperial renaissance in
which claims to a pre-Islamic past were part of an Ottoman project to present
the empire as a modem scientific power and to promote a sense of Ottoman
citizenship. 230 Journals were increasingly reporting on archaeological
discoveries while the Ottoman governments went to considerable efforts to
demonstrate their interest in uncovering and sustaining significant
archaeological finds by transporting them to the capital Istanbul.23 In parallel
missionaries saw in these archaeological remains a means through which they
explorations popularized the Phoenician heritage amongst French readers (Kaufman, Reviving
Phoenicia; see also Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism).
230 Ottoman interest in archaeology was officially registered in 1884 by the promulgation, for
the first time, of an Ottoman Archaeology law, which laid out the legal foundations and
practical procedures to register finds throughout the empire. Signifying the increasing interest
of the Ottomans in the history of the lands they governed, as historic precursors to the
Empire's current 19th century splendor, this law was also part of the larger attempt by Ottoman
authorities to centralize and "modernize" the empire under the guise of the single unitary
identity of Ottomanism. See previous chapter, also see H61ne Sader, Thomas Scheffler,
Angelika Neuwirth Baalbek: Image and Monument 1898-1989 (Beirut: Orient Institut der
DMG, 1989) especially Jens Hanssen, "Imperial Discourses and an Ottoman Excavation in
Lebanon," p. 157-172 and Ussama Makdisi: "The "Rediscovery" of Baalbek: A metaphor for
Empire in the Nineteenth Century," p. 137-156.
23 For example in 1856, a year before Shidyaq started writing his book Kitab Akhbar al-A'yan
fi Jabal Lubnan the sarcophagus of Eshmonazar, the Sidonite king of the fifth century BC, was
discovered creating a big stir amongst Westerners and ottomans alike. It was transported to
Istanbul with a great deal of fanfare. These were reported upon in local journals. It is only in
this context that his chapter entitled "Mudun Lubnan al-Finiqiyya" [The Lebanese Phoenician
cities] where he describes the eight main cities of the Phoenician coast with a short historical
account of each including Beirut makes sense. See Shidyaq, 18 Lisan ul Hal,
127
could reconstitute a geographic and biblical Syria; ideas which were to have a
profound impact on some of the intellectuals of the Nahda, in particular Butrus
and Salim el Bustani whom we shall encounter shortly. 232 This interest in
archaeology also marked one of the first of many successive attempts to
"recuperate" the "past" (Phoenician in this case) into the present so as to
justify new [political] boundaries. I will come back to this shortly.
Beirut: Ruh el Asr
In this period, Beirut had also become the center of an Arab literary revival
known as al Nahda. 33 Local writers, intellectuals, merchants and the upper
bourgeoisie began to question political and cultural values in the context of
global changes generated by the industrial revolution and local transformations
resulting from the centralizing efforts of the Empire and the 1860 civil
conflicts Mount Lebanon.2 4 At the same time, the progressive modernization
232 Fruma Zachs, "Toward A Proto-Nationalist Concept Of Syria? Revisiting The American
Presbyterian Missionaries In the Nineteenth-Century Levant" in Die Welt des Islams, 2001,
Vol. 41, 2: 145-173' Kais Firro, Inventing Lebanon
33 The word Nahda means rising up, awakening and has often been translated as the Arabic
literary Renaissance or revival. A critical part of the Nahda was the foundation of numerous
journals, reviews and newspapers such as Hadiqat al Akhbar and Lisan el Hal and Al-
Muqtataf. Initially centered in Beirut, some journals, such as al-Muqtataf established in 1876,
were moved to Cairo and Alexandria out of the immediate reach of the increasingly autocratic
reign of the Ottoman Sultan Abdiilhamid. Al Muqtataf and Lisan el Hal both ran a series of
articles on archaeological discoveries and Phoenician sites between 1882-1883. See Appendix
for some of the journals founded; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age
(Cambridge University Press, England, 1962); Donald J. Cioeta, "Ottoman Censorship in
Lebanon and Syria, 1876-1908," IJMES, Vol. 10 (May 1979), p. 167-181; See Kaufman,
Reviving Phoenicia.
234 Following the 1860 civil conflict in Mount Lebanon these writings started to acquire more
political overtones. Butrus al Bustani, for example one of the most notable intellectuals of his
time, attributes his engagement in politics in Nafir Suriyah precisely to these events. Butrus al-
Bustani also established the first secular school in Southwest Asia, named al-madrasa al-
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of the city became a dominant concern of local newspapers with daily or
weekly columns dedicated to municipal affairs and the physical
transformations of its urban fabric.235 Technological innovations, scientific
inventions, the physical regularization of the city's fabric and a call to
urbanity, often conflated with civility, were celebrated as the emblems of
belonging to al asr el jadid (the new era), the signs of ruh el asr (the spirit of
the epoch). Intellectuals and writers, immersed in the spirit of this new or
modern age that was sweeping through the empire of which the administrative
reforms or the tanzimat were the most emblematic, expounded on the new
zeitgeist in Beirut. The role of the city as the center of civility and identity in
its immediate regional and larger geo-political context became an object of
scrutiny in local literary imaginaries.
One of the first such articles was written by Salim al-Bustani, a pillar of this
cultural renaissance or nahda and the editor of al Jinan a local newspaper.236
In Beirut Markazuna (our center or position), published as an editorial in al-
Jinan in 1872, al-Bustani delineates a new economic role for the city by
placing it within the temporal time frame of imperial history and geopolitical
transformations. He begins by outlining the geographic centrality of Beirut in
wataniyah (The National School) that had a significant impact on successive generations of
Lebanese intellectuals and bureaucrats. He was also the founder of al Jinan newspaper and a
founding secretary for the al-Jam'iyah al-Suriyah lil-funun wa al-ulum (Syrian Society for the
Arts and Sciences). See Nafir Suriyah (Beirut, 1860-186; 1990: 28 & 48-50); See also al-
Khuri, Y, al-Mu'alim Butrus Bustani, 1819-1883, (Beirut: Bisam, 1995); Butrus Abu-Manneh,
"The Christians Between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al-
Bustani" in IJMES Vol. 11, no.3 (May, 1980), p. 287-304.
235 See Hanssen, Fin de Sicle.
236 He was the son of Butrus al Bustani and editor of al-Jinan.
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an empire whose "West God has bequeathed with Bilad237 , (cities) of civility
and success and east with abundant agricultural land and populations making
us [Beirut] the door through which the West enters the East and the East exits
into the West..."2 38 Bounded by "the political centers of Constantinople to the
East and Egypt and Tunis to the West, this centrality [also] makes Beirut
influential," for if "the empire is like an army, then the center is its
stronghold... making our position the most formidable in the world." After
criticizing the debt the city had fallen into, Bustani charts out an economic role
for Beirut, that could be attained if its citizens "emulate their ancestors, the
Phoenicians who knew how to develop into the primary nation of the world...
and become the site for the Orient's riches that attract the Occident's
wealth..." He continues, this can be achieved if its citizens recognize the
strength of Beirut's centrality between the agricultural labor of the hinterland
and commercial activities of the coast, and thus provide the West with raw
materials whilst acting as the node between the two.
Blending descriptive metaphors and economic analysis with a novel approach
to historiography informed by enlightenment ideals and the larger cultural and
political changes in the Empire, al-Bustani thus urges Beiruti citizens to
237 Bilad, which etymologically comes from Balad, means an urban organization, which once it
outgrows its walls becomes a city (al-Bustani, Muhit al Muhit...) In today's parlance, Bilad
also signifies country or nation.
238 Salim al-Bustani, "Markazuna," al-Jinan 3 (1872): 135-137. This article is the first of three.
It was followed by "Asbab taqaddum Bayrut wa namuwha al-asri" (The reason's for Beirut's
progress and its modern growth), 1872 and "Madinat Bayrut wa ihtiyyajatuha" (The city of
Beirut and its needs), 1884 both published as editorials in al-Jinan. which expanded upon his
father's discussion of Beirut, its people, needs and role. See Butrus Al-Bustani, Iftitahat
Majalla al-Jinan al-Bayrutiyya, 1870-1884, 2 Vols., edited by Y. Khuri, (Beirut: Dar al-
Hamra', 1990).
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recuperate the city's ancient role on the stage of world history as the "link
between east and West, in keeping with the new age, by traveling on the wings
of steam and telegraph." In other words, the city's identity and vocation are
contingent on a geographic centrality in the Empire and its immutable "global"
past that dictates and shapes its present. Beirut's future therefore, can only be
forged by embracing both its own past and the world's present (embodied in
the new technologies). 23 9 Significantly Bustani's metaphors of the city
whereby it was the door through which the Occident was to "penetrate" the
Orient echo the dominant orientalist discourse that feminized the orient as well
as the colonial division of economic labor whereby the orient role is to export
primary materials for manufacture by the West's industries. 240
This attempt to locate the city onto the stage of world history echoes writings
by his father Butrus al Bustani, who dedicates ten pages to the history of
Beirut in his five-volume encyclopedia Da'irat al-Ma'arif- Encyclopedie
Arabe. 241 In this narrative the "blessed" geographic location of Beirut and its
role as the port of Damascus or the node between Syria and the West is stated
several times. The city is projected as a center of learning, knowledge and
literary production (papers, presses, schools etc.), as well as a seat of
commerce for local (such as silk and tobacco) and international (cotton, Indian
29 Clearly influenced by enlightenment ideals that were sweeping through the Ottoman Empire
at the time, especially following the declaration of Hutti Humayun the attitude of both father
and son towards the West is a complex one. While the West is idealized for its technological
innovations and enlightenment ideals that the east must strive towards, the "riches of the east"
are also extolled and appreciated.
240 Traboulsi, Suisse Orientale, p. 33
24 Butrus al-Bustani Da'irat al-Ma'arif- Encyclopedie Arabe, Vol. 5(Beirut: Matba'a al
Ma'arif, 1881) 774-753.
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and Chinese) goods and thus the hinge between the East and West. Beginning
with a lengthy analysis of the mythological (Greek, Biblical and Arab) and
historical origins (Western and Oriental) of the name Beirut, al Bustani
proceeds with an account of regional and sometimes global historical events
through the prism of Beirut's own history of rise and decline, through its
archaeological remains and mythological attributes, its rulers and local leaders,
its monuments and its buildings. From its Canaanite and Phoenician "origins"
the reader is led through successive empires in which the city alternated
between being a vital economic node and a center for learning for its wider
Asian and Mediterranean regions and the hub for regional conflicts that
wrought havoc in the city. However, he continues, "the city's maritime
character and its natural location helped its inhabitants sustain its position for
many years especially since it remained the point of connection between
Europe and Syria."
Beirut in this narrative is central to the geopolitical changes in the region. It
functions as a node in a historiography that is concerned not only with
showing the "ancientness" of this empire but to also map its position onto an
atlas of world historical progress. (Its monuments are telling of this history).
The past is recognized simply as an antecedent to the present, where the
relationship between them is one of succession or cause and effect. From this
evolves two strategies of time; one that collapses time into a singular moment
which allows Beirut's contemporary role to be read as an inevitable and
transcendent vocation untouched by history, and a second, self contained
teleological narrative of imperial progress that uses existing monuments as
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strategies for representing the past from which the present of the Empire is to
be read. Progress of both empire and city are now bound within a geographic
center of knowledge and civility.
Like many interventionist narratives, the discourse of both Butrus and Salim al
Bustani is teleological and less nostalgic than utopian because their politics are
goal-driven: they discuss the past, but aim towards progress. However, a
foundational narrative of development that historically guarantees a sense of
cultural legitimacy has to be laid down before competing, correcting, or even
counter narratives can be articulated. Consequently, the rise and decline of the
city, its development within the Empire and world history has to be expressed.
Time and geography become one and the same as the past, Phoenician,
becomes the present so as to both recuperate the city onto the stage of world
history and to promote the "proper" historical trajectory it should follow.
Moreover, the evocation of Phoenicia, not only marks one of the first instances
where the identity of the city begins to be attributed to its maritime
(Mediterranean) location (nature becoming history) but also signifies the
moment at which an economic role for this entity came to circumscribe this
identity. More critically, in the discourse of both father and son, as well as the
larger society that Butrus el Bustani had founded, the city, and here it is Beirut
is the place where people of different nationalities collide, the space in which
the strive for a secular Ottoman identity would be created and the place to
which it would be anchored. The city was opposed to the parochialism of the
mountains- it represented everything that the mountain was not.
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Unearthing the "Past": travelers and diplomats
While local intellectuals saw the city as the purveyor of modernity and civility
for its region, Western travelers to the region depicted the city in a multitude
of other discourses that collectively defined and redefined Beirut's identity to
an international audience. Towards the end of the eighteenth century and the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the areas of the Ottoman Empire that
included Palestine, Mount Lebanon and parts of Bilad el Sham, attracted an
increasing and ever diversified number of visitors and invaders. Napoleon
Bonaparte, Lord Byron, Herman Melville, Mark Twain, Gertrude Stein,
Constantin Volney, Gerard de Nerval, Alphonse de Lamartine, and Flaubert as
well as thousands of other visitors, pilgrims, and missionaries flocked to the
area in search of the mythological Orient, or the "Holy Land." This interest in
"discovering" the spaces of the Eastern Mediterranean was motivated by
different circumstances; religious endeavors, scientific exploration and exotic
travel.
The development of Darwinian evolutionism, especially in England,
threatened religious societies in Europe who then sought to legitimate their
"history" by locating the biblical narrative in its "birthplace." 242 Sustained
interest by Christian explorers and scholars transformed the "Holy Land" into
a unified object of research and inquiry. Paintings, lithographs, watercolors,
and later on photographs and other representations of the Orient grew at an
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astounding pace, bringing the Orient into the homes of "Christian readers."
Books like Footsteps of our Lord and his Apostles in Syria, Greece and Italy:
A succession of Visits to the Scenes of New Testament Narrative, by William
Bartlette, with its superb range of sketches and paintings of the Orient were
incredibly popular with mid nineteenth century travelers, while "fire-side
travelers" were guided through the Holy Land, on their way from Damascus,
Mount Lebanon, Beirut and then Palestine.243 Another writer, John Carne,
would declare, the "times of wild adventure, of delicious heroism, and of
suffering for the sake of the cross are now passed away... The increased
facilities of conveyance already bring Palestine and Syria comparatively near
to our own homes.24 4"
In this larger context, most of the travelers to the Levant had begun their
journey long before they actually embarked. One of the most famous and
influential travelers was Volney, whose powerful portrait of Mount Lebanon
shaped much of the romantic discourse of nineteenth-century travel writing.245
242 It was also directly connected to domestic politics in England; for example, the metaphor of
progress was used in the move against feudalism and the deterioration economic circumstances
for which it was blamed.
243 Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism
244 Carne quoted in Makdisi, ibid, p. 50.
245 Volney inherited an unexpected bequest of money, and decided to visit the Orient,
beginning in Egypt and moving on to Syria and Mount Lebanon over a period of two years
(1783 to 1785), of which eight months were spent in Mount Lebanon. Volney's brief stay
represented as far as he was concerned a sufficient length of time to judge the character and
nature of the Orient out of which he could weave an epic narrative that never for a moment
questioned his own transience and, in fact, criticized those travelers who were more concerned
with antiquities than with the people. Constantin-Francois Chassebouef Volney, Voyage en
tgypte et en Syrie (Paris: Mouton, 1959 [1787]). Napoleon refers explicitly to Volney in his
reflections on the Egyptian expedition. Furthermore, and as Edward Said has argued, the
drawings sketches and descriptions of his Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie continued to have a
substantial impact on later voyagers and travelers who, almost to a person, cite him, applaud
135
In his narratives, along with other travelers and missionaries, Syria and
Lebanon were constituted as parts of the holy land, a critical slice of a biblical
odyssey to be undertaken by all believers. "Who dares be skeptical at the foot
of Lebanon? Gerard de Nerval, another French traveler, would ask. "Is this
shore not the cradle of all the beliefs in the world? Ask the first Mountaineer
that you come across: he will tell you that it was on this land that the first
scenes of the Bible took place; he will guide you to the place where the first
sacrifices were offered; he will show you the rock stained by the blood of
Abel."24 6 Lebanon, in these narratives, is transformed into the site par
excellence from which the "sick man of Europe" is to be redeemed. As
Makdisi argues, for the very reasons that Nerval identified; the biblical
landscape, the stunning beauty of the mountain chain that appeared to be an
inviolate sanctuary, and the eagerness of local and mainly Christian population
to welcome these travelers, most European travelers would come to view
Mount Lebanon as the ideal site from which the reformation of the Ottoman
Empire would take place.247 For these very same reasons also metaphors of the
mountains as the site of refuge for persecuted minorities would also
proliferate.
These descriptions, as Said and others have argued, presented the Levant as
the Orient of time immemorial, the custodian of Western history, traditions
and Biblical "origins." The romanticism that pervaded these writings pointed
him, and occasionally correct him. Said, Orientalism, p. 169-170. See Makdisi ibid for further
discussion of Volney.
246 Gerard de Nerval, Voyage en Orient (Paris: Michel Lvy Freres, 1884), 1, p. 281-282
quoted in Makdisi, ibid)
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to a primordial search for an original state of innocence best articulated by
Lamartine's description of his first vision of Mount Lebanon as "the land
where all my thoughts of the moment converge, as a man and as a voyager; it
is the sacred land, the land where I will search the souvenir of primitive
humanity." 248 The orient is to be re-claimed onto the stage of world history, as
the theater and the custodian of these narrative events but not as an active
participant in them. The passive Orient, in other words, was projected as a
place of pilgrimage, and a site of spectacle at one and the same time. More
critically, geographical distance across space is figured as a historical
difference across time so much so that "the philosophical traveler, sailing to
the ends of the earth, is infact traveling in time; he is exploring the past."249
In this context, Beirut occupied a liminal space between the East and West, a
part of the ancient oriental world that could still be considered a part of the
Occident. According to de Nerval, from the heights of the el Borj el Kashef
(the revealing tower) located to the east of the city, Beirut, whose "oriental
skyline" and "physiognomy of an Arab city" are apparent, also exhibits
"European influences," if only in the quarters occupied by the consulates,
where national flags fly on Sundays and during the holidays." Upon entering
the city, he continues, he finds himself
247 Makdisi, Culture of Sectarianism, p. 38
2 48 Lamartine, :p. 83
2 49 J.M Degerando, quoted in Mclintock, p. 40
137
Figure 9: First image of Beirut taken by Goupil-Fesquet, in
1839 (Source: Debbas Des Photographies A Beyrouth 1840-
1918, (Paris: Marval, 2001), p.22lso
like a man in the Thousand and One Nights, penetrating a city
of seers in which people have been transformed into stone ..
everyone is sleeping the sleep of innocence, abandoning the
city ... " for "the nature, beauty, ineffable grace of the cities of
the orient constructed near the sea ... a spectacle of the most
beautiful human race, costumes, beggars etc .. how does one
render the impression that you IBeirutJ cause and that
transform a premonition into a reality? We have already read
about you in books, admired you in paintings ... J~ou I now
transform me into a cut out copy of Captain Vernet
2.';() This image was taken whiles he was on a voyage with Horace Vernet. He descri bes the
intention of the photograph as follows "The view was taken from the terrace of the French
consulate and represents the domes of the mosque, called the palace lof emir Fakhreddinel;
and in the background we see the country homes which make this country a wonderful place
to stay (Goupil-Fesquet (1942) Excursions daguerriennes, Vues et Monuments les plus
remarquable du globe, Paris Lerebours, quoted in Debbas Des Photographies A Beyrollth
1840-1918, (Paris: Marval, 2001), p.22.
2.'>1 de Nerval, :80-81. He was instructed by Nicolas-Marie Paymal Lcrebours, an optician from
the Observatoire et fabricant Parisien and the first to think of publishing photos of voyages
around the world. Emile Jean Horace Vernet (1789-1863), a painter of military history was one
of the first two travelers to take daguerreotypes of the region. These were published by Goupil-
Fesquet, the photographer of the group as the Voyages d'Horace Vernet en Oriellt (Paris,
Challamel,1843). It included the first view of the city, (February 1839) taken by Goupil-
Fesquet (Debbas, 200 1:22).
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These romantic descriptions would be echoed by missionary biographies or
accounts of their residence in the Holy Land. "How is it you never told me in
any of your letters that Beirut is such a beautiful place?" the Reverend W, M.
Thomson, one of the first American missionaries to move to Syria in 1834
would ask. 252 He continues, "I did; but you could not understand, and no
wonder. Neither pen nor pencil can do justice to Beirut..." 253 (Box 5)
Distinguished from the biblical magnificence of Mount Lebanon, the city was
nevertheless romanticized and idolized as the site from which the Ottoman
empire would be redeemed by European powers. As the 1882 Guide Isambert
would claim
"Beirut will certainly play one day an important role in the
regeneration of the Orient. The number of Europeans who live
there, the richness of the commercial establishment, the
prosperity of its port and the vigilant protection by diplomatic
agents of European maritime powers, assure us of a
considerable influence in the future destiny of Syria." 254
Biblical Archaeology and the procurement of knowledge
By the mid nineteenth century this "Biblical" activity came to be increasingly
linked with growing imperial interests.255 Many postcolonial critics have
252 The arrival of the Reverend Thomson in Beirut in the first half of the nineteenth century
heralded an increasing interest in the area by religious missionaries, both Catholic and
Protestant coming to redeem the primitive inhabitants of the Holy Land, as they languished
under 400 years of despotic Islamic rule.
253 Rev. Thomson D.D., The Land and the Book, p.:33
254 AD Chauvet et Emile Isambert Itindraire de L'Orient, Syrie, Palestine (Paris, 1882) p. 584
255 Said, Orientalism; Bernal, Black Athena; Neil Asher Silberman, "Promised Lands and
Chosen People: the politics and poetics of archaeological narrative" in Nationalism, Politics
and the Practice of Archaeology, Philip Khol and Clare Fawcett (editors) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Nadia Abu el Haj Facts on the Ground: Archaeological
Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002)
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pointed to the fact that the process of Western imperialism was not limited to
overt economic and political activities, but included an entire system of
scientific and artistic classification necessary for the success of the imperial
enterprise. The geographic location of these areas, Palestine, Beirut and Mount
Lebanon, all constituents of the "Holy Land," at the intersection between
Egypt and Mesopotamia, transformed the search for Biblical antiquities into a
means for Western penetration into the Empire and an "extension of the
'Eastern Question' waged on the battlefield of the past." 256 Archeological
excavations were launched as part of this Biblical and scientific odyssey. 25 7 In
Palestine, through the Palestine Exploration Fund, Royal Engineers, and
thereby, the war and colonial offices of the British Empire, acquired
cartographic knowledge of the country.258 However, these efforts at mapping
the Holy Land, as Abu el Haj argues, were quite exceptional. 'This was not an
unknown territory to be explored and discovered but rather a presumably
known territory to be "identified" and "recovered."259 Using the Bible as a
guide, existing sites were "recognized" according to Biblical narrative, the
256 Neil Asher Silberman Digging for God and Country, Explorations in the Holy Land, 1799-
1917, (New York:: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1982) p. 4
257 Ciriaco de Pizzacoli of Anconais, credited with the "invention" of archaeology in the
fifteenth century, traveled throughout Italy, Greece, Asia Minor and Egypt to, in his words
"awaken the past." (Silberman, Promised Lands, p. :254). His organized expedition reflected a
new and growing political interest in classical ideals and social norms previously rejected by
the High Gothic movement. During the seventeenth and eighteenth century and with the spread
of methodical archaeological exploration throughout Europe, interest in the past was seen as a
direct reflection of local patriotism. As Silberman and others argue, this was the first age of
archaeological nationalism.
258 Founded in 1865, the Palestine Exploration Fund was given the mandate for " the
prosecution of systematic and scientific research in all branches of inquiry connected with the
Holy Land... the principle reason the illustration of the Bible which might be expected to
follow such an investigation (The Palestine Exploration Fund (PFP) 1895:11-12 quoted in Abu
el Haj, Facts on the Ground, p.: 68).
259 Nadia Abu el Haj, Facts on the Ground
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land mapped back into a historic geography at once known and
recognizable. 2 60
From this perspective archeology as a practice was critical as a means to chart
colonized lands and locate them within the Eurocentric meta-narrative of
human history and culture (in the same way that ethnographic studies were
concerned with portraying the native as savage requiring colonial education
and modernization).26 ' Archeological practices in the Levant, of which one of
the first was the Mission en Phinicie launched by Ernest Renan, were
concerned with not only locating a particular past, but in placing this past in a
linear spatial and temporal relations to other "pasts." The literature of the
Greeks and Romans as well as the Bible were viewed as the direct connection
260 For example, in The Land and the Book, Reverend Thomson, a missionary of thirty years in
Syria and Palestine states that his book is a description of Biblical land, unlike many of the
false books, which have emerged about the Bible. He states, "the student in the heart of
Germany or America, surrounded by libraries, is in a better situation to carry on profitable
inquiries than the pilgrim to the Holy land, however long his loitering or extended his rambles.
But it is far otherwise in respect to the scenes and the scenery of the Bible, and to the living
manners and customs of the East, which illustrate that blessed book. Here we need the actual
observer, not the distant and secluded student... the east is to be observed." He continues "want
of space has compelled him to omit such [personal] details...some things must be left out...
and yet it is obvious that we ought not to impose silence upon the thousand witnesses to the
veracity of the Bible which meet the pilgrim at every turn in his pathway. Broken columns and
prostate temples, and cities in ruin, must bear testimony to the inspiration of prophecy; and
ravens and sparrows, and cedars and brambles, and fruits and flowers, will preach sermons and
utter parables, and we will not hesitate to listen when they begin to teach (Rev. Thomson D.D.,
The Land, p. :xii- xiii).
261 Along with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1797, came a Scientific and Artistic
Expedition, composed of France's most prominent scholars, scientists, engineers, naturalists,
orientalists and antiquarians. The mandate of this mission was to survey every facet of present-
day Egypt and propose the best means for its restoration. When they invaded Palestine, the
army was accompanied by this specially selected team of scientists and mapmakers whose job
was to compile the first topographic map of the country (See Silberman, Digging for God; Abu
el Haj, Facts on the Ground
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between Europe and the lands of the Eastern Mediterranean and past
pilgrimage roots were now subjected to thorough "scientific" exploration.26 2
Under the impetus of nationalism, archeologists abandoned their primary focus
on evolution and began to concentrate on interpreting archeological remains as
the history of specific peoples. The rise of nationalism in Greece and Italy
meant that it was increasingly easier to acquire archaeological relics from the
Near East, making it more fashionable to think of Asia as the cradle of
civilization, so much so that Victor Hugo could declare in 1829 "Au Siecle de
Louis XIV on tait hell6niste, maintenant on est orientaliste"26 3 The
development and movements of entire groups could now be traced, studied
and analyzed through archaeological records.264 Consequently, the populations
inhabiting these lands were also subjected to scrutiny as the present day
descendants of ancient peoples so much so that Pierre Lortet26 5 would describe
the streets of Beirut in 1884 in the following manner:
262 Geary argues that this connection was forged by stolen manuscripts and artifacts and
standardized pilgrimage roots in the medieval period (Geary in Silberman, Promised Lands, p.
255).
263 Victor Hugo Les Orientales, Elisabeth Barineau, (ed) Paris: Didier, 1829, 1952), p. 11
264 As Trigger argues this took on various manifestations. European archaeologists sought to
lengthen the pedigrees of their own national groups. Some German archaeologists for example
emphasized the apparent absence of non-German peoples in their homeland to be a sign of
their racial purity hence superiority. British archeologists countered by reading the successive
invasions their isle had gone through as a "selective" process for the creation of a superior
culture and people (Bruce R. Trigger, "Romanticism, nationalism and archaeology" in
Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology Philip L. Kohl and Claire Fawcett (eds.)
(Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 267
265 Pierre Lortet, was the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Lyon which was
closely linked with the Universite Saint Joseph (USJ) in Beirut since its establishment in 1875.
His book La Syrie d'aujourd'hui : Voyages dans la Phinicie, Le Liban, et la Judie, 1875-1880
which was republished as La Syrie d'aujourd'hui: Tour du Monde became one of the most
influential sources for travelers and travel guides in the region.
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In the streets, in less than an hour, it is possible to see the
descendents of all the various peoples: here is an Egyptian
with blemished limbs, almond-shaped eyes, and the profile of
the Sphinx. Next to him, approaches a warrior that resembles
those of the palaces of Khorsabad and of Ninve; the
extremities of the Assyrian are stout and tough, the shoulders
are large, wide, and powerfully muscled; his shape is small,
the beard is thick and curled ... and he is amiable, like the
terrible occupiers of banks of the Euphrates. Here goes the
descendant of the ancient Phoenician: his face is fine, notable,
his nose curved his lips thin, he is big and supple in his
movements; his striking black eyes shine of fire and
intelligence. Nevertheless, do not ask from him any skill
other than that needed for commerce; he is avaricious,
sometimes frugal to the point of avarice, innovative, and he
will not hesitate to mislead you in order to win a small sum
[...] These are the venerable sons of the famous merchants of
Tyre, Sidon and Arados, [whose] powerful vessels traveled to
the most remote corners.
He continues, as opposed to the Phoenician, the Arab is:
[...] pure-blooded, strong, energetic, infatigable, tanned, well
muscled... flexible and agile...an accomplished horseman...
He has a high forehead, lips thicker than those of the
Phoenician, a less aquiline nose [...] He also values commerce
above all other transactions, but he is even more excited by
physical struggle, by the violent movements of war and the
hunt. His imagination is flamboyant and humorous; he
adores spectacular stories, the poetry of Antar, the tales of
One Thousand and One Nights.2
In other words, while Mount Lebanon was eulogized for its "biblical"
landscape, Beirut was extolled as the living, cosmopolitan cradle of
civilizations and the origins of man.
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Travel Guides and City Narratives: History in a timeless orient
With the emergence of official travel guides and increased travel to the area,
the impact of these descriptive metaphors and approach to the history of the
area would not only increase but would also continue to shape discourse
around the city well into the 2 0 th century.267 These would be bolstered by an
abundance of photographic records taken by travelers and locals alike. The
first of these was the Itinraire de L'Orient, Syrie, Palestine.268 Based on
Renan's Mission en Phinicie Beirut's history, follows the now familiar story
of the rise and decline of a Phoenician city becoming the most important
center of law in the Roman Empire, only to be destroyed by an earthquake and
a tidal wave in 529 AD, and ruined in the year 600, thus leading to its easy
conquest in 635 by the Muslims. Of the latter we are told little, as the arrival of
266 Pierre Lortet La Syrie d'aujourd'hui : Voyages dans la Phdnicie, Le Liban, et la Jude,
1875-1880 (Paris, 1884) p. 77.
267 At the turn of the nineteenth century travel to the Ottoman Empire, or the Grand Tour in the
Ottoman Empire as it was known, became fashionable. Indeed it replaced the then traditional
tour of Europe for young men, so much so that a graduate from University in Doctor Thorne,
published in 1858, is described as "doing the fashionable things, going up the Nile, crossing
over to Mount Sinai, thence over the long desert to Jerusalem and home by Damascus, Bayrout
and Constantinople, bringing back a long beard, a red cap and a chibook, just as our father
used to go through Italy and Switzerland and our grandfathers would spend a season in Paris"
(Anthony Trollope, (1914): 433, quoted in Mansel, 2001:59) During this same period, a visit to
the ruins of Greece and the Near East was also becoming part of British architects' training
(see Mansel, 2001).
268 This was initially published as an 1104 page volume of L'Itindraire descriptifs, historique et
archeologique de L'Orient covering Malta, Greece, European Turkey and Asia, Egypt, Syria
and Palestine by Adolphe Joanne and Emile Isambert, written in 1853 and published in 1861.
It was reissued in 1882 as the Itineraire de L'Orient, Syrie, Palestine. Emile Isambert died in
1876. His collaborator, Mr. Joanne, produced the 1882 volume published by Hachette as a
travel guide that was based on the original book. Among his collaborators on the guide were
Mr. Chanter, director of the museum of Lyon, Mr. Alric, the dragoman at the French consulate
in Constantinople, and who was residing in Jerusalem, Mr. Blanche, the vice consul in Tripoli,
and Dr. Suquet, sanitary doctor in Beirut, other consular staff in Syria and Me. Bourgin on the
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the crusaders becomes the next important stop in the in the city's history as it
us captured "heroically" by Baudoin in 1110 and then recaptured by
Salaheddine in 1187 placing it once more under Muslim domination. Ten
years later Amaury the King of Cyprus is said to have laid siege to Beirut,
forcing the Sarassins to abandon it and the eventual liberation of 9,000
prisoners. In 1290, the city fell to Muslim influence once more.
Ever since then, according to the narrative, the city has been under the control
of the Druze princes, who were granted semi independence by the Ottoman
authorities. It is under one of those, Fakhreddine (1595-1634) that its
fortifications were constructed. These however, did not prevent Ibrahim Pasha
from capturing the city in 1840. During this expedition, which threatened the
Ottoman Empire and that could have brought a general war to Europe the
English bombarded Beirut. Since this period, the city is growing prosperous
and according to Mr. Lortet,269
more than any other city on the Syrian coast, it (Beirut) is
closely surveilled by European agents, its properties and its
citizens are more respected than those in Acre, Tripoli or
Aleppo, and furthermore in periods of political or religious
strife, it is easy for a large portion of its population to find a
safe haven with the Christian princes of Lebanon. Large
emigration from surrounding areas has continuously
augmented the importance of the city.2 70
Arab architecture of Syria. The book also quotes extensively from and which relied
considerably on Pierre Lortet's La Syrie d'aujourd'hui: Tour du Monde.
269 Pierre Lortet, was the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Lyon which was
closely linked with the Universit6 Saint Joseph (USJ) in Beirut since its establishment in 1875.
His book became one of the most influential sources for travelers and travel guides in the
region. A subsequent version of this publication entitled La Syrie d'aujoudhui, Tour du Monde,
1880 is cited throughout the guidebook.
270Lortet quoted in Chauvet and Isambert, ibid., p. 583-584.
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Consequently, the guide continues, "Beirut is today the entrepot of all Syrian
commerce, the port of Damascus, especially since the construction of the
Damascus-Beirut highway by a French company directed by the Comte de
Perthuis and whose headquarters are in the Place des Canons."2 71
Not only does this brief historiography and outline of the city's urban history
stand in stark contradiction to the contemporaneous local accounts of the city,
its history and monuments as discussed by al-Bustani and others, but the
metaphors describing it's economic vocation come to dominate all discourse
around the city- so much so that it becomes part of the official sanctified
version of official Lebanese history during the French mandate. The physical
descriptions of Beirut focus on its lack of monuments, its new quarters built in
a "European" style and its picturesque character. These descriptions that we
shall see in the following chapters were echoed quite closely by Rene Danger
the first planner to be invited to draw up an urban plan for the city in 1932.
At the same time, these narrative representations of Beirut slowly shift as the
city is transformed in the literature from an Arab city with "narrow and
convoluted alleyways" to a thriving, cosmopolitan Mediterranean port city. By
1933, Beirut has "lost" its oriental identity so much so that it had "become the
Nice of the Levant."272 These descriptions are then echoed in most subsequent
guides, whether French or English, in which the orient is reduced to singular
elements of oriental clothing, the tarboush, the robes, the veil, and from which
271 Ibid, 587.
272Geiger, La Syrie et Le Liban (Paris, 1933), p. 125
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Beirut stands somewhat distinct for the conspicuous absence of most of these
elements. 273
Nationalism, Particularism, Pluralism and the Mediterranean: Lebanon
is a country that resembles only itself27 4
This loss of Beirut's oriental or Arab identity in the travel literature echoed the
slow and progressive suppression of Lebanon's "other" identities during the
mandate period. While I will not go into the full panoply of debates that took
place at the time and the different positions they adopted275, I would like to
expand on what eventually became one of the most dominant narratives about
Lebanese identity and which subsequently had a considerable impact on its
visual culture during the mandate period. This narrative is best represented
through two if most powerful ideologues: Michel Chiha276 and Charles Corm.
273 Here Geiger is distinguishing between different races that occupied other French colonies,
such as Algeria. Curiously enough, and despite this narrative of "progress" the images that
accompany Geiger's text sustain the photographic conventions of the 1 9 th century. Beirut in his
images continues to be a picturesque and oriental city with old houses, ruins and various
orchards presenting the bulk of the city and the only building shown is the USJ (Universit6 St.
Joseph constructed by French missionaries). Its citizens are pictured as either peasants or in
oriental garb. Consequently, the visual tropes of the nineteenth century of a primitive orient
stand in sharp contradiction to the narrative of a Europeanized city.
274 Michel Chiha, Politique Interieure, (Paris: Editions du Trident, 1957) p. 17 8
275 Those who believed in an independent Lebanon have tended to be divided in two camps;
those who maintained that Lebanon, although Arab had a local form of Arab civilization worth
preserving and others who believed that Lebanon was refuge for Christian in the ocean of
Islam and Arab nationalism and that the Lebanese were a separate nation, Christian, connected
to the Mediterranean and to Europe. While the former position would take precedence in the
post independence period, the latter position dominated during the mandate and had a
considerable impact on the visual culture of the city.
276 Michel Chiha, born in 1891 to a Chaldean Catholic family that originated from Iraq is
considered as one of the most important political figures of the period with intimate
connections to both the French and Lebanese elite. He acquired his primary education with the
Jesuits and spent the WWI years in Egypt amongst Syrio-Lebanese circles growing close to
Yusuf el Sawda, one of the fiercest and most prolific advocates for an independent Lebanon
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Even though Chiha's position differed considerably from that of Corm's on
the nature of Lebanese identity, their commonalities to a great degree
determined many of the discursive and visual trappings of contemporary
Lebanon today. While the former was more powerful politically, the latter's
notions profoundly impacted the visual "grammar" of national identity in ways
that continue to be seen today. His influence will be discussed in greater detail
in Section II, Part 3.
Michel Chiha, one of the architects of the Lebanese constitution is considered
the "father" of Lebanon's political vocation as a Merchant Republic. In
Chiha's writings, which influenced and affected most contemporary Lebanese
historians including some of those mentioned above, Lebanon's uniqueness is
defined by three main characteristics: "its geographic location at a "global"
juncture between east and West, its mountains in which one can take refuge
and from which one can defend oneself, and lastly, its long vista open onto the
sea... [which] brought to this land the persecuted and exiled." In particular this
vista, he claims
based on Phoenician heritage, Hector Klat, poet and writer and also a firm believer in
Lebanon's Phoenician identity and Bishara al Khoury who could become his brother in law
and Lebanon's first post-independence president. He was appointed to the municipal council of
Beirut in 1924 by the French authorities. In 1925 he was elected to parliament to a minority
seat and in 1926 played an important part in the drafting of the Lebanese constitution so much
so that he has been nicknamed the "father" of modern Lebanon. He retired in 1929 from
parliament to become one of the most influential behind the scenes figure on the political
scenes as the ideologue par excellence for what came to be dubbed as the Merchant Republic-
that is a Lebanon of liberal laissez faire economy, of tourism and a haven of refugees. For
more information on Chiha see Fawaz Traboulsi, Silat bila Wasl: Michel Chiha wa al
Ideologia al Lubnaniyah (Links without Connections: Michel Chiha and Lebanese Ideology),
(Beirut: Riad el Rayyes Books, 1999); Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia; see also Zamir
Lebanon's Quest p. 158-159 for the extent of his influence.
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transformed Beirut into the meeting place for all the people of
the Mediterranean...an indescribable mixture, all the languages
of the Mediterranean, all races... all the dregs, all the flowers
of civilization are driven to this corner of the Phoenician
seaboard.... Will anyone after this say that the Lebanon of
today is Semitic? Will anyone say that it is Arab?2'7
Combining elements of geographic determinism 27 8 and Ernest Renan's279
notions of the nation as a spiritual idea constituted by both the past and the
present, Chiha projected the Phoenicians as the heroic ancestors that would
provide the Lebanese with a past sufficiently far into history to overcome their
differences and provide the second major constituent of the nation; the will to
come together. The mountain on the other hand was the place of refuge, the
space where individuals turned for solace, the complement to the city. The
secret of Lebanon he would claim "est dans ce fait que la montagne fut
peuplke graduellement par les homes inquiets, par les homes traque. Ces
homes avaient laisse leurs biens derriere eux pour sauver leur vie et leur
me. "280 This approach was further developed between 1944 and 1954 in a
series of articles on the Mediterranean and Lebanon's position in the world.28 '
In them, Lebanon was resolutely defined as a Mediterranean country, a part of
277 Chiha, Liban D'Aujourd'hui
278 Geographic determinism is an approach to history that sees individuals and communities as
influenced by the environmental factors of their geographic locals that not only determine
characteristics that do not disappear with time but also place communities and races at
different points in the ladder of progress. Arnold Toynbee who would lecture in Lebanon was
one its strongest advocates.
279 Chiha by his own admission was influenced by the work and thought of Ernest Renan
especially his famous essay on the identity of the nation. Ernest Renan "What is a Nation?" in
John Hutchinson and Anthony D Smith (eds.) Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994), p. 17-18. For the influence of Renan on Chiha's political thought see Traboulsi, 1999;
Kaufman, 2000
2,~ Michel Chiha, Visage et Presence du Liban, (Beirut: Chiha Foundation, 1994), p. 16 7
281 These were part of a lecture series initiated by the Cnacle Libanaise See Les annees
"C'enacle.
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the Near and not the Middle East - an erroneous geographic label, he went on
to argue, "that cuts it (Lebanon) off intellectually and socially from that sea...
and implicitly destroys the balance of the Mediterranean world."282
In these descriptions Lebanon is a port and a place of refuge at one and the
same time, where geography, nature and history combine to give it qualities
that transcend time immemorial. More critically, these unique geographic
qualities transform Lebanese society into a distinct mosaic of different
communities, which according to Chiha is what makes them Lebanese. His
ideal is non-sectarian state and he reluctantly accepted its insertion into the
constitution as a temporary measure a titre transitoire. Lebanon in other words
is made up in the cosmopolitan image of Beirut; a Levantine port city that
embraced people of diverse ethnicities, sects and beliefs, the place where a
multitude of languages were spoken and which coordinated the republic's
relations across the Mediterranean and Arab worlds. The city's pluralism
became for many historians including Chiha and others, an opening onto the
Lebanese "past". It was one of the characteristics that demonstrated Lebanon's
uniqueness and thus its right to exist as an independent political entity.
282 He continues, "the Near East is known through the windows it has on the Mediterranean;
the Middle East has its windows on the Indian Ocean; the Far East opens up to the Pacific ...
for the Lebanese, our future in the Mediterranean sphere is primarily the result of the past."
These arguments and part and parcel of Chiha's larger intellectual approach summed up in his
statement that "Geography gives birth to history and controls the fate of nations and their
strategies. We can also call it the nature of things." (Chiha, Le Liban dans le Monde
Perspectives D'avenir," reprinted by the Chiha Foundation in Lebanon at Home and Abroad,
Beirut, 1951, 1994) (Leo Arnold and Jean Montegu trans.), p. 134
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The city was obviously central to defining Lebanon's national identity. Kamal
Salibi has argued that the Phoenician city-state of Tyre was Chiha's prototype
pf modern Beirut- the idea that was at the heart of his political, social and
ideological life. Beirut was to occupy the leading role in defining Lebanon's
modern identity. Here the history of ancient Phoenicia became once more the
trope through which the nation's inherent vocation as port and refuge could be
read. However, it is no longer a Phoenicia whose boundaries simply coincide
of those of the Imara. Phoenicianism had become a cultural identity that
crystallized much of the nineteenth century discourse of about the city. Picking
up where Bustani had left off, Beirut's Phoenician identity had assumed the
cultural traits of the cosmopolitan, commercial city, its populations exhibiting
the mercantile qualities of the ancient inhabitants of these cities and that
exhibited the uniqueness of one community. As in Bustani's writing, the city
presented the secular ideal of a multicultural and plural society open to the
world. It was also an opening for Chiha onto the Mediterranean and away
from the confines of Maronite nationalism. He would state, "the population of
Lebanon is Lebanese, quite simply, and that with due reservations made in the
case of those very recently naturalized, it is at present no more Phoenician than
Egyptian, Aegean, Assyrian, of Medic, Greek, Roman, Byzantine or Arab...
At the very most we say that it is a Mediterranean type."28 3 As the next section
will show, this Mediterraneanism would be elaborately developed by Charles
Corm, another major advocate of Lebanon's Phoenician heritage, who had a
major impact on the development of its "national symbolic."
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Chiha, Lebanon Today, p. 33-34
National and Cosmopolitan: Ideologies of the Mountain and the City
This reconstitution of the city in and through these various writings had a
significant impact on the place the city came to occupy in the national
imaginary. In a 1981 Albert Hourani, the eminent historian of Lebanon and the
Middle East, read the struggle for Lebanon's national identity (and the
ongoing civil war at the time) as a conflict between the "ideology of the
mountain" and the "ideology of the city." 284 In this essay, the ideology of the
mountain represented the 19 th century populism and narrow nationalism of the
Maronites that implicitly included a distrust of the city. The ideology of the
city, came about with the creation of Greater Lebanon after the 1920's and the
incorporation of Beirut as the capital. It represented the urban notion of
Lebanon as "neither a society closed against the outside world, nor of a unitary
society in which smaller communities were dissolved but something in
between the two: a plural society in which communities, still different on the
level of inherited religious loyalties and intimate family ties, coexisted within
a common framework." 285 He suggested in passing that the latter notion began
284 Hourani Ideologies, p. 175. He also argues that one of the assumptions of the modern
Lebanese state was that the common interests of the country's merchants and financiers backed
by the communal elites would ensure that the sustainability of Lebanon. However, this alliance
of Muslim and Christian politicians he suggests did not "imply necessarily the merging of the
communities; on the contrary the new immigrants into the cities seemed to be more aware of
their sectarian affiliations."
285 He also argues that one of the assumptions of the modern Lebanese state was that the
common interests of the country's merchants and financiers backed by the communal elites
would ensure that the sustainability of Lebanon. However, this alliance of Muslim and
Christian politicians he suggests did not "imply necessarily the merging of the communities;
on the contrary the new immigrants into the cities seemed to be more aware of their sectarian
affiliations." Albert Hourani Ideologies, p. 175 & 177
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to emerge in the 19t hcentury; partly as a reaction to the 1860 civil conflicts of
Mount Lebanon, partly as a result of the tanzimat, and partly as an expression
of a commercial city where "people must meet in peace to do business, and
doors should be open to the outside world." This ideology of the city however
could be read in one of several ways; either as a transplantation and
modification of the Christian Mountain 286 as Michel Chiha and Charles Corm
did (even though the latter focused on Lebanon's Phoenician heritage), or as a
transplantation of later Ottoman ideas as a non-sectarian, yet sufficiently
nationalist (Arab and Muslim at the time) philosophy. Lebanon in this latter
formulation was a separate part of a larger unity that embraced the Arab region
rather than the Mediterranean. This idea he argued was expanded upon by the
Syrian Populist Party in the 1930's but by its very nature it challenged the
secular idea of Lebanon rather than underpin it.
While in basic agreement with Hourani, I would like to nuance his argument
further and suggest that this secular notion of Beirut as the node around which
Lebanese identity was infact far more developed and had a far more profound
impact on Lebanese national discourse. Beirut played a singular role in this
project of constituting Lebanon's identity and that the end result of Lebanese
nationalism was not the domination of one ideology over the other but rather a
constant tension between them. While nationalism in many parts of the world
is considered an anti-urban ideology; one that posits the roots of national
culture and ideology in rural cultures (India for example), Lebanese
nationalism, from this perspective can be interpreted as a rural (mountain)-
286 Hourani, ibid, 176.
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urban fusion that sought to bring together irreconcilable differences. While
many historians have focused on the struggle between the different versions of
history, the role of the city in constituting this "national symbolic" and
fabricating a national identity has been neglected.
As both Hourani and Beydoun argue, this Mountain-Urban fusion in the
projection of Lebanese national identity did not diminish the singularity of
Maronite historiography and the call to maintain it as the mainstay of
Lebanon's history and that of its different communities. 287 What infact resulted
was the partial dominance of the "ideology of the mountain" over the
"ideology of the city," a mountain whose name now overshadowed the names
of other territories and whose identity as a place of refuge for minorities was
seen to "define" Lebanon's political ideology. In Chiha's words, it is this
mountain that forms the "backbone" of the country. Pluralism and multi-
sectarian society became the country's hallmarks- a country whose name
according to these same historians could be traced to Biblical scripture, which
at once guarantees this history an ancient geographic "reality" and this
political entity an ontological presence that transcends time.2 88 From this
perspective the coastal zones of ancient Phoenicia that had now been
"recuperated" into a holistic Lebanese entity, define Lebanon's
complementary vocation as a cultural and commercial entrepot. In this
founding moment, nature and history become one, granting political
287Beydoun, Struggle over Lebanese History, p. 143
288 For example, historian Jawad Boulous suggests that the name Lebanon has been used from
3,000 BC to refer to the snow topped mountains that descend to the sea along the
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legitimacy to all that precedes or follows. Nature is not neutral awaiting man's
actions. It is active. It has a "natural" vocation to bind apparent opposites;
mountain and coast, port and refuge, agriculture and commerce, and tradition
and cosmopolitanism.
More critically, the place of the city, namely Beirut, in these narratives is seen
as a complement to that of the mountain representing all that the mountain was
not; the geographic location from which Lebanon's apparent
economic/national vocation emanates; an international route, the meeting point
between the east and the West, a station, a node, a center making the country
the cosmopolitan Paris of the East, a fragment of the larger Mediterranean
hence in Chiha's and Corm's understandings, an element of the Western
world. The city was now representative of a Mediterranean humanism
according to Corm.2 89 Part of the Phoenician world, Beirut's importance was
relegated to an organic relationship with the land and an economic vocation
that overwhelmed all its other identities. It had become the agency through
which Lebanon's national identity was to be enacted as cosmopolitan. In
contrast to North Africa, where Mediterranean identity became a means
through which modernism would be anchored to a regional identity, the notion
of the Mediterranean for Lebanon became the means through which
Lebanon's identity would be separated from its surrounding Arab hinterland,
and through which the "idea" of Lebanon would be enacted. This "idea" of the
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Mediterranean coast. This "narrative" reiterated by countless historians found its way into
school history books.
nation here takes the place of the history lost to it. It devours it. Only and as
we shall see in subsequent sections, these are never silenced and return to
haunt the text from which they have been excluded.
Contrary to Hourani I would also suggest that with time, the nationalization of
Beirut as the capital of Greater Lebanon and its modernization entailed the
subjugation of its cosmopolitan character as a port city to the sectarian order of
Mount Lebanon. The conflictual relationship between Beirut and its
immediate hinterland in Mount Lebanon was nothing new. These were
conjoining territories with porous boundaries. Many of the 19 th century
inhabitants of Mount Lebanon lived and worked in Beirut for a good part of
the year, or had emigrated to the city in the aftermath of economic and
political unrest or civil violence, such as the 1860 war. (See section I) Even
more, as Beirut's Vali from 1891-1892 would remark as he went about
inspecting its various territories "There are houses in the town, the gardens of
which outside the territories of the Vilaya."290 Requests by the inhabitants of
Mount Lebanon to annex Beirut to their own territory were propagated as did
counter requests by Beiruti inhabitants to remain independent.291 At other
289 Charles Corm "At the Mediterranean Congress" in Al Muqtataf, 1936. This Mediterranean
Humanism for Corm was also a way to draw a Christian and Western identity to the area in
general and to Lebanon in particular.
290 Isma'il Kemal, The Memoirs of Kemal Ismail Bey, edited by Sommerville Story, (London:
Constable and Co, 1920), p. 193 Moreover, the boundaries between Mount Lebanon and
Beirut caused numerous problems for the Wali since infrastructural projects connecting its
different towns would be vetoed by the administration of Mount Lebanon. The tension got
acute enough that the Wali of Beirut was forced to visit the rest of the Vilaya of Beirut's
territories by boat (Hanssen, 2001)
291 For example, the governor of Mount Lebanon Dawud Pasha inaugurated his governorship
of the area with a serious campaign to incorporate the costal cities including Beirut into Mount
Lebanon (Hanssen, ibid.,Fin de Siecle). In another incident, prior to WWI, reports in the press
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times joint petitions by Beiruti's and Lebanese traders to co-join their
territories were also sent in. One of the petitions written in the 1920's
protesting the "annexation" of Beirut to Mount Lebanon, riled the advocates of
Greater Lebanon enough to entail a detailed point by point rebuttal as to why
the Beirut should be part of the new Lebanese entity.29 2 These arguments
obviously did not address the problem of how to integrate the masses into a
new hegemonic national identity without opening the realm of back-room
politics and which became a critical point of concern to the elites of the period.
As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter the electoral and
personal status laws became regulated by religious affiliation so much so that
to be Lebanese meant to be defined according to religious affiliation. There
could be no Lebanese citizen who was not at the same time a member of a
particular religious community. Accordingly the nationalization of the capital
city now had to reflect this new national/sectarian identity and distinguish it
from its pervious imperial characteristics.
suggested that the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon had petitioned the Sublime Porte in Istanbul
for the annexation of Beirut to the mountains. Following heavy criticism in the press,
authorities in Mount Lebanon quickly denied the charges.
292 Shaykh Salim Khattar al Dahdah "Lubnan al Kabir wa Mutassarifiyyat Lubnan al Qadima"
(Greater Lebanon and the Old Mutassarifiyah of Lebanon) in Al Machreq no. 8, August 1933
The petition it seems argued that Beirut should not be incorporated into a political entity that
was less important that its previous status as a vilaya, that its population was more numerous
than those of Mount Lebanon and finally that by annexing Beirut to Mount Lebanon Damascus
would no longer have a port. As can be expected, the rebuttal was that the Mutassarifiya was
equally important; that the inhabitants of Beirut were primarily non Beirutis, most of whom
came from the mountains, that despotic Turkish rule had "unnaturally" conjoined it other areas
defying history and nature, and that the city belonged to Mount Lebanon but was forcefully cut
off from it by Al Jazzar in 1775 and finally that Damascus did have access to the sea through
Alexandretta and Latakia and that Syria was never politically united with Phoenicia for such a
claim to make sense.
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History of the City/History of the Nation: A Few
Remarks
The history of the city as drawn in the different literature becomes that of the
nation. While local intellectuals and public figures during the 19th century were
pre-occupied with projecting Beirut as the center of the nation, the transmitter
of al asr el jadid (the new age), and the center of civility for the region- Beirut
was being constructed by travelers, archeologists and foreign diplomats as an
ethereal space of the East, the playground of the Occident in Oriental garb.
Informed by enlightenment ideals these local chronologies presented regional
and sometimes global changes and transformations through the city's own
history and monuments at the same time as French, American and British
writings portrayed the city as one site in a "Holy" travel itinerary that sought
to recuperate Beirut into the mythological spaces of the Bible and the
spectacular sites of a thousand and one nights simultaneously. A site of
encounter between the East and West, Beirut inhabited two time zones; the
dynamic time frame and geo-political context of the Ottoman Empire on the
one hand, and the static frame of Biblical time and Oriental myth on the other.
The limits of these 19th century historical imaginary played a decisive role in
identifying the key constituents of Lebanon's identity as port and refuge and
subsequently the boundaries for reconstituting Beirut's urban and architectural
landscape as the capital of a 2 0 th century new nation state.
However, I would argue that the contexts and conditions from which Lebanese
nationalism in particular emerged were further complicated by the contentious
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relationship of Beirut to its hinterland. As we saw, and unlike many other post-
colonial contexts, the formation of Lebanon as a modem nation state owed its
existence and materialization primarily to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon
and more specifically the Maronite community. While various groups and
entities in the coastal cities of modern day Lebanon, and particularly Beirut,
envisioned various scenarios for the future of the city, imaginings which
ranged from a "Mediterranean humanism" to Pan-Arab nationalism, the
formation of modem Lebanon "annexed" the city to a smaller territorial entity-
that of the Lebanese mountains and ended Beirut's 19th century territorial
ambitions.293 In other words, the hinterland in the Lebanese nationalist project
was not constructed as either the "other" of the city, nor as its mechanism of
identification and implementation. It was central to the production of this
project. This tension between mountain and city, between cosmopolitan and
national was critical for the architectural and urban representation of this
identity and for the reconstitution of the capital city. This will be explored in
the next section.
Changes in the depictions of Beirut may also be connected to developments in
the discipline of urban history itself. The eminent historian of "Arab" cities
Andre Raymond and other urban historians have argued that our contemporary
conceptions of the Islamic city- that is a city whose structure is inherently
influenced by the Qur'an is a creation of early 20th century writings about the
colonial cities of Damascus, Fez, Rabat etc. by Sauvaget and others. Raymond
293 Infact a "Conference of the Coast" was organized in 1933 and 1936 by notables in Beirut
and Tripoli to counter the "annexation" of Beirut to the mountains. Organizer were demanding
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also suggests that this process of labeling is also partly the result of the
essentialism that accompanied Orientalism. While I agree with his analysis, I
would suggest that the process of "classifying" these cities begins to occur
much earlier in the travel literature and guides- and that it became "scientific"
knowledge in the 1920's-1930's onwards. It is through this literature that there
is an attempt is made to distinguish Beirut from other Arab cities in the
Ottoman Empire. Moreover, in contrast to North Africa, where Mediterranean
identity became a means through which modernism would be anchored to a
regional identity, the notion of the Mediterranean for Lebanon became the
means through which Lebanon's identity would be "Westernized,"
"Christianized" and separated from its surrounding Arab hinterland, and
through which the "idea" of Lebanon would be enacted.
a pan-Syrian federation.
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ection II
Staging
Modernism
Architectural
Narratives and
Historical Imaginaries
Figure 10: Amenagement de Beyrouth, Romaine
Delahalle (Source: L'Architecture Franraise, 1941)
"Historians are to nationalism what poppy growers in Pakistan are to heroin
addicts; we supply the raw material for the market." (Eric Hobsbawm,
"Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today" in Anthropology Today (8( 1): 3-
13)
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n 1934, the French language Lebanese weekly "La Revue du Liban"
published a small article by a Mr. Ab-delly, one of their regular
journalists describing an architectural project for the Western tip of
Martyr's square in Beirut. This project, designed by a M. Delahallel,
proposed a total overhaul in the status of the square and its reconfiguration as
the major sea portal of the capital of Beirut. A statue of Emir Fakhreddine was
to be placed at the key entry point of the square, and the architecture was
depicted as a melange of Phoenician and Islamic buildings. Describing his
project, the architect stated, "I wanted to design an entrance befitting of the
largest Phoenician port, the most important in the Levant. ... an indispensable
addition to the urban reconstruction and modernization that the city is
currently undergoing and which are making the capital of Lebanon the most
important port of the Eastern Mediterranean." In his introductory comments,
Ab-Delly emphasizes the importance of this project as part of the larger
framework of reconstructing a modern capital undertaken by the
municipality. 294
One can only wonder why a French architect would be giving shape to the
capital city of an emergent nation state, by hailing it as modern, Phoenician,
Islamic and Mediterranean at one and the same time. How do these
architectural/cultural metaphors relate to the general cultural and political
context of the French mandate and of Lebanese nationalism? What do these
metaphors imply regarding the relationship between colonialism and the
"national" identity of city and nation? What kind of modernist or modernizing
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agenda is presupposed and/or proposed and how does it relate to the larger
disciplinary discourse on architectural and urban modernism? In other words,
what kind of a world has to be imagined for this discourse to be possible?
Using this project amongst several others, this section will show that through a
series of interventions urban and architectural modernism was used by both
the French and the Lebanese to present the transformation of Lebanon into an
independent nation-state as a progressive act of modernization, thus helping to
conceal the politics- that is the conflicts and divisions- behind this move to
nationhood. It will also suggest that the city is implicitly present in the
evocation of nationalism, both as the agency through which this ideology gets
enacted and as the site for the articulation of a nationalist ideology. It will
argue that the specificities of mandate rule precluded the enactment of urban
politics similar to those implemented in other colonial contexts such as North
Africa. Consequently French authorities adopted a dialectical approach to the
urban environment. While reform of urban laws, begun by the Ottomans in the
19th century and aggressively promoted by the French after WWI irrevocably
transformed public (and private) life in the city, the implemented change in
architectural syntax and type ingrained a particular view of the country and of
its capital Beirut. Despite the conflicts which accompanied the establishment
of Greater Lebanon, this view sought to re-present the newly founded nation-
state as cohesive, modern and rooted in its "natural" frontiers, a testimony to
France's mission Civilisatrice and a critical node in its external economic and
political interests. In the process the discourse around modernity and the
294 R. Delahalle, Revue du Liban, 1934.
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history and character of Beirut became intimately intertwined with 19th century
Biblical, archeological and touristic accounts. It was a modernism rooted in
"history."
These arguments will be made through a series of interrelated narratives that
move through the rubble of collapsed buildings and in-between architectural
representations, urban reforms and historical debates. The aim of these
narratives is to not only highlight the conflicting agendas which governed
French rule in Lebanon and their relationship to politics in the metropole, but
also to shed light on the dialectical process by which a specific kind of
nationalist discourse entailed a particular approach to the urban environment
was formed, one which continues to permeate public culture in Lebanon today.
What I am particularly interested in here are the ideological, cultural and
historical contexts necessary for the production of a certain kind of knowledge.
This interest stems from questioning the role that architectural objects play in
inscribing certain spaces with a nation's "identity" hence placing much of its
"history" beyond the realm of discussion.
This section will explore the interconnections between politics and cultural
production specifically the effort to use architecture and urban design from
ornamental motifs to changing urban and municipal regulations will be
discussed as part of a complex political agenda. While many historians have
focused on the political aspects of creating a national community in Lebanon,
this section will focus on the physical and social processes were meant to forge
this nation together. This is not to say that all architecture and urban planning
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and design are mere reflections of external political forces. Rather it is an
attempt to historicize the complicity between architectural and urban
production and the larger cultural and political context in which it takes place.
It will therefore explore several interrelated themes. From an institutional
perspective, it will show the degree to which the "continuation" of this project;
that is of modernizing and of controlling Beirut by French mandate authorities
and Lebanese government officials and intellectuals became emblematic on
political, cultural, social and economic levels of both the process of nation
building and the construction of a new nation-state and the extent to which this
process continued to be entangled in 1 9 th century narratives of Lebanon's now
national identity. In this instance the city becomes the site par excellence in
which national identity is forged and the instrument through which it is
articulated. Consequently, it will argue, that the projects undertaken were not
meant to spur comprehensive urban reform. Rather they were meant to
respond to the specific economic and political needs of the period. It will also
suggest that the specificities of the mandate rule itself precluded the kind of
comprehensive urban reform witnessed in other French colonies and thus
"hindered" the full application of France's "civilizing mission.
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The French Mandate: War, Planning and
Political Transitions
Ihe beginning of WWI in 1914 marked the end of what had been a
relatively long period of stability, economic growth and prosperity
that had begun in 1880 due to both Ottoman reforms and the
adaptation of local trade to worldwide economic conditions. As
discussed in section I, the centralization of the state helped improve security
conditions in rural areas thus encouraging farmers to cultivate more land while
the infusion of French capital into the silk industry created a boom in Mount
Lebanon leading to extensive employment and manufacturing opportunities.
At the same time, European investments in infrastructure such as railways,
roads and ports provided additional and more efficient trade opportunities and
helped increase the wealth of local merchants. This in turn lead to the
emergence of a new land owning bourgeoisie that benefited from extensive
ties to European capitalism. This generation in wealth was accompanied by a
population boom leading to its near doubling within this same period.295
Even though much has been written by contemporary historians, social
scientists and other academics about the political, military, social, economic
and even cultural aspects of WWI and its aftermath in the West, these accounts
have rarely included a discussion of the trauma and suffering that befell the
295 See Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy (London, New York: Methuen, 1981) p.
224-264; Issawi, Fertile Crescent, p. 9-39; Khoury, Urban Notables, Thompson, Colonial
Citizens, p. 24-38.
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Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Beginning with the increased
conscription of men into the army,296 the declaration of the state of war and
emergency throughout the empire, the appropriation of the Ottoman army of
all modes of public transportation and finally the famine that struck the area,
these events shattered completely the prevailing social order, and, "cut wide
cleavages between the rich and the poor, Muslim and Christian, ... and fueled a
mad and cut throat competition between citizen and state, peasant and
landlord, consumer and merchant, even parent and child." 297 In particular, the
famine has been singled out by contemporary chronicles of the inter war and
post WWI period as the single most devastating social event of the period, far
more significant than the war itself. By 1918 an estimated 500,000 people are
said to have died from hunger and disease in the area of Greater Syria (today's
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Israel). 298 When combined with military
fatalities, estimated by George Antonious at around 150,000 (or one in six
adult males living in 1914), the percentage of casualties from the geographic
provinces of Syria, rises to around 18% of a pre-war 3.5 million population.
As Thompson points out, this by far exceeded the mortality rates of the
countries hardest hit by the war; namely France and Germany both of which
lost less than 5% of their pre-war populations.
296 By late 1916, the Ottomans were conscripting all Muslim and Christian men between the
ages of 17-55, (except for those in Mount Lebanon) into an army whose ranks eventually
swelled to 2.85 million troops.
297 Thompson, Colonial Citizens p. 19
298 Thompson Colonial Citizens, p. 21-28 and list other sources including George Antonius The
Arab Awakening
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In this context, Beirut fared quite badly. By mid 1916, the city's population
had been reduced from 180,000 to 75,000 due to military conscriptions, the
ever-increasing exodus out of the city either on board Italian steamships or on
local trains hired by the municipality to take people to Damascus and death
caused by the famine. While most young men were conscripted into the
Ottoman army never to return, the poorest of the poor, unable to pay the
subsidized fees of travel or to locate alternative accommodations abroad or
even in Damascus, stayed behind along with a few notable families. The
ottoman authorities under various pretexts deported many families to Anatolia
or other parts of the empire. Fuel and foodstuff shortages meant that a greater
portion of the surviving populations spent the war years hungry and cold. The
American consul described Beirut's streets in July 1916 as "filled with
starving women and children... In my early evening walks I frequently see
people lying dead in the gutter."299 Diseases, especially typhus and malaria
were rampant and bread riots were everywhere from Aleppo to Jerusalem.
With the development of the war, the gradual disintegration of the economy,
the banking moratorium, the ranks of the poor, the number of female-headed
households and of orphans and orphanages increased dramatically.30 0 The dire
economic situation was further exacerbated by the devaluation of the currency
through the introduction and imposition of paper money in lieu of Gold coins
through a series of laws promulgated between June 13, 1915 and September
299 Quoted in Thompson, ibid, p. 20
30) Nicholas Ajay Jr., Mount Lebanon and the Wilayah of Beirut, 1914-1918: The war Years
(Unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1973); Antun Yammin, Lubnanf al-
harb : aw-dhikrd al-hawadith wa-al-mazalim f Lubnan f al-harb al-umumiyah, 1914-1919
/ bi-qalam [Lebanon during the war: Memory of Events in Lebanon in the general war, 1914-
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25 1918, which drove pnces up considerably. In tandem debtors took
advantage of the dramatically fluctuating exchange rates to accrue wealth from
now destitute populations?OI Various prominent families were said to have
amassed fortunes during this period either through grain speculation that
boosted prices far beyond what the poor could pay, or by buying up the
properties of individuals on the brink of starvation.302 Stories of peasants
selling their homes and lands for a loaf of bread or an orange and of real estate
speculators buying up entire neighborhoods abounded. In due course and as
we shall see shortly in the discussions and the implementation of the Etoile
project, these events were to cause considerable controversy in the post-war
period.
\oJ
Figure 11: The arrival of General Allenby to
Beirut, 1919 (Source: author's collection)
19181 (Lebanon, 1920); Dodge, David Stuart Memorials of William E. Dodge. (New York:
A.D.F. Randolph, I887);Thompson, Colonial Citizens, p. 32
3D! A black market sprung up as a result of these actions with disastrous consequences for the
local populations. On the one hand, those with pre-war debts in Gold coins took advantage of
the situation to settle their debts much more cheaply. On the other hand, local money handlers
both manipulated the exchange rates from Gold to paper money. Similarly, families borrowed
money from well know debtors to tide them over the war period only to find in the post-war
period that the lOU's they signed were not for the 100 Turkish liras they had received but for
the same amount in pound sterling. What made it worse was the high interest loans they had
been forced to pay. George Ashqar quotes in Ajay, The war years, p. 325
302 BMM, 1919-1920 for further discussion of this issue
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On October 1s t, 1919 French troops landed in Damascus. One week later, on
October 8th they entered Beirut to find a city partially demolished by interwar
reconstruction efforts, an economy exhausted by a war blockade, and a
predominantly hostile population decimated by famine and war. Around
100,000 Armenian refugees fleeing Turkish genocide had also arrived in the
area and were housed in Beirut's Qarantina quarter in makeshift housing and
in other parts of the country. Institutionally, the city had been cut off from its
capital Istanbul and the municipality was the main locally functioning city-
level organization. More critically for the French, following the departure of
the Ottoman Vali, an Arab government was formed in Beirut under the
leadership of Omar Daouk, the president of the municipality who swore
allegiance to Emir Faycal before lifting the Arab flag over the municipality
housed in the Petit Serail in al Borj square.303 Chukri Ayoub, Prince Faycal's
designated governor for Beirut and Mount Lebanon also arrived in Beirut. At
the insistence of Ali Salam, a prominent Sunni notable and one of the most
influential figures in Beirut of the period, Habib Pacha al Saad, the president
of the Administrative council of the Mutassarifiya, was instated as the
governor of Mount Lebanon swearing his oath of allegiance to the Emir. Upon
arrival the French took over the port of Beirut, dissolved the Arab government,
303 The Arabs under the leadership of Cherif Hussein had been offered full independence by the
allies during WWI if they were to rise up against the Ottomans and aid allied efforts in the
region. Hussein was promised an Arab Kingdom that spanned most of the countries of the
region. His son King Faycal was to be installed in Syria.
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removed the flag from the top of the S6rail and took over the administration of
the city and the region.3 4 Beirut was now officially under French mandate.
Faycal and French/British Rivalry
However, the conflict between Prince Faycal and his men did not end there.
The St Remo agreement, (which formally divided up the Ottoman Levant
amongst the British and the French), was declared null by Faycal as he
successfully set about establishing his rule in Syria with the blessing of
occupying British forces. British officers did everything they could to
undermine France's position and prestige in the area.305 The French construed
Faycal's success as a deliberate plot by the British to capture territory
rightfully belonging to France. The fact that British troops in the area (45,000)
greatly outnumbered French troops (8,000 mostly colonial troops stationed in
Cilicia) also served to weaken French position. Attempts by the local French
High Commissioner to bolster up their numbers were vetoed by General
Allenby. By 1919, the French realized that a reassessment of their policies was
necessary. Prodded by George-Picot the high commissioner of the period, the
French government launched an extensive campaign both to strengthen
France's position and prestige in the area and to counter anti French
propaganda engendered both by Faycal's followers and British officers.
Intensive lobbying to weaken Muslim resistance to the French mandate was
34 For further information on this particularly turbulent period see, Philip Khoury, Urban
Notables; Mir Zamir The Formation of Modem Lebanon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985);
Gerard Khoury La France et L'orient Arabe, Naissance du Liban moderne, 1914-1920, (Paris:
Armand Colin 1993).
305 Mir Zamir, Modern Lebanon, p.55. See also Khoury, Urban Notables
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launched as the French prepared for battle against Faycal and his supporters.
Contacts, until now limited to the main Christian groups and notables were
established with the other communities in the country such as the Druze and
the Shiites.306 The army was bolstered with soldiers from their African
colonies whilst Faycal, now proclaimed King, gathered his troops from all
over the region. Both armies clashed at the battle of Maysaloun in which
Syrian forces were defeated. Following this defeat, the French entered
Damascus on July 25, 1920 proclaiming and enforcing their mandate over the
region. In September of the same year, General Gouraud, the French
Commissioner declared the creation of "The State of Greater Lebanon," with
Beirut as its capital.
Between Mandate and Colony
In addition to the differing "nationalist" positions adopted by the various
groups in Lebanon the identity politics of this period were further complicated
by the political structure of the mandate that both modem day Lebanon and
Syria were placed under. 30 Defined by the Covenant of Nations as " a sacred
trust of civilization" the mandate straddled the divide between colony and
protectorate. It was viewed as a compromise between the principle of self-
determination and the principle of partition. Mandate authorities were
officially required to "guide" the nations placed under their control towards
sovereignty, democracy and independence, regardless of their own interests. It
306 For example, as a result of French rapprochement to these groups, the Druze refrained from
recognizing Faycal as King.
37 See Section I, Part II.
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was a political system untried elsewhere that required mandate authorities
themselves to conceive of and implement the administrative principles of
mandate rule. Since France was required by its covenant to prepare and
promulgate a constitution (within three years) and to facilitate the progressive
development of Syria and Lebanon as independent states the highly politicized
task of giving the mandate concrete physical form became quite distinct from
other colonial contexts. This was epitomized by General Weygand's response
in 1924 to a question from a member of Lyon's Chamber of Commerce as to
what Syrian products should be displayed in the city's colonial museum, with
"politically I cannot call Syria a colony."308
The mandate system posed a new challenge for the French; to develop a new
model of governance distinct from protectorate or colony but that still allowed
them to develop their colonial ideas. As General Catroux, a key figure in this
period who was charged with creating the administrative set up of the mandate
within the bounds of article 22 of the United Nations Charter would state in his
memoir "It was an attribute with a very imprecise foundation." 309 He describes
it as "finding a formula to reconcile two opposing principles; the independence
of Syria and the obligation placed on these countries of being under foreign
tutelage."3 0 Therefore, he continues, while the first of these principles
303 Weygand quoted in Thompson, Colonial Citizens p. 62
309 General Catroux came three times to the Levant. Between 1919-1922, at the request of
General Gouraud, the French high commissioner at the time he organized the administrative
set up of the mandate. Again between 1926-1930 he led the French administration in the
Levant and after joining General de Gaulle in 1940 he took over the Liberal French troops in
the Levant in 1942. George Catroux, Deux Mission au Moyen Orient 1919-1922, (Paris:
Librairie Plon, 1958), p. 57.
310 Ibid, p. 86
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excludes the direct control of the country by French officers but rather
postulates the existence of a national independent Syrian government, the
second principle requires that this government act only under the guidance of
French representatives. In addition, there was also the issue that General
Gouraud, was used to ruling the "less developed" Africans and not a more
"developed and civilized" populations. Consequently, Catroux proposed a
system in which the Lebanese and Syrian governments would function as
liberal and independent entities and the mandate authorities as a technical
consulting body thus allowing the mandate, according to Catroux, to intervene
in the "least perceptible manner." Referring directly to Lord Cromer, the
British model of indirect rule was proposed by Catroux as the most suitable
example for mandate rule. 311 Technical consultants were attached to the
various newly created ministries and government offices as well as existing
institutions. 312 They worked with the local organizations and reported directly
to the High Commissioners office. In practice successive high commissioners
in Lebanon played a distinct and visible role in drawing out the contours of
political participation, and in identifying economic and urban policies.313
This system was further complicated by the inherent conflict at the heart of the
mandate system, pointed to by various historians; that is the opposition
311 Catroux explicitly refers to the example of Lord Cromer in Egypt as his main inspiration for
the mandate system he proposed. Lord Cromer he says discreetly influenced political, social
and economic affairs in Egypt with a handful of high functionaries under the title of 'the Agent
of Her British Majesty.' ibid, p.86-88
312 He continues, seven consultants were appointed, each in a different ministry, functioning
"as the minister's collaborators as well as mine and allowing me [Catroux] to follow the
evolution of projects through these intermediaries" ibid, p. 88
313Mir Zamir, Lebanon's Quest:; Zamir Modern Lebanon; Thompson, Colonial Citizens
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between the legal and moral conception of the mandate, and the real self-
interest of the French government. It resulted in contradictory politics and
hindered the French mandate's ability to govern and organize the territories
effectively. Officially, mandate authorities were required to guide both nations
towards sovereignty, democracy and independence, regardless of their own
interests. In reality, France's claim to a mandate in Syria and Lebanon was
based on its historic, cultural, economic, and military interest in the area that
included considerable economic investments that needed to be protected as
well as an ongoing bitter politico-military rivalry with Britain for control over
the area.31 4 As Shambrook effectively points out, "what the Syrians [and the
Lebanese] witnessed, in large measure, were the high commissioner's practical
endeavors to carry out the latter, whilst he publicly continued to declare his
faithfulness to the former." 315 This fact will become more evident in the impact
314France's claim to a mandate in Syria and Lebanon was made through historic, cultural,
economic, and military arguments. On the eve of World War I French capital amounted to
45% of all foreign investment in the Ottoman Empire while French financiers controlled about
60% of all Ottoman debt. In Beirut, direct French financial investment was estimated at F200
million. (Carolyn Gates, The Historical Role of Political Economy in the Development of
Modern Lebanon, (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, Papers on Lebanon, no. 10, 1989), p.
13. The scale of investment led to the development of an extraverted commercial activity at
the expense of local products.
315 Peter Shambrook, "Maintaining the Mandate: High Commissioner Henri Ponsot in Syria,
1926-1933" in The French Mandate in Lebanon, (Seminar, Center for Lebanese Studies,
Oxford, 1994), p. 17. However as a quick overview of the daily papers of the period indicates
this issue generated intense and heated debate in the local papers especially Al Maarad whose
editor, Michel Zaccour, was a member of parliament. For example, several articles questioning
the "so called" independence of Lebanon and its status within French Politics were printed.
"Are we a Colony? Michel Zaccour would ask in 1924. Written in response to Lebanon being
listed as a colony in a Parisian post office and in the Echo de Paris one of France's dailies, the
article along with subsequent correspondence in al Maarad including a response by the Echo
de Paris, went on to expand on the notion of a colony so as to explain why Lebanon, a separate
entity from Syria, could and should not be considered as one- a label that locals saw as
humiliating (Al Maarad, 1921-1936)
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of private interests on the urban development of the city and the delimitation
of its boundaries.
In contrast to its North African colonies or protectorates, French policy in
Lebanon was not one of integration and transformation of the population, nor
of association. Rather, it was based on cooperation between colonizer and
colonized, within the framework of local institutions. In other words, the
structure of the mandate itself meant that the myth of the clean slate in which
the colonizers could operate and which was exemplified by General Lyautey's,
statement that "in these new states, the ground belonged to no one" was not
feasible in Lebanon. 316 All of these objectives, however, must be placed
within the framework of France's larger Mission Civilisatrice and the shift in
French policy from assimilation to association. This shift in policy, also
coincided with the rise of regionalism and organic nationalism within France
itself and which would subsequently impact French approach to the urban and
architectural environment in the colonies.
316 It is important to point out is mandate attitudes towards the Lebanese and the Syrians were
not constant. Towards the beginning of the mandate, and as one French observer remarked,
"the French...did not grasp the special obligations of the mandate, but treated the country as if
it were a French colony... and at least in the early part of the Mandatory period they did not
hesitate to express their contempt for the Arabs." This contempt, according to leading
editorials and cartoons during the period, was reflected in "the use of Senegalese troops first to
expel Faycal and then on garrison duty in Syria and Lebanon" Albert Hourani, Lebanon and
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Mission Civilisatrice and Republican Ideals
The French Mission Civilisatrice is by now a well-recognized tenant of French
colonial policy throughout the world. Michel Adas argues that the most
significant element of French civilization in the modern era was faith in the
scientific and technological supremacy of the West, a key tenant in the mission
civilisatrice.31 7 Lewis Pyenson went even further and claimed that the essence
of the civilizing mission was a disinterested desire by French (among other
Europeans) scholars to spread Western "exact" sciences around the globe.318
However as Alice Conklin argues, while the material control of nature through
science and technology was certainly central to French definitions of
civilization, it always shared pride of place with a belief that republican France
had achieved unparalleled supremacy in the moral, cultural and social spheres
as well.3 9 In her Mission to Civilize she traces the origins of the French
mission civilisatrice, and its application in French West Africa. Rooted in
French republican ideals of personal and political mastery, she argues that the
French understood their role in the world to be a call to civilize the indigenous
people of the colonies who despite their primitive status were still capable of
progress. She also points to the connections between and the impact of the
civilizing mission and politics in the metropole.
Syria, (1946). Moreover, the different personalities and ideologies of the successive high
commissioners had some impact on the way mandate rule was carried out.
317 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of
Western Dominance, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
318 Lewis Pyenson, Civilizing Mission: Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830-
1940, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
319 Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West
Africa, 1895-1930, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997).
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This belief in the civilizing mission of France lead in the nineteenth century to
what became known as the policy of assimilation in which colonized people
were meant to benefit from the adoption of French civilization. Raymond Betts
argues that through assimilation the colonial possessions of La Plus Grande
France would "become an integral if noncontiguous part of the mother
country, with its society and population made over-to whatever extent
possible- in her image."320 Under this policy, France and her colonies were
conceived as one united body, under the same flag and ruled by a single
legislative body; the parliament. Here, Algeria, colonized in 1830, and
considered by many as a departure point in French colonial policy and the first
campaign justified in the name of the civilizing mission, embodies the most
immediate and visible impact of this policy.32 ' During the 1830's and 1840's
the country was "pacified" or subjugated militarily through the systematic
destruction of its people, culture, property and land or what became known as
razzia. As David Prochaska outlines in his seminal Making Algeria French,
this process of assimilation or pacification was systematic whereby the French
first occupied the buildings in Bone, second, they appropriated the plains on
the outskirts of the city, third they took over cork oak forests, fourth they
mined for minerals and finally they displaced the Algerians and peopled the
city of Bone with Europeans.32 2 Through this policy the fabric of Algerian
social and economic life was decimated, cities and towns were destroyed and
320 Raymond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) quoted in Morton, 184.
321 Infact, the Egyptian expedition in many ways served as a precedent to the Algerian
conquest and was used as a model for further action in Algeria. See Conklin, ibid, p. 10-20.
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then reconstructed in French style, while French schools were established and
a French provincial government installed.323
At the turn of the century, and with the advent of social Darwinism,
nationalism, theories of social evolution and the example of Dutch and British
colonial administration, French policy was transformed to one of association
even as it implicitly retained some aspects of assimilation.324 On the one hand,
British forms of "indirect rule" by which native elites administered their
colonies served as a model for French colonial governance. On the other hand,
Darwin and Spencer's theories of evolution proposed relativistic theories of
race and geography thus encasing civilizational differences within an
unbreacheable structure of thinking. The basic tenants of association were a
stated respect for indigenous cultures and traditions, the involvement of local
elites in the decision making process, and the belief that while the uplifting of
these inferior races was the ultimate goal of this policy, the slow pace of
evolution placed this goal in the far future. Through association the colonial
administration enforced strict political, institutional, cultural and social
segregation between the natives and their European colonizers. The main
argument was that if indigenous populations had their own structures, how
could the French impose a new civilizational structure on them that, as
322 David Prochaska Making Algeria French
323 See also Celik, Algeria
324 For example, the institutional and cultural structures established under assimilation in
Algeria, Senegal and other "old" colonies were sustained. Jacques Thobie et al., Histoire de la
France coloniale, (Paris:Armand Colin, 1990), p. 33-35. See also Betts, Assimilation and
Association ibid.
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Conklin suggests, may eventually threaten the colonizers own political
ascendancy in these areas.
This change in policy constituted a significant shift in French ideology. Albert
Sarrault, a prominent advocate of association, a former minister of the
colonies, and governor of Indochina, best summarized the relationship of the
colonies to France in his La Mise en Valeur des Colonies Fran:aises. He
stated
"Instead of adapting all our prot6ges by force to the conditions
of the mttropole, according to the old assimilationist error, it
must be understood that under our tutelage, their evolution
should be perused in keeping with their civilization, their
traditions, their milieu, their social life, their secular institutions
that we can no doubt improve, reinvigorate intelligently, by
infusing them with the useful wisdom of modem progress...
Accordingly, and since conditions in the colonies varied considerably from
one to another as well as within each colony, he goes on to suggest, indigenous
policy in Indochina and Madagascar could be geared towards education whilst
that of equatorial Africa should be more "medical and alimentary" since their
inhabitants were less intelligent.326 Encased within the larger mission
325 Albert Sarrault La Mise en valeur p.114-118. See also Christopher M. Andrew and A.S.
Kanya-Forestner France Overseas The Great War and the Climax of the French Imperial
Expansion, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981).
326 Sarrault's theories were based to a large extent on those of George Papillaut, professor at
the Ecole d'anthropologie, who believed that anthropology could give us facts on the
"aptitudes and the value of colonized races and their relationship to the Metropole. He
summarized the application of his racial theories to French indigenous politics as: "1) North
Africa, Syria etc. are peopled by white races of a very evolved condition. Their progressive
assimilation to French civilization is possible and desirable. 2) The Negroids of Africa and of
the pacific can be, in a certain degree educated, not assimilated; 3) The Malagasy natives are
Negroid crossbreeds [metis]. They can be educated not assimilated; 4) The Indochinese natives
are cross breeds of Veddoids and Negroids. They can be, educated, not assimilated; 5) Among
these three last groups, a slow assimilation can be made by more and more frequent cross
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civilisatrice the associationist doctrine would allow the easy coexistence, in
the eyes of its contemporaries, of racism with republican ideals.
Adapted to its fullest by Mar6chal Lyautey in the Moroccan Protectorate
established in 1912, the policy of association insured strict political, cultural
and physical segregation between the colonizers and the natives. European
cities were constructed adjacent to indigenous medinas, traditional government
structures were retained under direct French control, indigenous arts and crafts
were preserved and encouraged and an architecture based on native precedent
was instituted. More critically, these policies enacted visibly the difference
between European and native, French and Moroccan, thus displaying the
primacy of French culture whilst mummifying native society as part of a
traditional, timeless orient.327 Here the colonies acted as a laboratory for
civilizing techniques that for a variety of reasons could not be implemented in
the metropole. As Wright argues, "the colonies provided more than the ideal
laboratory so often evoked, and more than the mirror we might refer to today.
They functioned like a magnifying glass, revealing with startling clarity the
ambitions and fears, the techniques and policies that pertained at home, here
carried out almost without restraints." 328
breeding with the French" Papillaut quoted in Patricia Morton Hybrid Modernities:
Architecture and Representation at the 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris (Cambridge, MA,
London, UK: MIT Press, 2000), p. 189. Accordingly, the forms of colonial rule were adjusted
in keeping with the place of individual races in this hierarchy.
327 Even though both Wright and Celik show how associationist ideas influenced colonial
architecture in Morocco Indochina, Madagascar and Algeria, neither author explored the
relationship between the principle of association and the ideology of the mission civilisatrice.
Wright, Politics of Design; Celik, Algeria
32 Wright, Politics of Design, p. 306.
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Regionalism and Organic Nationalism
This move from assimilationist to associationist policies coincided with the
rise of the regionalist movement in France that advocated the revival of
regional culture linked to right wing nationalism.329 Initially the regionalist
movement emerged in the third republic as a protest against the cultural
ascendancy of Paris, the effacement of provincial differences under the banner
of national solidarity, the centralization of all architectural decision-making
and the incessant classicism that pervaded architectural production. This
protest appeared most clearly during the universal exposition of 1898, which
took place in Paris. During the exhibition, Lucien Lefort, who presided over a
provincial professional association announced the decentralization of practical
education in architecture by challenging the authority of both the Beaux Arts
and the power of the Conseil des Batiments Civil over provincial architects.
He also denounced the uniformity of architectural production brought about by
political centralization and demanded that architects pay closer attention to
materials, techniques, artisans and the customs of their regions. In October of
the same year, most regional associations got together at Bourges and founded
L'Association provinciale des architectes Franfaise.330 The association
claimed that the past of France lay in France and not in the edifices of Greece
329 The roots of the regionalist movements have been traced back by various authors to the mid
19'-h century and the work of the geographer Proudhon in particular. However it only ascended
with full force on the French scene at the end of the century. This discussion is base on the
excellent discussion of the regionalist movement by Jean-Claude Vigato, L'Architecture
Regionaliste, (Paris: Norma editions, 1994); Rabinow, French Modern.
330 Charles-Brun was a professor at the College Libre des Sciences Sociales and the Institut de
Droit International de Paris and Secretary General of the Socit6 Proudhon. He was an admirer
of Pierre Joseph Proudhon and in 1921 he edited and prefaced Proudhon's 1863 essay Du
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of Rome and that local architecture was opposed to archaeology in the same
way that the picturesque was opposed to academism. Cultural and architectural
inspiration was therefore to be located in a rustic style that responded to the
daily needs of its inhabitants. Within 2-3 years eight regional schools were
created.
Two years later, the link between regionalism and right-wing nationalism was
forged through the creation of the Federation Regionalist Francaise. Founded
in 1900 by Jean Charles-Brun, the federation included leading figures of the
third republic such as Maurice Barres, Paul Doumer, Paul Vidal de la Blanche
and Jean Brunhes.331 Through the FRF, Charles Mauras and Maurice Barres
created the link between the regionalist movement, human geography and
nationalism by referencing the work of Barres, a native of Lorraine, who
accused republican ideology and institutions of rootlessness and espoused a
form of cultural nationalism based in Catholicism, the monarchy, and a respect
Principe fidratif (The federative principle) that became one of the political cornerstones of
the regionalist movement.
331 Maurice Barres, a well known political figure who became the foremost speaker and thinker
for the French radical right was instrumental in tying the geographic regionalism advocated by
Proudhon and others to a nationalist ideology through his La Terre et les Morts in which he
identified the province as the basic unit of France and appealed to the individual authenticity of
each province by emphasizing the power of the land. His subsequent work Une enquete aux
pays du Levant, published in 1923 following a pre-WWI visit to the area would have a
considerable impact on initial French policy in Lebanon. This latter book is saturated with
romantic images of the Orient and of Beirut's role as the beacon from which to morally
conquer the Orient through the Christian Syrians and the French missionaries. His work
influenced Charles Corm one of the leading advocates of Lebanon's Phoenician identity,
whom we will encounter shortly. Paul Doumer was governor of Indochina and would become
President of France, Paul Vidal de la Blanche and Jean Bruhhes were leading geographers of
their time.
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for one's ancestors, blood and soil.332 Likening this from of conscious
association with ancestors to the transfer of the family home through different
generations Barre's doctrines reflected the intellectual changes of turn of the
century Europe that brought together racism, Darwinism, and anti-positivism.
He believed in attachment to the country and soil, yet saw the need to
reconcile tradition and industrialization. Accordingly, the FRF presented an
apolitical electoral program that called for economic, administrative and
intellectual decentralization along regional lines rejecting what they saw as
arbitrary Napoleonic departments. The new social sciences, particularly
geography was to provide the knowledge necessary for rational reform, whilst
respect for soil, climate and materials became the trademarks of a regionalist
architect. They believed that respect of regional diversity would weld the
nation together through a harmonious blending of modernism and popular or
rustic art. Leandre Vaillat,333 architectural critic and journalist would establish
one of the most direct links between nationalism and the arts when he stated
that nationalism was "the desire to localize, to situate an art, to adapt it and to
harmonize it with...what Taine has called the 'milieu"' thus making "national
unity and provincial diversity his credo".334 In this context, Vaillat interpreted
classicism as a "rtgionalisme urbaine", while regional styles become local
332 Barring some differences these ideas were quite similar to parallel to German movement,
best represented by Tessenow et al
333 Vaillat (1876-1952) was a novelist, journalist and one of the most influential architectural
critics of his time. He liked touristic "literature" on Morocco, Tunisia, and the Savoi. He wrote
several essays on Paris and the Ille de France as well as essays on the history of Art, decorative
art, urbanism, and a small co-authored work on theories of architecture entitled Le Rythme de
L'architecture with Louis Sue. Tired of the decorative fantasies of the Art Noveau, Vaillat
became a powerful advocate of architectural regionalism.
334 Vaillat, quoted in Viagto, L'architecture rigionaliste, p. 72 & 196
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adaptations of a national style.33 5 These ideas were also adopted by a host of
other regionalist organizations that sought to emphasize the cultural
distinctiveness of each region. Provincial societies were formed, costumed
preserved, regional crafts promoted, regional theater invented, local historians
resurrected. Many of these cultural ideas were later taken up by the business
and tourism industries.
Regionalist architects, such as Charles Letrosne and Gustave Umbdenstock
amongst many others championed traditional forms while employing modern
materials and construction methods.336 A relationship was established between
form (pre-determined according to institution- school, bank, post-office) and
ornament that by necessity had to be regional, so as to evoke a sense of
belonging for residents and citizens. Rather than a mimetic imitation of the
past, they attempted to reflect the character of a region by abstracting local
forms into new modern ones. While new forms of production, the uniformity
of "modern time" and of relations were accepted the "cubism" of the German
school and the "dressed down" simplicity of its architectural forms were
rejected. Architecture's role was to mediate between the demands of the
present- as modern and traditional at one and the same time. As Leandre
Vaillat would later argue, architectural regionalism was neither "a masquerade
335 In the arts, Romy Golany argues that the revival of landscape painting in the aftermath of
WWI is directly linked to the quest for a return to regional culture. "For its ultimate goal-the
reaffirmation of French cultural supremacy after the ravages of WWI- was inextricably part of
the larger history of French nationalism... [landscape painting] participated in a specific
regionalist identity that linked France's cultural vitality to the strength of its rootedness in the
soil" Golany quoted in Morton, Hybrid Modernities, p. 190).
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nor a perpetual copying of past styles" but rather an "adaptation of ancient
forms to new needs- a formula of conciliation between the consuls of the past
and the demands of the present." The political role of such architecture
Letrosne would claim was to imbue administrative buildings with a regional
flavor. In a description of the Savoie post office that he constructed he
suggested that it represented a promotional space for the scientific evolution of
society; "a moral bond erected by the law, the usage between a central
administration and more modest citizens... [and] through its savings bank, it
maintains the economic spirit of the nation." 337 However, as Vigato illustrates,
the political function of regionalist architecture was not limited to patriotic
sentiments and the "nationalization" of local architecture. By dressing up local
branches of central institutions such as banks and post offices in regional
costumes, architecture gives a familiar and reassuring face to new modes of
exchange and production, to new economies, to a different conception of time
that disrupts the cyclical pattern of rural life. Architecture here becomes
complicit in deluding local inhabitants, in "helping them forget" the evident
centralization of new power relations.
Debates between the regionalists and the modernists on architectural aesthetics
and how best to reconstruct devastated regions in the post WWI era, were
dominated by the regionalists who believed that "the new France...was to give
336 See Vigato, L'architecture rgionaliste for a detailed exposition of the work of different
architects, their role in the diffusion of regionalism, as well as the transformations of its tenants
over time.
337 Letrosne, quoted in Vigato, ibid, p. 147- 148
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the world an example of beauty."3 38 As Le Corbusier's Vers une architecture
was printed in 1923, Charles Letrosne published his Murs et toits pour les pays
chez nous" that became the architectural bible of all regionalists. Based on
visits and descriptions of 24 regions or departments, the institutional needs of
individual locals (the police station, municipality, etc.) and architectural
aesthetics to be employed in their construction were outlined. The book also
included a critique of past eclecticism and a "false picturesque" based on what
he termed as "badly interpreted provincial archaeology."339 It was a
"progressive agenda that aimed to have a "definition of France through the
edifices of France" that included new conceptions of communal life that
differed from the pre-war period by including new activities emblematic of
modern life such as cinema, bookstore, banks etc... Criticizing the dictum of a
house is a machine for living in espoused by Le Corbusier L'esprit Nouveau
Vaillat argued "a house is not a factory where we work... a house certainly has
to respond to logic, to reason, to good sense, and thank God we find these
[elements} abundantly in our national and regional traditions without recourse
to the German-suis rationalism." 340 In Vaillat's discourse, the cubic forms of
pre-cast concrete recalled the "Muslim city" thus indicating the banality of
modernist propositions, already anticipated by Viollet-le-Duc's use of gothic
cathedrals in chalets.
This position was countered by a host of architects and critics including Le
Corbusier's whose disdain of regionalism was clearly outlined in his Towards
338 Vigato, ibid, p. 139.
339 Ibid, p. 141
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a New Architecture where he declared "Think of it: we have arrived rightly
and out of breath to regionalism! Ouf! And what is more comical is that it is
the devastation of the country that is leading us. Infront of the immense task of
reconstructing everything- basically rather than reconstruct we spend time in
commission upon commission." However, whilst laughing at a movement that
asks a train company to build 30 different stations in 30 different styles, his
chapter on the decorative arts of today inaugurated a paradoxical attitude
toward folklore, which oscillated between a profound respect for authentic
popular art but a notion that it had arrived at its end. In his last autobiographic
chapter Le Corbusier addresses Leandre Vaillat directly: "See Mr. Leandre
Vaillat, that I also am a long time regionalist" and proceeds by listing the
itinerary of his celebrated Voyage to the Orient listed under three headings I
(Industry) F (Folklore) and C (Culture). From this perspective "popular art
floats on the surface of the highest civilizations. It becomes a norm, a sort of
measure... of the human race- the savage if you want. "3 41
Notwithstanding these debates, the development of regionalist architecture
flourished with the expansion of tourism, the suburbs, post WWI
reconstruction and the movement of troops. The international expositions, the
press, architectural societies, academic and professional associations,
journalists and art critics all played a critical role in the diffusion of regionalist
ideas and their architectural manifestations. Regionalist architecture began to
appear in France namely through beach houses, suburban villas, touristic
340 Ibid, p. 195.
341 ibid, p. 137
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hotels and resorts, schools, railways; that is in structures that were meant to
reflect "modem" living, through forms "derived" from the land itself. These
ideas were also clearly reflected in the colonies and in representations of these
colonies such as international expositions.
In short, regionalism transferred the notion of association and its civilizing
agenda into a metropolitan context that necessitated a new series of nuances.
Rather than separate between colonizer and native, association in the
m6tropole used architecture to ingrain notions of national identity within a
regional context. This shift in approach was in turn transferred to the newly
mandated territories where it was to have a decisive shape of architectural and
urban production of Beirut.
Economics as an antidote to politics
The first years of the mandate inaugurated what would become the
predominant French attitude towards the consolidation of the country. To
avoid the more troubling political challenges facing them; namely the demand
by Syrian and Lebanese nationalists for independence, interest in the economic
development of the territories was used, as an "antidote to politics" which in
this case included urban politics. Modernity was presented in Lebanon
primarily as an economic and infrastructural improvement; the stagnant state
of which was blamed on 400 years of Ottoman neglect. Modernization was
interpreted as the facilitation of the objectifiable and measurable time of
capitalist civilization. The transformation of Lebanon was presented as an act
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of modernization, a "move" as French administrators and bureaucrats would
describe it, "from an autocratic empire to a modem nation-state." It was a
rhetoric that attempted to conceal the politics- that is the conflicts and
divisions- behind the move to nationhood under French tutelage.
Through an elaborate administrative, institutional and legislative apparatus the
colonial imagination succeeded in ingraining itself deeply into the social and
institutional fabric it sought to control. French Mandate policies concentrated
on creating a liberal laissez-faire system that would serve as a market outlet for
their own products. Building on more than half a century of metaphors and
ideas about the role that Beirut could and should play in the region and despite
an evident potential for commercial, industrial, and agricultural enterprise, it
was Switzerland with its service economy, trade, transit, banking and tourism,
which was considered by French officials and Lebanese elites as the ideal
model for Lebanon. Nature and climate were regarded as the prime asset of
Lebanon and despite the possibility of progress in commercial, industrial and
agricultural enterprise; the answer for Lebanon was seen in emulating the
Swiss and thus becoming "The Switzerland of the Orient." 342 The French
mandate's objectives in the country can be summed up as; firstly the creation
of a market outlet for their own products, secondarily, a propaganda oriented
justification of its presence to local populations by distinguishing itself from
Ottoman rule through various infrastructural improvement, and thirdly, aiding
in the formation and constitution of a fledgling nation state which would help
promulgate and maintain France's political and cultural influence in the area.
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These goals were to be achieved thorough a cohesive program of mise en
valeur a term popularized by Albert Sarrault in the 1920's to index the
economic development of territories under French rule.343 Rather than pure
territorial expansion mise en valeur now welded the exploitation of colonized
territories to concepts of rationality, progress and conservation. In other words
the term came to connote more rational, long-term progressive development
and planning, especially in the post WWI era. In addition to reforming private
property (or rationalizing it as Sarrault liked to call it) and the construction of
infrastructural networks such as railway lines and ports, begun in Beirut and
Mount Lebanon for example in the latter part of the 19 th century, the concept
now included a more rational division of labor, and an emphasis on the
improvement of hygiene.344 It also focused on improving communication
networks between coastal cities and their agriculturally based hinterlands.
The development of this concept within the larger framework of the Mission
Civilisatrice and mandate politics was to have a significant impact on the
economic and physical development of Syria and Lebanon. A document
entitled Les Etats Sous Mandat Francais describing conditions in Lebanon and
Syria at the beginning of the mandate and explaining the projects undertaken
by French authorities until 1928 claimed that "little was done by the Ottoman
government to develop this part of the empire economically even though it is
342 See part I, Section II; La Revue Phinicienne etc..
343 Furthermore a transformation of the concept of mise en valeur especially in the 1920's and
the publishing of Albert Sarrualt's book accompanied this change from a policy of assimilation
to a policy of association. See Sarrault, La Mise en valeur
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one of the richest with one of the highest source of revenue for the
government]."34 5 Maximizing the economic efficiency or the mise en valeur of
the mandate territories became paramount.
Successive French high commissioners built upon ideas already implemented
in France's North African colonies regarding the development of cities and
their relationships to one another. Beirut like Rabat was transformed into an
administrative capital to a much larger hinterland. Along with other coastal
cities such as Tripoli and Latakia, these cities were also to serve as the link
between France and [it's] hinterland.346 This entailed a macro approach to the
economic development of mandate territories. The logic for this program was
outlined in a 1928 report entitled Les Etats Sous Mandat Franfais.347 It argued
that "even though most of the public works were undertaken [in the major
cities] with local financial resources this is not enough for the large
infrastructural works needed for the mise en valeur of these countries..."348
Consequently the economic development of Lebanon and Syria was to focus
on two specific points; the agricultural production of Syria and Lebanon and
the modernization of their irrigation systems, and the geographic location of
mandate territories as the link between Iraq, Persia, Turkestan, Afghanistan
and all countries that use the Suez canal. This approach entailed a significant
344 See section I
345 Les Etats Sous Mandat Francais (1928) p.1 in MAE. Nantes Inv. 21-365. See also Valeur
Economique de La Syrie et du Liban, March 4, 1925, MAE-Nantes 21-353
346 Maurice Barres, Une enquete aux pays du Levant, (Paris, 1923); Sarrault, La Mise en
valeur; Wright, Politics of Design ; Celik, Algeria; Rabinow, French Modern.
347 MAE Nantes 21-365. This is probably the rough draft of what later became a French
mandate publication under the same title outlining their accomplishments in Lebanon and
Syria.
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growth and enhancement of hydraulics and irrigation networks in the
agricultural regions of the Syrian hinterland and the Beqa valley (now part of
Greater Lebanon), the expansion of the communications infrastructure through
the creation of a large and efficient infrastructural network of highways, ports
and airports such as the roads and railways between Damascus and Baghdad,
Beirut and Damascus, and Beirut and Palestine etc.,349 and the creation of a
new cadastral system that significantly and irrevocably transformed property
relations in the region.
Along with scores of other documents, reports, letters and books350 a letter
from Henri Ponsot to the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated Feb. 18, 1930
asking for a loan for the territories under mandate further testifies to the
dominance approach.3 51 It begins by stating that one of the major
preoccupations of the mandate authorities was to establish a public works
program that addresses the "disastrous situation left by the Turks." It sought to
create a road network between the principle regions of the territory, reestablish
348 Ibid, p. 8
349 For example a 1938 file on the public works carried out by the French with details of work
on the airport and port begins with: The program of economic development realized in 1934-
1938 included the completion of the public works of common interest in the principle areas of
state activity- (railways, reconstruction and planning of roads and construction of frontier
posts, maritime works, hydraulic works aviation and electricity) it includes a discussion of
construction works for airport and ports of Beirut and the Beirut- Nakoura road which now
allows the trip between Beirut and Haifa to be completed in 2 hours- what is evident is that
even those were two states, the French saw their economic program as addressing one whole
territory so at the macro scale planning. Execution du programme des travaux d'jquipement et
de mise en valeur des Territoires sous mandat July 15, 1938- MAE Nantes 21-365.
35) Haut-commissariat en Syrie et au Liban La Syrie et le Liban en 1921-1922 Paris : Larose,
19:22; Berger-Levrault ed. La Syrie et Le Liban sous L'occupation et le Mandat Francais 1919-
1927 (Nancy- Paris, 1927); Union des Ing6nieurs et Techniciens de la France Combattante Les
Lettres Franqaises, Vingt-cinq Ans D'Efforts Franfais au Levant 1920-1944 (Beyrouth, 1944);
See also MAE Nantes, 21-364; 21-365
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or reconstruct the railway lines, construct public buildings, (hospitals, schools,
S6rails, prisons etc. and equip them with the necessary material), install in the
large cities of relative importance infrastructure that responds to the most
immediate needs of public hygiene. Part of this program, the letter continued,
has already been undertaken with local funds (construction of schools, S6rails
etc.). However, these local funds were not sufficient for the execution of large
projects such as irrigation networks, railway lines, urban planning and electric
networks. At the same time, the augmentation of current taxes would not
generate sufficient funds. Furthermore, by the order of General Duport, the
11%-15% increase in customs duty that amounted to 36 million French Francs
initially deposited in a special account created in 1924 for the execution of
public works and projects of special interest had been reallocated to the
maintenance of public order (probably through the Ministry of Interior)
following the rebellion in Jebel el Druze. Since that period, the note continued
and to alleviate the French treasury, the money has been systematically used to
pay for new military needs. As a result, the military budget for the army rose
from 3 million FF in 1924, to 7 million FF in 1925, to 10 million FF in 1926,
to 94 million FF in 1927, and continued at the same pace for most of the
mandate period.
Now that the situation is stabilized, Ponsot argued, it was time to pursue an
economic agenda that has long since been at a standstill. He proposed a
program, which would cost 585 million FF for particular railways, 95 million
FF for three ports (60 of which were allocated to the port of Beirut alone), 250
351 MAE-Nantes 21-364
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million FF for irrigation projects, 200 million FF for urbanism (100 for each of
Lebanon and Syria)352, and 60 million FF for aviation and telephones. Despite
their significantly different sizes Lebanon's budget was 90 million FF higher
than that of Syria indicating the degree and intensity of French investment in
Lebanon. Furthermore, while most of the Syrian investment was going into
Irrigation (180 million FF as opposed to 50 million FF in Lebanon), most of
the Lebanese investments were to be poured into its infrastructure networks
indicating the extent to which Lebanon was seen as a communication hub for
an agricultural hinterland that is Syria.
In Lebanon, viewed as part of the larger mandate territories, this approach lead
to a policy of uneven development whereby there was an overwhelming focus
on the rehabilitation of Beirut as the economic center of the region and the
capital of the mandate and a considerable neglect of the north and south of the
country.353 This was particularly evident in the status of infrastructural
development created in Beirut and the immediate vicinity of Mount Lebanon
in comparison to the rest of the country.3 54 It was also suggested that Beirut, as
352 This was inline with an earlier program on public works dated Dec. 13, 1926, that extended
over 15 years and allocated 250,000 FF to urbanism in mandated territories (to encourage
municipalities to draw up plans, construct public buildings, sewage networks etc. MAE 21-365
353 See parliamentary sessions April 23, December 18& December 26, 1934; December 1939
amongst others (LPR)
354 In a follow up letter, Ponsot went on to outline the programs that were of particular concern
to Lebanon. Of primary importance were the construction of the railway line between Tripoli
and Beirut (140 million), the enlargement of the Beirut's port (80 million) the creation of a port
for sea planes in Tripoli (20 million) and the establishment of a telephone network (20
million). Of secondary urgency were 30 million for irrigation (Hydraulics) and 100 million for
urban works. Ponsot to the High Commissionner Project d'emprunt pour la mise en valeur
des Etats sous Mandat FranVais (Liban) March 11, 1930, MAE Nantes, 21-364. See also
numerous documents in MAE Nantes, 21-365; 21-354; 21-353 ; 21-374
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capital of the mandate, could be declared a duty free zone, and even an
independent federation.355
Beirut 1921
The first large scale manifestation of the particularities of mandate approach to
the formation of modern Lebanon was the Beirut fair inaugurated in April
1921 in the city center on the site destroyed by the Ottomans during WWI.
The decision to organize the fair was announced in the French journal Revue
du Deux Mondes and other local newspapers. The rational for holding this fair
was articulated as:
"Pour en hater l'essor, en montrant tout ce qu'on peut attendre
du dveloppement du mouvement conomique du Levant, le
general Gouraud a rsolu de renouveler au printemps prochain
a Beyrouth l'heureuse initiative que le gneral Lyautey avait
prise en plein guerre, en crtant au Maroc la grande foire de
Casablanca. Il fait frappant, en effet, de voir notre propagande
commerciale tres neglige jusqu'ici au Levant, alors que celle
de nos rivaux et de nos ennemis tait si soigneusement
poursuivie." 356
Directed at Syrian, Lebanese, French and British audiences at one and the
same time, this statement signaled the complex issues that the fair was meant
to engage with. On the one hand, French/British rivalry was at its zenith over
the region.(See previous section). The Sykes-Picot agreement between the two
countries has been signed but the disputes between them had not yet waned.
355 Calls to make Beirut a duty free zone were initially made by French administrators in 1923.
In the 1930's and with the growth of the port of Haifa, these calls would resurface but by the
Lebanese Chamber of Commerce this time. For more details on Beirut as a federation see Les
Finances Municipales de Beyrouth et L'avenir de centre ville considere au point de l'interet
general du pays sous mandat Francais et de l'influence Francaise en Orient- May 31, 1923
MAE- Nantes, 17-2436c. For more details on Beirut as an economic center MAE-Paris, Syrie-
Liban Vols. 581, 583, 585; see also Marwan Buheiry Beirut's Role
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On the other hand, France was in the midst of reinventing its techniques of
producing knowledge, and action both in the metropole and the colonies.
Albert Sarrault's "mise en valeur" was one aspect of this renewal. Another
was the invention of a new "Muslim Politics." 357 This was epitomized by the
creation of the first chair of Muslim Sociology at the College de France in
1902 by Alfred Le Chatelier, who subsequently founded the Revue du monde
musulman in 1907, and the father of a tentative "Muslim politics" coordinated
with the ministries.
In this context, the French government viewed its presence in Syria as one of
primary importance. These views were outlined in an article in the Revue des
Deux Mondes as a response to queries from the Metropole about the logic of
its (France's) interventions in the Orient;
"...France took the decision [to intervene] because its national
prestige was at stake, and because its immediate and long term
interests demanded such a response. It would have otherwise
seriously compromised its position not only in the Orient, but
also in Europe and the World, that are eager to disavow its
projects in the Levant. This intervention is justified by our
(France's) historic rights to the area, our position in the country
and the popular demand of the Syrians."
The article continued to assert the importance of the position which France
now occupied in the Oriental Mediterranean and therefore along the route of
the extreme Orient. It also emphasized Syria's importance as a strategic
356"L'oeuvre de La France en Syrie_ Le Gn6ral Gouraud Organisateur" Revue des Deux
Mondes Paris, March 1, 1921, p. 123.
357 Henry Laurens, << La Politique Musulmane de La France >> Maghreb-Machreq , no. 152,
April-June, 1996, p. 3-12; Francois-Xavier Tregan "Appr6hensions et M6thodes dans un
System Mandataire" in France, Syrie et Liban 1918-1946: Les Ambiguite' et les dynamisme de
relation mandataire, Nadine, Mouchy (ed.) (Damascus, IFEAD, 2002), p. 91-103.
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Muslim power in the light of European partitioning of the seventeen pillars of
moral and intellectual centers of Islam whereby France retained two; Kairouan
and Fez, in comparison to Great Britain which had gained possession of six;
Cairo, Baghdad, Lahore, Delhi, Benares and Calcutta, with Kaboul, Chiraz
and Ispahan also falling under its sphere of influence. "It is therefore of
paramount importance for us (France) to remain present in Damascus, the old
center of Islam, in Aleppo, an area of transition between Arab Muslims and
Turkish Muslims, and in the proximity of the Arab world, with territorial links
to Mecca which continues to represent the most venerated space of Muslims,
the center of their moral and religious society." 358 The political importance of
Syria to France was further affirmed by the assertion that France is a
Mediterranean nation and that its political axis is located within that basin.
Consequently, if France's role was to be confined within the Western side of
the basin then Syria had to be established as the base for France's Oriental
operations in the area.
These arguments and many others successfully turned the question of French
control over Syria into one of national prestige. Syria was described as the
second "Alsace-Lorraine", in bitter debates about British efforts to undermine
traditional French influence over the area. These rivalries were further
extended into domestic political debates by a small but powerful group of
French investors who had direct interests in the Levant. The question of
French control in the Levant was transformed into a humanitarian mission bent
on continuing spatial and cultural links to the area. This group, referred to as
358Revue des Deux Mondes, ibid, p. 133-135.
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'The Syrian Party' by Sykes were divided into individuals and groups with
colonial, commercial and financial interests in the Levant and others with
religious, cultural and educational interests. Among the former were banks and
businesses involved in ports, railways, import and export, textiles and silk
production, as well as various industrialists, financiers and entrepreneurs.35 9
The Chambers of Commerce of Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles, as well as the
French Catholic church, and its religious orders with long standing educational
and cultural activities in Lebanon supported them. For these groups, control of
Syria was necessary to guarantee large financial investments dating back to the
nineteenth century. At the same time, they were attracted by the seemingly
great economic potential of Syria. Consequently they acted as a strong
pressure group, both through the press and the indirect support of other groups.
North African Precedents
As was clearly articulated in the Revue des Deux Mondes article, precedents
for this fair had already been launched in France's North African colonies
particularly Casablanca in 1915. In North Africa, the primary goal had been to
establish an economic foothold that would consolidate French political and
territorial claims. These preoccupations were particularly apparent in the
359 Mir Zamir Modem Lebanon, p. 43. One of the most influential groups in this 'Syrian Party' was
the Comite de L'Asie Francaise established in 1901 for the advancement of further knowledge
of Asia in France and the promotion of French interests in the area. This society was supported
by many prominent French politicians such as Poincare, Doumer, Marin and established close
ties with many officials in the Quay d'Orsay including George-Picot, Margerie, Berthelot,
Gout. Its bulletin, Correspondance de L'Orient whose editor was Robert de Caix who was
later to become secretary-general to the high-commissioner in Syria and Lebanon was
extremely influential in the shaping of French public opinion. He was to become part of the
'Comite d'Honneur of the Beirut fair.
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rhetoric that accompanied the Casablanca fair. Modeled along the lines of the
Marseilles fair (1912), it was the product of outright French concern with
German-Austrian encroachments on the North African market. Fair literature
would clearly state "the envisaged goal, is in effect to combat, by showing the
colonies and the indigenous populations, the pre ponderous place that Austrian
and German products have occupied for many years whilst offering their
inferior merchandise, and hence replacing them with French products." 360 As
such, the value of the fairs lay in their ability to integrate the local population
in commercial relations with the mandated country whilst acting as an
exhibition of France's continuous work abroad so much so that "even a world
war ... did not interrupt the progress of Morocco, but actually accelerated it."361
They were the ideal vehicle with which France could express its political and
economic hegemony over these areas and garnish the support of populations
both at home and abroad. Tales of the surrender of a rebel chief in the north on
the condition that he visit the Casablanca fair were widely circulated as an
indication of the success of France's policies in the area as well as that of the
fairs in pacifying the local populations.
The success of the Casablanca fair as a vehicle for consolidating political and
economic power led to the establishment of several successive fairs in the
following years in different Moroccan cities such as Rabat and Fez. The fair
was used as a political and economic vehicle to enhance the status of the
36Rapport sur La participation de la Section coloniale franqaise a 'Exposition de Casablanca
en 1915 Exposition Franco-marocaine de Casablanca; Rapport Gendral et Rapports des
Sections Plon-Nourrit & Cie, Paris, 1918, p.31 0 .
361 ibid.
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colonizing power both within the colony and at home. It also formed an
integral part of the urban politics implemented in their protectorates. These
fairs became an important node in a larger program of mise en valeur that the
French authorities had begun implementing in the country as a means for
consolidating their presence and of extracting the maximum economic gain
from the colonies. The outline for this approach was clearly stated in the
general report of the Casablanca fair:
"A centralized urban and social order was established..., based
upon two poles situated on the coast, both looking towards
Europe - one the administrative and cultural capital (Rabat), the
other a commercial and industrial center, (Casablanca)...
Simultaneously the protectorate created a dual urban regional
system in Morocco, favoring the development of the major
coastal cities tied to the French economy and the extraction of
wealth from the inland regions."36 2
To implement this policy, the fairs were accompanied by a rapid overhaul in
the communication services of the city and the establishment of planning
regulations, the creation of roads and zoning regulations, the enlargements of
the port, which linked it to France, and the improvement of the railway station
that accessed the hinterland. As Wright points out, the "protectorate system
was indeed a 'fiction'," where "colonization imposed on the country not only
its authority, but a whole set of descriptive symbols ...[and consolidated] ...
the need to simulate the economy by a strategy which joined centralized
commercial enterprises, decentralized regional industries, and the promotion
362 ibid. p.95.
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of tourism."36 3 These policies, clearly articulated in the Casablanca fair,
resurfaced in post WWI Beirut, albeit somewhat differently.364
The Beirut Fair
The Beirut Fair was inaugurated on April 15, 1921, in the city's historic
center, 7 months after the announced creation of the Republic of Greater
Lebanon. The site of the fair was the Burj square, the place where Arab
Nationalists had been hung by Jamal Pasha in 1916, as well as the now re-
named rue Allenby area, originally destroyed by Jamal Pasha in his mid-war
modernization efforts. Like its North African counterpart, the fair, organized
by military commissioners, was seen to respond to triple purposes: "... to
develop commercial relations between France and Syria, to vigorously
promote agricultural production and commerce, to get to know certain
industries in the country that are in the process of disappearing, to contribute
to the re-establishment of calm to the area, and to substitute economic
development for current political agitation." 36 5
36 3Gwendolyn Wright The Politics of Design, p.89.
364 For the economic relevance of the fair see Haut Commissariat de La R6publique Franqaise
en Syrie et au Liban (HCRFSL), La Syrie et le Liban en 1922 La Foire Exposition de
Beyrouth, Confirences, Liste des Ricompenses (Paris: Emile Larose: 1922); for the special
decree regarding taxes on imported merchandise for the Beirut fair and other correspondences
see Beirut Port Archives (BPA) P8/1/3 Exposition/Foires.
365 Revue des Deux Mondes, p. 124.
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Map 4: Beirut Fair Layout (Source: HCFSL, La
Syrie et Le Liban) Blue areas mark the location of
the fair in the center.
It comprised of an exposition of French goods, agricultural and industrial
products of Syria, agricultural equipment and non Syrian wares, and a various
number of attractions for the local population. The total number of exhibiting
firms exceeded 1200 whilst visitors came from Turkey, Greece ,
Mesopotamia, Egypt and Persia. Two French ministers and forty senators and
deputies attended the fair. The presence of Captain Winslow, the delegate of
the American high commissioner in Constantinople was also noted due to
extensive American participation in the fair especially in the Agricultural
pavilion.
The fair consisted of two sections. The first comprised of a row of stalls
constructed of brick stands covered with cloth running across rue Allenby that
contained 488 stands, 360 of which were taken over by French companies,
whilst the rest were left for Syrian firms. The official catalogue of the fair
would describe this section as a " ...clear, open and well aired bazaar, contrived
in opposition to the obscure and mysterious markets, where the mentality of
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uneven and dishonest speculation develops." Furthermore, the catalogue
continues "...banks and the large societies were interspersed with crowds of
Bedouins smoking the narghile infront of the fairground booths. ,,366 This
linear, organized and 'oriental' space stood in sharp contrast to the demolition
that encased them (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Maarad street/Rue Allenby during demolitions and with Fair Stores
(Source: La Syrie et Le Liban)
Figure 13 Beirut Fair, Al Borj Square and the city pavilions (Source: ibid)
366 HCRFSL, ibid, p. 2
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The second section of the fair was located in the place de Martyrs where four
'oriental' pavilions were constructed to represent the four major cities of the
mandate territories: Beirut, Tripoli, Damascus and Aleppo, encircled by two
newly constructed French museums, that were in turn flanked by an Ottoman
Serail at one end, and the rest of the city on the other. (figure 13) These four
pavilions were to contain the exhibition of native arts and industries; "Oriental
or European furniture executed by the artisans of Beirut, cottons, tobacco,
vegetables, fragrant fruits, light oils ... all the agricultural products of the hills
and valleys between Tyre and Alexandretta." 367 An agriculture pavilion,
occupied mainly by French and British firms was set up in the large space near
the old Muslim Cemetery. A circus was also erected on this site along with an
elevated French restaurant. Moreover, and according to newspaper articles all
entrances to the fair were marked by gateways designed in "fine Moorish
style".368(figureI4)
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Igure 14: Entrance
Debbas, Beirut, p. 241)
367 HCRFSL, ibid, p.2.
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This area was described by the official guide as the "...forum of the Beirutis,
where under the shadow of the trees, and amongst the carpets of flowers of
purple and royal blue ...the pavilions of the principle cities of Syria are
organized with the collaboration of notables and French representatives."
Like the Casablanca fair of 1915, the fair of Beirut, was not seeking to ingrain
France's position in a global context by displaying its technological prowess
and its extra-territorial possessions. Rather, these fairs had a dual political and
economic purpose. Politically, they were meant to convince the skeptics
"back home" of the relevance of the colonies and their importance to France's
political and economic well being. In the face of British (in the Levant) and
German (in North Africa) rivalry and the hostility of local populations, these
fairs were meant to assert France's control over these territories by ingraining
itself into the actual urban and social fabric of their major cities.3 69
Economically, the commercial nature of these fairs370 transformed them into a
powerful vehicle for integrating the local population in trade relations with the
mandated country whilst acting as an exhibition of France's continuous work
abroad whereby, even a world war "... did not interrupt the progress of
Morocco, but actually accelerated it."37' The Beirut fair in this sense became a
vehicle for France to place its products, both literally and metaphorically, on
exhibit, as well as establish French hegemony economically and politically.
36 'The Beyrout Fair" in The Near East February 24, 1921, p.2 3 4 .
369 The Casablanca fair was meant to combat German encroachment on what the French
considered as their market and their territories.
370M.Tamir Les Expositions Internationales a Travers les Ages These pour le Doctorat
d'Universit6 pr6sent6e a la Facult6 des Lettres de L'Universit6 de Paris, Galerie Jeanne Bucher,
Paris, 1939, p. 13.
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Whilst international expositions displayed technological superiority and
political and economic prowess in the metropole, local fairs reaffirmed this
control in the territory. In what follows I would like to focus on one particular
aspect of the fair; its role as part of the territorial tactics of the mandate
authorities to consolidate their control over the city and by extension the
region, and the representational mechanisms they used in the process.
The primacy of urban organization and architectural form in the territorial
tactics of the French mandate did not simply lie in the representation of these
ideas. It was also apparent in their enactment. Set in the heart of the city, and
on sites demolished by the Ottomans, the fair inaugurated a new set of power
relations in the city that would be augmented by other territorial tactics
adopted by the mandate authorities such as the immediate occupation of the
large Ottoman Srail overlooking the city center and the construction of a
series of military barracks around the city.372 It also symbolized the promise
that the political, economic and urban restructuring inaugurated by the fair
would extend and re-order the rest of the city. To achieve these ends, fair
organizers relied on two interrelated strategies reflected in various ways in the
site plan of the fair, the organization of activities and the buildings constructed
to house these activities.
To begin with, fair organizers appropriated the symbolic order of commercial
activity supposed to be emblematic of this "imaginary orient" that they had
371 ibid.
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come to occupy. The structures within which French products were housed
were constructed of local materials and organized in an 'oriental' fashion.373
Placing European products in this kind of a setting served a dual purpose. On
the one hand it integrated colonial authority into the economic and social
structure of the city it sought to conquer. On the other hand, in keeping with its
civilizing mission and as the fair brochure would declare, it claimed to render
these spaces where deals "sous le manteau" usually occurred, modem,
transparent, legible and above all moral. 374 It was a derivation of policies
adopted in Morocco, to modernize without seeming to destroy cultural norms.
This produced spatial hierarchy embodied what Timothy Mitchell describes in
the context of the 1898 colonial exposition in Paris as the contradiction within
the European between the "... need to separate... from the world and render it
as an object of representation and the desire to lose oneself within this object-
world and experience it directly... the European as participant-observer." 375 By
ordering and structuring the bazaar the European could both participate, as a
local, in this exotic world, yet maintain the clear position of the detached
observer. The juxtaposition of "banks and des Grandes Societ6s" with the
crowds of Bedouins smoking Narghile in their descriptions of the fair,
exemplifies this attitude.
372 At the same time, French authorities began a process of building a series of military
barracks in what were at the time the peripheries of the city.
373 These stood in stark contradiction to the grandiose structures, which were built during the
international exhibitions both to flaunt technical superiority (Crystal Palace, Tour Eiffel, the
Grand and Petite Palais) and to emphasize the host country's position within global power
relations. This inversion of policy reflected in part the wish of the French government to
display itself not as the mighty power, here to subvert, but as the culturally enlightened
economic power wanting to integrate.
374 ibid.
37 5Timothy Mitchell Colonizing Egypt, p.307
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In parallel, spectacle determined the spatial quality of the pavilions where
local wares were exhibited. Constructed in eclectic "Moorish" styles, the local
pavilions were imbued with an iconography that was both foreign and familiar
to local audiences. "Islamic" elements were interspersed with jutted
fenestrations, minaret like towers, and perforated Musharabbiya' like windows
that resonated far more closely with France's North African colonies?76
(figures 15- 16) The closest architecture within the vicinity of Beirut that
exhibited similar architectural details such as the window fenestration, the
jutted roofscape etc. was a house constructed by a French traveler around 1900
(figure 17)
Figure 15: Beirut Fair, Damascus Pavilion
(Source: HCFSL, La Syrie et Le Liban )
376 For the architectural eclecticism of North African colonies see Seguin, Arabisances
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Figure 16 Beirut Fair, Beirut Pavilion (Source:
Debbas, Beirut, p. 241)
Figure 17: Villa Eucalypta- constructed by Hercule
Morel- circa 1900 (Source: Debbas, Beirut, p. 166)
Housed in a picturesque garden and flanked by museums and a circus, the area
was clearly designated as a space of leisure and not commerce. Contrary to the
Maarad street (Fair street), local products were exhibited in these pavilions
like museum pieces detached from the actual acti vity of commerce thus
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signaling their status as the outcome of antiquated modes of production.
(figure 18)
Figure 18: Interior of the Beirut Pavilion (Source: ibid)
This new method of spatial and descriptive order both codified and produced a
visible political hierarchy. The appropriation of the street/bazaar theme for the
display of European products and the transformation of the Borj gardens, the
site of nationalist hangings, into an entertainment and educational area, served
a dual political purpose. The integration of France, in physical and
organizational terms, through the appropriation of the heart of the city,
signaled the beginning of a political certainty, and the means for its
production. At the same time, the four pavilions of the Burj square
representing Beirut, Tripoli, Aleppo and Damascus, delimited the political
future of the territory.377Even though these pavilions were meant to represent
the four most important cities under French mandate, they in fact corresponded
to three of the four provinces into which geographic Syria would be carved
3TI In contrast pavilions in international universal exhibitions were utilized to represent the
collective subordinate status of specific cultures. The singularity of the individual nations was
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into within a year.378 The fourth Tripoli pavilion was probably an attempt on
the part of the French authorities to appease Moslem notables adamantly
opposed to the idea of a greater Lebanon. It was also in line with General
Gouraud declaration that Tripoli would be granted its own special status
whereby "...like Beirut, [Tripoli] would have its own large administrative and
budgetary autonomy, along with its Muslim suburbs."379 As an article in The
Near East in December of the same year would declare, the Christians of
greater Lebanon were apprehensive of French plans to endow Beirut and
Tripoli with an "...autonomous municipal regime... fearing it as an attempt on
the sovereign rights of their new state." The article goes on to claim that whilst
France had supported militant Christians "..at the beginning of the
occupation... After the fall of King Faycal, however, they initiated a pro-
Moslem policy. It looks as though France is now committed to the role of a
coquette dallying between two lovers."380
As Michel Foucault has shown us, there is no privileged domain outside of
power, but rather a web of interrelations in which everyone is intertwined.
Culture, far from being extrinsic, often acts as the vehicle through which this
web materializes and only by analyzing it closely can one begin to discern its
force. The uses to which cultural representation was put in these the local fairs
was bound to economic and political realities that were in the process of being
denoted simply through their eclectic peculiarities, which to the undiscerning eye remained
simply part of the consolidated space of the bizarre.
378 The administrative division of mandate territories was a major issue of contention for the
French authorities. See MAE Nantes,
379 This statement was part of his declaration of the State of Greater Lebanon. Revue des Deux
Mondes, ibid., p. 103.
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articulated. The politics of representation utilized, determined the
interchangeable ways in which the same signs would be applied to achieve
disparate political ends in different contexts."' What these pavilions made
evident was the eclecticism by which mandate authorities approached the
architectural identity of the cities in question. With no apparent and unified
architectural language to speak of, the arabisances that had characterized their
architecture in North African colonies was put to use in yet one more context.
At the same time, the use of these pavilions signaled the dominance of the city.
Even though both Lebanon and Syria had both been declared as separate
entities, no structures were created to represent these identities.
These fairs also became part of presenting an 'Orientalized European' who
would be judged by his/her apparent respect of indigenous culture. French
colonial officials proclaimed their tolerance for difference, their appreciation
for other cultures, their respect for tradition, and their ability to modernize in a
modern sensitive manner. As Lyautney the governor of Morocco had
argued"...power should be exercised, not as a matter of destroying (people),
but of transforming them."382 The apparent respect for other cultures and their
notions of modernizing in a 'sensitive' manner, imbricated French authorities
in efforts to facilitate economic modernization, as indicated in the fairs, and
thus creating different types of production and consumption of space and of
380 "Rivalries in Syria" in The Near East Dec. 1, 1921.
381 The bazaar could therefore change from being a winding space of spectacle and
entertainment, a specimen of a traditional, even antiquated mode of economic exchange in the
universal exhibition of Paris, to a linear, well lit arena for the exchange of advanced European
products, the endorsement of contracts, the utilization of the modern monetary services
supplied by banks and societies, in the Beirut fair.
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goods through infrastructural modernization and attempts to give modernist
aesthetics a sense of locale or place. It is to this process which I now turn.
3812 Wright, ibid.,p.76.
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Modernizing Beirut: Building City and Nation
With arrival of the French came an intense discussion as to how to address
urban planning and aesthetic concerns. Beirut was now charged with playing
the dual role of capital to a new nation-state and to French colonial powers.
What is evident from municipal minutes, local journals and mandate archives
is that a high level of fluidity characterized the planning of this period. It
included the creation of new urban actors and the initiation of a new approach
to city making. This structure was further complicated by the structure of
mandate rule, which as discussed in the previous section meant that the
implementation of urban projects resembled politics in the metropole far more
than France's other colonies. The requisite close cooperation with local
administrative personnel in the context of bitter conflicts between different
Lebanese notables and politicians over the contours of national identity meant
that projects more often than not could not be directly implemented.38
Lebanon and Syria could not be used as a laboratory for French ideas of
planning. This was most evident in the implementation of urban planning
policies and cadastral reforms and the role that the municipality was asked to
play in this process
383 To date no one has investigated whether the intersection between the mandate and national
politics in Syria resulted in a significantly different approach to urban planning and
architecture in Damascus from what happened in Lebanon. For further information on mandate
politics in Syria see Philip Khoury's seminal Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of
Arab Nationalism 1920-1945, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987); For
information on urban politics in mandate Damascus see Philip Khoury "Urban Politics in
Transition: The Quarters of Damascus during the French Mandate" in IJMES (Volume 16, no.
4, Nov. 1984), p. 506-540. No studies of Mandate planning and architecture were found.
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Building the City: A Public-Private Initiative
In the first few years of the mandate, the actions of the French authorities were
to a great degree directed at addressing the physical and social conditions that
prevailed during the war years. Following the material and human losses
wrecked upon Beirut during World War I, the French administration lost little
time in the creation and implementation of a crash program of relief and
reconstruction. It was viewed as part of an overall effort to distinguish the
mandate powers from the Turks who had "left the country in ruin." As an
article in the Revue des Deux Mondes would proclaim, "Beirut, once a
prospering city contains 50,000 inhabitants only. 300,000 people have died of
starvation. Our first action is therefore one of charity." 384 The port was dredged
up, health clinics were set up and emergency supplies brought in etc... "Haut
Commissariat statistics indicated that 10,000 children were hospitalized in
Beirut within 12 months, while 138,000 adults received intensive care in
emergency clinics. The number of hospitals tripled in the short space of two
years."385 But the item of high priority on the agenda of the French
administration was the modernization of Beirut and the restoration of
commerce. In April 1920, 9500 tons were imported whereas 1000 were
exported.386 Public squares were built, streets were widened, old and new roads
paved, new avenues cleared and a modern network of sewers and streetlights
laid out.3 87
384 ibid.,p.98.
385HCRFSL La Syrie et le Liban p. 127-128.
386Revue des Deux Mondes, ibid p.98.
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These efforts were accomplished in part through a highly privatized system of
delivery of public services that was created between 1919-1926. This system
relied on missionaries present in the area since the 1 9 th century or on pre-war
concessionary companies. Missionaries were asked to revitalize the
educational sectors despite protests that a private educational system based on
religious missions would not foster cross-communal relationships vital for the
postwar period.388 Health was particularly problematic given the shortages of
medical services of the war period as a result of conscriptions, the closure of
all hospitals associated with the allies and the rampant spread of diseases such
as the Bubonic plague, smallpox, typhoid, malaria and typhus. In addition to a
hospital that was opened in Beirut in 1919, French missionaries were also
asked to help out with the medical situation and a new sewage system was
commissioned through a private French-Syrian company through the
municipality.3 89 Companies with pre-war concessions such as the Tramway
and Electricity, the Water, and the port companies were contracted to renovate
3"7 Les Etats Sous Mandat Franfais, 1928 Inv. 21-365: p. 7-8
388 For example by May 1920, there were 740 private, mostly Christian schools created by the
missionaries or through subsidies given to the Maronite patriarchy versus 240 public schools
opened by the Mandate authorities (Thompson, Colonial Citizens, p. 61). This discussion
would continue well into the mandate especially in the parliament where many MP's voiced
concern that cuts in the public education budget was undermining national education and
giving way to sectarian divisions. In a passionate defense of the public school system, MP
Michel Zaccour would argue, "only in public schools could the constituents that make a nation
be brought together." (Chambre Des Dputts, Troisieme Legislature, Deuxieme Session
Ordinaire, Compte Rendue de la Seance, Seance du Mardi, 18 Dec. 1934, p. 6. MAE Nantes,
18-942.
389 See MAE Nantes, 21-247 for various documents regarding a competition for the design of a
sewage network for Beirut and the creation of a French-Syrian consortium to undertake its
construction. See also Municipal minutes throughout the mandate period for discussion of the
project and the loan the municipality was forced to take in order to carry out the project.
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the road and rail networks and other infrastructure projects.39 In Beirut, the
Societt des Tramway for example, undertook considerable infrastructural
work in the extension of its tramway line from Rue Fosch to the port area and
which entailed the funding and cooperation of the port company, the Banque
de Syrie and the municipality. The Beirut port was presented as a shining
example of the cooperation between these private concessions, and local
authorities. While its reconstruction and expansion had already been
undertaken by the port concession company, improvements of some of the
docks were carried out in coordination with the Railway company that wanted
to construct a station for the Tripoli-Nakoura line and the municipality. Most
important of all was the founding of the Radio-Orient in Beirut, which
rendered the cable network via Egypt obsolete and turned Beirut into the
communication center of the Middle East.
These initiatives cut costs to the French government that was already in dire
financial straits. As outlined in a report by Vasseylet the consultant to the
French High Commissioner on Public Works on December 13, 1926, entitled
Programme de travaux don't la realization est envisage par initiative prive
this system was seen to function in parallel with the projects undertaken by the
39Two other lines were planned and subsequently implemented; a tramway line to the St. Elie
quarter in Acharfieh and a doubling of the line to Basta. At the time they offered the
municipality to participate with 70,000 FF in the expropriation needed to carry out these
projects. For a summary of this and other work, such as the road and irrigation networks,
carried out by the private concessions see Programme de travaux dont la ralisation est
envisage par initiative privge, 13 December 1926, MAE-Nantes: 21-365
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state.39 ' Their work was presented as complementary to state efforts and in
some instances replacing it.
Reliance on these private concessions in the construction and reconstruction of
the city gave them inordinate influence in the decision making process with far
reaching consequences. In the post WWI period many of these concessions
changed their identity to become either purely French or added French
capitalists to their boards. For example, the constitution of the tramway
company was rapidly transformed at the end of the war from being a Belgian
entity to a mixed capital venture that was one third Belgian, one third French
and the last third Syrian. One of the most telling indications of their reach and
power was the controversy that erupted over the delineation of Beirut's
administrative boundaries. Villages such as Antelias, Jal Ed Dib, and Jedeide,
were excluded from the boundaries whilst others that were further away were
included in these boundaries. A letter was sent by representatives of these
municipalities protesting the issue and arguing that they had been left at the
mercy of a company that had been exploiting them for years. Subsequently,
many residents took to the streets to protest the "unjustifiable monopole of the
electric and tramway companies." Furthermore, the letter argued, the logic of
these new administrative boundaries did not make sense since they had
transformed the city.392 In time, the influence of these concessions and their
monopoly over service delivery and hence in pricing these services
391 The report also goes on to state that a similar approach was implemented in many other
cities in the mandate areas and in addition to these projects there were many other such as a
cement company, industrial fishing etc.
390- MAE Paris, Levant, Syrie-Liban box 578 (1930-1940)
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transformed them into potent targets of urban unrest such as the massive
strikes and violent riots that took place in the 1930's.39 3
Planning Beirut: Looking East
In this context, the planning of the city was also relegated to the private sector.
In 1920, within months of the arrival of French mandate troops in the area,
plans were laid out to launch a competition for the enlargement of the city of
Beirut. Given that this is the only discussion of the need to plan the city during
that period, and that several of the ideas that were presented were picked up
again by the city's architects and planners this project is worth discussing at
length.
In a letter dated October 6, 1920, the Conseiller of Public works Escadron
Perrin, sent a letter to the Governor of Greater Lebanon proposing a program
to launch a competition for the enlargement of Beirut and soliciting his
opinion on the matter.394 The competition was to consider Martyr's square as a
central point in the city. Roads of 20 meters wide as well as a circular highway
393 Thompson Colonial Citizens; Carla Edde "La mobilization populaire a Beyrouth a
L'6poque du mandate 1918-1943: l'apprentissage progressive de la participation" in The
French and British Mandates in a Comparative Perspective M6ouchy and Sluglett (editors), p.
623-648.
394 MAE Nantes, 17-2435. Another unsigned report dated 1922 on the Public Works section
mentions that the office of the municipalities is actively involved in drawing up new urban
planning regulations while the office of Buildings (Batiments) is preparing a project for the
enlargement and alignment of the city of Beirut (MAE Nantes, 5-392). Also a document from
the Service des Travaux Publics entitled Note sur L'auvre des Travaux Publics en Syrie, and
dated January 11, states that the city of Beirut is in considerably bad condition and that it
should all rebuilt. To do so a plan has been formed and a new city will soon rise next to the
old, which will also be rebuilt slowly (MAE Nantes 21-364).
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25 meters wide were to be created around the city. He also suggested that the
plan earmark for demolition if necessary all constructions adjacent to the
principle public and religious edifices of the country through the creation of
roads or public spaces. Spaces for roundabouts and gardens were to be
allocated and the infrastructural needs for laying out the sewage system were
to be considered. The proposal also stipulated that the project was to be
executed with minimum expropriation and impact to recently constructed
structures of relative importance. Participants would be asked to submit one
plan on a scale of 1/5000 and another bird's eye view from a height of 600
meters. All projects resembling the one already undertaken by the ministry of
public works were to be eliminated from the process.
Rather than use urban models from their North African colonies, the French
consultant turned to two examples in Egypt; the new Heliopolis quarter
constructed in Cairo and the extension of the old city or the Ramleh quarter in
Alexandria.395 While there is no indication in the text as to why North African
models were rejected, references in other documents plainly state that the
North African model was unfeasible in Lebanon. Moreover, the proposals to
build a new city south of Beirut a la Heliopolis preceded WWI.3 96 The report
395 Reference to the planning of Cairo and Alexandria was presented in a full report attached to
the competition document and entitled "Etudes de dveloppement et de creation de villes en
Egypt." The choice of these cities was justified as a response to the question of how to
"mrnodernize oriental cities" that preoccupied mandate authorities. (MAE Nantes, ibid). For a
full discussion of the construction of Heliopolis see Robert Ilbert "Heliopolis: Colonial
Enterprise and Town Planning Success?" in The Expanding Metropolis: Coping with the
Urban Growth of Cairo Ahmet Evin, ed. (Singapore: Concept Media/The Aga Khan Award
for Architecture, 1985) p. 36-42.
396 On April 17, 1914, A. Pelletier de Martres, an engineer consultant wrote to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs asking for information on a project that friends of his in Lebanon had
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submitted by Perrin stated that the cities of Cairo and Alexandria presented
two primary examples of how to modernize old oriental cities in less than half
a century. It argued that there were two ways to modernize an oriental city: 1)
to both enlarge roads and basically reconstruct the old city or 2) to simply
construct a new city at the edge of the old. In the former proposal, enlarging
the roads and opening up large arteries by expropriating entire quarters would
hike up costs as would creating new quarters in the suburbs of the old city and
on land of significant real estate value. The latter approach, the report
contended, would lead to a drop in real estate values in the old city and
eventually cheaper expropriation costs. Consequently, Beirut which like many
other cities around the world was facing a significant housing crisis due to
interwar demolitions in the city center, the return of expatriates and the
financial crisis of the war period, the latter solution of either extending the old
city or constructing a new one on its southern or southeastern edges were
proposed. They claimed to have bought land near the Beirut river on Lebanese land and were
asking him to help find French investors for it. He believed that they would respond positively
to such a proposal but wanted to make sure that the French government would not frown on
their initiative. They also wanted to know whether the other major powers (protectors) in
Lebanon would not protest against a project that is entirely French and that is to take root in
this protectorate. More interestingly, Pelletier also argued that the project of his Syrian friends
would help the expansionist aims of France in the orient. George picot, the French consul
general in Beirut at the time responded with a letter that stated that Pelletier de Martres had
hired a local architect to survey a piece of land around 216,000 m2 north of Beirut but that this
plot of land ha not been bought yet. He also suggested that the new city would not be
successful due to its location in an industrial area. Accordingly, a deal was being negotiated
with big land owners namely Antoine Malhame, Emile Tabet and Joseph Tyan to buy another
piece of land to the south of the city (40,000m2) that has around 5 million m2 of potential
expansion room. This land, he claimed was owned by an Egyptian-Belgian society from Cairo;
Enterprises and Development that was proposing to build a city similar to Heliopolis on this
site. MAE- Paris Turquie Box 426 D
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found to be more appropriate. 397 Given these conditions the report suggested
the creation of a new city a la Heliopolis in Beirut's southern or southeastern
suburbs, and the formation of a concessionary company to undertake its
construction, whilst a new plan would be drawn up for the old city; one which
could also follow the Egyptian model of widening the roads by destroying the
ground floor while solid structures and top parts were cantilevered.39 8
The model of Heliopolis is also significant in another respect. Constructed in
1906 by a Belgian financier using the Garden city ideas of Ebenzer Howard,
through a private concession, Heliopolis was considered as neither native nor
colonial. As Robert Ilbert suggests, the plan of Heliopolis utilized
development models that were being implemented in Belgium, France and
England. 399 Initially designed as an isolated entity and planned after
Letchworth, the city was to have two oases; one residential and touristic
(surrounding the Heliopolis Palace Hotel), and another catering to workers.
However the 1907 financial crisis meant that only the former oases was
constructed. In the context of Beirut reference to the Heliopolis model
indicated that right from the start, French mandate authorities did not see
themselves as leading the construction and planning of the areas under their
397 Then report goes into different infrastructural solutions for sewage, paving, widening for
roads, asphalting etc.. hygiene a major issue, dead rats, stagnant water near Nahr Beyrouth,
smells etc. Given that all the conditions are in favor (one can extend water and electricity etc.)
398 Creation de Nouveaux Quartiers a Beyrouth Amelioration de La Voiries de L'Ancienne
Ville, October 6, 1920, MAE Nantes, Syrie-Liban lere Vers No. 2435 (inv. 17) The first
suggestion; that is the creation of a concessionary company to construct the new city was
initially presented by French and Ottoman real estate developers prior to WWI (see MAE
Paris.. ). The latter suggestion of cantilevering roads would become a major contribution to the
urban landscape of historic Beirut and a trademark of the French mandate city.
399 Robert Ilbert Heliopolis, 1905-1922, genese d'une ville (Paris: CNRS, 1981)
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control in the same manner as their colonies and protectorates in North Africa,
Africa and the Far East. Rather, as in other sectors of infrastructure
construction and reconstruction, such as electricity, water, education etc. they
saw private sector involvement leading the process of urban development and
regeneration. For the first time, the private sector was to play a major role for
the private sector in the urban transformations of the city. Had the plan been
implemented it would have introduced a new scale of planning and would
have resulted, also for the first time, in large swaths of a homogenous and
uniformly built environment and residential areas constructed to fully
imported standards. For many reasons, not least of which were the dire
financial problems that both the municipality and the mandate authorities were
facing, this plan never saw the light.
The Beirut Municipality: The Politics of Urban management
With the growth of private concessions came a transformation in the role of
the municipality, the one remaining Ottoman administration, and the creation
of new administrative bodies for addressing planning and archaeological
concerns. These included the Ministry of Public works and the Department of
Antiquities both of which had a considerable impact on the future shape of the
city.40
Shortly after their arrival French mandate authorities set about transforming
the role and jurisdiction of the municipality. Established by the Ottomans in
1863 the municipality was the most potent vehicle for urban restructuring in
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the city through which the city's urban elite took a very active role.401 In this
transformation, the rules for local representation and the margins of local
autonomy were reformulated. As the director of the interior would state in a
rare comment on the matter "the municipality must become an extension of
central authority.' "42 One of the stipulations of the 1922 law addressing
municipal changes was transforming the representational character of
municipal members. Under the 1877 Ottoman law, the municipality was
composed of 12 members who had to be Ottoman citizens and property
owners in the city. The 1922 law demanded that each sect be represented in
proportion to its size in the city.403 To insure the representation of all the
different sects, the number of seats on the municipal council was increased
(from 12 in 1918 to 24 in 1953). Foreigners living in the city also acquired
seats on the municipal council that rose from one seat 1918-1926 to 4 seats
1926-1947. This phenomenon was particular to Beirut where large foreign
communities lived and traded. It also served a practical and symbolic purpose:
400 See Ghorayeb Structures Urbaines for further details.
40' See section I, Hanssen, Fin de Si&cle; Malek Ali Shareef Urban Administration in the late
Ottoman period: The Beirut Municipality as a Case Study, 1867-1908 (unpublished MA
thesis, American University of Beirut, May, 1998); Carla Edde "tude de la composition du
conseil municipal beyrouthin (1918-1935). Renouvellement des lites urbaines ou
consolidation des notables>> in Municipalitis et Pouvoirs Locaux au Liban Agnes Favier
(editor), (Beirut: CERMOC, 2001) p. 79-102.
40'- This comment was made infront of the representative council during the 1922 vote on the
new municipal law. Quoted in Mohamed Machnouq, Hukumat Bayrut: Iskaliyyat al-qiyada al-
asriyya li-baladiyyat al-asima [The Governing Beirut: The problem of modern leadership for
the, municipality of the capital city] (Beirut: Mu'assasat lil-nasr, 1995), p. 45.
403 This last requirement was replaced after independence with proportional representation
based on urban districts rather than religious sects. See Edde Conseil Municipal Beyrouthin for
her detailed work on changes in confessional and professional representation in the municipal
council during the mandate period. According to Ghorayeb, in 1924 the distribution of the 15
members was as follows: the administrator of the municipality of Beirut, the president of
municipal council, 5 Sunnis, 1 Shi'a or Druze, 2 Maronites, 2 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek
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it reassured foreign communities that the French mandate "signified the will of
the mandate authorities to reinforce the real or presumed "cosmopolitan"
character of Beirut.' 404 It also signaled the first move to place religious
confessionalism at the heart of political life in Lebanon.
Changes in municipal organization and representation extended to the limits
and jurisdictions of municipal authority. Under the Ottomans, the municipality
had been the most important local institution addressing all issues of urban
management and growth. At the end of WWI, and the dissolution of the
Vilaya, the municipality became the last and most important authority
remaining in the city. Mandate authorities were plagued with questions
regarding the best way to reformulate municipal organization. The status of
Beirut as capital of the French mandate and its religiously and ethnically
mixed population preoccupied their discussions of the best means of governing
the city. Had the municipal council inherited the duties of the administrative
councils of the Vilaya of Beirut and of Mount Lebanon? Should North African
models be followed in the reorganization of the municipality, or should the
French code of conduct be adapted?405 What was the role of local
Catholic, 1 representative of other Lebanese minorities, 1 French member and 2 members
elected by the US and members of the United Nations. Ghorayeb Structures Urbaines p. 154
40 Edde, Conseil Municipal Beyrouthin, p. 82 The allocated proportions to each community
were based on a 1922 census conducted by the French and which was itself problematic.
Members of the Shi'a community especially did not register for the census fearing it meant an
increase in taxes. Armenian emigrants who had recently arrived from Turkey were also
underrepresented. Consequently, one of the repercussion for this action was the creation of a
cleavage between the city and its residents; a cleavage which continues into the present day.
405 For example A Note from the financial consultant of the mandate, on Oct. 13, 1921
expanded upon the organizational; system that should be created in Beirut. He quickly
dismissed the notion of the commune that was imported from France to North Africa. "We
learnt our lessons there" the report stated. He then went on to criticize the French for an
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administrators in this process? One consultant, Mr. Duchotel even proposed
the enhancement of the municipal autonomy of Beirut so as to facilitate the
commercial renovation of the city in a way that allows it to "bypass the limits
of the particular state in which it is located." The city of Beirut, he argued, "the
commercial capital of all the states under French mandate, with all of its
hinterland ... should have ... all the privileges of a liberal city."4 Despite the
potential of this proposition since "Beirut was the real political capital from
the French point of view of their countries under mandate," the separatist
tendencies of other cities such as Tripoli, Saida and the Beqa prevented its
implementation.4 7 Another report of the same period outlined the financial
difficulties that the municipality was facing, especially as a result of increased
municipal debt due to war period land expropriations (see following chapter)
obsession with uniformity that lead to the transplantation of a specific organization "the
commune" from France where it was created as a response to very specific political conditions
to create balance between the different parts of France to Algeria. He also cautioned against
increasing the number of municipalities in a country where voting traditions were still "weak."
Such action he argued would adversely affect the political clout of mandate authorities and
would require a substantial increase in skilled personnel. He suggested the concentration of
municipalities in urban centers and the adoption of existing organizations rather than the
creation of new ones based on tribal and religious divisions. MAE-Nantes 17-2436c. This
emphasis on religious divisions and their impact on local governance and elections is a running
theme through much of the discourse on Lebanon of the period. Also this criticism of North
African models was part of a larger debate taking place in France regarding the best way to
govern France's overseas territories. See Ghorayeb Structures Urbaines, p. 149-157 for a
discussion of the evolution of municipal governance in North Africa and their relevance for
Beirut.
406 M. Duchatol Les Finances Municipales de Beyrouth et L'avenir de centre ville considre au
point de l'intret general du pays sous mandat Franfais et de l'influence Francaise en Orient-
May 31, 1923; MAE-Nantes, 17-2436c.
407 Response of the Financial Consultant to M. Duchatol, untitled, June, 1923, MAE-Nantes,
17--2436c.
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and suggested the appointment of French and other foreign advisors to the
municipal council so that expenses can be kept under control.4 8
The municipality was placed under the control of the Public Health and Public
Works Services. The municipal administrator was a Lebanese bureaucrat,
nominated by French mandate authorities at the suggestion of Lebanon's
administrator who was also assisted by a French consultant. A French
municipal consultant was based at the municipality and another at the high
commission. The municipality was given certain prerogatives in the running of
daily affairs in the city and required to cooperate with the governor of Lebanon
and the French mandate over other issues. Amongst the matters that required
cooperation were the municipal budget, municipal taxes, the acquisition of
buildings, reconstruction, modifications to roads, public spaces, public gardens
and promenades, the creation of new urban plans or the modification of
existing ones, health and hygiene services etc. This created a terrain of
potential conflict between all parties involved. Crucially, authority over the
creation and allocation of taxes between the government and the municipality
was accorded to the government which stripped the municipality of a
substantial source of income which given its insecure financial situation was
quite debilitating.
408 Rapport sur la municipalite de Beyrouth, undated, MAE-Nantes, 2436c. The report
basically argued that the municipality badly needs money and that interwar demolitions and
expropriations drained its revenues. In addition, the world economic crisis is driving people to
sell their buildings thus driving the property values of municipal land down. It also suggested
that foreigners should be taxed and that the existing system of municipal aid to the poor should
be eliminated.
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The erosion in municipal authority and its conflicts with the mandate created a
crisis of authority which materialized through its recurrent concern with its
physical location within the urban fabric of the city in the first years of the
mandate. Upon arrival in Beirut, the municipality was asked by the French
High Commission to vacate its premises in the Petit Srail. After initially
refusing and following discussions with French and Lebanese officials
municipal offices were moved to a nearby school building. On October 19
1921 the municipality decided to construct a new building for itself on the land
where Khan Tabet used to be near the port. The argument for this location was
the centrality of the site between the government's office (in the Petit Srail)
and the high commission in the Grand S6rail and because it would be the first
official building visible to travelers arriving at the port of Beirut.409 This
project never saw the light, but, as we shall see shortly, within a few years the
municipality moved into its new monumental premises in the heart of the
cities.
The financing of the city's urban infrastructure also acquired an unexpected
political dimension. As a result of its accumulated debt the municipality turned
to international financiers for loans to complete ongoing infrastructural works
and to implement new ones. A report on potential investors in the country
described American interest in providing loans to the municipality and
suggested that it was "in the national interest of France to impede American
capital from controlling the Syrian economy." The report then went on to
argue that "in view of future French interests in Lebanon and Syria, it is better
409 This project was never implemented for unknown reasons. BMM, 1921
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to encourage French capital investments in the countries under mandate, for it
is quite evident that the day when America, or any other nation, is financing all
the Lebanese and Syrian loans, to the exclusion of French capital, it will also
have ... a right with regards to the economic and political growth of these
countries and insure its political influence." 410 However since mandate
authorities could not prevent Lebanese and Syrian municipalities from making
deals with American firms that were providing much more favorable
conditions, mandate authorities were asked to provide tax incentives and
concessions to French capital. Effectively, most of the loans that the
municipality would subsequently undertake to finance the installation of its
sewage system and to complete the expropriation, demolition and
reconstruction of the city center would be with French capital. These loans
along with the control of the private concessions over urban infrastructure
would substantially limit municipal authority and its potential for maneuver.
Finally the placement of confessional representation at the heart of urban
affairs meant that regardless of the quality of its personnel, political influences
successfully paralyzed the ability of the municipality to effectively manage the
city.
410 Note, October 3, 1928, MAE-Nantes, Levant Srie E, 323 quoted in Ghorayeb, Structures
Urbaines, p. 174. This same approach seems to be the principle mode of reconstructing Iraq
today.
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Oriental Cosmopolitanism, Architectural Aesthetics and Image making
in the City
No comprehensive master plan was drawn up for the city of Beirut in the first
14 years of the mandate. However, municipal archives indicate a considerable
level of planning and building activity with multiple plans drawn up for
various sections of the city in a sometimes random and even conflicting
manner. Roads were opened up, street alignments adjusted and sometimes
readjusted leading to some confusion with regards to expropriations and
building permits. These were part and parcel of a larger concern with the
image of the city.
Concern with the "image" of the city dominated municipal discussion to
various degrees throughout the mandate. Municipal concern with architectural
aesthetics and the "image" of the city extended into the regularization of
facades and architectural details, attempts to create architectural prototypes
that "complied with hygiene and beauty," the expansion of the city's
boundaries and the creation of new neighborhoods to the south of the city.
Local papers reported that a committee for the reconstruction of the city was
created in 1920. It included Omar Daouk, Yusuf Aftimous, the former
municipal engineer during the Ottoman period and future minister of public
works, engineer Michel Hippolyte and commandant Matthieu amongst others.
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411 Plans to complete the project begun by the Ottomans resumed probably
under the supervision of Aftimous and Hippolyte along with new demolitions
area near bab es saraya. A competition for two facades types that would set the
standard for future constructions was launched. The municipality continued
with its practice of constructing the ground floors of buildings and selling of
air rights above these stores.
Concern with the image of the city materialized in three different ways:
construction laws, building permits and municipal competitions. Rules and
regulations for the size of arches, the heights and widths of openings were
created in a seemingly incremental fashion.41 2 For example the size of the
arches that line Maarad street (named after the Beirut fair-see Figure 22) were
affected by the construction of the Grand Theater owned by Jacques Tabet,
and designed by Yusuf Aftimous in 1924. The technical commission agreed
with the architect's proposal to extend the building over arches and gave
permission for construction to commence.41 3 The municipality also decided
that to make this norm for both Maarad and Syria streets. A simple change in
the requirement for building permits in 1921 was to leave a permanent mark
411 Lisan el Hal, 29/9/1920; Davie, 2001. However no reference was found in the municipal
minutes of the period.
412 On January 22, 1924 an architect writes to the municipality enquiring about the rumor that
the municipality will not allow the construction of arcades as in Alexandria. The municipality
denies that such a request had been made but notes that there is a plan to use arcades on rue
Allenby (and al Maarad). The public works municipal commission accepts the proposal and
agrees to giving building permits for the construction of arcades as long as this applied to the
whole street since a practical application would disrupt the harmony and aesthetic look the
municipality was trying to create in the new streets. BMM, 1924-1926.
43 He requested permission from the municipality to make the extension over the arcades on
the upper floors 60 rather than thirty cm, and which when included with the 25 cm corniche
becomes an 85 cm extension (MMB, 1924-1926)
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on the city. On July 12, 1921 Lebanon's governor sent a memo to the
municipality stipulating that construction permits for buildings along a main
road should be granted only if a drawing of the faqade had been submitted.
The municipality agreed since this was already a requirement inherited from
the Ottoman period for building permits along new roads it was constructing.
Since the creation of the municipality and the fabrication of new urban
management strategies in the nineteenth century, the accompanying building
code suggested an increased interest in architectural aesthetics and the "image"
of the city. 414
This concern with the image of the city extended to newspaper criticizing the
eclecticism that characterized the Beirut streetscape with designs from Paris
adjoining others from New York. The author of one particular article, possibly
Yusuf Aftimous, the former Ottoman municipal architect and the future
Minister of Public Works, called on the municipality, which "represents the
people" to take over its main streets and set the architectural models that
should be applied. It argued that there is no evidence in Beirut's streetscape of
any harmony or proportion or of the oriental style that had such a tremendous
impact on architecture from Spain to the capitals of the East. This architecture,
the author reminded us, is "the nature of the land." To achieve such a sense of
harmony he urged the municipality to design and build prototypes for the
constructions that were taking place on Allenby, including the adoption of the
arcade system that would benefit both property owners and inhabitants whilst
enhancing the city with an "eastern architectural design that is adapted to its
414 See Section I for a fuller discussion; Adbel Nour, 1896; Hanssen, 2001
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regional character and its people's traditions." It was only by incorporating
these and other oriental motifs, would we see "something national in ... [this]
homeland."41 5
Architecturally, the municipality launched a series of competitions for four
municipal buildings that would be constructed 1923-1926. Accroding to
municipal minutes, these were meant to instigate building activity in the
center, illustrate the architectural styles considered appropriate for the new and
modern Beirut and generate income for the municipality. The first of these
buildings was a series of stores on Fosch street whose roofs would in 1926 be
sold to a local resident.4 1 6 The second was launched through a competition in
November 1923417 that was won by Yusuf Aftimous. 418 On January 10, 1924
this building became the headquarters of the municipality. (Figures 19-20) The
415 Al Surouji "Designing our streets" in Lisan al Hal, February 21, 1923 quoted in Saliba,
Beirut City Center, p. 121.
416 On April 22, 1926 the request by Mr. Khalil Daaboul and partners to buy the roofs of the
first municipal building, which is in Rue Fosch, was granted. The municipality had already
placed these roofs for auction in October 1924 but had not gotten any good bids. So since it is
unable to complete their construction right now (busy with other big buildings) and since the
structure is ruining the general view of the street which is now "full of buildings constructed
according to modem style" the municipality decides to: sell the rights to him for 26,000
Lebanese-Syrian Liras and to announce it for three weeks in the papers- if no one submits a
better price within that period the sale will be finalized and construction will commence within
6 months (BMM, 1926).
417 The competition was decided upon earlier. However the conditions were amended based on
the request of the participating architects. The new conditions stipulated that they are asking
that some of the conditions be adjusted:
1. increase of 15 days for the competition
2. Prizes raised to 250, 200 and 150 liras respectively.
3. Building insurance was to be 5 years
4. The names of participating architects would be published in local papers.
On a side note, municipal minutes name the intersection as Fosch and Bab Idriss. However
since those streets are parallel to each other, it is more likely that it is the corner of Weygand
and Bab Idriss that the building was to be constructed (BMM, 1923-1924).
418 For more on Aftimous, see Section I; Hanssen, Fin de Sibcle
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fourth municipal building, constructed near the petite Srail, was eventually
rented to the government. It housed the Ministry of public works and the Post
Office.4 19 (Figure 21) These buildings were cited in the press as examples of
"modem architecture, European style and artistic taste." 420
The municipal building completed in 1924 exhibits Yusuf Aftimous's
trademark concern with anchoring his architecture in oriental, Arab and even
Islamic environment and reflects the cosmopolitan Beirut that he grew up and
practiced in. Using a classical Beaux Arts style design, the building spans a
considerable stretch of one of the newly constructed streets in the city center.
The central location of the building and its monumental scale that dominates
the rest of area addressed municipal concern with it's eroding authority under
the French whilst reflecting Aftimous's own experience as municipal architect
under the Ottomans. The building faqade, constructed in hand carved yellow
limestone that had become mandatory for the area, is decorated with an
eclectic mix of motifs developed during his practice under the Ottomans, such
as his design for the local clock tower. From crusader like towers that mark
either end of the building to the jagged corniche, an Aftimous trademark for
institutional structures, the faqade is structured with elements he believed to be
reflective of the city's oriental and cosmopolitan identity. As we shall soon
see, under the influence of Charles Corm, this oriental cosmopolitan would be
transformed into a distinct form of organic nationalism that rooted Lebanese
419 The first municipal building, also launched through a competition that was won by Bahjat
Abdel Nour is somewhere on Bab Idriss but I have not been able to pinpoint the exact location.
The third is located somewhere between Fosch and Allenby.
420 Al Maarad, January 15, 1929:9 signed as Ibn Beirut (the son of Beirut)
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identity in a Mountain based popularism that materialized in the construction
of the parliament building.
Figure 19: Illustration of Beirut Municipality. Fa9ade (Source: Saliba, City
Center Recovery)
Figure 20 Beirut Municipality, Yusuf Aftimous Architect (Source: author's
photographs)
Figure 21 Fourth municipal Building completed in 1926-1927
(Source: author's Collection)
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With the construction of the last municipal building (Figure 21), the particular
architectural aesthetic espoused by Yusuf Aftimous and promoted through the
municipality of embedding oriental motifs into now "classical" forms was
slowly replaced by the more austere style of architecture epitomized by this
fourth building. (Figure 21) The axial symmetry of beaux arts planning was
replaced with a readable concrete frame emblematic of transformations in
modern architecture. Gone were the detailed fenestrations, the carved stones,
the intricate balustrades as the basic shape of the building was retained. As we
shall see shortly, the promotion of a new and far more radical "modem"
architectural aesthetic would extend to other parts of the city.
On March 10, 1926, municipal members discussing architectural aesthetics in
city planning demanded that for adjacent buildings be harmonious and street
views diverse, it would be better if a distinct architectural style was adopted
for each street. A committee was formed to give their opinion on the style of
buildings to be constructed on the new roads that were being built in
expropriated zones in the city center.4 2' These rules were for the most part
localized in the city center and along the new routes that were being created.422
421 It comprised of Mr. Odino (the municipality's technical advisor), Mr. Duraffourd (general
architect), Mr. Kofaleski, the municipality's architect, Yousef Aftimous, and Sheikh Jamil el
Khazen. BMM, 1926, p. 286.
422 For example, these include stipulations that all new construction permits along major roads
be accompanied with a drawing of the faqade (July 12, 1921, memo from Lebanon's governor
to the municipality). In another meeting on January 12, 1923 a discussion of conditions in the
city in the municipality lead to the adoption of a decision to require all property owners pave
roads infront of their properties and to make this a condition for acquiring building permits.
Other measures included the removal of all makeshift stores from Fosch and Allenby and the
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What is evident is while some guidelines for the height of arches and
relationship to street frontages on Maarad street were created progressively;
namely on a building by building basis, the question of aesthetics was quite
subjective. At no point do municipal discussions indicate that the acceptance
or rejection of a building permit based on the drawing of the facades followed
a particular set of criteria beyond complying with "modem" or "proper"
architectural aesthetics. These aesthetics, based on what was eventually
constructed during this period moved from being an "orientalized"
architecture, emblematic of the architecture of Yusuf Aftimous to a more
classical modern. Even though buildings were accepted or rejected based on
their application of "appropriate architectural aesthetics," no trace of what
guided these aesthetics has been found.423 What is evident however is that
there was a concerted effort to create a sense of order, harmony and uniformity
in Beirut's streetscape that was not only meant to be emblematic of the
modern city but to also contrast with the apparent chaos of Ottoman/medieval
Beirut.
Serail Mosque square; prohibiting makeshift stalls infront of stores and shops on roads through
which the tramway passes etc. A decision was also taken in the same session to ask the
municipal architect to draw up a plan for the Avenue Francasie. Signs hanging from storefronts
and which make the street look ugly and impeded passersby were also prohibited. The use of
yellow limestone on facades was also enforced (BMM, 1924).
423 For example, a permit for a building between Fosch and Allenby was accepted conditional
upon an amendment of the faqade "since the building proposed was found to comply with the
rules of art, hygiene, it will be accepted up till point X placed by the architect who believes that
the room drawn on the top floor is destroying the beauty of the faqade." BMM, Jan, 13, 1926.
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Figure 22: Al Maarad street, (the site of the 1921 Beirut fair- see Figure 12) and
today considered as the French mandate quarter of the city. (Source: Author's
photographs)
By the 1930' s the architectural aesthetics of modern Beirut as defined by the
municipal architects had changed dramatically. On August 27, 1931 the
municipality launched a competition for the construction of facades and
independent villas that were to be used a blue prints or models for the
architecture appropriate for the corniche. The committee overseeing the
competition was composed of Yusuf Aftimous, Farid Trad, Behjat Abdel
Nour, George Sarkis, Antoine Nahas, namely the most important and well-
known architects and engineers in the city. The architects were asked to study
different building typologies and present to the municipality the facades of 1)
an independent villa occupied by one tenant 2) a villa with several independent
floors and occupied by several tenants and 3) a building that consists of 6-10
apartments. These facades were to recede according to the street alignment (4
m minimum) to allow the establishment of gardens between the buildings and
the street while the enclosure of the building would consist of a low wall with
a gate made out of cast iron. Garages for cars were to be hidden from view
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either by placing them in the back facades of the villas or in specially
constructed areas in the building courts or gardens. Provisions for a passage of
3 m minimum between the enclosing wall and the wall of the building were to
be made. Competition rules also stipulated that external staircases should not
cover in any way the 4 meters reserved between the enclosure wall and the
facade of the buildings. Competitors are free to choose the style and the
materials they use.
On April 25 th of the same year Igor Pitlenko, an architect of French-Russian
origin residing in Beirut, was declared winner of the competition (out of 6
entries).424 While the rules drawn up for the competition indicated the degree
to which the municipality was striving for diversity within uniformity in the
image of the city, the winning entry indicated the extent to which architectural
aesthetics were changing in the city. (Figure 23) The expressionist language,
the angular shapes, the jutting pyramid on the roof, Art Deco inspired features
contrasted dramatically with the oriental motifs and medieval fenestration of
Aftimous's municipal building. The plan of the villa itself is interesting for the
criteria it assumes necessary in the new bourgeois family home. A separate
lounge is created for the ladies and a smoking room extends from the official
reception area. The plan of the building itself is quite ingenious for the way it
424 Two prizes were awarded: First prize was 100 Lebanese-Syrian Liras and the 2nd prize, won
by architect Otto Michelbar was 50 Lebanese-Syrian Liras. (BMM, 1932). No discussion in
the papers seems to have taken place regarding this competition. Not much is known about
Pitlenko and the only reference we have of him is as the author of the first reference book on
Architecture entitled L'annuaire d'Architecture du Liban et du Syrie that covered the
architectural landscape of the area between 1900-1930. It included 35 works from 13 different
architects.
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met the competition criteria. The garage for the car is tucked away on the side
while the internal staircase juts in within the building. Even though the
structure was never built the winning project signaled a dramatic shift in
architectural aesthetics and notions of what modern living entailed.
Figure 23: Winning Design by Igor Pitlenko, 1932 (Source: Igor Pitlenko,
Annuaire, 1934)
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Domesticating Modernism: Towards a National
Symbolic
rmed with a silver axe, the Vali of Beirut and the Commander
of the 4 th Turkish regiment Jamal Pasha42 5 took the first swing at
the walls of Suq el Haddadine in Beirut's historic center,
inaugurating the 1915 demolition of parts of its historic center.
Or so the story goes. Even though no documentary or photographic evidence
of Jamal Pasha's performance has been located to date, what is clear is that his
verbal order was transmitted through the Vali of Beirut to the municipality on
Sunday, March 22, 1915 (1331). It stated: "By the order of the commander of
the fourth fleet, the municipality is to expand the areas of suq al Khamamir,
and Haddadine as well as Bab Yacoub (door of Jacob, one of seven main
portals into the city) up to 20 meters" so as to link Beirut's port with the heart
of the city (see map).426
The stated aim of this operation was the expansion of the city, its organization
and its modernization. The project was to begin immediately on Thursday,
March the 24th . Owners were to be notified, preliminary paperwork for
425 Jamal Pasha or Jamal Pasha al Saffah (the butcher or slaughterer) as he is popularly known
was famous for his brutality. In 1916, he ordered the public hanging of Syrian and Lebanese
notables accused of treasonous contact with the British and French over the cession of their
provinces from the empire. He also exiled another 200 families to Anatolia for suspected
collaboration with the French. See Antonious The Arab Awakening p. 185-190; 201-203; 227-
28; Adham al Jundi, Shuhada al-_arb al-alamiyah al-Kubra [Martyr's of the World War in
Lebanon] (Dimashq: A. al Jundi, 1960)p. 16-25; Ajay, The War years ).
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expropriations were carried out based on the plan prepared by Nathif bey al
Khalidy the architect/engineer of the Vilaya and Bishara effendi the
architect/engineer of the municipality. The expropriation laws of Istanbul were
to be followed in the process. "Suq el Haddadine and suq al Fashkha," the
order continued, "were the first structures to be demolished." In the first
installment round 140 stores and 90 homes were demolished. A few months
later, on Nov. 16th another order by Jamal Pasha was relayed to municipal
members asking that a road extending from Khan Fakhri Bey to Locanda
Bassoul be created. It was approved in this same session. Around 2356
properties were expropriated totaling 807, 390 TL in what was to become Rue
Fosch and Allenby. An expropriation commission of 7 members that included
former municipal architect Yusuf Aftimous was formed.42 7 Its role was to
value property that was to be expropriated and decide on the proper
compensation amounts. Other municipal members suggested that, given the
dire financial situation of the municipality, perhaps the land resulting from the
expropriation should be sold immediately in a public auction. In either case the
municipality also decided that since funds were limited, it would first
compensate the poor and when more funds became available the rich would be
paid. Another option discussed was the exchange of property between the
municipality and owners. As was the norm, remains of the demolitions were to
be sold.
426 BMM, 1914-1915 (1331-1332)
427 See section I.
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Map 5: Plan of Beirut's Historic core 1921. Demolitions
undertaken by the Ottomans during WWI are marked in
the dotted areas. The new Fosch and AlIenby roads are
visible in the same areas and the Plan de L' Etoile would
be constructed on the site of these demolitions. The
outline of the Grand Serail is also visible to the right of
the plan. (Source: Archives de L' Armee Francraise du
Levant, in Tabet el aI, Beyrouth, Portrait de Ville (Paris:
IFA,2001),p.14.
One has to wonder why the commander of the fourth fleet in the Turkish army
was occupying himself with the modernization of the city in the midst of a war
that threatened the very existence of the empire itself and in a city that was
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facing an acute famine.4 28 Hostile allied forces were patrolling the coastline, an
invasion of Beirut was expected even though it never occurred, citizens were
evacuating en masse and the general atmosphere was one of turbulence and
uncertainty. Was it a military decision based on the needs of the Ottoman
army? Were wider roads needed to facilitate the movements of troops through
the city's highly congested and convoluted alleyways? Was it an act of
affirmation of Ottoman control over the area at a time when Arab nationalism
had taken hold along with calls for the independence of Arab citizens under
the leadership of King Faycal?429 After all these demolitions were taking place
at the same time as attempts to turkify the area had intensified. Schools in the
areas of Mount Lebanon, Syria and the Vilaya of Beirut were either closed
down or forced to begin teaching in Turkish-Ottoman while newspapers that
were still functioning were being heavily censored for reports challenging
Ottoman government narratives of the progress of the war.4 30 Or was it a
genuine attempt to improve the city's infrastructure in line with ongoing
efforts in Istanbul and other piecemeal efforts already underway in the city? 431
In the absence of any documentation thus far over what Jamal Pasha's
428 Discussions of how the municipality could address the apparently impending famine were
carried out in the same session.
429 See Section II, Part I.
430 See Ajay The war years for a detailed discussion of these practices. See also Antonius, The
Arab Awakening Thompson, Colonial Citizens Yammin, Lebanon during the war; Dodge,
Memorials of William E. Dodge; Schilcher, Linda "The Famine of 1915-1918 in Greater
Syria" in J. Spagnolo, ed. Problems of the Modern Middle East in Historical Perspective:
Essays in Honor of Albert Hourani (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1992) p. 229-258 for various
descriptions of general socioeconomic conditions and Ottoman practices in the area during the
war period.
431 Contrary to many assumptions, this project was not a unique incidence but rather part of an
ongoing effort to improve circulation in the city. At the same time as this effort was launched a
plan to expand the road of Mina el Hosn along the seafront and the construction of a coastal
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reasoning might have been, what is certain is that this act of demolition in the
name of modernization, and in the midst of a brutal war inaugurated a crisis of
legality and of representation for the city's administrators and inhabitants for
decades to come.432 It resulted in a housing crisis and displaced a large number
of tenants whose rights were never upheld. It also transformed the heart of the
city and the lives of its inhabitants-their spatial practices, daily lives, and
economic systems-on a scale commensurate with the regional changes that
were occurring.
Over the next two decades, the reconstruction of the demolished center served
as the experimental terrain for the production of the city and its spaces and
transformed the city into the site for structuring the narrative of national
modernity. It set the tone, means and strategies through which both city and
nation would be reconfigured physically, socially, economically, politically
and visually. In essence it is during this period, when the contours of national
identity were so much in flux, when the debates over the final shape of
territory and nation had taken center stage that a visual grammar of the nation
was being created and new concepts of citizenship projected. This part will
examine the changes brought forth by mandate politics and the collaboration
between colonial administrators and technicians and local institutions. It will
explore some of the elements through which a capital city reflective of both
road to Saida through Ouzai were also being debated (BMM, decision 2/460, 21 September,
1915[1331], p. 112). See also Section I.
432 Extensive archival research in Beirut, Istanbul and France has not revealed any evidence of
the reasons behind Jamal Pasha's actions, or any images of what the new Beirut was to look
like. This is not surprising given both the period in which this project was undertaken (WWI)
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the new nation-state and of colonial politics was projected. In what follows
this chapter will consider the different ways in which the visual production of
the new nation and thus the new citizen by different actors both at home and
abroad meant the degrees of domestication for modern architecture. As I will
show in the last section of this dissertation, the French/Lebanese plans for the
areas demolished by the Ottomans also laid the basis for the 1991-2004 post-
civil war reconstruction efforts for the center of Beirut.
Constitutional Modernism and National Architecture
The year 1926 constituted a watershed for the new Lebanese nation-state. The
popular revolts in Hauran had finally ended, the Lebanese constitution was
promulgated generating vigorous debate as to the status of Lebanon under the
French, and its position as a colony or an independent nation state under the
mandate, a complete overhaul of the cadastral system was initiated so as "to
insure the security of private property" generating new economic dynamics by
transforming private property into an alternative form of credit,4 33 plans for a
national museum would soon be discussed, an international archaeology
conference took place generating a new and intense discussion of the history
of the nation through its archeology in the local press, and the project of what
would become the place de L' Etoile and the parliament building was
launched. In what follows I will begin with the project for reconstructing the
center and the parliament building followed by a brief discussion of the other
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and more the significant destruction of both institutional and personal archives during the civil
war in Beirut..
themes. Discussion of the project will focus on two aspects; the actual
planning or re-planning of the area under consideration and the construction of
the parliament building as an emblem of the new nation state. The project
itself went through two phases: the transitional 1915-1926 period and the post
1926 design of the Etoile and its subsequent implementation. During both
periods two particular issues affected this plan; the expropriations undertaken
for the "public good" and the cadastral reform undertaken.
Ottoman onto French: 1915-1926
From what can be gathered from existing archives,434 the Ottoman plan for
Beirut's historic heart seems to have been in line with approaches to planning
characteristic of the period- that is buildings and land were expropriated for
the expansion and realignment of roads or the construction of public
edifices.4 35 As outlined earlier, the initial demolitions of Suq el Haddadine that
took place on March 22, 1915. These were part of a larger series of changes
that were being implemented in the city center including the construction of a
new Halles on the site of Khan el Sagha (Jewelry) and Khan el Harir (Silk)
433 Rapport a la Socijte des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban, (Paris: Imprimerie
Nationale, 1924-1928)
434 The reconstitution of this project included primary research in the French archives (Paris
and Nantes), Municipal Archives, Lebanese National Archives, Parliament Minutes of
Meetings, the cadastre, the Sunni and Roman Orthodox Waqfs, local papers and private
memoirs as well as readings of secondary literature.
435 Under the Ottoman expropriation law it included 20 meters of road and 20 meters on either
side of the road.
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both of which were to be knocked down,43 6 the demolition of the Petit S6rail in
Al Borj square (Place des Martyr's) to open up the area to the sea,4 37 the
expansion of the road between the port and Locanda Bassoul, the creation of a
road linking Locanda Bassoul and Khan Fakhri Bey and another linking Place
Assour to the Parc des Pins. On September 5, 1915 a commission was created
to estimate the value of the properties in the expropriated and now demolished
Suqs. The aim of this demolition was to construct new warehouses, shops,
houses and then sell these new constructions by auction. Yusuf Aftimous was
appointed as the head architect of this project while municipal engineer
Durfler drew up a map of the newly realigned center (See Appendix III for
further details).
In essence, the initial demolitions undertaken by the Ottomans seemed to have
been following the 1882 urban planning laws and the 1879 expropriation laws
drawn up for the city of Istanbul and which were mimicked in all cities of the
empire.438 However, the speed with which they were conducted, in the midst of
the war, set the stage for a lengthy legal battle and the eventual revision of
436 On February 24, 1915 [1331], the municipality decided to commission a map of Khan el
Harir, (silk) and Kahn el Sagha (jewelry) to turn them into a halles for the sale of meat,
vegetables and fish [decision 1/7531. On May 1 1h of the same year the municipality decided to
demolish both of the khans. On August 15, municipal decision 1/394 is taken to construct the
halles that had already been planned by order of the Vilaya. The commission to oversee the
project included: Rashed Effendi Beyhum from the Vilaya Administrative Council, Selim el
Bawab and Omar el Daouk, from the municipality, and the engineer of public works (al
Nafiaa) Nouri Bek. Emile Khacho who had already drawn up the maps was appointed as the
project or construction manager. What is clear from the text is that the municipality was
approving a posteriori a project ordered by the Vilaya and on which construction had already
begun.
437 On November 16, 1915, the municipality decided to sell municipal land near the Petit S6rail
through public auction since the removal of the S6rail itself had been decided upon.
438 See section I part I; Hanssen, Fin de Siecle; Abdel Nour, Kanun al Binaa, (Beirut, 1896)
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property laws. Through this process urban identities of city and citizens were
formed and inscribed.
Upon arrival in Beirut, French authorities were struck by the apparent chaos
that seemed to dominate the expropriation and reconstruction process of the
city center. Three specific issues seem to have caused this chaos: problematic
expropriations, bad municipal finances and IOU's. As a French administrator
would suggest in a Summary History of the state of the city in 1919, "even
though the operations seemed to offer all the guarantees of a legal
expropriation, it accomplished nothing of the sort."439 According to this report,
most of the stipulations of Chapter 2, articles 10, 12, 13 14 and 15 of the urban
planning laws, as well as Chapter 2, articles, 5,6, 7 and 8 of the expropriation
laws were not respected. 440 Even though the project was supposed to
439 Historique Sommaire, March 20, 1921, MAE Nantes, 21-2432; see also Ghorayeb,
Structures Urbaines. Annex II.
440 These included the preparation of a plan of the size and location of the planned road and its
profile with the exact areas to be expropriated. This plan was to be placed in an area visible by
the: general public. In addition another plan was to be prepared which included the boundaries
of the area to be expropriated, those of the neighbors, the names of owners, the area, and all
natural landmarks existing on the site (Article 5). The law also included stipulations for the
public notification of owners and their right to examine the plans and give feedback within 15
days of official notification, which were then to be sent along with the plan and the reports of
the municipality to the board of the Vilaya and to Istanbul. Infact there is a contradiction
between the urban planning laws and expropriation laws regarding the length of the period
during which owners and others affected can lodge their protests. Whilst the urban planning
laws stipulate 15 days, expropriation laws give owners only eight days. Also the manner of
notifying owners of the planned expropriation differs. The urban planning laws identified two
ways of notifying property owners: either through a notice delivered directly to each individual
affected by the opening of the road and which includes owners as well as those overlooking the
planned road, and whose delivery is corroborated by the local mokhtar or mayor or the local
imam, or through a general public notice delivered through the different imams. However, the
expropriation laws stipulate that a map with the names of the owners and the area to be
expropriated should be hung, on the door of the municipality, in an appropriate place on the
property itself, in local places of worship, and/or should be announced via public notices in the
newspapers. These notices were to remain for full eight days during which owners had the
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commence upon approval by the board of the Vilaya, no such edict was found.
The required detailed plans of the new roads, the profile of buildings and the
limits of expropriations could not be located and it was not certain that they
existed. Property owners were not notified properly since many of them had
left the city out of fear of the war, 44' and the municipality realizing it lacked
the financial means to compensate owners started issuing municipal bonds (or
IOU's)'s that were then sold and transferred at considerably depreciated
prices.4 42 Once the demolition had taken place, the municipality according to
this history failed to indicate the edges of the new street alignments on some of
the property maps leading to a considerable confusion with some buildings
constructed over what would later become new street alignments.
This Summary History report also claimed that 84 property owners had not
received proper notification, and that dire financial conditions of the
municipality meant that it was unable to compensate anyone for the
expropriated properties. Some of the property owners (1%) had contested the
right to protest the plan. The municipality then had eight days during to respond to the
complaints and send the entire file to the administrative office of the Vilaya (Abdel Nour,
Kanun al Bina, p. 27 & 93-94 See also Ghorayeb, Structures Urbaines).
441 Infact the municipality was instrumental in helping local residents fearful that the war may
spread to Beirut travel to Syria. A deal was struck with the local train company to lease out
three compartments at half price to the municipality. After 1500 people were transported the
municipality requested that the service be provided for free. Shortly after, the Turkish army
requisitioned all train lines for military use only (BMM, 1914-1915).
442 At the time of the demolition the municipality realized that it would be unable to
compensate the owners in Suq el Fashka, and Suq el Haddadine whose properties it was
expropriating. Several options were considered including an exchange with some of its own
properties located near the petit Serail. (BMM, April 15, 1915). Instead the municipality
decided to issue municipal bonds, guaranteed by the president of the municipality and paid at
6%. annual interest (see also BMM, Public Works Ledger's 1939-1944, April 15, 1939).
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expropriations.443 In other instances some of the land subsequently resold by
the municipality during the war was also contested. Some demolished
properties had not been paid for while other owners were still in possession of
their properties. The municipality had also transformed the land into public
thoroughfares, laid new sewage and water networks without resolving the
conflicts over the expropriations. Consequently by the end of the war in 1918,
the municipality found itself faced with three main types of owners; those who
has accepted the payments and whose title deeds had been transferred to the
municipality, those who had accepted the expropriations but were still in
possession of their properties and title deeds and those who had contested the
expropriations and were still holding onto to their title deeds and/or their
properties.444
The extent of the problem generated by the speed of expropriations was
outlined in a second report produced by French administrators during the same
period.445 According to this report some 2278 properties whose individual
areas are unknown have not been registered while around 72,000 square
meters had been expropriated during this period. 446 After accounting for roads
443 Rglements de La Question des Expropriation A Beyrouth, MAE, Nantes, 2369, also in
Ghorayeb, Structures Urbaines, Annex II
444 By 1918 the total value of expropriated properties was 108,159,300 (GTL). Of this total
only 33,637 (GTL) had been transferred to the municipality and 74,522,200 (GTL) worth of
properties were still in the hands of owners who had b4 en neither paid nor issued with IOU's.
ibid. However, I was unable to find any references to the number of properties this total
amounted to.
445 ibid.
446 This amounts to 1,200 linear meters of roads and a width of 60 meters and 1,081,593 TGL,
and 40,364 TGL of interest, making the total cost of expropriation 1,121.957 TGL. The price
per square meter of land was 15.95 TGL. The report estimated that once construction work
was completed properties should be resold at an average of 24 GTL. Ibid.
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and public spaces included in the plan of the time, the municipality was left
with around 51,580 square meters that were to be subdivided into individual
lots and sold. By the time allied forces arrived in Beirut, 4272 square meters of
land sold in public auction by the municipality had neither been properly
delineated nor paid for. A further 43,775 square meters remained to be sold.
Of those, around 3245 square meters were due to the Sunni and Greek
Orthodox communities whose mosques (10) and one church had been
expropriated and demolished. The administrative consultant proposed that
both religious communities could be compensated with properties equivalent
to those demolished within the same area on the condition that they would not
construct houses of worship on the premises. This he argued was in the
financial interest of the municipality that needed to recreate the center as a
cosmopolitan space where "the population will surely be a mix of strangers."
Alternatively both religious communities could be compensated with
properties of equivalent value within essentially Muslim or Christian
neighborhoods. The decision was also taken that no new mosques, churches or
synagogues could be constructed along the new roads. We will come back to
this issue shortly.
Despite the perceived irregularities, the debate surrounding the expropriations
focused on their legality and the modes of resolving the conflicts between the
municipality and the owners who had either contested the expropriations 447 or
447 These were owners who had contested the initial compensation offered for their properties
or owners still in control of their expropriated properties whose prices had appreciated
considerably as a result of the end of hostilities and the road and infrastructure works carried
out.
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who alternatively had not been properly notified. French authorities estimated
that only a fraction of those of those who contested the expropriations could
legally continue in their contestation since the mandate authorities had legally
approved the estimates made by the Ottoman commissions. The main
argument in favor of picking up where the Ottomans had left off was that the
general interest of the city (or public good) superceded those of individuals.
The most problematic component of the expropriations was the resale of the
municipal bonds (or IOU's)'s. The financial straightjacket that the
municipality found itself in during the war forced it to issue municipal bonds
(or IOU's)'s for the property it was expropriating.44 8 The right of the
municipality to such action was questioned by the French. During the war, and
as the economic situation deteriorated, many of those municipal bonds (or
IOU's)'s were in turn snapped up by some uppers income individuals or by
banks at ridiculously cheap prices. French administrators estimated that while
initial trade in the IOU's alternated between 70-80% of their value, and then at
35% of their value, some were eventually sold at around 5% of their total
value. The insecurity of the war, the introduction of paper money and hence
the depreciation in the value of the bonds, the uncertainty regarding the
municipality's ability to pay back the value and the interest accrued (6%) and
the destitution of some of the lower income families all contributed to the
448 An unsigned report on the municipality written in 1920 states that the demolitions during
the war, and expropriations drained municipal finances while the sales it has carried out will
not cover _ of its debt. World crisis is driving people to sell their buildings thus driving the
property values of municipal land down. MAE- Nantes 17-2436c
254
fluctuation in prices of IOU's. Some had changed hands so much that it was
almost impossible to trace their original holders.
A variety of solutions to these problems were proposed. Amongst others these
included the re-expropriation of land already sold through public auction by
the municipality for resale at better prices, the construction of the stores and
residences in the areas, even asking one developer to reconstruct the whole
area at favorable fees and real estate tax exemptions. Eventually none of these
solutions were adopted. A decree was issued on June 9, 1921 accepting the
legality of the expropriations was then augmented by another on January 30,
1922 (decree 1106). 449 Both decrees argued that despite the ambiguity of
property status in the downtown, since many of the steps legal prior to
expropriation were not observed, the economic and hygiene needs of the city,
the exceptional circumstances they were undertaken in, the impossibility of
questioning the legality of the operations that have already been undertaken,
and that its advisable to safeguard the interests of the collectivity without
undermining the rights of individuals, the Ottoman foundations of this project
had to be accepted. The first article confirmed the legality of all expropriations
undertaken under decree 326 issued on May 22, 1915 by the Vali of Beirut
(even if the operations concerning them occurred a posteriori). Other
expropriations undertaken to open new roads between the Palais des Pins and
449 Members of the commission included the governor of greater Lebanon, a representative of
the French Mandate administration, a representative of the Lebanese administration and two
notables from the city of Beirut. See Projet d'Arrete, June 9, 1921 MAE Nantes, 17-2435. See
also Lebanese Republic, The collection of Decisions of the Government of Greater Lebanon
[Majmou 'at al moqarrart li Dawlat Lubnan el Kabir] (Beirut: Al Adab, 1925-1927), Volume,
I.
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the Asour square, and between the Place des Canons and the port (that
included the demolition of the petit S6rail) were cancelled. The buildings and
properties were to be returned to their owners. Moreover, the prices of
expropriated properties were maintained as evaluated by the Ottoman
commission under the leadership of Mohamed Effendi Tayyara. These
estimates were to be examined by another special commission in cases where
the estimates had been contested. The municipality was also required to pay all
property owners and holders of municipal IOU's, the full value of their
properties and bonds. The municipality was also considered the legal owner of
all the expropriated properties. Buildings transferred by the municipality to
third parties were considered irrevocable. Citizens still in possession of their
expropriated properties were to hand them in within a month. A special
commission was to evaluate all litigations brought against the municipality or
conflict between the municipality and owners still in possession of their
expropriated properties and to examine the properties already expropriated.
On January 31, 1924 the municipality formed another committee to look into
the problems associated with the expropriations and to make a list of all
properties expropriated.4 5 A summary report by the municipal accountant
indicated that by 1931 the total cost of reconstruction amounted to 22,000 SL
450 Based on the January 21st, request of Beirut's judge the committee was headed by the
administrative governor as the head of the committee. Its members nominated by the
municipality included the president of the municipality as well George Rizkallah, and Bahjat al
Daouk. (BMM, 1923-1924) Between 1924 and 1928 the municipality also took out a series of
loans from two banks to cover its 1915 expropriations and the subsequent expropriations
generated by the creation of the Etoile in 1926. See BMM 1924-1926; 1927-1928; 1928-1930;
1931; and PWL 1928-1934. MAE Nantes, 21-347, 21-353-354; See also Ghorayeb, Structures
Urbaines, Annex II, Document no. 10
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22,000 SL with another 2,152,592.60 SL still owed by the municipality of
which 51,690SL were for expropriation related IOU's. Of those 27,940 were
unpaid IOU's issued during WWI. (See Appendix III)
By 1939 these issues had still not been resolved and new ones had accrued.
Another summary report requested by the municipality on April 5th 1939
claimed that the star shaped public space created in 1927 to facilitate the
connection between the Damascus road to the corner of Bab Idriss and
between Rue Fosch and the Port area to Basta had caused bottlenecks with
regards to expropriations and demolitions.45 ' The process of expropriations
was chaotic to the point that entire lots remained in the hands of their owners
whilst others were jointly owned between the municipality and the private
owners. The latter were particularly problematic since they could not be sold
unless the municipality expropriated them entirely, something it was unable to
do given its financial difficulties. (See Appendix III for more details).
Various solutions were proposed including the suggestion that joined lots
should be expropriated by the municipality and then sold once the roads
around them had been designed and the plan approved. This solution was
meant to provide leeway for the municipality to offer the government land in
exchange for municipal debt forgiveness. The challenge was that the
municipality was unable to proceed with the expropriations and the laying out
451 For example, the municipality was still negotiating with both the Sunni and Greek Orthodox
Waqfs the values of properties expropriated during WWI, well into the late 1920's. See MSW,
1921-1928, 1928-1936; MMB, 1927-1934
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of the necessary infrastructure unless it took out a loan for the project. An
agreement was struck with the Bank of Syria and Lebanon to give the
municipality a loan of one million Lebanese-Syrian Liras (LSL) over 10 years.
The money was to be used to 1) pay the previously issued IOU's (those whose
owners refuse to exchange them with the newly issued bonds of 5 _% interest
instead of 6% interest) 2) build the municipal halles 3) continue with the
expropriations so long as the loan and the income from the land that is sold is
used to complete the planning of the Etoile and only according to need.452
The municipality agreed with the report and accepted the proposal since,
according to municipal minutes the deal would "rid the municipality of its debt
to the government and allow it to deliver the land within the allocated 30
months... [it] also guaranteed the planning of the Etoile, the sale of its land as
well as the goals of hygiene, health the city strives for and the growth and
architectural beauty it aspired to." The physical design solutions proposed will
be discussed further below.
Physical Planning
The first scheme for the reconstruction of the area was proposed in April 1921
by a private entrepreneur and well known developer Derwish Haddad who
asked to buy the whole area from the municipality so as to redevelop it under a
particular set of conditions.4 53 The proposal was discussed in the municipality
452 The loan and the costs it incurs were not to be included in the general budget but rather they
should have an independent budget. BMM, 1939.
453 On April 12, 1921 Derwich Haddad wrote to the municipality asking to take over the land it
had expropriated during the war, and rebuild it. In return he offers to pay the past property
owners whatever the municipality owed them in gold, under the following conditions:
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and subsequently rejected as unfeasible. As we shall see in section III, it would
take another 71 years or so for the rebuilding of Beirut's historic center to be
privatized in an analogous manner. Beyond this proposal municipal minutes
show no indication that an overall and comprehensive plan for the demolished
areas was being considered. A sole reference in the 1923 municipal minutes
indicates a discussion to plan and rebuild the area within 5 years.
To reconstruct the area French mandate authorities in conjunction with the
municipality continued the expropriation and demolition begun by the
Ottomans in 1916. These included in addition to privately owned properties in
the area, places of worship and waqfs (religiously endowed) land. Mosques
and churches were to be demolished and re-built by the municipality, while
owners of homes, land, or shops were to be financially compensated for the
value of their property. Between 1920-1926 municipal engineers continued
working in the same manner as they always had; that is roads were planned in
1. The municipality sells his company the land it expropriated during the war and which is
40,000 m2 for 41,500,000 francs.
2. The municipality will smooth over any potential difficulties that could face the company
from a third party and will follow up on any law suit that could result.
3. For the municipality to recuperate the difference in land prices between when it initially
expropriated during the war and the current situation, the company agrees to give the
municipality 10% of its net profits every year (from the sale or rent of land or any other way).
4. The municipality will absolve company from all taxes or fees during construction and for
two years after unless the land or constructed buildings are sold before then.
5. The municipality will also prevail on the government not to collect fees from the company
on the title deeds and it would also absolve the company form all taxes on construction
material.
6. All infrastructure will be undertaken by the municipality.
7. The municipality will have the right to oversee the financial books of the company but only
for incoming finances and does not have the right to interfere in the work of the company- goal
is for it to insure it is getting its fair share.
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a rectilinear manner, expropriated plots were re-organized in a grid like
fashion and then sold in public auctions. In January 1923 the construction of
30 stores to the North East of Rue Fosch commenced. By September 1923
these were up for sale through public auction along with their air rights.454
Building permits were assessed based on their architectural aesthetics and their
compliance with street frontages and set backs.
Star of the Nation: the 1926 plan for the city center
In 1926, the areas to be expropriated were enlarged and a star shaped plan was
drawn up by French engineers working at the Ministry of Public works (Map
6). The municipality stopped issuing building permits in the area until the plan
was finalized whilst buildings already constructed but that would be affected
by the new plan had to be redesigned. One example was the Shamseddine
mosque constructed in 1924 whose north facade had to be demolished and
8. If the company asks the municipality to expropriate the rest of the properties between the
newly constructed roads, it agrees to do so under the same conditions as the already
expropriated roads.
454On August 28, 1923 some of the conditions for these sales were:
1. every person interested in entering into the competition should pay the municipality 10% of
the amount that is offered (in cash or IOU) to the municipality as a guarantee of participation.
2. auction will go on for 61 days starting from the day of notification
3. if the price is not right the municipality has the right to extend the auction period
4. 'Within 7 days of the auction winning bids must be paid in total to the municipality.
Otherwise the sale is considered null and void and the municipality retains the 10% down
payment.
However the municipality decided to retain its rights over air rights (construction over the
stores). On September 4th the municipality changed its mind and decided to put the air rights up
for sale. The conditions of sale were identical to those of the stores with on addition. The buyer
was required to pay his share of the cost of the building plan drawn up by the municipality
whereas the municipality had to construct the first floor of the building within one year of the
sale. (BMM, 1923-1924)
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reconstructed to comply with the new street alignments created by the plan de
L'Etoile . After a series of negotiations with the Muslim Sunni Waqfs, the
owners of the building, the fa~ade was reconstructed according to the new
plan.455
Map 6 Place de L'Etoile, 1926, signed by Louis Tabet. Black
areas indicate the new axis of the plan and the grey areas the
existing fabric and landownership patterns that were
reconstituted by the plan. The two axis to the right were never
built since they would have entailed the expropriation and
demolition of two existing churches. Refer to map 5 for location
in the city center (Source: MAE Paris)
The parliament building, initially planned for Martyr's square was assigned a
plot on one axis of the Etoile. This was part of a larger land deal between the
municipality and the government whereby the government would get one plot
of land in the Etoile area on which to construct the parliament and national
library and another on Rue Fakhreddine on which to construct the post office
455 BMM 1924-1926 ; Muslim Sunni Waqfs (MSW), 1921-1928
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buildings.456 In 1929 the deal was signed and a 10,000 Syrian Lebanese
pounds credit was opened to the account of the municipality by the
government for the construction of the parliament building that was also to
house the national library and the Service Foncier.457 Madiros Altounian who
was working at the Ministry of Public Works at the time as an illustrator was
assigned the task of designing the structure.4 58
456 This exchange of land was part of a larger series of exchanges that were negotiated between
the government and the municipality and between the French military authorities and the
municipality. A letter from minister of Public Works dated Nov. 3, 1928, mentions that the
government had decided in its session of October 29, 1928 to negotiate with the municipality
through the Mohafez about an exchange of land in Martyr's square (where the police station
is)- and which is not large enough to construct the parliament building and the national library-
with another piece of land in Allenby street. The municipality agrees to finish all expropriation
and estimations on that plot and then exchange can be conducted according to these reports. In
its session of Oct. 9 1929 the municipal council approves the deal with the government for an
exchange of land between Martyr's square and the Etoile area. In return the municipality will
acquire ownership of the local stock exchange (bourse), the old post building in place al Sour
(Raid el Solh today). Even though there the difference in the value of the land is in favor of the
government, the municipality will not collect the difference. The municipality accepts the deal
grudgingly arguing that it is unfair and stipulates that the transferred land in the Etoile will
only be used for the construction of the post office and parliament buildings and that if the post
building is not constructed on the assigned land the municipality reserves the right to re-
expropriate it. It also makes a 50 year extension on its lease on Sanayeh gardens a condition of
the agreement. (BMM, PWL 1927-1930) On Nov. 13, 1929, the government responds to the
municipality saying it agrees to the terms only if the municipality gives it a 10,000 sqm piece
of land in Horch el Sanawbar (Pine Forest) where it can build a presidential palace in the
future. The municipality agrees if the government transfers ownership of the Sanayeh gardens
to the municipality (the garden was Miri Land so became government land once the Ottoman
Empire was dismantled.
457 A credit of 10,000 SL was opened up to begin construction of the parliament building (that
is to also include the national library and the cadastral administration). An additional 142,000
SL was then assigned in this year's budget. To ensure that this project takes place an additional
credit of 75,000 has added to the budget of the ministry while the remaining 18,000 will be
eventually given from the surplus available in the 1929 budget ( Letter dated letter Oct. 25,
1929 Summary of main budgetary decisions- MAE Nantes 18-1547),.
45 Madiros Altounian (1888-1958) was born in Bursa (Turkey). At the end of WWI he
emigrated from Paris where he was pursuing an education at the Ecole des Beaux Arts, to
Beirut. Upon arrival he was assigned as an illustrator and then architect at the Ministry of
Public Works. During his long career he designed a variety of private residences as well as
many civic and religious buildings in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and India (Interview with his son
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Mimicking in miniature form its namesake in Paris, this eight-sided star was
implemented between 1927 and 1932. In the absence of actual evidence it is
likely that the plan itself was drawn up by Durrafourd, the French architect in
charge of the implementing the new cadastral system in the country and
actively involved in the reconstruction of the city center. Symbolically the plan
signaled the creation of a new center of power towards which the city and it's
now national public were meant to converge. This act of grafting redefined
the appearance of the city from Ottoman to French and thus according to
French narrative from medieval or backwards to "modern." Its representational
mechanisms also placed the city somewhere else- that is it displaced the realm
of' urban politics onto France's imperial ambitions. Torn from its context,
metropolitan Paris, and superimposed in a triumphant gesture over the
remnants of an Ottoman, now read as "Mediterranean" city, the Place de
L"Etoile begins to function as a double metaphor for both the birth and the
still-birth of the new nation state.
This double metaphor becomes more forcefully clear in the figurative language
of the parliament building, the most potent representation of this modern
nation-state, now anchored in the Etoile's imperial embrace. The monumental
stature that the structure was meant to occupy was significantly undermined
through it's location on one axis of the Place de L'Eotile so much so that it
Achot Altounian March 2003; Achot Altounian, A La Recherche du temps retrouve avec mon
pre (Beirut: Sipan Printing Press, 2000); Robert Saliba, Beirut City Center Recovery: The
Fosch Allenby and Etoile Conservation Area, (Germany, Steidl, 2004): 123; Daher, Laws
Regulating the General Budget in Memory 1920-1988, (Beirut, Lebanon: 158-159 ; MAE
Nantes 5-392
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practically disappears into its environment.459 This is further emphasized in the
site plan for the area. The monumental stature of the building, the position it
was meant to occupy in the framework of the new nation-state is consistently
destabilized, through practices of planning that render it invisible on the site
plan of the Etoile. This created a situation of near impossibility where the
practices of architecture and urbanism where if one exists the other must
"disappear."
Figure 24: The parliament building
(Source: Left MAE Paris; Right author's
photographs)
The classical lines of an early modernism now replace the Baroque forms
common to Ottoman architecture. Even though this political transition from the
Ottoman Empire to the French Mandate at the end of WWI, itself coincided
with a shift in architectural and urban discourse from Beaux Arts to early
modernism in Europe, French rhetoric described the new style as a move from
459 As a friend commented during one of my my presentations, when she saw an image of the
parliament building on the screen she realized that she has never really "seen" the building
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the archaic and backward forms of stagnant Ottoman rule to the progressive
forms of "modern" French governance. In other words the disappearance of
ornament now signified a transformation in the status of knowledge and socio-
political structures: from an "archaic" Ottoman to "modem" French and from
an "autocratic" Empire to a "democratic" nation-state.
However, the attempt to index a nation, whose contours were as much a
product of colonial power itself as they were of the endeavors of various local
groups, meant that the clear lines of modernist architecture had to be anchored
in place, in a history which would act as its public reference, as its trace in this
place. Through a selective use of history, modernist architecture became the
means through which the incorporation and pacification of various locals takes
place. As was common in other post-ottoman contexts such as North Africa, a
turn to local motifs implied a return to a pre-Ottoman Islamic past, in most
cases the Mamluk period which immediately preceded, was utilized as means
of indexing local identities. In the case of Lebanon, this turn became doubly
fortuitous given the overlap of Mamluk architecture and the palaces of
Fakhreddine. As Achot Altounian, the son of Madiros Altounian would state,
"my father traveled the country in search of an architecture emblematic of
Lebanese national identity. He was to find this inspiration in the palaces of
Fakhreddine in the Chouf."46 0 Various elements were incorporated into the
facade of the building. An arch composed of yellow colored local brickwork
marks the main portal of the building. Over the arch sits a slightly jutting
despite her almost daily visits to the area.
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window of three rounded arches and an upper jagged ledge. On either side of
the portal, long thin windows, which stretch down the length of the facade,
also terminate with two muqarnas like motifs.461 Through the juxtaposition of
these motifs, Lebanon's Arab and Oriental identities were interpolated with the
emblematic figure of Fakhreddine and subjugated to the representative
institution of the nation-state. Modem architectural forms inflected with
"national" motifs were used by to inculcate a unified, historically specific and
territorially bounded subjectivity, a pre-requisite for participation in the state or
the nation. Recovered from the layers of the land, Lebanese identity was
projected as an autonomous subject eternally present through history. (Figures
24)
Figure 25: Parliament Clock tower and Phoenician heritage. Left: the clock tower
constructed infron of the parliament. Right: Phoenician Architecture, "Historie de
L'habitation humaine, construction edifiee par Charles Garnier" Exposition de Paris,
1889, supplement no. 7, p. 50-56., in Davie, Beyrouth, 2000, p. 81
4(i) Al Anwar, Interview with Achot Altounian conducted by Nuhad Tapoulian, January, 2002;
Private interview, March 2003
461 The muqarnas is a motif common to Mamluk architecture and reinterpreted by French and
British historians of the 19th century as an embodiment of Islamic and Arab architecture.
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These national symbols were further reinforced by the architect in his design
of the clock tower in front of the parliament. Donated by a Lebanese expatriate
living in Mexico, the clock tower was built to echo Lebanon's "Phoenician"
identity. Altounian, was a member of Charles Corms' circle and a participant
in the 1939 New York exhibition that Corm organized where he submitted a
painting the depicted Lebanon's Phoenician origins. These will be discussed
shortly. Altounian's winning design, echoed the classical lines of his
parliament building inflected with "Phoenician" elements. Building on Corm's
interpretations of Phoenician architecture the tower incorporated structures
taken to be Lebanese heritage. This conception of architecture as locally
grounded was further evidenced in his rejection of Michel Abed's
modifications as neither culturally nor historically appropriate. (Figure 25)
In an amusing but telling __ u. ... - _
anecdote, before launching the
competition, Michel Abed, the
benefactor sent two potential
designs from Mexico city
depicting his vision for the
clock tower. Fantasies aside,
the images depicted indicate
the extent to which Paris, the
capital of modernity and the
Metropole was a point of
reference for the city of Beirut. "
After Altounian's design was
selected he sent in further modifications to the clock tower suggesting that the
architect incorporate 5 bells, a moving dolls over every face, and a golden rooster a
meter and a half tall that flutters its wings three times, raises its head three times and
crows three times eve hour A ndix III & Ai Maarad October 1931 .
Figure 26: Abed's designs for the Clock tower (Source: Ai Maarad, October,
1931)
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The struggle to define Lebanese national identity within the framework of
French colonial politics became the context in which and through which these
and other projects were formed, and by which the different languages, physical
realities, behaviors, urban and territorial dimensions, politico-economic
dynamics were bound. As projected in this project, modernism and
nationalism were not about emancipation and universal citizen rights as much
they were about control, power, economics and centralization. In other words,
the forging of a modern national identity in this instance was an attempt to
consolidate colonial and elite control over the rest of the country. The
discourse associated with modernism and nationalism, the right to self
determination, the universal rights of citizenship etc.. were used to constitute
the Lebanese subject as a unified whole, forever present and existing outside
of' history. As MP, editor and owner of the weekly Maarad Michel Zaccour
would caption an image of the building copula with "the huge size of the
building contrasts with the meager authority of its parliamentarians. Lebanon
would have preferred that its parliamentarians have real powers even if they
met under a tent of hairs."4 62 (Figure 27) The diminutive size of the copula,
invisible from the street may in part be explained by the desire to distance the
new image of the city from its Ottoman/Islamic recent past. Symbolically, this
act of emasculation further signaled the impossibility of the new nation-state
and its architectural impossibility.
462 In another article in the same year he complained we never imagined that enlarging the
meeting room of the parliament meant a decrease in its size and powers. Al Maarad, October
19:34.
268
Figure 27 "The Grandiose Parliament
Copula" (Source: Ai Maarad, June 14, 1934)
The construction of the Etoile area brought into view a host of other issues that
were plaguing both the planning of the city and the 'construction' of its new
identity. As Tafun points out, the construction of any physical space is always
a site of struggle and that struggle is never complete. Rather it leaves residues,
borders, which remain unexplored. In other words, such plans are often broken
up by technical accidents and subterranean ideologies, which act at another
level. As discussed earlier, to implement the project French mandate
authorities had to continue the expropriation and demolition begun by the
Ottomans in 1916. This effort coincided with a comprehensi ve overhaul of
cadastral services and a transformation of property rights throughout the
country.
Unlike its French counterpart, the Lebanese Place de L'Etoile could never be
completed. As a result of opposition by the Christian Waqfs,463two of the
planned radial axis, which would have entailed the destruction of two existing
churches; the Greek Catholic S1. Elie, and the Roman Orthodox S1. George,
463 The Waqf is an endowment often in property and money, held in trust for the members of
the particular religious community.
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could not be completed. No trace or explanation could be located in either
municipal or waqfs archives as to why these churches were never expropriated
and the Etoile completed. However this accident of time, projected physically
and symbolically the fissures that ran through Lebanese nation building and
which had transformed religion into the single most important aspect of a
citizen's public identity. Read alternatively, the basis of the project that is both
the constitution of the nation the construction of the Etoile, and the meanings
they are supposed to embody become mutually exclusive. If one exists than
the other must be fiction. Architecture here was mandated with registering the
continuities that could not be extended on an urban level leading to a situation
of tense impossibility. On another level, the juxtaposition of both the nation
and religion throws into relief the precise nature of the whole enterprise of
Lebanese national identity and its impossibility.4 64
464 A national pact was struck between by Lebanon's political leaders in 1943 in an effort to
maintain a balance of power between the various religious communities. It distributed
parliamentary seats according to a formula of 6 Christians to 5 Muslims applied at all
administrative levels in the country. It also designated that the president of the republic be a
Christian Maronite, the prime minister a Muslim Sunni and the speaker of parliament a
Muslim Shi'a. All administrative appointments in the government follow the same pattern. The
president of the central bank is traditionally held by a Christian (Roman Orthodox) his first
vice president a Sunni, the head of internal security must be a Shi'a, the Commander in chief
of the army a Maronite, whilst his second in command must be Druze. However, it effectively
led to an overwhelming concentration of power and thus economic growth, in the hands of the
Maronites primarily and the Sunnis secondarily. It is also worth noting that this pact violates
article 12 of the constitution which states that, merit and competence according to the rules set
by the law are to be the only criteria by which all Lebanese are considered for public
employment. However, this article itself conflicts with article 5 of the constitution which
insists on the equal representation of all sects in public offices.
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Architectural Fantasies and Colonial Expositions
The fluid images that were used to identify the grammar of the nation were
further reflected in the architecture and images used at the 1931 Colonial
exposition and the 1939 New York World Fair exposition. The former was the
product primarily of French mandate efforts and was coordinated out of the
Institut Franqaise in Damascus.465 The latter was the brainchild of Charles
Corm who exerted considerable effort to define the visual attributes of this
new nation state. The material produced for both events contrasted sharply
with the pavilions of the 1921 Beirut fair with its North African references and
orientalized motifs.
Paris 1931
In 1931, a colonial exposition was held in Paris. Some scholars have explored
the historic context of this particular exposition and its civilizing missions,
others have investigated questions of power and representation of the different
1 9 th and early 2 0th century international exhibitions and yet others have
analyzed the orientalist tropes that "enframed" the presentations of cultures
465 With the establishment of the mandate in Syria and Lebanon a French institute for the study
of Muslim society was founded in 1919; the Institut Francais d'Archeologie et d'Art
Musulmans based at the Palais Azem, a spectacular 18h century private residence bought by
mandate authorities. This institute was academically and scientifically connected to the
University of Paris and administratively to the French High Commission. The creation of such
institutions in the area was in part a response to a larger geopolitical competition with German
and British activities in the area that preceded WWI. (See Beirut Fair, Part I, Section II) It was
also a form of moral and intellectual legitimation of French presence and control; an idea that
would reemerge with Michel Ecochard in the 1940's towards the end of the mandate, and a
mechanism through which to bring the past of geographic Syria and with it the human
geography of its populations to life. See section I. For a description of the Institute and its role
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and nations.4 6 6 My particular interests in this exhibition lies in the ways in
which the fledgling nation states under French mandate were being
represented and its connections, if any to the creation of a national symbolic in
Lebanon in particular. As such I will focus on the ways in which the Pavilion
of Syria and Lebanon was apprehended by French colonial authorities and
through French and local newspaper coverage.
Originally voted for in parliament in 1919, as a national and then an inter-
allied effort, it finally became international in 1931 under the influence of
Marechal Lyautey, the French governor of Morocco and the organizer of the
exposition. Through this exposition he expanded Albert Sarrault's notion of
"rmise en valeur" to include the cultural and historical context of the
colonies.467 The continuity of the exhibition itself with France's larger colonial
project was evident not just in the name of the exhibition but in statements
made by Mar6chal Lyautey:
see Berger-Levrault (ed.) La Syrie et Le Liban sous L'occupation et le Mandat Franfais 1919-
19.27 (Nancy-Paris: 1927) p. 148-149
466 See Patricia Morton Hybrid Modernities: Architecture and Representation at the 1931
Colonial Exposition, Paris (Cambridge, MA, London, UK: MIT Press, 2000) for a an
examination of the use of architecture and planning in the politics of representation and
colonial action ; Zeynep Celik Displaying the Orient; Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century
World's Fairs (Berkeley, Los Angeles : University of California Press, 1992) for the representations of
Islam and the Ottoman Empire in International exhibitions; Timothy Mitchell Colonizing
Egypt for a discussion of the Egyptian section of the 1898 exhibition in Paris.
467 Meant to promote the economic utility of the territories to French and international
audiences, the 1931 exposition, according to General Lyautney was also seen as a way to
address internal schisms in France itself, and educate its lower income populations (the
mission civilatrice moving home). See Mar6chal Lyautey "L'Exposition Coloniale
Internationale de Paris: Le sens d'un grand effort" in L'illustration (special issue, July, 1931),
n.p.; See Catherine Hodeir et Michel Pierre L' Exposition Coloniale (Brussels: Edition
Complexe, 1991) for an introduction, reprint and discussion of the exposition. For a
contemporary analyses of the exposition see Patricia Morton Hybrid Modernities
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"Casablanca 1915. Paris 1931. The comparison imposes
itself irresistibly in my thoughts... but the Casablanca
exhibition was nothing more ... than a machine of war. We
inaugurated yesterday a masterpiece of peace... [Where the
world] discovered amongst other things ... the real meaning
of colonial actions... [that] only through colonial
action...can a notion human solidarity be realized...it
inaugurates a new spirit, a new conscience...to colonize is
not just to build port, factories, or railways but also to gently
win the savage hearts of the savannah or desert."48
This would be further emphasized by Pierre Deloncle469 who stated in the
same issue of L'illustration that the exhibition "was not a point of arrival,
rather a point of departure, that may determine the future orientation of French
and international politics."4 70 Accordingly, it was to be an exhibition of the
French mission civilisatrice in which architecture was to embody the racial
hierarchies of La plus grande France, the France of 100 million inhabitants.
The architecture of the exhibition, was influenced by the transition to
associationist policies, French architectural regionalism, and its connections to
organic nationalism. It was meant to show the primitiveness of the colonies as
well as the accumulated benefits of colonization, and the work that had
resulted from its benevolent intervention.4 7' The effect of French social
thought on the forms of the pavilions reinforced long established stereotypes
of the colonies. Well into the 1930's, the physical manifestation of a society's
evolutionary level (through physical difference in body, technology, material
culture) was the basis upon which French colonial policy was predicated.4 72
468 ibid.
469 Pierre Deloncle was the rapporteur general of the colonial politics group at the 1931
exposition.
470 Pierre Deloncle "La Continuit6 de L'action Franqaise" in L'Illustration ibid.
471 See Part I of this section; See Morton Hybrid Modernities
472 Rabinow, French Modern; Morton ibid
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Architecture in the colonial expositions was seen to embody the level of
"advancement" of a society on the evolutionary ladder. As architectural critic
Marcel Zahar states: "Architecture presents the synthesis of the potential of a
race and the resources of the region. "473 In other words, architecture is the
physical embodiment of the link between geographic attributes to social and
cultural attributes, an indicator of human interaction with their environment, a
sort of racial/developmental atlas of the world. In this evolutionary order,
Europe and the Mediterranean basin, which unlike the African village, were
exposed to the world, sat at the pinnacle.474
Lebanon and Syria were both represented through one pavilion: Pavilions des
L'Etat du Mandat. (Figure 28) The pavilion created by ministry of the colonies
in France was meant to reflect French interests in the area as well intellectual,
artistic, commercial and industrial products of these countries.4 75 This
approach marked the move from the economic strategy that dominated the
Casablanca fair, to a more inclusive approach that sought a synthesis between
economics and culture by highlighting the domains of archeology, tourism and
education potential; " touts matiere propos desquelles il serait facile d6mettre
473 Zahar quoted in Morton, ibid, p.182.
474 According to Paul Vidal de la Blanche, the leading French geographer at the time, the
milieu in which individuals were located and which included contact with other societies as
well as the geographic features of a society's environment, determined their status in this
hierarchy. The most favorable milieu was one of a moderate climate with natural resources
with which to develop technology and agriculture, whilst providing its inhabitants with
frequent contact with others. For further details see Morton, ibid.
475 The Lebanese government was invited to participate and decided to allocate 15,000 SLL to
the project. This generated an intense debate in parliament. Some MP's objected to Lebanon's
participation as a state under mandate. Others pointed out that the notion of Outre Mer was
created specifically to distinguish countries that were not colonies and that the US was
participating in the exhibition even though it is not a colony. (LPR, 12, November, 1930)
274
facile d6mettre en valeur l'effort franqais."476 The exposition was meant to
encourage tourism in the area. As Andre Geiger author of the guide on
Lebanon and Syria477 would suggest "the purpose of the pavilion is double: ...
to expose the French and foreign public to the treasures of the orient... and ...
to entice them to visit... Visiting the Pavilion is a revelation. To visit the
countries of the Levant would become the complement."47 8 Pierre Alype4 79 was
nominated as the commissioner of the exposition, Jean Sauvaget480 and Robert
Montagne the individuals in charge at the IFEAD in Damascus, Ponsot the
French High Commissioner in Lebanon coordinated locally, and Ulysse
Moussali 48' was designated architect of the pavilion.4 82 In his description of the
pavilion, Geiger, would state "...this was a manifestation of all of Syria: The
Lebanese Republic, the State of Syria, Djebel Druze, the government of
Lattaqui6 (or the Alaouites). [It was] a national showing, Beyrouth and
Damascus are capitals to independent populations - neither protectorates nor
colonies- that France has been designated the honor ... of guiding them
towards independence and liberty." 483 In the words of Demaison, the author of
the official guide to the exposition, the pavilion was meant to show "the
476 MAE Levant, quoted in Tregan Apprdhensions et Methodes p. 99.
477 See Section I, Part II.
478 Geiger, Les Etats , 1931.
479 He was the director of I' Office des pays du Levant sous mandate Franqais in Paris
480 Jean Sauvaget was an archaeologist who would subsequently work quite closely with
Michel Ecochard.
481 No information on this architect or his background has been found thus far.
4 The French military became involved in the project when Montagne decided to integrate
scientific endeavors to what had been thus far an exhibition of artisanal and archeological
production of the Levant.
483 Andre Geiger, "Les Etats du Levant" in Illustration (special issue, July 1931), n.p.
275
had marked their dominance of Syria and Lebanon in the course of the last 10
years." 484
Architecturally, by 1931, the eclectic orientalized motifs and Moorish designs
that had distinguished the pavilions of the Beirut fair in 1921 had more or less
disappeared. The mandate had been in place for a little over a decade, the
identity politics and local socio-economic conditions differed as did the larger
political context. The pavilion of the Levant was created as a stylized
reproduction of both the Azem palace in Damascus and the Beiteddine Palace
in Mount Lebanon. (Figure 29) In a discussion reported by the Bulletin de
L'Union Economique de Syrie Pierre Alype, stated "the pavilion of Syria and
Lebanon presented a great synthesis of Arab art of the eighteenth century. It
borrowed from the Azem Palace in Damascus and the Beiteddine Palace their
elegant architectural details.... [the exhibition will show] samples of their most
characteristic arts and archeology... a testimony to all the civilizations that
have succeeded each other on the oldest land in the world." 485 The same
motifs that marked the parliament building, the same yellow bricks promoted
by the municipality, the same source of inspiration for visually identifying
Lebanon's new national identity now marked the grammar of Levantian
nations under mandate. What is evident is that a singular architectural
language was being produced, one in which the classical influences of
modernism, evident in the parliament structure fade away under the more
484 Andre Demaison, Exposition coloniale internationale [a Paris en 1931]. Guide officiel,
Paris, quoted in Tregan "Appr6hensions et Mthodes" p. 99.
485 "Documentation et Information de 'Exposition Coloniale et Internationale de Paris en
1931" in Bulletin de l'Union tconomique de Syrie March 31, 1931, p. 27.
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elements/ornaments necessary for representing an architecture of a thousand
and one nights. In describing the pavilions, all the 19th century tropes of the
biblical mountains and Phoenician cities were repeatedly evoked. As one
guide book would describe it "ayant absorbe la civilisation de races divers,
Egyptiens, Persans, Grecs, Romains, Arabes, cette region porte en elle les
traces d'un curieux amalgame ethnographique qui se reflete dans toutes les
manifestation de I' activite nationale ... Car la Syrie et Ie Liban ont garde une
civilisation originale qui attendait Ie bienfait de la tutelle fran~aise pour
renaitre et se moderniser ,,486
Figure 28 Payilion of the Levant, 1931 Colonial Exposition, Paris (Source: Andre
Geiger, "Les Etats du Levant" in Illustration special issue, July 1931, n.p.)
Figure 29 Beiteddine and Azem Palace (Source: Edna L: Nicoll A Travers
L' Exposition Coloniale (Paris: 1931, p. 182)
486 Edna L Nicoll A Travers L' Exposition Coloniale (Paris: 1931) p. 183
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These tropes were further emphasized in the interior contents of the pavilion
which was replete with archaeological findings, local artisanal production as
well as exhibitions showing French mandate accomplishments in the region
over the past 10 years; that is "the possibilities of the future in this most
seductive country in the world, that will prosper once it becomes more well
known." 487 The interior of the pavilion was divided into different areas; the
Lebanon wing, the city of Damascus room, an Aleppo wing, the Druze
Mountains wing, the Alaouite government wing and a joint archaeological
heritage section. The Lebanon wing contained a picture of the cedars, a
sculpture of the first Phoenician,488 some old silver jewelry, hand made Jezzine
knives, a panorama of Beirut prepared by the municipality of Beirut,489 as well
as a special room dedicated to Amir Bechir4 90 (who built the Beiteddine palace
that inspired the pavilion itself) with a full wax figurine of the Emir as hosting
the French poet Lamartine. The Damascus room "the most beautiful of the
487 For more information on the contents of the pavilion, see Geiger Les ttats; Nicoll, ibid; Al
Maarad, 1931.
488 Both of these items were criticized by Al Maarad, the journal owned by MP Michel
Zaccour the only local journal to report extensively on the fair, the first for being a simple oil
painting rather than the diorama it was listed as and the latter for having been sculpted by the
French sculptor Piaget, since the local Lebanese sculptor Hoyek could not complete the
sculpture on time. The article also chastised the Lebanese government for not taking an active
part in preparing the Lebanon section of the pavilion. The exposition according to Al Maarad
was meant to encourage tourism and not art. It then went into a detailed description of the
Syria and Lebanon pavilion with little comment on the architecture or content. Al Maarad,
May-July, 1931
489 In January of 1931 the municipality of Beirut discussed the city's participation in the expo.
A suggestion to build a miniature model of the city to be exhibited is rejected as being too
expensive and the municipality opts for the creation of a panorama representing the city.
(BMM, 1930-1931; January 8 and January 28)
49() Amir Bechir is considered the last great prince of Mount Lebanon who converted to the
Maronite faith thus symbolizing the transfer of dominance over Mount Lebanon and
subsequently over Lebanese history and national narrative from the Druze to the Maronites.
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exhibitions of the Near Eastern territories under mandate" included a full
oriental living room, with 18th century carved woodwork, painted ceilings,
ornate carpets, while the Aleppo room exhibited a painting by the French
painter Michlet of Aleppo's crusader castle and a few artifacts from the city.
The room dedicated to the Druze mountain included sculptures of local
residents in their folkloric dress and some locally made handicrafts while the
joint archaeological room housed pictures by the photographer Philip Mourani
of various archaeological sites in Syria and Lebanon, Phoenician artifacts on
loan from the National museum in Beirut, especially the Phoenician
sarcophagus of Ahiram that is covered with the most ancient Phoenician
inscriptions, as well as other paintings by Lebanese and French painters of
cities and people of the region. The inclusion of the sarcophagus, the prize of
the National Museum of Lebanon, is particularly relevant since these
inscriptions are considered key to the study of the evolution of writing systems
and hence Lebanon's claim to be the place where the alphabet was invented
and disseminated.491 At the entrance of the exhibit stood the model of Baalbek
created by sculptor Jean Debs and paid for by the Lebanese parliament.49 2
Despite the entrance fee of one FF an estimated 3,000 visitors per day were
491 Even though very few scholars would subscribe to this theory today, the myth persists quite
strongly in popular culture.
49'- The making of this model created some controversy in parliament. It seems that Debs,
encouraged by the government built the model, and was paid part of its costs by the
government before approval by the parliament. This created concern amongst certain
parliamentarians who could not see the value of such an endeavor and believed the money
could have been put to better use. The government argued that it had agreed to Debs's proposal
because it thought Lebanon would benefit from such a model just as Athens benefited from the
model of the Acropolis and Rome from a model of the Pantheon. A committee was formed of
Henri Seyrig, the head of the archaeology department in the French mandate, Jamil Chehab,
the director of the Ministry of Finance, MP Henri Pharoun, Maurice Chehab, the Lebanese
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said to have visited the model. Even though the pavilion also showed the
"modernizing" efforts and large infrastructure projects initiated by the French
and Lebanese authorities, it was the archaeological richness of these areas and
their touristic potential that captured the imagination of journalists reporting
on the fair. As Geiger would describe the pavilion:
"Even though the pavilion of the states of the Levant is not one
of the largest in the exposition, by comparison, what other can
enclose more historic souvenirs, religious and archeological...
To be precise: the real orient, the pure orient, simply the orient,
which is not the "near east" nor the "far east" and which does
not include Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco often confused with
it. They are Berbers, it is Arab. Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, these
are the countries of the Bible and the Evangelists, of the Koran
and the thousand and one nights. There are words we cannot
define. We cannot define a perfume, a piece of music, a dream.
The "Orient" is a word that resonates with our souls through all
of our literature.. since the crusades until Chateaubriand,
Lamartine, Barres, Loti... Visiting the pavilions is a revelation.
Visiting the countries of the Levant could become the
complement."
Lebanon and Syria in other words, continued to figure through 19th century
Biblical and Orientalist tropes that transformed them into the religious cradle
of' mankind and the land of a thousand and one nights. In short while the
architecture produced utilized the same iconography as the Lebanese
parliament, stripped of its historical referent- the Mamluk period- and reflected
the shared heritage of a region where until the end of WWI architecture was
referenced more by its cities or regions rather than nations, the pavilion
exposed the ambiguity of the Lebanese national project and it's appropriation
of a shared architectural heritage. It also indicated the extent to which 19th
century cultural tropes for viewing, imagining and thinking the orient
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head of archeology, Mr. Henri Mechaqa and Madiros Altounian the illustrator at the Ministry
continued to dominate the discourse on the region. The lasting legacy of the
pavilion did not simply lie in reinforcing these 19th century tropes and in
giving primacy to one version of history or to the tourist potential of the
country. It also marked the first official attempts at incorporating specific
visual elements such as the cedars, Emir Bechir, the Jezzine knives and the
Roman temples of Baalbek into a Lebanese national iconography thus
transforming them the visual representations of Lebanese identity .493 These
efforts at delimiting Lebanese history and national identity between Emir
Bechir and Phoenicia would continue in the 1939 New York fair.
~>Br.
Figure 30 Reconstruction of Baalbek by Jean Debs
(Ai Maarad, May 1931)
of Public Works and designer of the parliament building. (See LPR, May 5, 1931)
493 The Roman temples of Baalbek had been a subject of interest since the 19th century
especially for biblical travelers, archaeologists and tourists, the most famous of which are the
lithographs by David Roberts in his Travels in the Holy Land. While the government of Sultan
Abdul Hamid tried to incorporate them into a national Ottoman heritage that exhibited the
might and ancientness of the empire, this incident marked the first attempt to recuperate these
temples onto the national stage as symbols of Lebanese national identity. See Section I, part II
and Sader, Scheffler, & Neuwirth Baalbek.
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New York, 1939
In 1939, Lebanon was officially invited to participate in the World fair of New
York.494 A separate wing was placed at the disposal of the Lebanese
government free of charge by the fair authorities. Lebanon's participation in
this fair was significant. It was the first time that the state was representing
itself individually without the input or the political cover of French mandate
authorities.49 5 Hamid Frangiyeh, the minister of Finance argued quite explicitly
that Lebanon's booth was fourth amongst the independent states in the Hall of
Nations.496 The government also argued that in addition to the tourist potential,
Lebanon's participation was requested by the multitude of Lebanese emigrants
in the US. The fair itself represented the last international exposition before
WWII took place the world woke up to a very different new world order.
The Lebanese government assigned Charles Corm the devout Phoenician, as
commissioner of the Lebanese pavilion, a post he utilized fully to spread the
Phoenician message among visitors and participants of the Fair.497 Even
494 For a general book on the fair see Larry Zim, Mel Lerner, Herbert Rolfes, The World of
Tomorrow; The 1939 New York World's Fair (New York, 1988); See also Official Guide
Book, New York World's Fair 1939 (New York, 1939); "New York World's Fair 1939"
Illustration (special issue July, 1939)
495 This was one of the main arguments made by the government to the parliament when
discussing the request for a budget of 100,000 SLL. The additional budget of 200,000 SLL
allocated by the French mandate directly to the project via the commissioner and the
government caused further conflict between the government and the parliament. (LPR,
November 21, 1938; March 30, 1939)
496 LPR, March 30, 1939
497 While it is likely, as Kaufman suggests, that Corm's friendship with the then president
Emile Edde played in his favor, the government's report to parliament indicates that of a group
of local intellectuals and artists asked to produce a brief of what a Lebanon pavilion could
carry; Corm was the only one who responded. (LPR, 21 November, 1938)
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though he was one of many advocates of Lebanon's Phoenician identity, Corm
was the most central figure to the cultural and visual production of a
Phoenician/Lebanese national culture. Corm was born in 1894 to a
cosmopolitan, upper Bourgeoisie family whose father Daoud Corm was a
painter.r98 In 1919 he launched La Revue Phenicienne which lasted a year.499
Initially like many of his peers at the time, Corm advocated the establishment
of a Greater Syria as a non-Muslim entity.00 When King Faycal's Arab
movement propagated the idea he became a firm champion of a separate
Lebanon. In 1934 he liquidated a profitable business as the sole agent of Ford
Motor cars in the region to dedicate himself to writing and poetry. In 1935 he
launched his Editions de la Revue Phenicienne a publication house dedicated
498 Corm was an acclaimed writer who in 1935 he won the Edgar Allan-Poe prize for
international poetry. In what follows the biography of Corm, the rise of Phoenicianism and its
influence on Lebanese politics through the networks involved with Corm is based in part on
Asher Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia: and on a private interview with Ahiram Corm, the son of
Charles Corm, April 10, 2004.
499 Contributors to the journal included some of the most well known intellectuals and artists
of the period, some of whom came to occupy administrative posts under the mandate.
Amongst them were Philippe de Tarrazi, (MP and head of the National Library and member
of the National Museum Committee), Jacques Tabet (also a member of the friends of the
museum and one of Beirut's most prominent businessmen), Albert Naccache, Ibrahim J.
Tabet, Auguste Adib Pasha (Lebanon's first administrator), Elie Tyane, Chekri Ganem,
Yousef Hoyek (sculptor whose works adorned the covers of the revue) and Henri Lammens.
The journal was also the first to publish Francophone poetry by Lebanese poets who were
identified as writing "national poetry" replete with Phoenician symbols. Among others it
included Hector Klat, Elie Tyane, Alfred Naccache (President of the Lebanese republic, and
Michel Chiha. See La Revue Phinicienne (Beirut: Edition Maison d'art, 1919 reprinted by
Dar An-Nahar, 1996); The British Lebanese Association (BLA) Lebanon - the Artists View
(London, 1989); Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia. for the biographies of the different
characters involved.
500 In February 1919, shortly after the first Lebanese delegation to the Peace Congress arrived
in Paris, Charles Corm established a society named l'Association Nationale de la Jeunesse
Syrienne, advocating for "indissolvable Syrian unity, equitable conciliation between all parties
and disregarding all consideration of ritual or religion." Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia, p. 167-
171; Correspondance d'Orient, no. 210 (April 1, 1919), p. 378-379
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mainly to disseminating "Phoenician" works over the next two decades.50 In
the same year he represented Lebanon at the Congras de la Mediterranee
where in a widely circulated speech he anchored Lebanon's history and
identity in its Mediterranean (hence Christian and Western for Corm) location
and its avowedly Phoenician origins. In 1938 he launched a new journal
Phinicia that would last for two years.-03 His emphasis on publishing and
speaking in French, something he was often criticized for even by his most
stringent admirers, was a way of emphasizing the separateness of Lebanon
from its larger Arab environment.4 By the 1930's the multiple positions on
national identity that permeated the 1 9 th and earlier part of the 2 0 th century had
in essence been reduced to Arabism (asserting Lebanon's Arab identity) or
Lebanonism (affirming Lebanon's uniqueness in the region and which
included Phoenicianism).505 The cultural edifice of this national identity
50' He also founded La Socijted des gens de lettre du Liban and La Societe des auteurs libanais
de languefranCaise, both of which were a diverse association of Lebanese writers and thinkers
who met at Corm's home to discuss literary issues and debate Lebanon's cultural and political
orientation.
5 Charles Corm al-Mashriq (January-March, 1936), p. 94-103
5 This journal was viewed by many as the cultural and artistic arm of the political agenda of
Lebanonism in its most Phoenician sense.
504 For example, the writer Amin al-Rihani, who was an Arab nationalist and believed in
Lebanon's Arab identity, dedicated his book Qalb Lubnan, a descriptive travelogue of his trips
in Mount Lebanon, to his friend Charles Corm. In his book Al-Rihani named Corm "the
Lebanese, Phoenician, French poet ... ] one of the legends in the country of legends," pointing
to the fame and status Corm has come to occupy within Lebanese society by the mid 1930s.
He also described a banquet where Corm, "who writes poetry in the language of Racine and
Moli&re" and yet does not know how to say I love you in his own tongue, shocked the
audience by giving a speech in Arabic. Amin al-Rihani Qalb Lubnan [The Heart of Lebanon]
(Beirut: Dar al Jeel, 1971), p. 271-272
505 For example the papers were replete with debates and statements over the nature of
Lebanon's national identity during the parliamentary elections of 1937. However asserting
Phoenician identity during this period did not always imply, as it did for Corm, direct decent
from the ancient Phoenicians. Rather it was a claim by the Christians of the area to assert
Lebanon's right to exist as an independent entity. See Kaufman Reviving Phoenicia, Chapter
Three for more details. See also See also Unite syrien et devenir arabe by Arab-Syrian
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including language and architecture became critical to this process. The most
emblematic structure to reflect Corm's ideas is building Corm designed for
himself (Figure 31), meant to reflect Lebanon's Phoenician heritage. The
formal monumentality of the structure belied its internal functionality.
Figure 31: Corm's Home: A Phoenician Skyscraper506 (Source:
author's photograph)
Preparations for the fair began in July 1938 shortly after Corm was appointed
by the Lebanese government and prior to the approval of the parliament. This
appointment caused controversy within parliament that cut across political and
ideological lines. The concern was not with the integrity of Corm himself.
Rather it was with the advantages and disadvantages of participating in the
exhibition as well as Corm's Phoenician beliefs. While the Chafic Karame, a
Muslim MP argued that he would rather spend the money on real needs such
nationalist Edmond Rabbath who reduced the diversity of the Lebanese national movement to
being for or against Phoenician ism.
~ Charles Corm designed this building himself in what he imagined to be Phoenician style.
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as "spreading primary schools across underprivileged villages and thus fight
illiteracy... or create a new government university... or an agricultural school"
Tawfic Awad, a Maronite deputy close to both the president and to the
Maronite patriarch stated he "did not believe in Corm's Phoenicianism or the
Phoenicianism of others" but suggested that the budget be increased lest
Lebanon be badly represented.507 Hamid Frangiyeh responded that the
exhibition would include all the different historical epochs of Lebanon from
the Phoenician period onwards for "the country is the result of this mixture and
we should not forget a single factor."' Cosmopolitanism had indeed become
the basis of national identity.
As expected, Corm utilized all his skills to present Lebanon's Phoenician
identity to the detriment of any Arab references. The exhibition itself was
subdivided into different sections each focused on a specific theme: America
in Lebanon, France in Lebanon, Arts and Crafts from Lebanon, Lebanese
Economy, Intellectual Culture in Lebanon, Archeological Excavations in
Lebanon, Lebanon in the Future, and Artistic work on Phoenician History and
Legends.- Visitors to the pavilion were welcomed by three large statues of
Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'ni (1585-1635), Bechir II (1767-1840) and Yuisuf Karam
5r7 Awad also argued that the sums requested represented 1/3 of the budget needed for the
creation of a diplomatic corps. LPR, March 30, 1939
5st This conflict was also part of a larger and much longer struggle between the government
and parliament over budget allocations, especially ones that are assigned a-posteriori. (LPR, 21
November, 1938)
509 See Asher Kaufman Reviving Phoenicia for description of the contents of the Lebanon
pavilion.
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(1822-1889). 510 A large cross section of Lebanon's artistic population was
mobilized for the exhibition many of whom were part of Corm's inner circle
of friends and associates. As a guide he prepared a small sketch book of
Phoenician elements and motifs and asked the participating artists to
incorporate them into their work.5 '
Participating artists51 2 included Mardiros Altounian, the architect of the
parliament and Dabbagha Mosque who painted a picture of important
Phoenician maritime discoveries; Csar Gemayel, who drew paintings of the
great Phoenician inventions: the alphabet, navigation, glass and the color
purple; Abdel-Wahab Addada who participated with a series of drawings of
great Phoenician constructions; Blanche 'Ammoun, who contributed paintings
about Phoenician diplomatic treaties with the Egyptians, Romans and
Israelites;51 3 Saliba Douaihi, who presented sketches of Tyre the Phoenician
city resisting the invasions of Alexander the Great and Nabuchodonzor; Halim
510 Fakhreddine is the father of modem Lebanon in Lebanese national narrative and for Corm
the reviver of "New Canaan" in his novel La Montagne Inspiree; Emir Bechir, as elaborated
earlier signaled the transfer of authority from the Druze to the Maronite community while the
third was a popular Maronite leader who led the peasant revolts of 1864 and was transformed
into a mythical figure of bravery and resilience in local Maronite folklore.
511 Charles Corm L'Art Phinicien (Beirut: Editions de la Revue Ph6nicienne, 1940) is a
collection of the sketches that were given to the participants. A selection of these sketches were
also published in Phenicia (January, February, 1939, p. 14-22) My thanks to Ahiram Corm, the
son of Charles Corm for making a copy of the book available to me. (see Appendix V for a
sample of this work).
512 In a letter to Abdallah Bey Beyhum, dated October 23, 1940 Corm lists all the artists who
participated in this exhibition with a brief description of their contributions. See MAE Nantes,
8-924. Many of the artists had also taken part in the 1931 Paris expo.
513 Blanche 'Ammoun was the first female graduate from the faculty of Law at USJ.
However rather than practice law, she built her career and reputation in painting and
literature. In 1940 she published an illustrated children's book, Histoire du Liban (Beirut,
1940), that depicted history of the country from the Stone Age to beginning of the French
mandate in 1918.
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al-Hajj and Yusuf al-Hoyeck51 4 who carved medallions and bas-reliefs
depicting Phoenician artifacts from the British Museum and the statues of
Yusuf Karam and Gebran Khalil Gebran respectively; Mustapha Farroukh,
contributed water colors showing peasant life in Lebanon; George Coury who
painted images of Greek and Roman Beirut including the known Phoenician
love story of Aphrodite-Venus and Adonis in Lebanon and Beirut's famed
Roman Law school; Boris Novikoff the municipal engineer who submitted
sketches of Lebanese architecture; George Cyr, who presented an image of the
future relations between Lebanon and France amongst others. 515 The
exhibition also included foreign artists interested in Lebanon such as the
French painter Michelet who had participated in the 1931 colonial exposition,
and who presented 12 paintings of Lebanon and France across the centuries,
and Parizio, the sculptor of the second statue of the Lebanese Martyr's; Ren6
Dudand, the famous French archeologist who excavated the site in Byblos,
directed the archeological gallery of the pavilion and designed a model of the
ancient city of Byblos and architect Delahalle who presented a model of future
Beirut and designs for a sports city and residential neighborhoods, as well as
back lit panels of the infrastructure of the country such as its port, airport,
514 Both Al-Hajj and Hoyek worked out of Corm's office in Beirut. The first eight issues of
Corm's 1938-1939 journal Phenicia features a sculpture by Yousef al-Hoyek depicting the
legendary Europa, being carried to Greece by Zeus, disguised as a bull. The gardens of the
residence today are replete with sculptures by Hoyek.
515 Gemayel was one of most well known painters and art teachers in Lebanon; Addada was a
Sunni artist and not necessarily part of Corm's circle; Dowaihi, a Maronite painter and also
considered as one of Lebanon's most important 2 0 th century artists; Farroukh, a sunni, one of
the luminaries of Lebanon's 20 'h century art scene and a keen advocate of Lebanon's Arab
identity, Cyr was also a well know painter. For additional biographical notes about the local
artists see Michel Fani, Dictionnaire de la peinture au Liban (Paris, 1998); Richard A.
Chahine One Hundred Years of Plastic Arts in Lebanon 1880-1980 (Beirut, Imprimerie
Catholic, 1982); BLA, The Artist View; see Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia
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tramway, railway etc.516 The participation of Romaine Delahalle in this
exhibition seems to have occurred at the suggestion of the railway company
and the Bank of Syria and Lebanon that had been approached by Corm to
submit something that would "glorify Franco-Lebanese" collaboration.51 7 Of
Delahalle's work more will be said in the next section.
The exhibition from this perspective became a joint and collaborative effort to
not only anchor Lebanon's culture, politics and history in a Phoenician
heritage and its Mediterranean local (hence Western and Christian according
to Corm) 5 8 but to actually identify the visual elements that would reflect this
identity. The 1939 New York world fair presented a chance for Corm to
specify the visual elements of Phoenician identity, what Kaufman terms as a
"Phoenician project in the making." The power to name, classify and
domesticate doubles as the means with which to silence, obliterate and negate
other histories and ways of dwelling within the same space. Through this
exhibition the ambiguities that underpinned Lebanese national identity were
further highlighted. Significantly, and unlike the Phoenicianism of Michel
Chiha and others, Corm's ideology was a melange of the cosmopolitan city
where he was based and nostalgia for the Mountain that his family originated
from. His was a Christian and specifically Mountain centered nationalism. His
writings and publications were replete with nostalgia for a rural life, pure and
undisturbed the "true" Lebanon. It was a mountain of goodness, of innocence
516 The exhibition is also listed as a milestone in the timeline of the development of Art. See
Chahine One Hundred Years
517 See letter by Nidelet from the Rigie Ginerale de Chemins de Fer et Travaux Publics to the
port company, January 11, 1939, in BPA P8/1/3 Exposition/Foires.
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and simplicity. The artists of the Lebanon pavilion presented image upon
image of peasants, traditional life, quintessential Lebanese houses (of the
mountains) not only in this exhibition but through his publications as well.
The relationship of the political to the pictorial has already been discussed by
many.519 The inclusion of these folkloric vignettes through the images of the
Lebanese peasant, the Druze woman, etc. in the exhibition and through his
multiple publications 520 created a powerful nation-building combination of
what Partha Chatterjee calls the "appropriation of the popular" and the
"classicization of tradition." They had a compelling, if tricky, subject-forming
power across Lebanon's diverse population.5 2' (See Appendix V)
518 See his article to the Mediterranean Congress.
519 See Said, Orientalism; Linda Nochlin The Politics of Vision, Essays in Nineteenth Century
Art and Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1989) for discussions of Orientalist art. See
James Ryan, Picturing Empire Photography and the Visualization of the British Empire
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997) for the role of photography in the
imaginative geography of empire.
520 The impact of this "project" was the culmination of an ongoing effort on the part of Corm to
disseminate this particular discourse and the visual imagery attached to it both at home and
abroad. This went beyond Corm's own publications and extended through other media. For
example see the special issue of al Maarad dedicated to Corm and his entourage. Al Maarad
(August 4, 1934). Many of the elements incorporated by Corm in his exhibition, even if not
identified as Phoenician are certainly described as Lebanese. Architecturally, the mansions of
Mount Lebanon, popularized by Corm and his circle as well as a host of other artists such as
Mustapha Farroukh, who politically was a stringent Arabist, were subsequently appropriated as
symbols of Lebanese patrimony. For a discussion of the incorporation of the three arched
house into national Lebanese heritage see May Davie "Genese d'une demeure patrimoniale: la
maison aux trios arcs de Beyrouth" and Michael Davie "La "maison aux trios arcs" de
Beyrouth, une construction idologique" in Les Maison Beyrouthine Aux Trois Arcs: Une
architecture bourgeoise du Levant Michael Davie (ed.) (Beirut and Tours: ALBA, 2003)
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Unearthing the Past, Casting the Future: The Making of a National
Museum
The narrative structure of display created by these exhibitions and the efforts
to anchor Lebanon's identity in its Phoenician context were further bolstered
by the rising interest in archaeology that began in the 1 9 th century and
increased significantly with the arrival of the French in Lebanon and the
creation of a national museum. The role of the past in "inventing traditions"
and the relationship between history, archaeology and nationalism in various
parts of the world was critically underscored by Hobsbawm and Ranger in
their seminal The Invention of Tradition. The role that archaeology in
particular plays in such a process is quite critical. As discussed in section I, the
development of archaeology as a scientific discipline was tightly connected to
the creation of a national history; that is a history directed at legitimizing the
nation's right to exist as an independent entity. Archaeology produces
knowledge about the past that is then interpreted and allocated a position
within a larger national narrative. Sometimes the same piece may occupy
different and even opposing positions in diverse national narratives thus
highlighting the question of what is included and what is excluded in this
process. As the work of Nadia Abu el Haj has shown, the extraction,
identification and designation of various artifacts is deeply implicated in the
ideological and political apparatus of the state.52
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521 In the 1950's 1960's this phenomena would come to permeate popular culture through the
musicals of the Rahbbani brothers and Lebanon's Diva Feyrouz.
522 Nadia Abul el Haj Facts on the Ground:
The value of archaeology in mandated territories was emphasized in article 14
of the League of Nations that stipulated the responsibility of mandate powers
over the territories they governed. In 1919 French authorities created the
Service des Antiquit6 et des Beaux-Arts that became an autonomous entity in
1921.523 This article also formed the platform for the creation of a decree (no.
207) to update Ottoman laws regarding archeological finds and to regulate
archaeological digs. One of the stipulations of the new decree was that all
structures before 1700 were automatically considered heritage, all structures
after this period were not, thus signaling the particularities of French interest
and their desire to erase the more recent Ottoman past. 524 In 1933 this was
amended to 1750 to include a good portion of 1 8 th century structures.
Implicitly this law and the change instated also pinpointed the "origin" of
Lebanese history- or perhaps the point at which it was "interrupted"- the time
of' Emirs Fakhreddine and Bechir.
The department of antiquities was required to build museums for the
conservation of archaeological remains. The singular importance of visual
culture for the identification and dissemination of national ideology and the
creation of institutions such as museums for the display of such culture was
53 It was initially attached to the High Commission's office and then to the Ministry of Public
Works. It's role was identified through decree 826 dating March 17, 1921 as 1) to survey all
historic monuments in Syria and Lebanon and device a plan for their conservation, 2) to
excavate on behalf of the High commission and instruct association wishing to excavate and to
oversee the various excavations, 3) regulate the trade in the export of antiquities 4) create
museums. La Syrie et Le Liban, p. 139.
524 This decree was created on March 26, 1926 two weeks before the international
archaeological conference took place in Beirut. This law is still in effect today, resulting in the
massive demolitions of Beirut's 1 8'h, 1 9'h and 2 0 th century heritage. It is being currently revised
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highlighted by Benedict Anderson.525 In the context of newly created nation
states, the focus on visual culture for "staging" deeply contested identity
becomes paramount.526 Through their techniques of display museums create
and convey a carefully regulated set of meanings and descriptions where
certain aspects or interpretations associated with a subject may be highlighted
and others downplayed. Historically speaking the introduction of the museum
as a Western institution, into the region, was the result of colonial practices
affected by the specific conjectures of "political, scientific, and emancipating
practices taking place locally and beyond and cannot be reduced to the mere
transition of a Western institution."52 7 In the 1 9 th century large museums, with
their techniques of collecting, display, interpretation etc. were established in
Baghdad, Cairo and Istanbul by Western powers (the French and the British in
Baghdad and Cairo) and local government (the Ottoman in Istanbul).528 With
the advent of the 2 0 th century the concept of patrimony took on the added
burden of colonial agendas that paralleled the rewriting of history. In sum, it
and updated. See also Mandate charter for Syria and Lebanon, July 24, 1922 The document
can also be found in Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London, 1946), p. 308-314
525 Anderson, "Census, Map, Museum" in Imagined Communities
526 For example, the National Congress, headed by Amir Faycal, was determined to set up a
national museum in Damascus in 1919 to halt the removal of Syria's antiquities and their
transfer aboard. The Damascus museum was opened along with the Arab Academy in 1920
with the declaration of independence by the national congress. Braae, "The Early Museums
and the Formation of their Publics" in Middle Eastern Cities 1900-1950: Public Spaces and
Public Spheres in Transformation (Aarhus, Aarhus University Press, 2001) p. 123-124.
527 Braae ibid, p. 113
528 See Braae, ibid for an overview of the creation of museums in the region with particular
focus on Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus; For further details on the Egyptian contexts see
Donald Malcolm Reid "Cultural Imperialism and Nationalism: The Struggle to Define and
Control the Heritage of Arab Art in Egypt" in IJMES (Vol. 24, 1992) p. 57-76; See Wendy
M.K. Shaw Possessors and Possessed: Museums, Archaeology, and the Visualization of
History in the Late Ottoman Empire (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press,
2003) for the politics of archaeology and museum culture in Istanbul during the Ottoman
Empire and beyond.
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focused on the effacement of Ottoman presence and contributions to the
history and progress of the region by highlighting varied elements of its
history. 529
Increased interest in archeology and the establishment of museums was taking
place in a politically, legally and culturally contentious period. Populations
and societies were still reeling from the affects of WWI and the dissolution of
empire. Nineteenth century Ottoman appropriation and transfer of local finds,
such as the sarcophagus of Alexander excavated in Saida, to Istanbul were
widely resented by local intellectuals and notables who called on the Ottoman
government to leave them in place. The re-appropriation of Phoenician
heritage for example by Beiruti residents to demand a separate vilaya is but
one example of the increasing importance of rooting local identities in the
remains of territories. 530 To this one can add the conflicting vision of a future
Lebanese entity and the complex overlap between ethnic and religious
identities.
This interest in archaeology was further encouraged by the plethora of writing
and publications in the local press and through various journals discussing the
relevance and importance of our "national heritage." Countless articles were
written expanding on the archaeological discoveries in the country and
529 See Rifa'at Ali Abu-El-Haj "The Social Uses of the Ottoman Past" in IJMES (Vol. 14, no. 2
(May, 1982), p. 185-201 for the link between the rise of nationalism and the erasure of the
Ottoman period in Arab historiography. However he fails to account for the role that
colonialism played in this process during the same period. For a link to museum displays see
Heghnar Zeitlan Watenpaugh, "Museums and the Construction of National History" in Sluglett
and Mouchy French and British Mandates, p. 185-202
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emphasizing their significance to the glory of the past and future of the young
nation. Calls were made for the establishment of a local museum to house
discovered artifacts whose potential and actual shipment overseas, especially
to France, had become a subject of acute concern. Arguments by the French
High Commission that they were paying for excavations out of their own
budgets were countered with requests that a local tax to fund such excavations
should be created or that the local Lebanese government find another source of
funding so as to ensure that ancient discoveries remain in Lebanon.53 These
discussions were echoed in parliament where the decision by the Museum's
curator in 1930 to donate some pieces to the Louvre museum caused a heated
debate.532 The interest in the past had trespassed the boundaries of a scientific
interest and acquired the singular purpose of identifying a past appropriate to
nations in the making. In a country like Lebanon with the intersecting religious
and ethnic identities renders this project into treacherous grounds. As a cartoon
530 See section I, Part II.
531 A debate erupted in parliament February 1928, about archaeological remains that were
found in Beirut, reported on in the press but could not be located either in the national museum
or in the National library. MP Fouad Areslan demanded that the government be notified about
the whereabouts of these artifacts, and whether they were still in Lebanon or had been
transferred to France to be studies (LPR, February 7, 1928) See also Al Maarad especially in
the period 1921-1928 for successive articles on the country's antiquities. Another indication of
growing government interest was the increased government funding of archeological journals
such as Etudes et documents d'archiologie and Le Bulletin du Musie de Beyrouth, The latter
was first published in 1937 with a Phoenician vessel on its cover.
532 MP Fouad Areslan had made this suggestion in 1924 where he argued that these were
doubles of pieces already owned by the museum and the gift was in appreciation of the
Louvre's yearly donations to the museum and to the efforts of the French excavation teams
that were paying for their own digs in the country as well as for the repair of broken pieces.
Other MP's protested suggesting that the value of these artifacts far exceeded what the Louvre
was paying. The resolution passed with a majority vote in 1930 (LPR, 1924 & 1930).
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on the occasion of the 1926 international archaeology conference533 that took
place in Beirut, it was a project fraught with contradictions. (Figure 32)
Figure 32: The 1926 Archeological Conference in Beirut.
The captions reads: "These archaeological remains identify
us ... Those are the real "antiquities" in Al Ahrar al Mosawara
(April, 1926) - The hats on top the different historic
monuments represented the different religious sects and ethnic
loyalties in the country- from left to right, Muslim Sunni,
Muslim Shiite, Arab, Christian Orthodox, Christian Maronite
and Jewish.
In July 1922, French mandate authorities and local notables created a
Lebanese national museum.534 The structure was meant to be a provisionary
measure until a larger national museum was built that could house all the
533 This conference was organized by the directors of Antiquities in Syria and Palestine Mr.
Virolleaud and Mr. Garslang respectively. The former was also in charge of the Lebanese
national museum until 1928. The conference brought together about 200 specialists
representing the principle institutions and universities of France Britain, the US, Sweden,
Poland, Bulgaria and Germany. Interspersed with scientific sessions were visits to
archaeological sites such as Baalbek in Lebanon and sumptuous lunches at the houses of local
notables. The participants noted that local cooperation had allowed significant excavations and
the creations of the two museums in Beirut at Damascus. The conference was widely reported
upon in the press.
534 This effort was augmented with the creation of a National Institute for Music and a National
Library in the parliament building. Beiteddine was to be transformed into a national museum
as well.
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country's archaeological findings.535 Similar museums were to be founded in
Damascus and Aleppo as well. A strict division of labor was created.
Lebanon's museum was to focus antique art- or Phoenician heritage- whereas
the Damascus museum was to be exclusively devoted to Islamic and Arab art
and heritage.536 At the same time, a new department of antiquities was founded
that also began to issue its own publication entitled Syria that was provided
readers with information, data and tables on archaeological sites and local
history thus "establishing the triangular connection between ancient local
history, its explorer - the French, and its recipient - the Syro-Lebanese." 537
In July, 1924 an influential businessman lead the drive to create a committee
called the Amis du Musie dedicated to raising money for the future Lebanese
national museum. Amongst others this committee included the Comte Philip
de Tarazi, the curator of the newly established national library.538 Their
535 The first museum in the region was created in 1868 at the Syrian Protestant College, and
which in 1921 and the establishment of an independent Lebanon became the American
University of Beirut. However, this museum was considered more of a private institution
geared towards academics and foreign tourists rather than a mass public consumption. Another
private collection existed at the Universit6 St. Joseph (USJ) and was bought up by the museum
committee. Other smaller collections were owned by private individuals. One such collection
known as the Ford collection was donated by his wife, Mrs. Livingston-Taylor to the national
museum in June 1930.
536 Berger-Levrault, La Syrie et le Liban , p. 150-151. See also Watenpaugh, "Museums";
Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia,
537 Kaufman, ibid, p. 223; For more information on the journal see also Berger-Levrault, ibid,
p. 153.
538 Other members included Henri Pharaon and Alfred Sursock, both local Sunni notables with
substantial art collections of their own. The mansion of Sursock was itself transformed into a
private museum over the last decade. The Pharaon mansion is currently undergoing the same
process. Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia
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fundraising efforts were to last almost a decade.539 As a note from Lebanon's
administrator indicates initial plans were to build the museum along with the
national library in Martyr's square as part of a seemingly larger effort to
modernize the area and transform it into an administrative/cultural center. 40
However this project did not go through and an alternative location was
identified at the intersection of Damascus street and near the Palais de Pins,
the residence of the high commission, the Hippodrome, the Palace of Justice
and an increasing number of large villas owned by the rich and famous of the
city. Locating the museum at this particular juncture was fortuitously
implanted the structure at the intersection between Lebanon's past, present and
future. Overlooking the ancient colonnade of Bernice, that surrounds the tomb
of the Unknown Soldier this most modern representation of the new nation
state, was placed in the immediate vicinity of its colonial present. It also
marked one of the new axis of growth for the city and which during the war
would become the most infamous checkpoint between the two parts of the
city.
A competition for the design of the building was launched and won by the
Cairo based team of Pierre Leprince-Ringuet and Antoine Selim Nahas.54'
Although the museum was inaugurated in 1937 the building was not
completed until 1941. The museum is composed of a classical structure
539 By 1929 private donations were at SLL, 20,000. Since the museum was a "national interest"
the government augmented this sum with SLL 42,000. Another 100,000 LL were allotted to
the museum in 1930.
s5 BMM, December 19, 1925- January, 15, 1926.
54' Nahas was of Lebanese origin. The design was supposedly carried out in Paris and
approved by the museum committee. MAE Nantes 18-1574
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intersected with Egyptian motifs such as the lotus leaves that cap the portico
columns (figure 33). This reference to Egyptian motifs in a Lebanese national
edifice is partly the result of Nahas's experience in Egypt where a similar
museum had been recently constructed. In tandem it also located Lebanese
national identity in a pre-historic civilization; one that was contemporaneous
to Phoenician city states. The ebb and flow of a cosmopolitan class of
Lebanese artists, intellectuals, politicians amongst others who had either lived
in Cairo or Alexandria (such as Charles Corm) meant that the iconographic
language used was exceedingly familiar. The building itself is compiled of
three floors: a basement, a ground and first floors. The internal design of the
museum catered to the display of specific collections such as the Phoenician
sarcophagus of Ahiram. 542 During the mandate period, the museum displayed
material from Phoenician, Greco-Roman, Byzantium and Islamic periods of
Lebanese history in chronological order, with the majority of the space
dedicated to Phoenician artifacts.5 4 3 In addition to the collection several wall
charts are said to have drawn parallels between the Phoenicians and modern
542 The appointment of Maurice Chehab in 1928 was significant for the direction of the
museum and its focus on Phoenician artifacts. An archaeologist, conservator, historian and a
close ally of Charles Corm, Chehab dominated the national museum from 1928-1982. During
the Lebanese civil war, (1975-1990) Chehab saved some of its most important pieces from
total destruction and looting by encasing them in concrete in the basement of the museum. The
museum checkpoint was on the green line and had became its most famous crossing point
between the two parts of the city (See Section III). Chehab also directed Lebanon's antiquities
services from 1942 and was instrumental in finding the appropriate funding for the
preservation and conservation of the historic heart of Byblos (Jbeil), the city proposed as the
birthplace of the Phoenician alphabet and where major archaeological digs had taken place
since Ernest Renan's expedition in 1868.
543 This distribution continues to be reflected today. The largest space is reserved for the pre-
historic and bronze age periods during which the Phoenicians flourished (half the first floor
and the half the second). The second largest is the Greco-Roman period. Arab or Islamic
artifacts are allocated the smallest space on the museum's first floor. The museum's collection,
like the archaeological law stops at the Mamluk period.
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Lebanon, through clothing, physical features etc. while the museum's broader
narrative was the Western orientation of Phoenicia hence Lebanon.544 This was
augmented with a map indicating Phoenician colonies in North Africa and
Southern Europe was placed on the second floor.
Figure 33: Beirut Museum (Source: Author's photograph)
The narrative of the museum reinforced the larger efforts by Corm, Chiha and
many others to transform cosmopolitanism into a national trait and to anchor
this national trait in the ancient Phoenician past. While the debates over
Lebanon's historiography were lively and ongoing, the narrative presented in
the museum, like the expositions before it, excluded all other potential
alternatives- no other narrative of Lebanese past, present and future was
possible.
Phoenician Beirut: A Mediterranean, Islamic port city
This interest in archeology as the basis of Lebanese national identity found
another interesting parallel in the works of Romaine Delahalle with whom we
544 See Watenpaugh, Museums for a more detailed description of the layout of the museum. For
a catalogue of its holding see Maurice Chehab, La Musee National (Beirut, n.d.).
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began this chapter. Delahalle was a regionalist and an avid Phoenician who
through his connections to the circles of Charles Corm was able to give
architecture a role in the construction of national identity.54 5 In his 1938 article
in Corm's review Phenicia.546 Delahalle articulated his position on the role of
architecture in giving expression to cultural values, specifically nationalism.
Architecture he declared has a social character: to reflect the values and
identity of society, their forms of urbanity and civility. He criticized both
modernist architecture that sought to replicate its forms regardless of context
and regionalist architecture that wilts and fades away because it has lost its
heroic elements its poetics. Clearly influenced by the regionalist discourse in
France and the doctrines of organic nationalism, Delahalle defined architecture
as "construction with art... [a way] to speak a technical language poetically."
Architecture was the means through which the poetic values of a society, its
cultural and ethical norms are expressed for "to participate in the aesthetics of
the city, all construction must lose externally its individual character..." 547 The
apogee of an architectural style is through its reflection of two elements:
evolution, a factor of time and stability a factor of place and this he believed
could be accomplished through a return to nationalism, regionalism and the
interpretation of new materials.
In Lebanon, architecture, urbanism and urbanity he argued should be
demonstrations of it culture for "exists a style, a Lebanese architecture, [that is
545 I have not been able to find any biographical notes on Delahalle. However, it seems that he
was the only architect associated with the circles of Charles Corm.
46 Delahalle, "L'Architecture, 616ment du bonheur," Phinicia (October, 1937), p. 5-12.
547 Ibid, p. 6.
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] a mix of gothic and Arab, that is not at all Muslim, not by a long shot... this
mix is the only original expression of Lebanese architecture."548 In other words
he saw in the importation of Venetian and gothic styles and their adaptation to
local conditions evidence of a national architecture. He continued "National
and municipal edifices are obliged to express and national style." 549 And this
national style he believed was rooted in the soil, in the climate, in the cedars of
Lebanon. The Mountains of Corm were transformed in his discourse into heart
of Lebanon where architectural inspiration for a national style was to be found.
Through the use of new materials architectural referents and a new national
style could be constructed that would reflect a cohesive society and its notions
of civility.
In this piece Delahalle was in part addressing the 1934 project that he designed
for the renovation or reconstruction the Place de Martyr and its extension to
the port.5? Delahalle's intention in the project was described as an attempt to
"conceive for Beirut an entrance commensurate with its status, it mission and
unique setting into which it was spontaneously inscribed." After all is was "the
port of the Orient, that opens onto Damascus and Baghdad, not too far from
the ruins of Baalbek, and Palmyra, the city sits at the foot of the Mount
Lebanon crisscrossed and marked with the paths of history." 551
548 Ibid, p. 11
549 ibid
550 It is still not clear why he undertook this project. There is no reference in the municipal
minutes or in Lebanese parliament records of this project which was first published in 1934 in
the Lebanese Revue du Liban. In 1941 a more elaborate plan was published in the French
L'Architecture Francaise. As far as I can tell, the project got no other coverage locally.
551 Romaine Delahalle, "Etat du Liban, projet d'amtnagement de Beyrouth" in L'Architecture
FranCaise, issue no. 7, 1941, p. 18-24
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Through his characterization of Beirut as a Mediterranean rather than an Arab
or Oriental city, Delahalle was constructing in the entrance of the city, the
myths and images, reproduced in tourist guides and French official discourse
where interest fell on Lebanon's archeological heritage, and its specifically
Phoenician past as a port city. In an interesting and perhaps quite literal way,
architecture found itself repeating history, as the archeological excavations
which littered the Levant throughout the 1 9 th century re-enacted fantasies of
recovery, and ways for imaging a lost origin. Moreover, placing Beirut in this
geographic and regional context meant that this regionalism became the basis
of the nation's and the project's legitimation.
Delahalle's project extended the Martyr square into the city through terraced
public space 70 meters wide and 600 meters long. At the port the ground
plunges another 15 meters. The portal of the "modern" capital of a new nation-
state becomes embedded in the rhetoric of the space it chooses to describe and
occupy. Greeted with the statue of Fakhreddine, the traveler is lead through six
miniature mosque like pavilions, to a series of terraces moving up toward
Martyr's square, now opened up onto the sea. Each terrace terminates at either
end with small arcaded structures that move into the square, itself marked by
two monumental buildings through which we enter the city. Around the
square, a reinvented Beirut continues, its red tiled roofs erased, its individual
houses transformed into miniature renditions of Parisian courtyard buildings.
What remains of exiting Beirut is the Place de L'Etoile, the French imprint on
the city.
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Figure 34: Amenagement de Beyrouth, Delahalle, 1934
(Source: La Revue du Liban, 1934)
Figure 35: Amenagement de Beyrouth, Delahalle, 1934 (Source: L' Architecture
Franfaise, 1941)
At one level, this rhetoric was directly linked to French imperial needs and the
political structure of the mandate itself. The Lebanese capital, viewed as the
capital of French enterprises in the Levant, was re-presented by French
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authorities as a Mediterranean rather than Oriental city. By reinforcing claims
to an independent separate identity, France could legitimize its own claims in
the area (as the historic protector of the Christians) and the need for its
guidance given the internal rift amongst various Lebanese groups. Moreover,
by focusing on Beirut's role as primarily a port city, a position it had
prominently come to occupy during the latter half of the nineteenth century
when the city functioned as an outlet for French goods and services, Beirut's
Oriental identity could be suppressed, its claims to being part of a larger Arab
entity de-legitimized. National identity in this case, which supposed to enable
society to move forward, to modernize, could only do so through a certain
form of regression into various pasts without which progress becomes
impossi ble.
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At another level, despite its oriental motifs, this bird's eye view renders Beirut
legible, comprehendible, to both the Western and to the Westernized eye.
Beirut's is re-incarnated as a thoroughly modern, Mediterranean cum Western
city, inculcated with a few oriental structures, necessary for its status as a
capital city of both east and West. In this rendition the city oscillates between
being the object of representation and the form in which things were being
represented. It becomes a collection of easily appropriated icons which are
assumed to be prior to that which is being represented; namely national
identity.
A direct programmatic relation is constructed by the architect between abstract
architectural thought and the representation of events. It is a way of thinking
tied into mimesis and representation, basically description, which obscures the
various levels of its own constructedness. Architecture in this instance is
transformed into an instrument of pacification as the multiple and often
conflicting claims to identity are absorbed within the city fabric of a
hybridized modernity. As the architect digs into an ancient past to reconstruct
the modern capital of the nation-state the more immediate Ottoman past of the
city is simply written out of the story.
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Being National, Being Modern: The Work of Antoine Tabet5 52
The role of architecture in representing and forging national identity was also
addressed by Antoine Tabet. A well known figure on the architectural and
political scene of the period, Tabet was perhaps the only local architect at the
time clearly to seek a definition for the role architecture could play not only in
articulating Lebanese national identity but also in forging it.
Antoine Tabet was born in 1907 in the village of Behamdoun (Mount
Lebanon), to a family of six boys and two girls.553 In 1926, after graduating as
an architect from the Ecole Sup6rieure d'Ing6nieurs in Beirut, Tabet left for
Paris where he met the surrealist artist Andre Lotte. Through Lotte's wife
Tabet was introduced to August Perret where he began working informally.554
Two years later, after receiving a diploma in architecture from the Ecole des
Beaux Arts in Paris, Tabet resettled in Lebanon. Upon arrival, along with the
Lebanese surrealists, George Shehade, George Naccache, Henri Ceree and
Gabriel Bonnor,555 they published the first and only edition of a literary
supplement to the daily Newspaper L'Orient under the acronym of A.B.C..
The nihilistic visions of the group caused a public outcry. Threatened by a
large number of possible subscription cancellations, the editors of L'Orient
discontinued the supplement.
552 I would like to thank Jad Tabet, the son of Antoine Tabet, for reading the first draft of this
chapter in 1993.
553 Please see Appendix VI for a more complete biography.
554 It is not clear whether he was working there full time. A letter from Tabet to Perret in April
1927, clearly apologizes to Perret for not being at the office as much as he would have like to
due to his workload at the university. See IFA, Series AP, Fonds Perret.
307
After this brief interaction with French Francophone circles, Tabet established
contact with Arab Nationalists; Abdel Hamid Karami556, and Raid el Solh557
amongst others and became active in the independence movement. The
influence of Solh's politics, described by some as "...the leading Sunni to
advocate the notion of 'Lebanonising the Muslims' in return for 'Arabising the
Christians' can be visibly traced through his writings. 5s8 Moreover, Tabet's
political commitments superseded national boundaries. He effectively
conjoined national resistance with a world wide struggle against Nazism and
Fascism as well as colonialism. In 1935 he joined the Syrian-Lebanese
communist party and was appointed the secretary general to the Organization
for the Struggle Against Nazism and Fascism in Lebanon and Syria. In 1936,
he went back to learn classical Arabic, that he was to use consistently for the
rest of his life. In 1941, Tabet along with Omar Fakhouri559 and others founded
555 All of them spoke and wrote in French only.
556 He was the former Qadi (Judge) of Tripoli and the most influential proponent of unity with
Syria. He was also a key figure in the opposition to the drafting of the Lebanese constitution
and pressured other Sunni notables to boycott the event. During the first decade of the
mandate, both el Solh, and Karami were associates of the Syrian National bloc. By the mid
1930,s they had shifted to the advocates for Lebanese independence camp.
557Solh is generally known as the first Lebanese prime minister. However, he was also an
active participant in the Lebanese administrative council during the French Mandate. In fact
during the struggles between Faycal and the French authorities, the council drew up an
agreement between them and Faycal in which the council agreed to drop the demand for
French mandate over Lebanon in exchange for Faycal's recognition of Lebanon's
independence. Solh was also an associate and a financial contributor to the Syrian National
Bloc and a key figure in the transformation of Muslim Sunni attitudes towards an independent
Lebanon and which culminated in the National Pact of 1943.
558 Farid El Khazen, The Communal Pact of National Identities The Making and Politics of the
1943 National Pact, Papers on Lebanon, no. 12, (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1991),
p.3 5
559 Coauthor of the controversial history book published in 1935 that advocated an Arab
identity for Lebanon.
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the communist bimonthly Al Tariq [the path or road], of which he was the
editor in chief. (see appendix for more details on Tabet's life).
In a series of articles published between 1942 and 1947 Tabet articulated a
position on the role of architecture in expressing and forging national identity.
These articles, entitled Thought and Labor (1942) My Profession and its
Impact on the Consolidation of the Nation (1942) and The Art of Building, Its
Influence and the Factors that Influence It (1943) were all published in Al
Tariq. The Art of Building was initially given as a broadcast on Radio Orient
directed at the "youth of the country."6 These articles were influenced by
Tabet's political affiliations and professional formations; that is Arab
nationalism and Marxist doctrines on the one hand and the tenants of classical
rationalism in architecture on the other. In all of these articles, Tabet employed
a materialist conception of history and a paradoxical juxtaposition of Marxism
and nationalism so as to anchor Lebanese national identity within its larger
Arab context.
On Language and Architecture
In 1943, the year of Lebanese independence, Tabet, along with various other
Lebanese intellectuals, was commissioned to present a paper entitled The Art
of Building: It influence and the factors that influence it at a lecture series in
560 Antoine Tabet "Thought and Labor" [al Fikr wa al 'amall in Al Tariq, Beirut, (June 10,
1942); "My Profession and its Impact on the Building of the Nation" [Mihnati wa atharuha fee
bina' al-umma] Al Tariq, Beirut (October 3, 1942); "The Art of Building: Its Influence and the
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Beirut.6' Realizing that most of the discussions were being presented in the
local dialect, Tabet refused to present his paper. His grounds of contention
were that classical Arabic and not local dialects was the proper form of
communication. The paper was subsequently published in Al Tariq. It included
a non accredited short introduction which outlined the circumstances for the
paper, in all probability written by Tabet himself.
This introduction began with a concise presentation which outlined a variety
of historical and phonetic arguments, as to why local Arabic may not be used
for intellectual argumentation. The claim was that "...the wide gulf between
the local dialect and classical Arabic,... [which] only occurred after centuries
of' cultural dissolution....[was] the result of historical decline and a sign of
cultural, economic, political and social abasement."6 2However, the growing
interchanges between various parts of the Arab region, as a result of
transportation links pointed to the historically inevitable movement towards a
greater rapprochement between local dialects and classical Arabic. Therefore,
"refusal to use classical Arabic ...is a stance against a clear and
ongoing historic activity.. Moreover, claiming that local
dialects are richer in vocabulary and more versatile for self
expression is but a superficial judgment. Such apparent
versatility is but the end result of the ability of local dialect to
address the inconsequential events of daily life. If applied to
the world of higher intellect, the limitations of these dialects
become apparent." 563
Factors that Influence It" [Fann albina': Atharohou wal mou 'athirat fih] in Al Tariq, Beirut
(March 21, 1943).
561 Thus far, I have not been able to trace the name of the organizers of the series nor the list of
other participants.
562 Tabet, The Art of Building, p. 5. Please see Appendix VI for a full translation of this article.
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Despite these shortcomings, the introduction goes on to state, the populace
cannot but intuitively and tastefully appreciate the musical harmony in
classical Arabic even as they remained ignorant of its meaning. Moreover,
attempts to undermine the use of classical Arabic through local dialects was
really ineffectual, since historic transformations of such magnitude, could not
be dictated "..by the whims of a person or two... nor the text of a lecture or
two." Consequently, the author concluded, since the rejection of classical
Arabic was futile it could only be construed as either 'a shrewd way of
attracting attention', or 'a veil for ulterior motives.'
Having set the tone for his paper with an unaccredited introduction, Tabet then
began his text with an apology to his audience for speaking in classical Arabic,
in the wake of a series of well known writers and poets whose wonderful
lectures were conducted in the local dialect. He presented himself as the
"mere" architect who would choose to speak in classical Arabic, against the
host of amazing literary figures, whose livelihood was language itself. He
claimed that as an
"...architect... who is the furthest away from writing and
literature,[he] is the most diligent in choosing a form of
communication many believe to be autocratic not popular ,
even though... the architect has to be democratic and popular
because he is the most in need of popular support and the help
of laborers to articulate his ideas and art." 564
563 ibid
564 Tabet, ibid
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Tabet effectively dissociated himself of any "political intrigue" and ulterior
motives. He was simply an architect whose profession provided him with the
capacity to realize meanings and ideas in material form.
On Architecture and Nation Building
Various strands of Tabet's political beliefs and professional formations can be
discerned in these statements and the arguments which follow. Given that the
article was written during a period of political turmoil in the region and six
months before Lebanese independence, this statement is hardly surprising.565
In global terms, World War II was nearing its end. Locally, even though the
territorial boundaries of Lebanon had been decided upon, conflicts over the
nature of Lebanese identity between Arab nationalists who subscribed to an
Arab heritage, and Lebanese nationalists who opted for a Phoenician, and/or
Western one, continued. A national pact was struck, that attempted to
reconcile opposing views of Lebanese identity. For some this pact came to
symbolize "... national integration and confessional unity; for others... a
philosophy of confessional coexistence; still for others, it was a 'capitalist
confessional' deal aimed at promoting the interests of some segments of
Lebanese society at the expense of others" 66 Negotiations between Arab
nationalists and its Western educated elite, around the nature of Lebanese
identity, were still considerable. This debate culminated in the issue of
56Vhis article was published on March 21, 1943. Lebanese independence was declared on
Nov. 22, 1943.
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language. Arab nationalists, Tabet amongst them, insisted on using the
classical form of Arabic.56 7 It was one way of addressing what el Khazen has
termed "the double negation formula" on which Arab nationalism was based;
that is "..no to the Ottoman, no to the French' [and which] in early Arab
nationalist terminology was equivalent to the [national] pact's slogan of 'no
east, no West."'68 Opposing them were the ultra nationalists or the proponents
of a separate Lebanese identity, distinct from their Arab compatriots, who
favored the use of either French, such as Charles Corm, or the local dialect
such as Said Akl a compatriot of Corm and one of Lebanon's most well
known poets and writers. For this latter group, when conversing in Arabic,
local dialects were the most potent way of asserting their "Lebaneseness."569
Against this wider political scene these articles were critical for the role they
accorded to architectural history in a larger social history and to architecture in
the process of nation building.
The debate over language in Tabet's article, was not informed simply by the
Lebanese context. It was also informed by Marxist doctrines. In the true
Marxist fashion, Tabet believed in bridging the gap between theory and
practice. In an earlier article entitled Thought and Labor, Tabet stated that
566Khazen goes on to explain that the pact was seen to be the outcome of overlapping
confessional and economic (class) interests... which created an economic dependency on the
"imperialist West". Daher in el-Khazen, The communal Pact, p.4
s67 The range of political parties and their confessional structures as well as political
allegiances was obviously much more complex than this simple dichotomy. However, for
practical purposes I am forced to limit my discussion to these two ideological positions rather
the whole panoply of political parties. (For further information see Section I, Khazen, The
communal Pact; Albert Hourani, Political Society in Lebanon, A Historical Introduction
(Oxford: Center for Lebanese studies, 1986)
568 El-Khazen, ibid, p.39
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"...the origin of thought is not thought but work...while thought itself is but a
mediating instrument in the crisis between simple primary work [or labor] and
high artistic or social work... " 570 Language here is thus understood subjectively
as practice or in the words of Raymond Williams "... a constitutive activity...a
distinctive faculty which made... [humans]... from the beginning, not only able
to relate and communicate, but in real terms to be practically conscious... "57'
The pedagogical value of language in this instance, relies on its presentation as
a holistic notion positioned within an evolutionary narrative of historical
continuity. Language-use therefore, while being historically derived, was also
a material activity, and language was actively and presently constitutive,
existing simultaneously with other human activities.
However, Tabet instates a distinction between local dialects used by the
populace, a tool or a medium for communication between individuals at the
mundane level of everyday activities, and classical Arabic, which mediates
with the "world of higher education and intellect." 572 Classical Arabic is
conceived of as an expression rather than a simple tool for the transfer of
information. Classical Arabic in this instance serves, in Marxist terms, as the
material base unifying the Arab region and thus Arab nationalism, which is
countered by the localization of dialects. Marxist arguments of historic
determinism are employed whereby "...refusal to use classical Arabic ...is a
stance against a clear and ongoing historic activity" especially since as a result
569 ibid
57o Tabet, Thought and Labor, p.2 & 5
571 Raymond Williams Marxism and Literature (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 32
572 Tabet, The Art of Building, p. 1
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of "the advancement in transportation and thus closer ties between the various
Arab regions... there is a growing historic proclivity for a closer conjoining
between local dialects and classical Arabic."57 3
Having laid out his argument about the relevance of language, Tabet then
turned his attention to its relationship to architecture and the art of
building, the announced title for his talk. For Tabet, like his mentor August
Perret, and many other architects of the period including Delahalle,
architecture was a language, a form of expression, and construction
techniques were "an architect's mother tongue."574 The appeal of one type
of construction over another he argued was directly linked to the tectonic
expressions used by the architect. "The question is" argued Tabet "an issue
of' expression... but that is not everything... it is also the complete balance
between what is required and the means to achieve this goal."
The main impetus of Tabet's discussion is a call for a continuing dialectic
between universal principles and local expression; that is a dialectic which, in
architecture, as well as language, would allow for the expression of particular,
local architectonic features, whilst repressing their all out separatists
tendencies. This dialectic, enabled by Tabet's understanding of both the
concept of architectural style as well as its history and development, appears
clearly in the linguistic analogy that he employs to conceptualize his
573 ibid
574 August Perret quoted in Peter Collins Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture, (Montreal:
Queen's University Press, 1965, 1967), p. 178. See also Reyner Banham Theory and Design in
the First Machine Age, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, (1960, 1990), p. 43
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understanding of architectural history. Classical Arabic becomes analogous to
the universal principles governing the articulation and development of
architecture, while local dialects are but atomized expressions of that
language. Such analogies between architectural styles and different languages
were prolific in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the earlier part of
the twentieth century in Europe.575
The novelty of Tabet's discourse was the context to which it was being applied
and the political use for which it was articulated. In a long discussion
regarding the origins of architecture in Lebanon as well as what he termed as
the Arab-Lebanese house, Tabet tackled the issue of regionalism or what he
termed as its misunderstanding. Unlike the question of regionalism in France,
namely an issue of style and traditional forms, regionalism in Lebanon was
complicated by the regional distribution of religious communities that further
hindered the national integration of the country's disparate populations into a
cohesive political community. 6 Grounding Lebanon's identity in one region
575 According to Collins, this discourse was dominated by two different schools; the first, best
articulated by Donaldson who in a debate at the university college of London in 1842, claimed
that each architectural style, like language, had its own distinct principles. An architect who
could master these principles, as any other language, is best equipped for dealing with different
circumstances. Such positions effectively implicated the architect in a process of historical and
regional revivalism. The second school, on the other hand, believed that no "...architect can use
with truth and freedom all the various styles of architecture" and thus "true architecture could
only be created on the assumption that it would be the natural unquestioned mode of
expression." This school embodied for Collins "the principle virtue of the [linguistic] analogy
which is that all spoken languages are based on what is usually called a vernacular, that is to
say an indigenous manner of speech which is not self-consciously foreign or of learned
formation, but is natural, spontaneous and uninhibited." Collins, Changing Ideals: 177-178
576 Religious communities in Lebanon tend to be concentrated in distinct geographical regions
where they often constitute a majority. This was further exacerbated during the 15 years of
civil war between 1975 and 1990. At the same time, substantial numbers of every sect are
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or the other was tantamount to locating it within the narrative of one religious
community. To overcome this dilemma Tabet presented a novel interpretation
of regionalism and its relevance to architecture today that relied on a particular
view of history.
Unlike Delahalle and Corm, regionalism in Tabet's discourse is not about the
reinterpretation of existing forms in local (often rural) architecture, taken to be
representative of an identity immutable over time. Rather, it is about the
dialectic evolution in construction techniques and social structures, about
environmental conditions and local materials, about the hybrid origins of all
cultural forms and their development over centuries of cultural exchange. By
linking theory and practice he insisted upon the reciprocity between the built
environment and its users claiming that "as the environment and different
situations affect the art of building, so does this art affect...social, scientific, 57
and intellectual conditions."578
This emphasis on reciprocity was used to undermine arguments by the
advocates of Lebanonism, such as Charles Corm, who rooted Lebanese
identity within the specificity of Mount Lebanon and within a particular
Christian heritage. Forms that evolved through environmental, social and
technical influences could not be rooted in immutable identities and religious
traditions and thus religious differences. To make this argument, Tabet
present in Beirut, the administrative, political, and economic center of the country. For more
information see Zamir, Modern Lebanon, p. 101-102)
57The word here is elmiyyah comes from elm which could be translated as either educational
or scientific.
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addressed the historical growth of what he called Lebanese Arabic architecture
and its evolution. Applying Omar Fakhouri's history of Lebanon as part of the
larger Arab world, Tabet argued that different civilizations have appropriated
forms from each other for centuries and that for example, the shapes of gothic
architecture were profoundly affected by Arab and Muslim forms.579 Similarly
he contended that the genius of Charlemagne, to whom many French and
Lebanese nationalists trace the beginnings of French protection of the
Christian communities in the area, was his connection to the Arab Caliph
Harun al Rashid and thus his appropriation of Arab skills in science, the art of
building and mathematics.58 By insisting on the hybrid origins and forms of
architecture, Tabet located Lebanese architectural heritage in both Western
and Muslim contexts, thus reconciling what seemed to be two polar positions;
the Muslim heritage of the Arab nationalists with whom he was politically
affiliated and the Western orientation of Lebanese nationalists dominated by
members of the religious community to which he was born.
Through these writings Tabet transposed the universal properties of classical
architecture, into a sophisticated hybrid of political doctrine and stylistic
explanations. He claimed, different styles are not "... narrations put together by
one nation, which remains itself the same, secure in just one image of its own
civic identity through the different periods of development and throughout
generations." On the contrary, these styles developed out of the evolution of
578 Tabet, "My profession", p.8
579 Delahalle suggests a similar reciprocity but in his case it is a unidirectional importation of
forms from the West to the east.
580 See Zamir, Modern Lebanon, p. 16
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different polities which in themselves were not stable. In other words,
communities and polities for Tabet were not based upon inherent or essential
formations, but rather on hybrid groupings of peoples whose boundaries were
transformed through time.
Cultural production was conceived in a similarly dialectic fashion. Cultural
production was conceptualized as the relationship between the arts and
intellectual life as they related to society. It was also formulated as a theory of
social process which created specific and different ways of life. Tabet thus
refuted the notion of a singular origin of any work of art, or nation, in favor of
a more hybrid understanding of culture and nationhood. To achieve this end
Tabet employed a particular understanding of architectural history as dynamic
and autonomous at one and the same time. The Hegelian teleology of
progression which privileged various epochs over others whilst establishing an
absolute aesthetic ideal was rejected in favor of a more uniform approach to all
historical periods. Moreover, the single creator, central to the individual work
was replaced with a notion which reflected the communal point of view of an
epoch. Tabet employed this liberal view of history to relocate the origins of
Arab and even Western architecture in various cradles. By arguing against the
essentialism, or the inherent characteristics of any one style, Tabet effectively
presented a vision of architectural history dominated by the appropriation of
structures according to human need, and the elaboration of the previous
achievements of different groups, through construction techniques; that is a
materialist conception of history, where the ultimately determining element in
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history is the production and reproduction of real life. This synchronic view of
history allowed the coexistence of radically different styles that could also be
simultaneously appreciated. Architectural history, in this sense, was both
autonomous containing its own internal dynamic and continuous, part of a
larger social history. This internal dynamic, assumed to drive stylistic changes,
was attributed by Tabet to the changing laws of design and production.
Differing Modernisms: The Architecture of Antoine Tabet
Tabet's theories regarding the relationship of architecture to identity resulted
in an architecture that was in many ways typical of its time yet radical for its
context. Despite the ambiguity that surrounds the actual designer of the St.
George Hotel it remains Antoine Tabet's most well known project in Lebanon.
Constructed between 1930-1932, the hotel was commissioned by the Socit6
des Grands H6tel du Levant, August Perret was hired as the principle architect
for the building along with the firm of J. Poirrier, A. Lotte and G. Bordes.
What is clear is that Tabet was the local architect in charge of construction and
implementation of the building.i58 Jutting into the bay of the St. George,582 the
building pioneered the use of reinforced concrete. It is distinguished by its
5' See exchange of letters between Tabet and the French mandate regarding tax exemptions
for the hotels since it was encouraging tourism, as well as the physical citing of the hotel and
other technical matters. MAE-Nantes, 17-2987.
582 The site of the building needed special permission from the municipality since it
contravened building laws that prohibits construction along the shore that blocks pedestrian
view of the sea. (BMM 1927-1934; 1930-1931)
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tectonic feature, horizontal massing, classical lines and concrete fenestration
that Perret was well known for. 583
Figure 37: St. George Hotel, August Perret and Associates,
Beirut, 1932 (Source: author's collection)
In the same year Antoine Tabet was commissioned to build another hotel in
Damascus; the Orient Place, also the first building in Syria to used reinforced
concrete specifically for large openings (more than 10m long). The classical
rationalism for which Perret was renown for is also fairly evident in the
exterior facades of this building.584 Applying the classical lines of early
modernism, the building skillfully integrates complex massing into a well
orchestrated series of advancing and receding facades that often betray their
functionality. While the massing of the latter building seems closer in forms to
mandate period architecture both structures certainly introduced new
techniques and forms into the country (figures 37 -38).
5R3 See Perret's design for the AEG beer factory.
5.'l4 It is not clear whether August Perret, Tabet's mentor provided input on the project. Tabet
sent a letter to Perret in May 1930, with a site map of the hotel attached to it, with a request of
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Figure 38: Orient Palace Hotel, Damascus, Antoine
Tabet (Source, author's collection)
Following these buildings were a series of commissions; a beer factory in the
suburbs of Beirut in the spirit of the Bauhaus (similar to AEG) (1934), the
Lycee for girls in Beirut (1938), the Hekmeh (Sagesse) school in Beirut
(1938), the convent of Kaslik (1949), the Union building in Beirut (1950), the
church of St. Anthony in Rmeily (1953) a housing complex in Hazmieh (1958)
as well as the Ministry of Justice amongst many others. Collectively, these
buildings betrayed as preoccupation with architectonic details such as posts,
lintels, etc. to display, expose and juxtapose masses and voids, light and
shadows. They all indicated the extent to which Tabet's political
preoccupation with the articulation of identity was not rooted in specific
regional or local styles. Rather like many modernists of his time, Tabet
believed architecture to play a regional role in the forging of communities
through the living environments it created rather than the ornaments applied.
His architecture was one of constant evolution and change As Hussein Mroue,
a plan and sketch of a fa~ade to guide him. Unfortunately, Perret's response was burnt along
with the rest ofTabet's archives during the Lebanese civil war. IFA, Fonds Perret.
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Tabet's colleague and partner in Al Tariq, would state, Tabet believed that
"maintaining normative rules arrests the development of art."'55 While he was
not calling for a world history in the Marxist sense, through his negation of
local regionalist identities Tabet promoted an architecture that he believed
could play a role in forging a regional Arab identity.6
,5 Hussein Mroue "Antoine Tabet, A Biography" in Al Tariq, (Beirut, May, 1964) p. 42
586 This position was to change after the independence of modern Lebanon as did his
architecture. For example, he dropped the Arab out of his discussion of the traditional
Lebanese house and he began to incorporate local materials such as yellow bricks into some of
his buildings. However it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss these changes. See
"The Art of Lebanese Architecture" lecture addressed at the C6nacle Libanais on April 25,
1947 and published in Les Conference du Cenacles, November 10, 1947 reprinted in Les
Anndes Cenacle (Beirut: Dar en-Nahar), p. 139-144
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Making Place for the Nation: Cadastral Reform
and Urban Planning
It has often been remarked that the city of Beirut did not have a comprehensive
plan till 1932, one which was never adopted and did not have an adopted plan
till 1953, one which was never fully implemented. Moreover, it was not until
1994 that a Lebanese planner actually attempted to visualize a part of the city.
This absence of planning has been blamed on a variety of causes including
financial constraints, the economic laissez faire attitude of the Lebanese and
their refusal to be constrained by rules and regulations, the absence of planners
in the country etc. While most of these are in part true, it still does not explain
why no Lebanese planner had ever tried to envision a comprehensive plan for
the capital city.
This chapter offers no explanation. Rather it is interested in exploring the
relationship between the politics of planning and the politics of nation building
in the period between 1920-1944. It is quite evident, as discussed earlier that
French mandate authorities viewed the planning of the city as an ultimate
objective; one which they were never able to achieve due to the policy
constraints of the mandate politics and financial restrictions. Attempts to turn
this endeavor into a private sector initiative did not work either. However,
despite this "apparent" absence to planning, the reform of the cadastral system
succeeded in transforming the fabric of the city and with it the identity politics
of its citizens far more profoundly than any plan ever could and in ways that
have yet to be understood.
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In what follows this chapter will examine the impact of the cadastral reform
instituted by French mandate authorities and examine their impact on citizen
access to their city. It will then discuss the two urban plans proposed for the
city by Rene Danger (1932) and Michel Ecochard (1943). My interest in these
plans lies in the political and cultural forces that impacted their production and
implementation or lack thereof. In other words, even though never
implemented, the process of negotiating these plans and the proposals they put
forth is as telling of the means through which Lebanese identity and that of the
city was being defined and redefined. They also shed light on the disjunctures
in French mandate politics and in the historiographies of modern urbanism.
The lead characters in these two plans were both planners who made their
careers working in colonial contexts. With each plan, they brought to the city
the ideas and assumptions of modernist planning that then had to be modified
within the local where they were to be implemented. What will become
evident is the different roles they saw for planning and the city in the
constitution of civic (and sometimes national) identity.
From City to Nation: Property Reforms and the Space of Violence
At some very basic level imperialism means thinking
about, settling on, and controlling land that you do
not possess, that is distant, that is lived on and often
involves untold misery for others." (Edward Said,
Culture and Imperialism, p. 7)
The reform of property rights by the French was believed to be a critical
instrument for the production of the new nation both economically and
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symbolically. It also engendered a new production of space at a variety of
levels. As argued in section I, the city, during the 1 9 th century had become the
locus for the production of a new Ottoman citizenship, in part through
Ottoman interest in projecting the state visually, and their modernizing reforms
or tanzimat that included a new land code. One critical aspect of this land code
was its relative success at laying the grounds for the privatization of public
property and instating a stricter segregation between definition of the public
and the private. Local practices, family oriented real estate management or
"family townscapes" and the dynamic real estate market that existed prior to
and after the implementation of the code also played a critical part in the
transformation of the city's urban fabric. During the mandate period, the city,
specifically Beirut became the center for the production of a new national
citizenship. As Ely and Suny argue, the utopia of modern nationality required
a grounding of the national community in a specific and more definitely
delineated territory, with harder boundaries, constitutionally regulated
citizenship, and very demanding claims to legitimacy." What is overlooked
in this argument are the internal boundaries through which this constitutionally
regulated citizenship could be physically grounded; namely property rights. As
frontier stories in the United States for example indicate, the formation of
national identity is in part a mediation on the meanings and significance of
land and property.58 8 Property also offers an important means for individuals to
assign symbolic and material order to the world, allowing them to categorize
people, places and spaces according to their relationships to property. Put
57 Ely and Suny Becoming National p. 19
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differently, speaking of property is not just about technical uses of land. Rather
it is a moral and ethical engagement with the social order envisioned.-89 As
such as Singer argues "choices of property rules ineluctably entails choices
about the quality and character of human relationships and myriad choices
about the kind of society we will collectively create." 590
In thinking about the varied intersections between property and the formation
of national identity it is useful to recognize that property is not a static entity
but a dynamic set of relations that are constantly modified through an active
process of negotiations, contestations and communications. In his Imagined
Community Benedict Anderson initially argued that nationalism in developing
contexts was modeled on the development of nation-states and nationalisms in
Europe. In an updated edition he reformed his opinion to suggest instead that
"the immediate genealogy should be traced to the imaginings of the colonial
state." What Anderson is basically referring to here is the impact of the
colonial state not only on the political and socio-economic realities of formerly
colonial states but on the actual production of space, to misquote Levebvre,
specifically national space. While he focuses on maps, museums and censuses
as the instruments through which this national space was created, I would like
to interrogate the "power of maps," to quote Dennis Wood, to forge that reality
physically. In his work, Wood underlined the power of maps in the invention
58' R. J. Ellis, "The American frontier and the contemporary real estate advertising magazine"
in Journal of Popular Culture 27 (3), 1993, p. 119-33
589 Alan Ryan, Property (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987)
590 Singer, J, W "Property and social relations: From title to entitlement" In Property and
values: alternatives to public and private ownership, ed. C. Geisler and G. Daneker
(Washington, DC: Island Press, 2000), p. 13
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and construction of social reality. He argued that maps give us a reality that is
often beyond our reach, they concreticize the invisible, the unattainable,
sometimes even the erasable. Through their representational powers maps link
a network of assumptions, prejudices, ideas, all political, social, economic, to
present a reality that "masks the interests that bring them into being." 59'
While eliding for the moment the representational power of maps I would
argue that the reform of the cadastre and the land program attached to it as one
of' the most significant undertakings in the history of modern Lebanon,
specifically for the "network of assumptions" and the space of violence that
under-gridded it. The connection between property reform and violence may
seem arbitrary at first glance. However, the centrality of violence to the law
has already been remarked upon by a variety of scholars.5 92 In Liberal law,
concerned with the drawing and policing of boundaries, violence is integral.
The connections between the law and property have also been well discussed.
As Bentham puts it "Property and law are born together, and die together.
Before laws were made there was no property; take away the laws, and
property ceased." 593 To have property in land is to have some use or benefit of
this land. Such a right is necessarily relational, related to others. Put
differently, property rights "regulate relations among people by distributing
591 Dennis Wood, The Power of Maps (New York: Guilford Press, c1992) See also Lisa
Peattie "Representations" in Planning: Rethinking Ciudad Guayana (Ann Arbor, University
of Michigan Press, 1987) pp.l 11-151 for an discussion of this issue.
59_ One aspect of this is that the construction of the law rests on the definition of a violent
world outside the law that needs to be subdued. Sarat and Kearns, 1992; Blomely, 2003;
Walzer, 1984
593 Jeremy Bentham "Principles of the Civil Code" reprinted partly in C.B. Macphearson (ed)
Property Mainstream and Critical Positions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) p. 52
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powers to control valued resources." (Singer, 2000b, p.3) Violence is therefore
integral to the social, economic and political regulation of property relations.
In colonial contexts this connection becomes a form of lawfare to quote J.
Comaroff; that is the effort to conquer and control indigenous peoples by the
coercive use of legal means."594
Cadastral Reform and Alternative Histories
The arrival of the French in the area brought with it a new understanding of
property. Mandate authorities viewed private property as a sign of modernity.
French mandate personnel often stated that a more traditional a society was,
the more customs that regulated its property relationships, the further down the
ladder of historic evolution it was. The French colonial administration had
already confronted a variety of property regimes in its various colonies.59 5 In
Lebanon, the question of property was posed differently. The issue was not
about replacing traditional property rights with new ones. Rather it was how to
superimpose a new system over the existing and deemed inadequate Defter-
Khane that allowed for too many ambiguities in the delineation and
identification of property. Conditions in Lebanon were quite varied between
the agricultural regions of the Beqa and south, the main cities of the coast and
the hinterland and the specific conditions that prevailed in Mount Lebanon.
Through the concept of mise en valuer French administrators and technicians
were seeking to secure private property and transform it into tradable capital.
594 Jean Comaroff, "Colonialism, culture and the law: A forward" in Law and Social Inquiry
26, (2):p. 517-539, p. 306.
595 Amongst others see Proshaska Making Algeria French; Ghorayeb Structures Urbanines
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On July 1921 a new cadastral service was created to reorganize the Ottoman
Defter Khane, and the waqfs property system and to establish a new
topographic service and a new mortgage system. 59 French mandate authorities
reformed the cadastral services at three levels; judicial, administrative, and
technical. Judicial changes modified the nature of property, administrative
reform changed the manner in which individuals, communities and the state
interacted with property and technical changes focuses on establishing a well
ordered fiscal regime attached to the property. As legislative changes made
property absolute, state coffers were augmented with taxes on this property. 597
In tandem a mortgage system was created. However it took another 5 years,
until 1926, before the new cadastral system was firmly in place. Through a
series of decrees a new system "following the principles of European
legislation" the new cadastral services were charged with the establishment of
a property register for each property that included delimiting the boundaries of
the property, identifying the administrative locals in which a property was
located, the creation of cadastral maps, the legal status of each property (mulk,
596 This new Cadastral office was charged with a variety of functions such as the study of real
estate legislation, the establishment and maintenance of property rights, the defter khane,
registering property and topographic services.
597 This change also created a tremendous source of financial gain for the administration. In
1919 the revenues of the cadastre rose to 800,000 FF, A year later, taxes on real estate
transactions rose of 1,200,000 FF. In 1921 with the reorganization of the Cadastral services the
figure rose to 3,000,000 FF. Receipts increased progressively from 65,270 SL in 1922 to
104,565 SL in 1934. In 1928, after completing the census and delimitations of Beirut, there
was a 20% rise within one year in revenues from such operations. By 1936 the number of
properties registered has risen to 28,809, increasing the treasury to 10,302 SL. Ghorayeb,
Structures Urbaines, p. 82
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waqfs, private etc.), and identifying the owners and their individual shares in
each property. 598
This new system was seen as creating a sort of civil status for each property
since it allowed one to know quickly "its origins, its history, it's judicial status
throughout time. "599 A plan of the property was also annexed to its registration.
One of the most important decrees that was to have a profound influence on
the shape of the city was decree 3339 promulgated on November 12, 1930.600
It identified property as three types; natural (includes all physical elements on
a plot that cannot be moved be they mines, bridges or buildings for example),
property and what it specializes in (that is things to which the property is
utilized such as agriculture or industry etc.) and immaterial property which are
the rights, shares and law suits that engage with any property. Property itself
was subdivided into 5 types one of which was empty or dead (mawat)
properties; that is miri land belonging to the state but that not yet been
registered or delimited. 601 The first occupant of this land, with permission from
the government was to have preferential access within the limits of the laws
598These were decrees 186-187, 188-189 dated May 15, 1926.
599 Berger-Leverault La Syrie et Le Liban, p. 295.
60' The Lebanese Republic Kawanin al-Iqarat wa al Mabani [Property and Building Lawsj,
Beirut, 1992, p. 88-114.
60' The first was all mulk or private property which included all properties situated to the
interior of all built areas (with the exception of ex. Mount Lebanon and that would continue to
be regulated through customary laws). The second was Miri properties that now belonged to
the state and could be utilized by the state in any way it sees fit, while the third was metrouke
properties also belonging to the state can only be used for the purposes of a collective good,
their right of enjoyment subject to administrative regulations. The fourth type was metrouke-
mehmie properties belonging to the state or municipalities are thus form part of the public
domain.
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governing the State's properties. In other words, in this latter category, the
door to further privatization of the public domain was laid wide open.602
The aim of the cadastre in this sense was to register both the legal status of
property as well as its material conditions. Property in this formulation was no
longer connected to family histories and social relations but had become a
concrete entity with its own history. Property was now considered as real
capital to be transferred at will, an instrument of social and physical
production. What people owned quickly became a spatially demarcated
physical entity whereby a specific plot of land was delineated, assessed, drawn
on a map, and labeled. Land was transformed from being a collective village
resource, in the case of the musha'a to becoming a thing owned by individuals
and free from the social constraints that regulated village communities. The
implications of this system far exceeded the regulation of tenure relationships
and the changes it created within social relations in the country and the city.603
It ingrained notions of citizenship that were now bound to a plot of land,
rooted in soil. Individuals could be identified through specific coordinates that
602 The contemporary history of land in Lebanon is littered with stories of large plots of land
registered in the name of notables close to the mandate authorities of the time. For an
interesting analysis of similar issues in Syria see Abdallah Hanna "The attitude of the French
Mandatory authorities towards land ownership in Syria" in French and British Mandates in a
comparative perspective, p. 457-476.
' Several scholars have argued that the transformations of land tenure transformed
landownership patterns in rural areas to the advantage of peasants in some and to landlords in
others. While increasing productivity and even the extent of cultivated areas, it also aided in
ingraining the power of the influential individuals, notables, agents of the mandate period and
iqta 'i-s (local chieftains who relied on feudal farming) in other areas, through evictions and
forced labor. Amongst others see Chevallier, Mont Liban Khoury, Urban Notables; Gilsenan,
Lords of the Lebanese Marshes; Violence & Narrative in an Arab Society, (London: I. B.
Tauris and the Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1996); Abdallah Hanna, "The Attitudes of the
French Mandatory Authorities Towards Land Ownership in Syria" in Meouchy and Sluglett
(eds), French and British Mandates, p. 457-475; Michael R. Fischbach "The British Land
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were mappable and knowable. The abstract maps created by the cadastre
represented a world of fixed objects rather than spaces of social and economic
practices. Put differently, space was desocialized and depoliticized whilst
concealing the process by which the cadastre and its "enframing" capabilities
worked as a device.
This new system also determined the external boundaries of what had now
become "national" space and the internal contours within this space. The
reality of Lebanon as a distinct entity for many of its inhabitants, especially in
the regions appended to it became a concrete reality with the survey maps, the
land registration documents, the censuses, the land tax lists most of which
were conducted under the authority or pretext of reforming the cadastral
services. The significance if this program extended beyond the political
implications of creating a national space to profoundly affect the social and
economic practices and futures of the populations inhabiting these lands. By
identifying new concepts of property and land, French mandate authorities
succeeded in transforming social and economic relations. This reform was
seen by the French as an instrument of social control and a way to create a
national space:
From the social point of view the consecration of property
rights has repercussions on all classes of society. It creates
property and protects it, which in effect will attach rural
populations to the land, sedentarize the nomads, instill in them
a love of order without which everything is in vain. Finally it is
to inculcate in them a taste of liberty that work provides, place
them in the heart of passion for their home first and then their
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Program, State-Soceital Cooperation and Popular Imagination in Transjordan" ibid, p. 477-
495.
nation, it is in a word to establish on a solid base a national
edifice." 604
Put differently the cadastral services and property rights instituted by French
authorities were one instrument through which citizens could be socialized in
the forms of national belonging. The modernization of space required a radical
intervention into forms of producing space that overturned public and private
hierarchies and redefined citizen access to their city. In physical terms the
expropriations undertaken in the city center and transformation of its tenure
relationships eradicated a large number of traditional businesses and banished
a substantial number of its previous tenants from inhabiting its spaces.
Furthermore, by instating a much sharper boundary between the public and the
private and by removing alternative uses of space, citizens came to be
grounded in the city not through belonging to a village or local community,
but rather through their membership in a national community. As property
owners and as citizens they actively participated in the production of both city
and nation.
Map 7 Regularizing the Urban Fabric through expropnatIon,
replanning and Cadastral Modifications, The etoile and the 2
Churches- the existing urban fabric is visible beneath the extension
of the Etoile in the middle (Source: Lebanese Cadastral Services)
604 quoted in Ghorayeb, Structures Urbaines p. 83-84
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The place de L'Etoile: An incomplete Modernity?
Citizen contestations were also central to the process of producing the city and
redefining rights to the city. Planning as has been noted throughout the thesis
is a process of negotiation that has impacted the urban fabric of the city in a
variety of ways. The process of re-producing the city was certainly not a linear
progression of well articulated steps that resulted in an orderly, uniform and
legible modern urban environment. Rather it entailed contestations and
interactions that resulted in unintended consequences and unintended cities.605
The inability to complete the Etoile discussed earlier, the continued
contestation over expropriations and building created a condition of constant
flux in which citizens played an active role in reproducing their city.
New Plans, New Cities, New Citizens
The centrality of the city to the production of citizenship was further
underlined through the plans proposed for Beirut. Even though never
implemented through their urban plans Rene Danger and Michel Ecochard
both tried to ingrain a new notion of citizenship and national belonging. In
what follows the details of each of those plans and the different ideas about the
605 Municipal minutes for example are full of citizen contestation of the planned construction of
roads. In one particular incident for example, the municipality was forced to return property
belonging to the Tabet family that it had expropriated for the construction of a road it
subsequently cancelled. The municipality argued that it was planning to construct a town hall
on the location. Mandate authorities claimed this did not fall under expropriation for the public
good. BMM, 1924-1926.
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role of the city in inculcating citizenship that they brought with them will be
explored.
Municipal concern with the absence of a master plan for Beirut had been
growing slowly since 1925 when the president of the municipality traveled to
Paris and Belgium to "to learn about new approaches to the urban planning
and the expansion of great cities and to attend a conference on municipalities."
6' Upon his return he made a series of recommendations for the improvement
of the city. These recommendations were very much in line with the
fragmentary manner by which the city was being built and rebuilt. By the
1930's with the exception of the city center and the opening of new roads in
and around the city, Beirut's spectacular growth was still not being
coordinated.
By the 1930's Beirut had grown considerably and the need to officially create
a plan for the city had become an urgent necessity. Congested, crowded,
606 On July 8 1925, the municipal commission examined two invitations received by its
president to attend a conference on urban planning that was taking place in Paris on July 14-19,
and to participate in the opening of the Decorative Arts exhibition. Unable to travel at that
point, the council decided to send its president to France at a later date to examine the latest
techniques in planning cities and to estimate the needs of Beirut based on his trip. In
September of the same year the president of the municipality traveled to France and Brussels.
Upon his return he submitted a report that included a series of recommendations for Beirut
such as 1) the creation of public parks 2) launching a competition for the construction of the
sewage networks project 3) prohibiting the dumping of garbage in the sea and the creation of a
garbage dump outside the city 4) increasing the number of public urinals to meet the needs of
the city and "diminish the adverse effect of people relieving themselves on the sides of the
roads," and 5) continue asphalting the roads etc. The municipal architect was instructed by the
council to identify empty plots in the city that could be expropriated for this purpose as well as
draw up a plan for the pine forest to turn it into a proper public park. He was also asked to
prepare the necessary plans for the creation of a garbage dump outside the city. (MMB, 1924-
1926)
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disfigured, capital, cosmopolitan, port, Mediterranean, dirty, Western, are but
some of the adjectives used by travelers, journalists and the city's
administrators to describe Beirut during this period. This chaos, a source of
angst for its administrator who saw it as disfiguring the "modem" and
"occidental" characteristics of the city, Beirut was also depicted as "the
manifestation of the most characteristic spirit of modernization of the new
generation of Lebanese. And this is where we can consider what can be
counted as a national initiative."607 Beirut was constructed and projected in the
press and various discourse, especially by the French Mandate authorities and
advocates of independent Greater Lebanon as a Mediterranean distinct from
neighboring Arab cities such as Aleppo, Damascus or even Tripoli. It was
discussed as occupying a liminal space between east and West, the window of
the East unto the West, the space through which interpenetration of the Orient
and the Occident occurs and goods flow. It was also a city that was expanding
rapidly without a comprehensive master plan.
Mediterranean Beirut: Rene Danger and Coercive Civility
Rene Danger,60 a well known French architect/urbanist was invited to submit
a proposal for the urban planning of Beirut in May of 1931.6°9 The principle of
607 Revue du Liban, 1934
601)anger was also a geometry expert with a diploma from the French government, whereby
he was the president of an association formed in Paris. A professor of urbanism at the Ecole
special de Travaux Publics, he also traveled between 1910-1912 in England, Italy and
central Europe. (Riseler, 1933:3).
6'9 This assignment took place after considerable negotiations that lasted almost 2 years. The
first contact was established by Raymond Danger, the brother of Rene Danger who on April
23. 1929, wrote to the municipality of Beirut suggesting that they contract his firm to create a
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an office, the Societe des plans regulateurs de Ville Danger was involved in
the planning of cities in both metropolitan and colonial France as well as other
foreign countries such as Troyes, Auxerre, Thonon, Montauban, Bergerac,
Bidart, Caen, Gagny, Menton, Romilly, Ajaccio, Sedan, Bone, Gulema, Fort
de France, Aleppo, Beirut, Antioch, Alexandria, and finally to Pont a Pitre. In
1919 he was named a member of the Section d'hygibne urbaine et rurale du
Muse Social and in 1923 of La Commission Supirieure des Plans
d'amenagment et d'extension des Villes through which his contacts with Prost,
Benard, Marrasat and others was established.6"' The context for this invitation
reflected political and planning concerns in both the Metropole and locally. In
France, planning discourse was characterized with an incessant preoccupation
with health, hygiene, and circulation. These began to appear in discussions
surrounding the planning of Beirut whose chaotic growth as a result of liberal
modern urban plan for Beirut as in other Turkish and French cities. He argued that this plan
would address questions of hygiene and rules of development so as to transform Beirut into a
modern city. Despite the appeal of the idea, the municipality declined his offer for financial
and practical reasons. It argued that not only do they not have the finances necessary for such
an operation but that the heart of the old city had already been designed in a manner
"commensurate with modern artistic and architectural taste." Danger however, it seems was
quite interested in the prospect. In February and December of 1930 both the Mohafez of the
city of Beirut and Mr. Durrafourd the engineer in charge of the cadastre wrote to the
municipality asking them to hire the services of Mr. Danger. In this letter Durrafourd
confirmed his willingness to work with Rene Danger on preparing the technical maps for the
improvement and expansion of the city. On May 20th 1931 and after considerable negotiations
between the municipality, Durrafourd, the Mohafez, and probably the high commission,
Danger is assigned the task of creating a new master plan for the city. See MMB 1930-1931,
1932 See also MAE- Nantes, 20-2891 & 21-347 for further info.
610 All were deeply involved in planning and building in other French colonial contexts such
as Morocco, Algeria, Indochina and Madagascar. See for example, Abu Lughod, Colonial
Urbanism; Beguin and Baudez, Arabisances; Rabinow, French Modern; Wright, Politics of
Design.
338
laissez faire policies had become quite marked.611 Locally, French-British
rivalry612 fueled demands for the 'embellishment' of the city and the upgrading
of both the port and its urban surroundings. The municipality's own program
of' planning and reconstruction was taking place in a piecemeal and
fragmentary manner as it had always done. These factors, along with the
required cooperation with local institutions were distilled in Danger's
approach to modernizing, hence to civilizing the country. They were made
manifest in his methodology, his proposed urban forms, and his legislative
texts.
611These discourses preoccupied French urbanists especially towards the end of the
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.
61 7The port of Haifa, which not only had better facilities but was the terminal for the Iraq
petroleum company pipeline from the Kiruk and Mosel oil fields, had become by the late
twenties a growing threat to Beirut's future as the "Porte de L'Orient." Apprehension over
French-British rivalry, which translated into two competing economic zones (Syria-Lebanon
and Iraq-Palestine) materialized clearly in a comment by one writer in the Correspondence
d'Orient, who stated "The beautiful dream...of Beirut ...as the only important port of the
whole region...was close to being shattered" ( Correspondence d'Orient, 1929: 9-10). This
threat was also outlined by Omar Daouk, the president of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce at
that time when he petitioned the French Haute Commissariat to take action in 1933. He stated:
...Beirut is threatened by the large modem port of Haifa. The construction of a railway linking
Haifa to Baghdad has also been decided. Turkey, for her part, is bent on gaining commercial
traffic with Persia. The Lebanese economy is on the decline, the re-exportation trade is
inhibited by newly imposed customs duties, agricultural output is falling, and the transit trade
is seriously jeopardized. Such palliatives as the construction of additional warehouses and the
signing of commercial agreements are without effect . Iraq and Persia are both looking for an
outlet on the Mediterranean, and transdesertic traffic is increasing (Daouk quoted in Buheiry,
Beirut's Role, p.14; see also Gates, Merchant Republic).
His conclusion to the problem was the immediate establishment of Beirut as a free port or at
least the creation of a free zone. The French mandate authorities responded by creating a
free zone within which the establishment of certain forms of industrial production was also
allowed.
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Enmeshed in radically different environments, Danger's approach came to
characterize the scientific determinism of the tenants of early modernism61 3
and which could be universally transposed from one context to the other. In
colonial contexts this methodology translated into what Rabinow has termed
as "techno-cosmopolitanism" which attempted to "operationalize history,
society and culture...it was technological in that its operations were
scientifically arrived at and could be specified; it was cosmopolitan in that
these operations were applied to specific customs, cultures and countries. ' 4
Urbanism, according to Danger, reflected the
different points of view of science, of technique, of aesthetic, of
public hygiene, of general economy, of politics, of sociology,
of statistics, of legislation, of jurisprudence....urbanism is the
science which is preoccupied with the organization of cities
and their extensions' 5
The city was therefore an object of contemplation, an organic entity that was
to be regulated by a uniform administration founded upon the techniques of an
all encompassing modern urbanism. Modernization, implied the optimization
6131n his book on urbanism Danger refers to Le Corbusier's City of Tomorrow, the work of
Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities of To-Morrow, as well as Camillo Sitte's City Planning
According To Artistic Principles. As a result his work came to combine elements of both
progressive town planning, as well as picturesque schemes, reflecting what Tafuri and Dal
Co have termed as the "veritable prototypes of colonial planning".
614 Rabinow, French Modern, p. 167
615 He goes on to say that "The shape of an empty terrain or a square that's urbanism, the
moving of a urinal, of a lamppost, of a tree, that is urbanism, the mode of purifying drinking
water, or used water... the color of the texts for signs, for advertisement...the modes of
construction...the organization of real estate systems of developed land...the placement of
sculpture along an avenue; the floral decoration of a government, that is urbanism!"...The
objective urbanism was to
a. strive to shelter human life from the inconveniences that result from cohabitation and
climate, with the aid of the remedies that we brought; hygiene, sanitary techniques and
physical education;
b. to organize the interactivity of the inhabitants of the agglomeration, with the minimum of
waste for the maximum production and security;
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of production, especially circulation, which necessitated a reclassification of
functions in the city. Zoning, he believed, would allow the decentralization of
specialization and the reorganization of land. Archaic functional distributions
in the city, such as the overlap between ethnic/religious and occupational
spaces evident in less evolved and hence less civilized societies (such as
Africa and India), would thus be addressed. Danger's approach to
modernization hence to civilizing the country manifested through his
methodology, his urban forms, and his legislative texts.
Such a scientific approach to planning suggested to Danger a singular work
methodology; what he termed as an Enquete Monographique Urbain, whose
objectives were to "...proceed from the general to the particular. .. compared in
... context" (Danger, 1933:27). A questionnaire was composed which could
guide the process. This comprised of 1) Site, 2) history, 3) demography, 4)
hygiene, 5) political and social function, 6) economic functions and
c. to render the framework of life agreeable and harmonious, in considering the esthetic, a
superior intellectual element, as a factor of progress and a necessary condition of peace,
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circulation, 7) architecture and local aesthetic, 8) ancient and current projects.
While I will not be addressing the different aspects of this methodology, I
would like to focus on one particular feature; his interpretation of history,
which had a determining impact on his proposals for the city.
French urban discourse based planning on a scientific logic and addressed
history through a functional and evolutionary perspective. When transposed to
non-Western contexts, and in a manner similar to the orientalist picturesque
paintings of the nineteenth century, this history was presented as a form of
'documentary realism,' which did not include cultural history. It was a history
delimited through the functional representation of static traditions and a
disorganized urban fabric and which, according to Danger, formed the single
most determining characteristic of Oriental or Arab cities (Danger, 1933:199).
616 The impact of the political and the economic history and administrations on
the urban tissue of the city were scientifically analyzed. Meanwhile, the
culture and traditions of indigenous populations; that is the questions of history
and community were treated anthropologically. They were addressed as
products of "demography" which classified society by "race and religion," by
"sex" and by geographic "quarters."
obviously within the framework of local conditions. Danger, L' Urbanisme en Syrie, p. 9-10
6'16 n his Cour d'Urbanisme Danger states: "The layout of the oriental or Arab city is always
disorderly; that of the Greek city follows the existing terrain; the Roman plan is that of the
grid; the medieval town is sharply defensive; the Renaissance city opens up to planned
perspectives..." Rene Danger Cours d'Urbanisme, (Paris: Librairie de L'enseignement
Technique, 1933), p. 199. For an interesting discussion of the adverse role of picturesque
painting in the representation of oriental cultures see Nochlin, The politics of Vision:, p.3-59.
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This anthropological perspective was also extended into issues of architecture
and aesthetics. Picturesque views, and elements of local architecture deemed
as characteristic of the 'native' culture, were singled out. 617 Following these
studies, a seemingly non interventionist attitude was adopted in Beirut. The
traditional center was to be preserved, with public commercial activities
organized around Martyr's square and high income commerce assigned to the
north of the city. The city was subdivided into seven geographic quarters, a
functional zoning of districts was proposed. 618 All public works carried out by
the municipality, such as the improvements in the port and the building of the
Maarad street and some of the proposed projects such as the enlargement of
Martyr's square were also integrated into the plan. Placed in the context of
French colonial enterprises, where the destruction of indigenous heritage
especially in Algeria had been severely questioned, its integrationist attitude is
not surprising.
617Historic monuments were also examined and documented both as objects of aesthetic
contemplation, or as the subjects of legends.
61Zoning the city was not used as a means of racial and ethnic separation, but rather as a way
to experiment with functionalist ideas. Seven geographic quarters categorized according to
three functional zones; commercial or public, residential, and industrial, were proposed for
Beirut. The traditional center was to be preserved with public commercial activities organized
around Martyr's square and high income commerce assigned to the north of the city. The
Armenian quarter, deemed as unhealthy and unclean was to be replaced with an industrial
zone. Three quarters were assigned a residential function. Ras Beirut was reorganized with
simple roads and connecting crossovers while the quartier des sables (near the beach front) was
to be developed with a pier for promenades and a fan shaped plan. The third quarter to the east
of the city and closer to the proposed industrial section was to be formed by an independent
garden city. Light and air were to be introduced into overpopulated areas through the creation
of public squares and gardens the enlargement of existing roads, and the creation of streets and
corniche. The expansion of the port, the public works carried out by the municipality, as well
as all other studies undertaken by the mandate authorities were maintained. Last but not least,
he recommended the regroupment of administrative services in a suitable structure or
"edifice".
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However, in the move "from the general to the particular" this 'documentary
realism' was made to overlap with the technological and scientific
determinism characteristic of the early stages of the modem movement.
Understanding the formation and transformation of monuments over time, was
critical to Danger. Through this process, he claimed, reverence for picturesque
views would decrease and issues of hygiene would be given priority.
"L'hygiene...est la dernier expression du progres,s social accompli par des
moyens scientifiques. Le degr6, de civilisation d'une nation se mesure
actuellement ... la perfection de l'hygiene" claimed Danger.619 Modernization,
in the practice of "techno-cosmopolitanism," implied the assessment and
operationalization of tradition in the name of health, productivity and efficacy,
the norm of an orderly modem society.
In parallel, the reorganization of public space, categorized as terre vivante
(pedestrian) as opposed to the terre morte (or vehicular spaces), was seen as
the best means to address these hygienic requirements; what he called 'defense
of the health of the city'. The only major physical intervention into the existing
urban tissue of the city center was to take place around the 'Place des Martyrs.
Echoing the municipality's plans and Delahalle's plan, the Petit S6rail was to
be demolished, while the square was to be enlarged to a seventy-meter wide
boulevard terminating with public gardens and opening up the view onto the
sea. Inspired by what Danger considered as the modem conditions of living
and a modem economy, he introduced a new form of public space and a novel
urban typology. To ".. put an end to the confusion and intermixing of
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619 Danger, Cours d'Urbanisme , p. 170
activities" the square was to be organized through the "creation of a center of
exchange which was now to become a hall, a market, a stock market..."
(I)anger, 1933:60). The modernization of the economy would thus lead to the
modernization of society. While reflecting the proliferation of new building
types in France, this proposal also suggested an inadvertent dismissal of
indigenous public spaces such as the traditional suqs, Hamams, and Khans. It
also indicated the modes by which a normative conception of public space
adequate for the meaningful social interaction of a now 'modern' collectivity
was transposed from France to Beirut.620
Modernity, for Danger, was not limited to the formal and perceivable elements
of' the city but extended into the actual organization of the state. An urban
administration guided by a set of seventy eight laws, subdivided under twenty
five headings was proposed for Beirut. Dominated by questions of
infrastructural hygiene these laws ranged from the particularities of the
dwelling such as water disposal, and household odors, to the modernization of
urban services or collective behavior such as garbage collection. 621 However,
hygienic requirements were not only physical but moral as well. By proposing
the norms which were to circumscribe civil behavior in the city, these laws
also put forth a form of moral hygiene. For example, it was forbidden to hit or
shake (that is clean) carpets and clothes in a public place, or to use water to
620 Inter-war planning ideals in France placed a particular emphasis on the use of technical and
commercial infrastructure as structural devices for the spatial and social organization of
neighborhoods. Children's playgrounds, public squares, swimming pools, sports facilities,
communal halls, cinemas and libraries were all used as the social 'edifice' around which
communities would gather, and thus modem sociability would emerge. These were all
suggested in Beirut.
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wash perishable foods or dishes in public spaces, or to spit on the ground.
Article 72 forbade funduks (Hotels) from admitting into the same room people
of different sexes. These rules were to determine the field of personal liberties;
in the name of hygiene and the "common good," the citizen had to be directed
by the specialist, the professional. These values were universal values
embedded within a grid which enmeshed general urban planning principles in
France's "Mission Civilatrice." Therefore, even though, his approach to the
urban development of the city indicates an acceptance and integration of the
existing city, his proposed legislation implies a behavioral modification. It
results in a coercive modernity which attempts to reform the behavior of
individuals at the local level from above. These could only occur through the
intrusion of the coercive apparatus of the state into the daily and private life of
inhabitants. 622 The picturesque setting of daily activities becomes the foil
against which science could perform its miracle, and within which behavioral
legislation would 'modernize' and civilize individuals.6 23
Michel Ecochard and Enlightened Modernity
While Danger's plan was formed in the midst of the mandate period and
informed by the tenants of early modernism and the immediate colonial
62 1Household garbage was to be placed in designated spaces between 15 minutes to an hour
before the trucks are scheduled to pick them up and must be removed 15 minutes after the
trucks have passed.
622 n his book there are sections on the police force and other law reinforcement institutions.
This non interventionist attitude is not surprising given the backlash against earlier
integrationist policies adopted by the French in Algeria and which entailed the destruction of a
large part of its architectural heritage.
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experience where the juxtaposition of traditional and modem cities had
become common practice, Ecochard's proposal was influenced, by his
patriotism to France, his experience working on archaeological sites and
historic monuments under Sauvaget in Damascus, as well as the tenants of
C[AM.624 An architect by education, Ecochard received his diploma from the
Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris in 1931.625 Between 1935-1939, he served as the
director of urbanism in mandate Syria626 and in 1946-1952 he became the
director of the Town Planning Department of the Protectorate. In 1941, he was
invited by General Dentz6 27, the high commissioner at the time, to submit
development plans for Lebanon in general, and Beirut in particular.628 The
political turmoil in the area was quite marked. Demands by Lebanese
623 In 1938 the plan was still being studied at the municipality and eventually was never
approved.
624 The Congrts Internationaux d' Architecture Moderne (CIAM), was started in 1928 in the
Swiss chateau of Hl6ne de Mandrot. Initially it was split between the Swiss/French group;
dominated by the cult figure of Le Corbusier, A. Lurcat, Pierre Charreau, A. Sartoris,
V.Bourgeoisie, S. Gideon, C. Van Eesteren and the German radicals; H. Meyer, M. Stam, H.
Schmidt, E. May as well as B. Taut, M.Wagner and W. Gropius. The instrumentalization and
institutionalization of the politics of city planning advocated in CIAM, profoundly influenced
post W.W.II reconstruction as well as post colonial planning (See, Ciucci, 1981; Cohen, 1992;
Landau, 1991; Gideon, 1941).
625Ecochard began his career by practicing archeology with Henri Seyrig, the director of the
service of antiquities of the French High Commission, and the historian Jean Sauvaget. In 1938
he was to publish, with Sauvaget, an article on the tomb of Sawfat el Molk. In 1949 he was
admitted to CIAM, and became one of the permanent members of the Bergamo commission.
An associate of Sigfried Gideon, whom he met in New York in 1945, and later in 1947,
Ecochard played a crucial role in the formation of the Groupe d'Architectes Modernes
Marocains, (or GAMMA) who became part of CIAM in 1951 in the Hoddedson conference.
626 In 1935 he collaborated with Rene Danger on a master plan for Damascus.
627Ecochard was invited by General Dentz on April 29, 1941 to submit plans for Lebanon. At
the: time Ecochard was the director of urban services in Syria. Dentz remained until July 8,
1942 when he was replaced by General Catroux. Ecohard's first mission was lasted from May
22-June 8, 1941 and resulted in his report Le Probleme de L'Urbanisme dans les Etats du
Levant.
628Hle was already undertaking similar endeavors in Damascus, Aleppo and other parts of Syria
and Colonial North Africa
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nationalists for independence had increased, as had the ad hoc development of
the city.
Concerned by the total lack of urban services, Ecochard began his mandate
with an article entitled Le Probleme de L'Urbanisme dans les Etats du Levant.
In this text his vision of both the role of France in the Levant and the function
of' the architect/urbanist in addressing the Ottoman legacy of "400 ans de
retard sur la civilization," were outlined. His opening statement is worth
quoting at length for what it conveys about his perception of the role the
architect/urbanist is to play in the context of both the French mandate and the
formation of the modern nation-state. He begins:
... the creation of the states of the Levant has radically
transformed life in a country which until now had suffered
beneath the stagnation of the Ottoman administration. Having
existed on the margins of world circulation, it must regain, with
the development of its industrial power, and exchange, the role
that its geographic location dictates ... Even more, political
modifications, the dismemberment and reconstitution of states,
the transfer of populations, provoke in cities demographic
transformations... [which] after the war will impose upon states
a new orientation as well as grave problems of planning,
organization, and urban extensions...62 9
At the same time, Danger's proposal was reduced to a plan "....limited to the
rectification of geometric alignments that can only accept without imposing or
more importantly resolving the vital question of the city.630"
629 Michel Ecochard, Probleme de l'Urbanisme dans les Etats du Levant , 1941 MAE-Nantes,
20--2927
630 Ecochard, ibid
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In this context, according to Ecochard, modern urbanism would in broad
outlines be achieved through two modes of operation; first through the
necessary tools for 'modern' urban planning which were the Services des
Travaux Publics, Services Techniques des Municipalitis and the Army, while
the second though a specifically created program of action. Even though these
tools reflected Ecochard's tendency for the centralization of urban
administrations and the incorporation of the military, I will only focus on his
program of action, and more specifically on his proposals for a new city which
was to contain a new university.
However, before getting into the details of Ecochard's proposals, one may
wonder why France, in the midst of a World War, and encountering economic
difficulties, would decide to invest in drawing up urban plans for an area
where local resistance had been slowly mounting and, where its mandate
stipulated the eventual independence of the state. The answer can be partially
found in General Catroux's, the High Commissioner, the General Delegate
and Diplomat of Liberated France in the Levant,63' speech on the occasion of
General de Gaulle's visit to Beirut in May of 1942. On the effort of France in
the Levant he stated
... there exists one domain in which we have been
insufficiently visible, that of urbanism... .The general
delegation which understands that a country does not leave a
profound imprint except in what is inscribed into the
territory... has... decided not to indulge in expensive public
631 Previously he occupied the post of Haut Commissaire for the government of Damascus
from 1920-1923 and was then appointed as director of information in the Levant from 1926-
1927.
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buildings but to mark now, on the ground, the traces
necessary for their for the future realization... 632
Urbanism was therefore seen as the means through which France was to leave
its imprint in the Levant. These views were echoed by Ecochard who saw his
role in the Levant also as part of France's war effort. The rhetoric of war
which littered his letters, seeped into his proposals.633 For example, on January
10, 1944 (three months after Lebanese independence) Ecochard proposed to
Rene Capitant, the commissioner of National education, the immediate
creation of a French University to "...conserve through our [French]
intellectual influence, all that we have lost politically" (Ecochard, letter from
Algeria, Jan, 10, 1944).634 The place of the university was to be in the new city
he was proposing; the reasons for establishing the university were outlined as;
because the culture of France is never discussed, because it is
France's duty to Orientals already 'impregnated' with our
culture, because Beirut is a Mediterranean center favorable to
the diffusion of ideas, because our Lebanese friends have
shown us that our intellectual formation is the best agent for
material and moral development. ....and because a French
632Catroux in Marlene Ghorayeb Les Deux Plans d'Amnagement Proposes pour la Ville de
Beyrouth Sous Mandat Francais: Danger & Ecochard, (Dipl6me d'6tudes Sup6rieures
Spdcialis6es (DESS) en Urbanisme, Universit6 de Paris VIII, Institut Fran:ais d'Urbanisme,
Paris, 1991)
633 Most of his explications regarding the proposed road network were justified with arguments
surrounding the military needs of French and British troops. For example, in his first report of
July 4, 1941, Ecochard's blames the inconveniences faced by French troops when trying to
disembark their trucks, on the absence of any overall policies guiding the growth of the city.
(Ecochard, 1941:6) Likewise, in a report to General Catroux on Aug. 27, 1942, the roads of
prime urgency were "those which were to facilitate the new traffic created by the state of
war...the routes of Saida and Tripoli" (Ecochard, Aug. 21, 1942). Another report was
submitted by Ecochard in Sept. 13, 1943 (less than tow months before Lebanese
independence) and entitled Etudes d'Adaptation de L'infrastructure Imperiale Franfaise, for
the building of an aerodrome and the improvement of ground transportation.
6341The actual idea it seems came out of a discussion he had with General Catroux on July 30,
1943- four months before Lebanese independence was granted
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university...can be a force and an inspiration ...to the
metropolitan organisms, and states to which it is "rettached".6 3 5
Accordingly, this new city was to help France, "maintain its true place in the
Levant [and]...prove to the Lebanese that France was only interested in helping
them in their economic development whilst seeking only cultural influence for
itself' (my emphasis). These aspirations were packaged in his planning
principles and the critical role he saw for the urbanist/architect in war and
peace. Unlike Danger, and despite his evident colonial perception of history
and ethnicity, Ecochard's projects did not reproduce the logic and practice
implemented in colonial contexts. Like many of his contemporaries, he
rejected the rational technocratic values of the early modern movement. His
approach to society was as a unified whole visible to the urbanist; his view of
the urbanist was of a regulator of social disequilibrium brought on by
capitalism and rampant speculation in real estate.6 36 It is this panoramic view
635 rhis new university was to both create new departments not available in the existing St.
Joseph university, and expand or regroup the different existing programs. A detailed report of
this proposal with what was to be developed and what was to be enlarged was outlined on
Nov. 30, 1943, less than a week after the declaration of Lebanese independence. Different
departments in the existing Universit6 St. Joseph were to be either financed or controlled by a
sister university in France. Ecochard however, overlooked the pragmatic implications of his
proposal given that different departments were controlled by various universities in France. For
example, in a letter by Pre Jacques Bonnet-Eymard, the rector of the Universit( St. Joseph,
dated Dec. 10, 1943, and addressed to Ecochard doubts over the willingness of the University
of Lyon to relinquish its control over the Law school and the engineering schools were voiced.
"The universities of the metropole," he continues, "are very attentive to their personal
missions." (Ecochard, Note Urbanisme Beyrouth Nov. 30, 1943- MAE-Nantes 20-2927. See
also MAE Nantes 21-347 & 17-2987
636The major features of his plan, completed in 1948, was its recommendation that the planning
of Beirut should go beyond it's administrative boundaries to include the area stretching from
Nahr el-Mot in the North to the Ouzai in the South. However, he continued to emphasize
Beirut's role as a port city, thus centralized city around the city center. Most roads continued
to lead to the city center, even as provisions for circular roads which would facilitate
communications between cities such Saida and Tripoli were made. Provisions for the main
access arteries suggesting a commercial ring around the city centre and creating a link between
351
of the city and its inhabitants, which accorded him this role. His was a new
form of intervention, which focused on process and function. Modem living
was no longer about "civilizing" through moral hygiene, but about a complete
rupture with tradition; a new way of living for the anonymous individual. It
was an engaged modernism which contained all the utopian elements of
international modernism about equality, freedom and democracy, and which
would be achievable through the abstract space of the planned grid. Social
good and aesthetic values had become synonymous for the newly independent
nation-state. This is best illustrated in his proposed plans for a new city.
Ecochard was influenced by CIAM doctrines637, and the tenants of modem
architecture whose objectives were to create new subjectivities through novel
categories of classification, restructured modes of perception, and a
reorganization of visual and spatial experience. This in turn suggested the
manner by which a society, in this case Beiruti society, whose cultural and
physical conventions were influenced by now archaic modes of production
would be effectively reprogrammed for life in the new industrialized world.
His principles for this new city were based on the separation of functions, the
Achrafieh and Ras Beirut were made. This plan also contained a complete study for the
protection of the natural sites including an intensive survey of existing open spaces and
gardens and all the valuable trees that should be preserved. It proposed twelve zones in Beirut
(commercial, industrial and residential) of varying densities; civic centers, location of
industries, housing for workers, popular housing, and all other categories of dwellings from
middle income to luxury as well as indicating the present location of the airport.
637That Ecochard was an adherent of CIAM is indisputable. Attributing his following of CIAM
to a meeting with Le Corbusier in 1946, Ecochard claims in his Casablanca, le Roman d'une
Ville "...we do not have secrets, all is contained (or can be found) in a small book called the
Athens charter put together by a group of architects, CIAM, in 1933, it gives simple formulas
and essential rules for the actual planning and development of cities." Ecochard, Casablanca,
le Roman d'une Ville (Paris: 1955), p.73
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delimitation of types of construction suitable for the "modern tenant." These
were outlined as a refusal of traditional regroupings in favor of cooperatively
owned clusters of high-rises where common public space would be accessible
to all. Provisions for further expansion and the assimilation of "climatic"
needs into housing construction, and setbacks were also suggested. The "old"
methods of building cities, such as enclosed courts and narrow roads fronted
by attached housing were to be excluded in the new city. More importantly,
they were contrasted to the 'new urbanism' which was to give birth to the
'new man'. Form is openly linked to social transformations as this new
urbanism is accorded the role of modifying social interaction. These projected
transformations were to not only cut across class boundaries since ethnicity is
not mentioned. They were also meant to embed this egalitarian attitude to
living into the urban fabric. Through strictly regulated heights and setbacks,
the new city was to be an ensemble which could reflect "...the glory of the
Lebanese republic."
The conflict between formalist and functionalist doctrines is quite clear.638 As
many scholars have pointed out, an implicit dichotomy exists within nation-
states between a quest for democracy, with its inherent claims to freedom and
equality for all, and the consolidation of an "imagined community" based on
distinct ethnicities, languages and religious communities. That fact that Beirut
was a plural society of seventeen different sects, is not addressed in his
proposal. He functioned within the tradition of middling modernism which
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according to Rabinow conceptualized "...The "human material' on which it
worked... [as] a universal subject whose needs, potentialities could be
discovered, analyzed and formalized by science...It sought to create New Men,
freed, purified and liberated to pursue new forms of sociality that-it was held-
would inevitably arise from healthy spaces and forms. '"' The utopic premises
under which middling modernism operated in colonized contexts was
transformed, on the eve of independence, into a pragmatic proposal that sought
to concretize the universalistic assumptions characteristic of the modern state.
His was an "enlightened" modernity, which appealed to the general needs of
the people, of the republic and of the nation. 640 Freedom was interpreted as the
right of the individual genius/architect-artist to create, while the question of
equality was translated into the social ideal of a revolutionary
urbanist/architect who retained a guiding role for architecture. Ecochard
espoused the role of the disinterested urbanist/observer, the "academic
interlocutor." Urbanism's role was to defend the public interest of the state
against the encroachment of private interests. Echoing the very contradictions
found within the charter of Athens, Ecochard's proposal also contained both a
bourgeois reformist attitude reflected in his demands for the 'new man' and a
marxist revolutionary who proposed collective housing where everyone would
638Here I am referring to the use of an abstract International style architecture, in form and
function, to create the 'new man' combined with an attempt to maintain the 'old' France in
place.
639 Rabinow French Modern, p. 168
640In his speech to the Lebanese Society of Political Economy in 1945, Ecochard makes the
synonymy between general interests of citizens and those of the nation more explicit. He
states: "Nous voyons...que la d6fense de l'intrt g6n6ral des citoyens, c'est-A-dire des int6rt
sup(rieurs de la nation..." Michel Ecochard La Ville de Beyrouth et son Avenir, (Beirut:
Socidt6 Libanaise d'Economie Politique, 5 April, 1945), p.7 See also Miche Ecochard
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benefit from communal public spaces. For this new city, a real estate society
was proposed and which would be financed by both local and international
capital (through different banks) and by the municipality and the Lebanese
government. Paradoxically, his centralizing tendencies contradicted those of
the mandate authorities, which had thus far espoused a liberal economic
system of laissez faire. Despite its reformist aspirations state authorities were
to be responsible for this new urbanism, which according to Ecochard could
not be left to private enterprises:
Une telle enterprise ne peut etre en aucune maniere laissee a
l'enterprise privee, car la speculation jouerait et des terrain
actuellement sans aucune valeur prendraient du fait des projects
de l'Etat une valeur qui interdirait tout travail d'ensemble6
These reformist aspirations were further ingrained in his proposed
transformation of the urban fabric. His new plan for the city included the
creation of a new administrative center on the existing site of the Ottoman
S6rail overlooking the city. (Figures 40-41) This approach to architecture and
by extension planning may in part be explained by his training as an
archaeologist coupled with his disdain for all things Ottoman. Out of the layers
of the land he intended to excavate the themes emblematic of the new nation
state.
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Programme de Grands Travaux d'Urbanisme pour L'itat de Syrie en 1942, MAE Nantes, 21-
347. See also Notes Urbanisme Beyrouth, July 30, 1943, MAE Nantes, 20-2927.
64' Michel Ecochard, ibid.
Figure 40 The New administrative center on the site of the Grand Ottoman
Serail, Michel Ecochard, (Source: author's collection)
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Figure 41 Michel Ecochard Elevation- New Adminstrative
Center, Beirut (Source: IFA)
Despite their polemics, both projects, albeit in different ways, indicate how
progressive town planning was meant to respond to particular economic and
cultural interests and not to actual urban reform. As we have seen, both
Danger and Ecochard had a strictly defined vision of architecture/urbanism as
a self contained discipline as well as a constituent of a larger cultural sphere.
Like many other modernist projects, the abstract functionalism of both
propositions functioned as a matrix in which the socio-cultural specificity of
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the context within which they were operating remained unaccounted for.
Meanwhile, society was presented as a self contained organic whole,
historically constituted, and thus a target for state, in this case French,
intervention and institutional reform. In different ways, each sought to
maintain a position of invisible centrality for French authorities in relation to
regional and local political transformations.
This goal was made to coincide with the more the explicit social agendas of
both projects; that is the attempt by the architects/urbanists to address the
sociopolitical status of the city through program. Danger's civil living was to
be achieved through the legislative apparatus of the state. However, in a
unique approach, civility was made amenable to a Mediterranean, but not
traditionally oriental city (here perceived as picturesque) setting. Ecochard's
democratic living on the other hand, was to be promoted through a specific
built environment that would indicate Beirut's changed political status as
capital. Civility implied the reformulation of identity through a trans-cultural
image reflective of a modern nation-state.
Even though never implemented, the effects of these plans, their design and
implementation strategies are not only formal, but moral and political as well.
They are moral because there is a continuing search for values which are
supposed to reflect and affect human associations, even if indirectly. They are
political because both project clearly seeks to identify the influence of forms
on both institutional life as much as that of the everyday inhabitant. As a 'site'
for the elaboration and implementation of a body politic, architecture and
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urbanism become part of the 'construction' of social reality itself. This will be
the discussion of the section following.
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ection 3:
Post?
Modernity:
Memory,
Architecture
and Urban
Narratives in Post-Civil
War Nation Building
Figure 42 Ibn Arraq Mausoleum, Beirut
City Center, 1992 (Author's photograph)
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n a 1999 conference in Beirut entitled Memory for the Future, a
prominent local politician and former candidate for parliament
declared: "We should let the dead be dead. It is the only way forward."
Coming at the tail end of 3 days of discussion in which the post-war
experiences of Lebanon, Rwanda, South Africa, and France and the role of
memory in post-war reconciliation were discussed, compared and contrasted,
this statement seemed quite remarkable for the purported pragmatism it
presented.
This section intends to examine the place of the dead and of memory in the
post-war civil war reconstitution of Beirut's urban and architectural landscape.
In the process it will raise a series of questions regarding the place of the city
in the contradictory project of defining national identity, in delineating the
boundaries of modernity and often of urban citizenship. Arguably, some of
these issues have shaped modernist discourse about the city in the last two
centuries. In the case of Beirut, a city that historically has stood for the
country, the confluence between globalism and post civil war identity making
brings up a series of questions such as in what ways does the double sided
character of nationalism- that is its need to project outwards as well as
inwards- redefine the boundaries of city and nation? How does the global take
on local form in culture and in the built environment and what is its impact on
the politics of memory and rights to the city? What I the role of architecture as
opposed to planning especially in a post-civil war context where the city
obviously had to be thought anew- reconstituted on innovative foundations.
What was important in this process was who thinks? Who acts? Who still
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speaks for whom? How was the disaster [of a long civil war in this case]
addressed through the work of the city's planners and what image of the city
was implicit in its post-war reconstruction? Given the legacy of civil war - that
is the penultimate point at which the official markers of national identity were
violently challenged by a multitude of alternate voices- those questions acquire
a certain critical urgency. This became manifestly clear in 1994 in a series of
conflicts, which erupted over different spaces in Beirut. In what follows I use a
particular reading of one of those incidents to inform and structure my analysis
of' the historic as well as the contemporary context for Lebanese nation
building and the centrality of the Beirut, the capital city for that project.
Off With Their Heads
In May 1992, during the demolition of the last two medieval suqs in the
historic city center of Beirut the remnants of a mausoleum suddenly made
headline news (Figure 32). Located within the military zone that separated the
city during the war, the mausoleum, made visible by war bombing that
partially destroyed the building in which it was hidden, was immediately
claimed to be a shrine housing the remnants of a Muslim Shi'a mosque
caretaker. Hizbu'llah6 42 quickly cordoned off the structure and the building
642 Hizbu'llah or the 'Party of God' was founded by a group of dissidents from Amal, the main
"representatives" of the Muslim Shi'as, in the summer of 1982 during the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon and the siege of Beirut. Initially called Islamic Amal, the militia was publicly
launched as Hizbu'llah in 1984. See A.R. Norton, Amal and the Shi'a Struggle for the Soul of
Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987); Waddah Shararah Dawlat Hizb Allah:
Lubnan mujtama'an Islamiyan (The State of Hizbu'llah: Lebanon as an Islamic Society)
(Beirut: Dar AnNahar: 1996). Between 1984-1991 and in the absence of state institutions,
Hizbu'llah created an interconnected system of NGO's. These provide a variety of social
services which include health care, the maintenance of sewerage and infrastructure, the
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was declared a religious monument, thus indestructible under the mandate of
Solidere, the real estate company that owns the area. For the following weeks,
nearby inhabitants transformed the structure into a small shrine for "pilgrims"
from around the city, especially its southern suburbs where the majority of the
city's Shi'a population lives. As stories of strange events and miracles were
being reported in city cafes and parlors, rumors of voices, sightings of ghosts,
and the inability of those in charge of demolition, despite repeated attempts, to
destroy the building proliferated in the local press.643 Reports of the broken
hinges of the first bulldozer, the shattered motor of the second, failed dynamite
attempts and the smell of orange blossom filtering through cracks in the wall
recurred in these articles. A few days later it emerged that even though the
structure, a seventeenth century Mamluk building, did indeed house the tomb
of the mosque caretaker Ibn Arraq, he had been a Muslim Sunni rather than a
Muslim Shi'a. Ironically, his effective hatred for Shi'as had led him to
condone their death by any means!! 644
construction and paving of roads, education etc. During the war years, these services helped
Hizbu'llah consolidate its territorial control over parts of the southern suburbs of Beirut and
establish the organization as serious political contender in the country..
643 The person in charge of demolition relayed to me at the time that they had avoided using
live ammunition and dynamite in the vicinity of the mausoleum and had resorted to bulldozers
instead because they were afraid of damaging it. Private interview May 1992.
644 Shi'a and Sunnis are the two major sects in Islam that emerged after the death of the prophet
Mohamed as a result of a conflict over who would succeed him as the leader or Caliph of the
Muslim world. In general the Shi'as as a sect have been considered as the underdogs and have
faced persecution at the hands of different political dynasties including the Ottomans. In some
parts of the world remnants of this conflict persist to this day with adherents of a conservative
strand of Sunni Islam accusing the Shi'as of being heretics (such as the Wahabi's in Saudi
Arabia). In Lebanon these divisions are not really in evidence and tend to flare up only at
times of extreme sectarian tensions- and even then amongst small sectors of society.
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Several questions are brought to the fore by this incident. The most obvious
and immediate question is why would Hizbu'llah, and with it the larger Shi'a
community rush to proclaim a shrine in an area where the Shi'as, a
traditionally rural population, which began to immigrate into the city at the
turn of the century, was not historically present and thus did not own
communal property? How does one interpret this incident in the framework of
post-civil-war reconciliation and more specifically within the scope of
proposed urban/architectural schemes for the country? More critically, why
this turn to the supernatural at this precise juncture in time and who were those
ghostly specters haunting the [re] consolidation and [re] construction of the
nation and of national identity? To contextualize this incident and the post-war
reconstruction program that was launched one slight digression is necessary
into the more contemporary aftermath of a 15 year civil war.
Savage Concordance or Al-amn-bi-l-taradi (Security through
Conciliation)
Contrary to popular perceptions, the civil war, or perhaps the different civil
wars that took place between 1975 -1991 in different parts of the country
intermittently and which were indeed both vicious and random, were also to
some extent regulated.645 Right at the onset of the war, central security
645 The Lebanese civil war certainly lived up to Elaine Scarry's claim that "in war the damage
inflicted on bodies is unalterable, whereas the symbolic claims or issues change with great
ease"(Scarry, 1985). The Lebanese conflict has been characterized by intermittent and sporadic
conflict between both Lebanese and non Lebanese groups. Alliances between the different
groups changed as frequently as did the involvement of external governments. The simplistic
reduction of the conflict to Muslim versus Christian was in part facilitated by the formation of
the green line which divided Beirut into a "Christian" East Beirut and "Muslim" West Beirut.
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committees or Al-lijan al amniyya, which included representatives from all
the militias were established in Beirut, the site of the heaviest and most
severe fighting. These committees used to meet at the race tracks, along the
"Green line" which demarcated East from West Beirut, to discuss the
imperatives of compromise, bargaining and the sharing of power or what
Antoine Messarra terms as "a system of concordance controlled by
violence."646 As Theodor Hanf argues, there were processes to regulate
violence insofar as it could be regulated, and which effectively achieved a
well-coordinated balance of terror.64 7 Every shelling of Mukhtara, the seat of
the Druze political chieftain, was countered by a shelling of Baabda, home of
the country's presidential palace; every shelling of Bkereke, the headquarters
of the Maronite patriarch, entailed a counter bombardment of Baadaran the
hometown of the Druze spiritual chief. This balance of terror extended into
hostage taking among other things, even as cordial interaction between the
heads of the different protagonists was rarely if ever interrupted.
In actual fact, different Christian and Muslim groups fought amongst each other for equally
important to the sectarian division of the militias was the political struggles amongst the elite.
Similarly, alliances with external governments shifted over time. The Syrians aided Christian,
Muslim and Palestinian groups, the Israelis in 1982, helped both Druze and Christians in their
fights amongst each other, while the Americans in 1983-1984 participated briefly in the
conflict by actively supporting the Phalange dominated central government.
646 According to various tales, fighting in the city center reached a cease fire, when a bilateral
committee between the different militias was established and joint teams were dispatched to
loot shops and institutions. Fighting resumed once the systematic sacking of the center was
complete. Messarra, 1988
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Reconstituting City and Territorializing Identities
This is not to say that the war was simply a synonymy of "causes" between
different forces or to belittle its violence. In fact the impact of the Lebanese
civil wars between 1975-1991 on Beirut's urban landscape was both vicious
and far-reaching. If territoriality, as Sack maintains, is a socially constructed
use of space through which power is reified making its links to society visible,
then the territorial practices of the militias focused on transforming the
political, economic and territorial constitution of Beirut into a mirror image of
their own violent conflicts.648 To assume control over territory the different
militias had to carve the city into socially, ethnically and geographically
homogeneous entities. To do so the militias followed two principal territorial
strategies. First they introduced a new spatial framework for Beirut by forging
a series of barriers throughout the city, which atomized state authority and
controlled mobility through the city (figures 43). Second, establishing
ethnically and religiously homogenous territories required, among other
things, the violent uprooting of large sections of Beirut's population from one
neighborhood of the city to another.64 9
647 Hanf, H, 198
648 Sack, Robert David, Human Territoriality Its theory and History (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1986)
649 Maha Yahya "Reconstituting Space, The Aberration of the Urban in Beirut", in Recovering
Beirut, Urban Design and Post War Reconstruction, Samir Khalaf and Philip Khoury (eds.)
(New York: E.J. Brill, 1993); Forbidden Spaces, Invisible Barriers: Housing in Beirut,
submitted in partial fulfillment for a Doctorate in Philosophy, (London, Architectural
Association, School of Architecture, 1994); "Right or Claim; Housing in Post-War Beirut", in
Urban Triumph or Urban Disaster? Dilemmas of Contemporary Post War Reconstruction,
(York U.K. and New York: World Monuments Fund, York University Press and the Aga Khan
Foundation, 1997)
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Figure 43 Barricades between different
neighborhoods in and around Beirut, 1990
(Author's photographs)
Initially, the spatial reorganization and fragmentation of the city depended on
the neutralization of its historic center. Many sociologists and historians have
argued that the pre-war center acted as the major public space and meeting
point of all communities and classes in the city.650Historically, it was also the
node in and around which the city had developed over the last 7,000 years.
With the outbreak of the war, the center was quickly colonized, converted into
a contested battlefield between rival factions. Looted, destroyed and emptied
of its inhabitants, the center and the Damascus highway stretching out of it
was altered into a desolate stretch of no man's land slicing the city in two.
Baptized the green line, this area was rendered inaccessible to all but the
militias for almost all of the following 15 years (Figure 44). 651
650 Nabil Beyhum et al. 'Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah (Rebuilding Beirut and the Lost
Opportunity), (Beirut: Rami al-Khal, 1992); Nabil, Beyhum "Du Centre aux Territoires, La
Centralire Urbaine a Beyrouth" in Maghreb Machreq (Paris: July-September, 1990)
651 Ironically this was not the first time that this zone was used as a dividing line between
warring factions. The Damascus road was used in 1842 by the Ottoman authorities at the
suggestion of European delegates, to subdivide Mount Lebanon into two separate enclaves or
qaim maqamiyyah for the Druze and Maronites. It also served as the demarcation line
between the Druze and the Maronites in the 1858-1860 mountain insurgencies.
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Figure 44: The green line through
Beirut's city center, 1990 (Author's
photographs)
As time progressed, new militias
appeared on the scene, alliances between existing ones changed, transforming
the tempo and location of the conflict in the city. Beirut was further
fragmented into smaller enclaves, each of which was circumscribed by
checkpoints and sand dunes: places to control population movements and the
transfer of goods.652 One was no longer ever in the city but rather inside one
zone in the city facing the boundary of another zone. This geographic position
no longer corresponded to the opposition of city to country or center to
652 The divisions in the city often went beyond the Muslim/Christian division so popular in the
press. For example, prior to 1982, the Western part of the city was primarily under the control
of the PLO and other leftist militias such as the communists and Amal, while the eastern part
of the city was controlled by the Lebanese forces and the Phalangists. Following the 1982
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of the PLO, the Western part of the city was
further fragmented. The socialist party, affiliated with the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, along
with Amal, the military wing of the Shi'a movement of the dispossessed established by the late
Musa el Sadr in 1974, wrested control from the Lebanese army of the Western part of the city.
In 1984, with the establishment of Hizbu' lIah, the southern suburbs were further fragmented
between these two parties. The 1987 so called "war of the camps" between Amal and what
remained of the PLO, lead to even smaller territorial enclaves within the Western part of the
city. In 1989, the "war of the brothers" as it was dubbed in the press, followed, as army officers
loyal to General Aoun fought with the Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea, both Christian
Maronites, for control over the eastern sector of the city, also leading to further fragmentation.
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periphery-it was the opposition of intramural and extra mural in the same city
(Image).6 5 3
This transformation in the city's urban fabric was reinforced by a policy of
"religious and ethnic cleansing" or population massacres and displacements
carried out by the different militias. As in other racially, ethnically or
religiously divided cities such as Jerusalem, Johannesburg, and Belfast
amongst others, the territorial inscription of military power is largely
dependant on creating socially "purified" spaces. In Lebanon almost a third of
the population, or around 800,000 people were violently and permanently
driven away from their homes.654 In Beirut itself, the eight squatter settlements
that existed in the eastern sectors of the city were eradicated in 1975, their
population either massacred or forced to flee.6 55 Those who escaped settled
653 Yahya, Reconstituting Space; Yahya, Right or Claim
654 Two types of population displacements were common during the war; permanent and
temporary. Permanent displacement, which usually took place under great physical and
emotional duress was caused by both inter-Lebanese fighting over fifteen years of civil war
as well as by Israel's successive invasions of the country in 1978, 1982-1984 and its 22 year
occupation of parts of southern Lebanon. Temporary displacement on the other hand
affected almost every Lebanese during the war. It occurred over brief periods of time during
excessive escalations of violence. It usually entailed leaving one's residence, in stressful
circumstances, for temporary respite with friends or relatives or even a secondary home in
the village until the cessation of hostility. In the absence of alternative respite, some
families ended up squatting in empty residences, or camping out in public buildings such as
schools, religious buildings or even construction sites.
655 This resulted in the permanent displacement of 75,000 Christians from West Beirut and its
suburbs towards East Beirut, 120,000 Muslims from East Beirut towards West Beirut and other
regions in Lebanon and 20,000 Christians from East Beirut towards West Beirut. As a result
Muslim presence in East Beirut was reduced to less than 5% of what it was before 1975. In
West Beirut there was a concentrated effort on the part of those in charge to build amicable
relations with all communities in the area. Christian displacement from the area was kept in
check between 1977 and 1982. In 1983 with the change in the political military forces there
was a systematic uprooting of the Christian population from West Beirut. A further
displacement of around 50,000 Christians from West Beirut ensued. Christian presence in
West Beirut thus decreased from around 40%-45% before 1975 to 40% in 1983 to the
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primarily in the Western sector of the city or its southern suburbs especially
Ouzai. These actions initiated a counter round of population displacement
from West Beirut and other parts of the country into the Eastern sectors of the
city and its Northern suburbs.656
Privatizing the Public, Publicizing the Private
Furthermore, as the war continued, traditional hierarchies between the public
and the private were overturned. First, public state institutions were
appropriated and "privatized" by the militias. These "took over" various state
institutions and ministries transforming the management of public needs into a
pawn in their military alliances.6 57 Other militias such as the Lebanese Forces
and Hizb'ullah created parallel institutions that sought to reproduce state
services at the micro-scale of their individual communities. 65 Second, the
10%-15% by 1991. In the last post-war decade there has been no attempt to find our the extent
to which this trend has been reversed.
656 Boutros Labaki, "Confessional Communities, Social Stratification and Wars in Lebanon" in
Social Compass, (Vol. XXXV, April 1988:533-562); Yahya, Reconstituting Space; Yahya,
Right or Claim
657 Spatial and temporal movement in the city were transformed and regulated through sporadic
rationing of electricity, communication networks, telephones, and water. For example, the only
functioning electricity line was controlled from East Beirut. The militias of East Beirut were
thus able to command the electricity supply of West Beirut especially in times of heavy
conflict between the two sides. Similarly, if one resided in an area in which a militia boss lived,
one would 'enjoy' the benefits of electricity or any other public service controlled by his militia
group. In another incident in 1991, one local militia forcibly stopped work on a new water
pipeline project to force the water authority to divert the line through its territory. Work
resumed, only after the water company complied. At the same time the militias also developed
new services such as the building of new ports, the construction of huge fuel tanks, the
installation of large community power plants (Antoine N Messarra, The Challenge Of
Coexistence (Oxford: Center for Lebanese studies, 1988); Yahya, Forbidden Spaces, Invisible
Barriers)
65r'he Lebanese Forces flourished during the war whereas Hizb'ullah flourished after the war.
In the case of Hizb'ullah, this process continues to this day, whereby these associations, all
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disintegration of the state led to the proliferation of local neighborhood
committees as well as the emergence of a large number of civic associations
and NGO's, many of which were active on a non-sectarian basis. Indeed one
can argue that one of the most durable effects of the civil wars in Lebanon is
the continued activity of civic associations spawned by the war. Third, the
city's urban topography changed in accordance with that of the war. Streets
widened or narrowed down according to exposure to snipers, new routes were
created through the walls of private gardens, the entrances of buildings, the
back walls of houses, what was once a living room gutted out onto a public
courtyard.
In physical and legal terms, population displacement transformed squatting
into the most basic strategy of survival and the principle form of urbanization
during the war years. This process took on a wide array of forms, which
ranged from the occupation of public and private buildings such as schools,
empty apartment blocks and constructions sites to the appropriation of public
or private land, as well as the growth of the pre-war settlements especially in
Ouzai in the southern suburbs of the city. The city was transformed into a
complex web of property disputes ranging from the illegal to the quasi legal.6 59
One could no longer speak of the legal or the illegal, but rather of inter-law
and inter-legality.
registered NGO's that reproduce state institutions at the local level are used to mobilize
residents and posit what they term as a society of resistance (mujtamaa al moqawma)
659 Yahya, Forbidden Spaces, Invisble Barriers; Right or Claim
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City of Fantasies: Post-(Colonial) Conquest and Micro-histories of
Resistance
Out of the violent demarcations of Beirut, which overtook the city and its
history, micro histories of defiance and resistance emerged, most visibly in its
empty center transformed by its very marginalization into the most visible site
for the sporadic challenges posed by the Lebanese to the division of their city
and country. While displaced populations occupied the derelict buildings on
the peripheries of the city center, the center itself became the site of anti-war
protests and resistance. On October 15, 1987 thousands crossed the
demarcation lines between east and West Beirut chanting "no east no West we
want national unity" as part of a demonstration organized by the workers
syndicate in front of the parliament in the Place de L'etoile. This "protest" was
one of a series of "civil" manifestations, which began in 1975 with different
Lebanese rebelling against the sectarian connotations of the war by erasing
their "sect" from their identity card. It also included demonstrations by
Lebanese youngsters in 1985, 1986 and 1987 chanting "Stop the war, partition
and hunger," a human chain which connected the capital on Aug. 20, 1987,
and a march by the handicapped across the country which took place 12-16
October, 1987. 66
660 In other instances, on June 26, 1987, the syndicates of printers and journalists declared a
strike to protest obstacles set by the militias over the distribution of publications between
sectors, and another three day strike 17-19 Sept. 1987 to protest the curtailment of intellectual
freedom(cf. Messarra, Coexistence
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In all of these instances, rejecting the war, "the war of others on our land" as it
is popularly called in the press today, became synonymous with crossing the
center, gathering in the center, challenging the gun in the heart of the center- a
center which was no longer confined within its geographic/historic boundaries
but thrust through the city. In its inaccessibility this "void" became the
constant around which the city formed a continuously shifting and transitory
figure. Just as every movement in the city was compelled to acknowledge the
center and its "demarcation line," every fantasy around Beirut could not but be
nourished by it. Symbolizing communal coexistence before the war and the
pulse of political state of affairs during the war, imaginative mappings of the
city came to be governed by an intention towards totality. Transfiguring the
reunification and reconstruction of the center into an emblem of national unity,
provided for a new spatial language-"Greater Beirut," "reunified Beirut,"
"demilitarized Beirut,"- the markers of that unrepresentable totality.
This act of naming, like all acts of primordial nomination, was an act of
possession, or perhaps in the case, a re-possession. The desire of civilians to
distance themselves from the militias and the war made the reclamation of this
center a necessary imperative. However, the "colonization" of this area by the
militias meant that this recovery could only occur imaginatively. 6 ' The center
66'In a mapping exercise conducted at the American University of Beirut, this inaccessible
void, Beirut's "forbidden city" around which the city now revolved was "remembered" by
youngsters who grew up during the war and thus who "knew" only a fragmented city, as a
series of associational spaces mentioned to them by family members or reported upon in the
press, even if the exact location of these spaces could not be accurately pinpointed (Saliba,
1990, Cf. also Lilian Barakat, (1991) Le Centre- Ville de Beyrouth. Pratique et Perception,
study contacted at the USJ).
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was recovered from the unknown, beyond the limits of their reconfigured
spatial identity.6 6 2
In turn, these micro-histories of resistance also expose the nature of a
"colonial" discourse dependant upon conquest whose procedures generate new
forms of knowledge about the city and its inhabitants.663 In the process this
discourse aims at the erasure of alternative pasts, so as to endow these powers
with a seemingly "natural" legitimacy. However, in these imaginative and
spatial re-locations, the city center with all its hybrid possibilities became the
space in which the discourse of the militias lost its grip on meaning and found
itself open to the imagination, the language, the representations of the "other"-
citizens who inhabited the margins of the war and its multiple centers of
power. Mimicking the effects of hybridity on colonial discourse, the fertile
imagination and actions of citizens transformed this marginalized site into a
critical node in the imaginative constitution of city and identity. Through
momentary and imaginative "recuperations" this space came to represent the
realization that political subjectivity is multi-faceted, multi layered, unstable
and contentious. It was precisely this possibility, which was to be challenged
at the end of the war.
662This ofcourse raises the question of what does it mean to remember something one never
experienced.
663 The social history of the war, that is the modes by which communities survived the war and
resisted its destructive effects on their lives-, is barely documented. What is evident however,
in this post-war era is that the legacy of this resistance is apparent in the numerous civil
organizations that emerged during the period and which continue to this day.
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Questions of History and the Politics in Memory: Building City and
Nation
Fifteen years of protracted violence left approximately 200,000 dead, around
300,000 injured and 800,000 permanently displaced in a population of around
less than 3.5 million.664 Lebanon's infrastructure was significantly damaged,
its capital fragmented and partially demolished. The World Bank and other
international agencies estimated total financial losses at $25 billion, real per
capita income half of what it was prior to the war while an estimated 200,000
professionals and skilled workers had emigrated out of the country. 665 Another
17,000 citizens remain missing.
With the signing of the Taif agreement in 1991, the "end" of the Lebanese
civil war was announced.666 As much the result of changed regional conditions
4 There are no official figures yet of the total number of dead, injured. The length of the
conflict and its episodal nature meant that for example the total number of those killed in
specific massacres, especially those that targeted informal human settlements such as Tell ez
Zaatar or the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila, can never be determined since the
number of inhabitants was not known. Moreover, as is common in most conflicts, the game of
numbers was also critical to the process of the war with each side inflating and conflating
figures according to their needs.
665 It is not clear whether this includes actual material damage to infrastructure etc.. only or has
considered losses incurred from the loss of potential capital investment in the country over the
period of the war.
666 Al Taef is the name of the city in Saudi Arabia where negotiations between all the parties,
both international and Lebanese to end the war took place. Ironically the etymological root of
the word in Arabic is the same as Al Taefa or Al Tawaef (pl) meaning religious sect or
community. The Taif accord (1990) addressed the disproportion in political representation in
the country. Allotment of parliamentary seats now occurs along an equal basis. More
importantly, article 53 of the agreement, made the appointment of both ministerial cabinet,
previously part of the executive powers of the presidency, one of the duties of the prime
minister. The post of the Prime Minister itself, also once a presidential prerogative, is now
appointed by parliament. For a well articulated evaluation of these accords and their impact on
inter-communal living in Lebanon see Ahmed Beydoun, The Torn Republic: The fate of the
Lebanese formula after al Taef, (Beirut: Dar Annahar, 1999) (in Arabic).
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as well as internal conditions, this "end" coincided with the conclusion of the
gulf war and thus a reshuffling of the political checks and balances in the
region. In Lebanon most of the militias were dismantled with many members
absorbed into the Lebanese army, parliamentary elections took place,667 and
militia heads were integrated into the state.668
Using urban practices distilled from earlier periods, the post-war Lebanese
state unevenly confronted a conundrum similar to that faced by French and
Lebanese administrators and architects in the 1920's-1930's; that is how to
give shape to a national identity when confronted with conflicting communal
and ethnic identities. The state embarked on a wide scale reconstruction plan
to both rehabilitate its institutions and physically rebuild the country. As in the
French mandate period the most important and grandiose urban rebuilding
projects focused once more on revitalizing Lebanon as the "Switzerland of the
Orient" and on [re]building the capital Beirut. Two large urban development
projects were launched: the Lebanese Company for the Development and
Reconstruction of the Beirut Central District (Solidere) for the rebuilding of
the city center and Elyssar, for the re-organization of the city's southern
suburbs.
67'rhese elections were boycotted by a substantial section of the Christian sector of the
population who considered the Taef agreement as illegitimate and thus not representative of
their interests. Parliamentary representatives of the Christian population for the Beqa, Beirut
and the Mountains were elected in most cases by default. Consequently, most Christian capital
located out of the country would not reinvest in the country, whilst Christian emigration out of
Lebanon, even though subsequently diminished, continued in the first few years of peace..
668All the warlords were given ministerial posts in the Lebanese cabinet.
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However, before moving to these projects a few issues should be clarified.
While post-civil-war reconstruction strategies to re-constitute Lebanese
national identity were startlingly reminiscent of post WWI strategies followed
by the French to consolidate Greater Lebanon, the context within which
current projects were being implemented was clearly different. Not only was
this process occurring at the end of a civil war, which saw the violent
displacement of more than one third of the population on the basis of ethnicity
and religion, but regional and global conditions also differed substantially.669
As such, the parameters for defining Lebanese nationess had changed even if
the perceived socio-political role of architecture and urban planning had not.
More critically perhaps, the exigencies of immediate post-war reconstruction-
as in post WWII Japan, Germany and Israel- demanded a deliberate forgetting
rather than remembering, of the war, of atrocities committed during the war, of
the traumas inherent to having survived and adapted to fifteen years of
violence which reached into every niche of daily activity. Through official
discourse, popular journals, daily papers etc. the 15-year-old civil war in
Lebanon was presented as an aberration, the "war of others on our land" by
intellectuals, politicians and the populace alike. Official history accounts,
including the newly re-written school history books have purged all references
to communal and individual responsibility for the war. As the director of the
project would claim, the approved history of the country "must eliminate
everything that creates conflict between the Lebanese" so as to facilitate
69 The end of the cold war, and in its aftermath the Gulf war signaled a "new" era in global
politics with a direct impact on the region and on Lebanon.
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reconciliation.6 70 Like the mythical phoenix to which Beirut is likened, the
country in post-war discourse was to resurrect itself form its own ashes in its
ever-familiar form. In this discourse, the construction of a new beginning
meant that history would simply pick up where the country left off in 1975.
Lebanon, according to leading policy makers was to retrieve its economic role
as the "Switzerland" of the Orient irrespective of regional changes. As we
shall see shortly, driven by the need to project a stable image to the outside
that would internally appeal to its disparate populations, state discourse re-
presented official Lebanese "national" identity as a process of retrieving the
remnants of a pre-war golden past, while narratives of war, death and survival
were written out of public discourse, relegated to the realm of the private, the
biographical, thus in official accounts the a-historical and a-political.6 71
Urban Actors
With the end of the war, the city's historic center previously accessible only
through heavily manned nodes and hatches, was suddenly thrown open to the
staggering and crushing overpressures of the outside world. The derelict city
center home to around 4,000 war displaced individuals, stood at the
intersection of several powerful discourses; an international discourse of
capital, a national discourse with its homogenizing tendencies, a discourse of
67( This project to update of school history books is probably of the most ambitious project of
the post war Hariri government. Its singular aim was to direct citizens to a new common past
whilst purging all references to the religious sectarian discourse that dominated during the war
(see Time International, January 15, 1996).
671 I intend to explore the ramification of this re-configuration of the public and private in a
forthcoming piece on the politics of re-cuperation.
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power and conquest and of re-establishing state hegemony, and the mlcro-
histories of communities, war, and resistance. In this intersection lay a new
frame of reference for thinking about the past, present and future. As we shall
see shortly, in all of these discourses the center was projected as an ontological
essence rather than as an historical entity.
Figure 45: City Center, Wadi Abu Jamil,
1990, with displaced populations- now
demolished (Author's photographs)
Post-war reconstruction of the city center included a variety of local urban
actors representing the public and the private sectors as well as local
inhabitants.672 In addition, local militias in control of areas occupied by
displaced populations also played an active role in initial negotiations around
the center. However, not all of these actors played an equally effective role. In
short, the Council for Development and Reconstruction, (COR), the official
body in charge of the reconstruction effort, hired Oar el Handasah
672 In addition to COR, public sector representatives included the Beirut municipality, the
Directorate of Urban Planning (DGU), and the General Directorate of Antiquities (DGA); the
private sector comprised mainly Oger Liban, as well as the property owners, tenants and the
different trade associations; and civil society included various NGO's namely concerned with
architectural heritage.
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Consultants6 73 (DAR), to submit designs for the area and organize the
reconstruction process. At the same time, members of Oger Liban, an
international firm based in the Gulf and owned by current Prime Minister
Rafic el Hariri, were either appointed to senior positions, or acted in a
consultative capacity to CDR thus placing private capital in control of the
foremost planning agency in the country.6 74 Henri Edd6, the lead planner at
DAR and an ex- minister, was handed the mandate to individually re-design
the city center. Designs were carried out in Cairo, in DAR's main office for
the Middle East. At the end of several months, members of the CDR were
invited to Cairo for the unveiling of the project. Upon approval, the project
was then brought to Lebanon, as the endorsed master plan for the city center. It
was presented at a series of meetings both in DAR and at various organized
events in government offices, hotels and universities.
The Plan: Colonial Imperatives and National Politics
As presented, this project proposed a radical reconstitution of the city center at
the procedural as well as the programmatic and design level. At the procedural
level, to implement the project, the geographic limits of the center were
673I)ar el Handasah Consultants is the largest Engineering Company in the Middle East and
ranks eighth in the world.
674 Al Fadel Challak, the founder and director of Oger Liban (1982) owned by Prime Minister
Hariri, and the head of the Hariri Foundation (1984) was appointed as the head of CDR in
1991. Until April of 1992, Mr. Challak maintained his office at Oger Liban, when the CDR
moved officially to its main office in the renovated Srail complex, also a gift, at a cost of 5
million dollars, from Mr. Hariri.
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delineated according to previous plans. 675 A private real estate company was
created to reconstruct the area within these boundaries. This company, named
Solidere, had a dual basis: an imported model and local planning laws. The
format of the company was based on a Real Estate Company created in Saudi
Arabia for the renovation and reconstruction of areas surrounding the holy
shrine in Mecca.676 However, the general provisional laws for a real estate
company already existed in Lebanon, more specifically in urban planning laws
as well as in the articles of establishment of the CDR. Initially envisioned as a
public-private partnership for the purposes of large scale urban renovation and
regeneration, this law was amended in 1991 completely privatizing the
reconstruction process. 677 Under the new formula, property rights would be
eradicated with fifty percent of the shares of the company distributed amongst
current property owners in a ratio equivalent to the value of their property.678
675 The geographic area of the center, as outlined in the 1977 master plan and adopted with
slight modifications in 1991, includes the area bounded by the Mediterranean to the north, Al
Gemayze district, to the east, Fouad Chehab bridge to the south and the hotel district to the
West.
676 Real Estate Holding Companies (REHCO) were formed in Saudi Arabia for the
development and rehabilitation of different cities such as Mecca, Medina and Riyadh. Several
formulas for public-private participation in these companies were tried. Beirut followed the
Mecca model. (for further information please see Upper Council for the Development of the
City of Riyadh, Bornamaj Tatouir Mantakat Kasr el Hokom; Al Marahal Al Thaletha
[Program for the Development of Kasr el Hokom Area; Phase Three], (Riyadh., 1995);
Yahya, 1994).
677 Two arguments were used to justify this action. The first was that the financial inability of
the state to undertake the reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure would cause significant
delays in post-war rehabilitation and delay the process of investment in the country. The
second was that the intertwined property and tenure relationships, namely the parcelization of
land due to inheritance and the tangled web of tenant rights resulting from outdated rental
laws, and complicated by the passage of seventeen years of war would hinder if not completely
stall the reconstruction process.
678 Legal commissions were formed for the sole purpose of estimating the financial value of the
said properties. Accusations of gerrymandering followed. With minimal venue for appeal
owners had little choice but to accept whatever estimates were made. One of the main
problems regarding this process was that estimates were based on the value of the land at the
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The remaining fifty percent of the shares would be bought by investors, none
of whom could control more than 10% of the shares at any one point. As we
shall see shortly, this act had significant impact on citizen rights in and to their
city.
At the programmatic and design levels, the proposed plan included a quasi
complete overhaul in the urban and architectural character of the area as well
as its in economic functions. In brief, the city center, 119.1 hectares of an
existing urban fabric, named by the planners as the "traditional" Beirut Central
District (BCD) was supplemented with an additional 45.8 hectares of land
reclaimed from the sea. Relying on a synthesis of picturesque planning and
Haussmanian civic monumentalism, the plan is marked according to its
planners by, "the themes of grandeur which mark the center of a capital city;
the 'Grand Axes'; High buildings; new roads and boulevards; the new city
park; the public and religious buildings."6 79 These three parallel "grand" axis
cut through nodes deemed of "national significance"; the two Srails or the
military barracks constructed by the Ottomans in the 1 9 th century and today
housing the prime ministry and the CDR; the Place de L'Etoile, with the
parliament and national library, all constructed between 1926-1930 by French
authorities during their mandate over Lebanon; and the Place des Martyrs,
time- that is substantially destroyed properties in a derelict part of town and not on the
potential value of centrally located property once reconstruction began. Moreover, Solidere's
current financial crisis, caused in part by tremendous overspending on infrastructure and a
general recession in the country, has lead to a considerable loss in the value of its shares,
generating further losses for those property owners.
679 DAR, 1994:60
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named after the Arab nationalists that were hung by the Ottomans In 1916.
(Figures 46)
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Figure 46: Solidere Project, The Grand Axis, 1992 (Source: Solidere Newsletter)
In addition to all religious edifices and a select number of residential buildings,
these venues formed the crux of the preservation, conservation and renovation
aspects of the project. 680 The company also instated a selective program of
recuperation of historic buildings along with a series of archeological digs
undertaken with the assistance of UNESCO and the Directorate General of
Antiquities.681 The 4,000 displaced citizens who had resided in the peripheral
regions of the city center during the war were given monetary compensation
and made to leave682 whilst the rest of the urban fabric was destroyed and re-
6&l According to the country's cultural heritage laws created during the French mandate only
structures prior to 1750 are considered as historically significant and therefore automatically
preserved. In part this has created a situation where land is considered far more valuable than
the building that stands upon, a fact that has lead to the avid destruction of the city's heritage
followed by the construction of new structures in a process of constant self-renewal.
681 Solidere was accused of destroying sites of significant archeological interest for
developmental purposes. Moreover, much available evidence points to the fact that the
"recuperation" of buildings was equally mercantile (See Sader, 1998)
682 These 4,000 individuals were squatting in abandoned buildings, especially in the Wadi Abu
Jamil area, throughout the war. Most of those, namely of Shi'a origin, had been displaced from
homes either in villages in the south of the country or from areas in the eastern (and for part of
the war period predominantly Christian) part of the city. Most of those families took the money
382
planned, with new street layouts, zoning and building criteria. This new layout
comprised primarily of financial districts, built to the Manhattan model, and
residential areas, such as Saifi, created as contemporary "urban villages."
(Figures 47-48)
Figure 47: Solidere Project: Conservation and Saifi Urban
Village (Solidere Newsletter)
In particular, the latter sought components from Ottoman and French mandate
residential buildings located within the same area. Elements, such as arches
and columns were used as surface ornaments, with no connection to the
structures behind them (Figures 47-48). Most of the previous functions that the
center housed, especially those that catered to the lower and lower middle
class sectors, such as Suq el Bale (second hand clothing) or Suq el Fashka
(wholesale cloth) of the Lebanese population were eradicated. 683
that they were given as compensation and moved to the southern suburbs, either the informal
settlements along the Ouzai area or more recent developments along the former Green line.
683 In addition, smaller businesses also deemed inappropriate for the center such as barbers,
grocery vendors etc. were prevented from returning to the center through complex and in some
instances prohibitive rules for the recuperation of previously owned or rented properties. As
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Figure 48: Solidere Project: Saifi
Urban Village (Author's photographs)
Local and International: The twin faces of national identity
This enactment of the project is not very surpnsIng. Post civil war nation
building required the projection of a stable, cohesive and easily recognizable
image both externally to the outside world and internally over a fragmented
territory; one that would counter the bloody associations brought about by
long years of conflict. Put differently this dual vocation created a tug of war
for the city planners between the denationalization of urban space inherent to
global capital and the need to nationalize the post-war city and the capital of
the country. This imperative of Lebanon's post war reconstruction drive, and
specifically the rebuilding of the city center of Beirut, as identified at the onset
by Prime Minister Rafic el Hariri, was to re-capture Lebanon's "national
vocation" as the financial capital of the East, and to re-insert Beirut into a
global narrative. In other words, Beirut was to 'Ire Icuperate' its pre-war
position as an international capital for global capital. More recently, he
the lawyer for the company stated in an interview "we made sure that undesirable functions did
not return to the area" (Solidere Lawyer, private interview, 1997).
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described these efforts as the "transformation of [Beirut's central district] into
a modern financial and commercial center [and] as symbolizing the rebirth of
the country and the determination of the Lebanese to rebuild their capital."
These themes echoed earlier descriptions of the project as the "national heart"
of the country, thus linking the rejuvenation of both economy and nation to the
rebuilding of the center of the city. Inadvertently, it also identified this
economic role once more, as the most salient aspect of Lebanese national
identity; an essential characteristic of national identity that transcended time.
To project a cohesive image externally, and thus [re]claim Beirut's position on
the global scene, the center and with it the city's identity, had to de-
territorialized, "liberated" from all existing codes and reference points to both
past and present. It was transformed- to paraphrase Marx's famous discussion
of' money- into a purely ideal mental form necessary for understanding the
ultimate abstraction of capital. Lebanon's national identity had to be projected
through the city center as a comprehensible whole, as its capital Beirut
becomes a node in a network of global cities identified by Saskia Sassen, as
cities, which no longer depend on their immediate hinterlands for their
economies. Defined by flexible production and transnational economies, these
cities make nonsense of national boundaries, national trade movements, and
often even of national politics.68 4 Inside those cities a new politics of centrality
and marginality is created with massive investments in downtowns and little
684 These cities usually require leisure areas, vast business areas, investments in infrastructure
etc Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (New Jersey, Princeton
University Press: 1991)
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resources in the peripheries. Outside the central business district, the rest of the
city is characterized by an urban space that is increasingly differentiated in
social terms, even as it is functionally interconnected in some ways beyond the
physical contiguity of neighborhoods. This recaptured economic vocation was
to neatly extend Beirut's historic role as an important node in a larger network
of Ottoman port cities and its more recent post-independence role as the
financial capital of the both east and West in the region onto a global stage.
Internally these reconstruction plans were informed by a series of primary
political concerns. To re-establish its power the state needed to enact its
territorial imperative in a physical space not implicated in the territories of any
of the warring factions. The city center was to be 'recovered' from the vagaries
of war, as the locus upon which the state could express its existence and spread
its hegemony in opposition to the fragmentation of national space induced by
the war. At the same time, the area of Ouzai, a mix of publicly and privately
owned land that grew during the war into the largest informal (squatter)
housing settlement in the city housing a predominantly lower class Shi'a war
displaced or economic migrants, was directly identified with the chaos and the
direct absence of the state during the war years. While the first project was to
signal the "recovery" of pre- war Beirut's position of eminence in the region,
the second proposal was to index the "liberation" of the city from the effects of
this conflict. In what follows this chapter will focus on the city center project
and speculate about the latter. In the city center special attention will be paid to
the location of memory in the urban politics and architectural iconography that
were used and its reinterpretation of rights to the city.
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At the urban level, and to achieve this end, the state employed a radical and
purely utilitarian approach to the notion of property. The area was composed
for the most part of privately owned property. The total privatization of the
center, it was argued, was necessary since the tangled web of property rights
and property claims, resulting from religious inheritance laws rendered the
property status of various quarters exceedingly byzantine. Planners suggested
that the parcelization of private property due to inheritance, the war, and
complex rental laws, would hinder the reconstruction process and prevent the
quick rehabilitation of the city center- a goal identified as paramount right at
the end of the war.685 This approach reenacted in a more radical manner the
reduction of property instated under the mandate into a physical entity rather
than a set of social relations and a system of rights between individuals and
with the state. In other words, property rights in the city center were not just
about the property itself, nor just about the rights of property owners to their
own properties but was also about the rights of citizens to their city. For as
Bentham maintains, property is not composed of physical objects only, but of
expectations of deriving certain advantages from the thing we are said to
possess.686 In some instances the definition of these expectations, property
65 Inheritance laws in Lebanon follow the religious affiliation of individuals. This is
particularly pertinent for those of Muslim faith, many of whom rarely draw up a will, since
inheritance is subdivided amongst males and females in the family along strictly designated
lines. This has resulted in situations where hundreds of individuals of the same family have
become part owners in same lot of land that has been handed down through generations
leading in many cases to a total paralysis in real estate transactions over these plots or to their
transformation into waqf land held in trust either for the family or religious sect.
686Bentham distinguishes between temporary and permanent expectations or what he terms as
"natural" expectations, or "expectations drawn anterior to the law" and the "strong and
permanent expectation which can only derive from the law." Jeremy Bentham "Principles of
the: Civil Code" reprinted partly in Macphearson, Property Mainstream and Critical Positions,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p.52 .
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rights, the 'official' interpretations of rights to land conflict with individual
notions of rights and access or, property claims, hence the citizen definition of
these expectations. More often than not these conflicts, regardless of context,
result in the same recurring phenomenon: lands of an ambiguous property
status where the control of one group over space is challenged by others.68 7 By
collapsing these distinctions the state negated all alternative claims to the city.
This narrow interpretation of property also neglected other, more intangible
aspects of property. As Hallowell and Macphearson argue, property is both a
concept and an institution- that is it connotes economic, legal as well as social
characteristics.6ti In other words, as a social institution property delineates
rights, obligations, power and privileges, thus reflecting, reinforcing and
sometimes challenging certain power structures in society. By transforming
the entire area into one privately owned lot of land and giving owners and
tenants a "share" in the company, Solidere succeeded in negating and
redefining topography making territory an abstraction. In the process, property
rights, which previously encompassed, rights to use, to construct, to build, to
reside etc. were reduced to a right to revenue, thus transmuting the social
institution of property first into a binary relationship between investors and
property owners and secondly into that of larger or smaller shareholders.
These actual and symbolic practices enacted by the project concretized at
different levels and in unanticipated ways both the imperatives of colonial
687 Omar Razzaz Group Non Compliance: a strategy for transforming property relations: the
Case of Jordan (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992:4).
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planning as well as the urban transformations that occurred during the war
years. The appropriation of publicly and privately owned land for the benefit
of a private company signaled the ultimate realization of the socio-economic
and political transformations of Beirut begun by French mandate authorities
bringing the economic imperatives of the construction of the parliament and
the place de L'Etoile by French engineers, to their ultimate realization.6 89 At
the same time, this project also symbolized the cumulative end to the
"emptying out" of the center enforced by the militias during the war period.
Separated from its pre-war social context by fifteen years of violence, the
eradication of property rights, and the obliteration of previous functions that
the center used to house through the destruction of their buildings, insured a
quasi-total divorce between the center and its socio-urban context and
redefined, once more, rights of access to the city. It also limited the range of
citizens whom the center would service.690 Without getting into the moral and
ethical question of appropriating private property on behalf of a private
company, the implications of these actions on citizen rights to their city were
manifold.
Internally, the chaos, anarchy and conflictual identity politics associated with
the war years had to be effaced. The state needed to assert its hegemony,
project its authority over the various territorial and communal fragments and
68 Peter G Hollowell, Property and Social Relations (London: Heinemann, 1982);
Macphearson, Property Mainstream, 1978.
689 Yahya Staging Modernism unpublished paper, presented at Building City and Nation
Conference, AUB in 1998.
69 For example around 600 historic buildings were demolished as were the two last remaining
suqs each of which housed scores of small scale businesses that can never afford to return.
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redefine the parameters of city and nation unfettered by the civil war and the
problems associated with the long years of conflict. The effacement of
property boundaries and various commercial functions in the city center had
significant consequences on the social fabric and memory of the city. Severed
from its social production, space is fetishized, presented an independent object,
politically neutral. More specifically what this formulation sought to obscure,
was that the organization and use of the city, as well as the attribution of
meaning to its spaces is primarily the result of social processes. By positing
space as primarily a question of functions, space becomes social only to the
extent that it satisfies the needs of unified groups of people and pre-designated
functions, especially ones identified as the "essence" of national identity. By
redefining Lebanon's identity through its economic vocation and thus
transforming the center into the internal shopping 'mall' of Beirut, the de-
territorialization tendencies of late capitalism, as enacted through this project,
provoked an equally compelling amnesia towards the social context and
myriad communities of the city. By eliminating all distinctions between
property rights and claims, the project succeeded in physically erasing and
radically altering a critical component of social memory. Transforming
property into an abstract space eradicated the subjective aspects of property,
such as its confirmation for many, of personal identity, of family lineage or
inheritance and severed its constitutive role as a "site" for collective memory.
Both the past and the present were unanchored, "deterritorialized."
Furthermore, by eradicating property boundaries, the ties that bind different
forms of urban reality to its proposed social structures were loosened. While
this dissociation between property and "right" to the city could potentially
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have spawned a radically new discourse about the city, the forms it took
foreclosed any alternative discussion about the city. Property was redefined
purely as a system of exclusions effectively transforming it into an abstract
entity removed from both physical reality and its social context. At the same
time, the hierarchy of social, economic and political relationships inherent in
various tenure arrangements was flattened into a two-dimensional structure in
which both property owners and renters became partners in the company. The
use value of the space becomes primarily political, its symbolism as a space of
re-unification exploited. Individual rights to the city were reduced to the
company's marketing logo at the time of "Buy a share in the reconstruction of
your city."
However, as Lefebvre argues space is political to the extent that it is produced
through recurring series of negotiations and appropriations. As we shall see
shortly, space, presented in the project as simply a collection of now organized
physical objects, the realm of pure technocratic decision-making, is produced
by the very conflicts over its uses and the meanings attributed to it by its users.
Architecture, Representation and the Problems of History
This attitude towards identity and rights to the city is further betrayed in the
politics of representation utilized for the project. With the eradication of the
existing fabric of the historic city center, and the voiding of the social content
of property, architecture's relationship to the sociopolitical context within
which it is being implemented is not addressed. At the urban level,
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representations of the center envisage it with no apparent links to the rest of
the city or country. Premised on the selective destruction and [re]construction
of both war and post-war efforts, the proposed plan presents a vision of future
Beirut and Lebanese national identity in the midst of a war torn city, now
silenced in the blank whiteness of the drawing. (see figures ) In these
drawings, Beirut is erased, the center presented as an exclusive entity floating
in a non-existent city. A perspectival tradition dominates the planning process,
with the organization of facades to be looked at and vantage points to see
from. The streets are wide and clearly visible, terminated by high towers from
which one can have a totalizing view of the whole city, while the daily
practices of citizens who survived 17 years of civil war are simply eradicated
from the drawing. The panoramic vision provided by such images has been
described by Michel de Certeau as one that "transforms the bewitching world
by which one was possessed into a text that lies before one's eyes." He
continues, "the panorama - city is a "theoretical" (that is, visual) simulacrum,
in short a picture, whose condition of possibility is an oblivion and a
misunderstanding of practices." '9 In other words, by using this panoramic
bird's eye view as the predominant way by which to present the city, the daily
spatial practices, premised from within a different locus of perception, are
effectively maintained external to the viewer's frame of reference and
expunged from the future of Beirut. Such overarching gestures are
simplistically rendered into an expression of power and authority. According
to Mr. Chalak, the president of CDR at the time, "...if you have a strong central
69' de Certeau, Michel, The Practice of Everyday Life, (Los Angeles: University of California
Press, 1984), 92.
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power, the streets of the city are wide. They are straight. When political power
collapses, they change into winding streets with dead ends."6 92 One then
wonders if what is desired is the eventual extension of this apparent order, of
the center to the rest of the city. This direct association of disorder and chaos
with the era of the war implicit in such statements appeared even more
equivocally in the underlying logic of the Ouzai project in the southern
suburbs. 69 3
More critically perhaps, assigned the status of an object: a symbol and a
signifier, the architecture of the project regresses into a picturesque pastiche
and fabricated motifs supposedly reflective of various communities.
Descriptions of the three main axis of the project recall the "modern" capitals
of Europe and America. Paris is evoked through the Champs Elysee, which
cuts through Borj square, Washington through the Srails complex now
capitol hill, New York, through the min-Manhattan on land reclaimed from
the sea. This language, used to describe the project, seemed to be subscribing
to the collective memory of expatriate Lebanese to entice them back.694 Yet
the iconographic images, which were used, plundered the city's fabric for
motifs ostensibly representative of this elusive national identity. Twelve
692 Quoted in Ousama Kabbani, The Reconstruction of Beirut (Oxford: Center for Lebanese
Studies, 1992), p. 38.
693 Yahya, Forbidden Spaces, Invisible Barriers
694 Lebanon has a history of immigration, which dates back to the turn of the century, and
especially the period of WWI, when famine struck the area. While exact figures for the
numbers of migr6s during the war are not available, foreign ministry sources indicate that
about eight million Lebanese of different generations reside in various parts of the globe. Of
particular interest to the government were the financially affluent expatriates, many of whom
reside in the major capitals of Western Europe and the US. See also Jad Tabet, Al I 'mar wa al
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story buildings along the Place de Martyrs are linked through a series of
arcades, similar to those found in colonial Beirut, and capped by red tiled
roofs emblematic of 19th century Ottoman city. At the same time, Beirut's
last remaining medieval suqs are destroyed in the name of creating a new
center for the city, and then reconstructed under the guise of "preserving" its
Mediterranean identity.
\ .
Figure 49: Solidere Project, 1992 Champs Elysee and Manhattan (Source:
Solidere)
The drive informing these "recuperative" initiatives was not the preservation
of a particular urban fabric or a specific lifestyle or the
restoration/conservation of one period in the city's history. It was about the
preservation of elements deemed emblematic of one aspect of identity, a
selective plundering that saw in the center's historic structures components
open to interpretation and renewal and others deemed for a nostalgic recall of a
bygone past, or the emphatic assertion of a contemporary condition. As Helen
Sader, a leading Lebanese archaeologist argued, ''The reconstruction operation
launched a destruction frenzy in the city center and an army of bulldozers
Fursa al Dai 'a (Beirut: Dar el Jadid, 1994) for an analysis and critique of the architectural
elements of this project.
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threatened both modern and ancient remains. In this struggle, the balance of
power was tilted against archeology. A department of Antiquities official
summed up the situation by openly asking whether the outcome of the
forthcoming reconstruction project would simply be "une destruction de
l'histoire."6 9 5 The cumulative impact of these actions is a patchwork center
with renovated pedestrian and office areas from the French mandate period,
and a series of isolated monuments, both historic and religious, standing
amidst large stretches of empty undeveloped land and parking lots. More
critically, by isolating the religious edifices from the urban fabric and daily
living rhythms that once enveloped them, these structures were transformed
literally and metaphorically into icons of the post-war era.
While the project de-contextualizes architecture by eradicating the city's
historic fabric, the new proposed sites manipulate scenery, ornament, and
faqade to create a site loaded with historical allusions. The project of memory
in this instance is quite selective in the details of what it includes and what it
omits. 696 In an attempt to create the modern space of Lebanese identity;
difference is suppressed, details are forgotten in the actual renderings of the
project. The architect omits the more immediate past to reach out to an idyllic
and revered time, the eternal past just waiting to be rediscovered, the
designated pre-war 'golden age' of Beirut. Beirut, according to its planners is to
"regain" its status as a Mediterranean port city, the gateway between the east
695 Sader 1998.
696 See Saree Makdisi in Critical Inquiry; Jens Hanssen and Daniel Genberg "Beirut in
Memorium" in Crisis and Memory in Islamic Societies Angelika Neuwirth and Andreas
Pflitsch (eds) (Beirut: OIB, 2001)
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and West, the "Paris" or "Switzerland" of the region. This past discussed as if
it simply existed, overlooks the fact that it is actually a paralyzed past that is
being plundered. In trying to create an image for the state and a locus of
power, difference is eradicated under the guise of unification. Memory thus is
not about addressing the trauma associated with neither the civil wars, nor the
strife over national identity and belonging to the city. Memory is now about
closure of that past, about forgetting, that is the replacement or displacement
of that past with another. The conflicts over the meaning of Lebanese
nationality which have plagued the country since inception are not questioned,
while persisting attempts by all the religious communities in Lebanon to
fabricate a politically distinct and almost sovereign "imagined community" of
their own are abjured. More importantly, by rejecting multiple notions of
identity as a precondition for reconstruction, the state preempts the multiple
experiences that different communities have undergone. The fragmentation
enforced by the war, and the coercion implicit in peace generated homogeneity
is in this sense commensurate.
These representations present a self-enclosed narrative, be it programmatic or
historical, which uses perspective to close and seal the rest of the city
whenever it can. Urbanity and national identity are transformed into a
complete picture with a constructed past and future; the present is simply
foreclosed, bracketed out of the image. The past here is transformed into a
question of representation and not of responsibility; and here the
representation voids private memories and painful histories. The present is
simply foreclosed, bracketed outside the image.
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This approach was most forcibly embedded within the legislative framework
of the country. At the end of the war the Lebanese parliament issued a law
declaring amnesty for crimes against humanity committed during the war,
including full-blown massacres of civilians and entire communities, acts of
mass torture etc. Excluded from this amnesty were assassination attempts
against political or religious leaders, foreign diplomats, or crimes sent to the
judicial council by the Council of Ministers as threats to national security. In
other words, the post war Lebanese judicial system sought to prioritize
individual over collective responsibility. The arguments used were that it was
time to forget and turn the page or else the country could not move forward.6 97
It was an attitude, which, as Nizar Sagiyeh argues, succeeded in basing the
process of national reconciliation upon a politics of suppression and denial.
Not surprisingly, it was also reflected in the representational mechanisms the
state utilized in its bid to reassert its authority over its renegade fragments.
However, and as Andersen suggests, the genealogy of "official nationalism,"
of the (de) colonized world of Asia and Africa should not only be "traced to
the imaginings of the colonial state", but should also include an exploration of
the basis on which official nationalism, in its doubled form as both universal
and particular, is able to foster a sense of national identity (Anderson, 1991).69 8
In other words, for the representations of "official nationalism" to work, there
should be a collective agreement around what should be remembered and what
697 Nizar Sagiyeh, "The Memory of War in the Lebanese Legal System" paper presented at the
Memoryfor the Future conference, (Beirut: United Nations Building, 30-31 March 2001).
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should be forgotten. Here I am not referring to the "invention of tradition"
thesis, which despite its accuracy in pinpointing the exclusionary practices of
official nationalism remains limited in its capacity to analyze the role of
mediation in this process. Rather I am concerned with this process of
remembrance and forgetting neither of which is passive.
Ghostly Specters and Alternate Memories
If the city center project seems to isolate memory, it also invokes the extremes
of forgetfulness. It acts as a form of denial, not of memory and forgetting, but
of the ability to tell the difference between what it means to remember and
what it means to forget. The politics of everyday memory rub against the
triumph list narratives reiterated by the state and by the custodians of the
center. However, as Francis Yates reminded us in The Art of Memory visual
supports and spatial distributions were essential for recollection and oration.699
Furthermore, as Maurice Halbswachs argued, memory is not free floating but
infact needs a social framework within which to function or what he terms as
"the social framework of memory." Through this framework, memory is to
guide experience by linking one to traditions, customs and religious beliefs. As
he points out "a man who remembers alone what others do not remember
resembles somebody who sees what others do not see. It is as if he suffers
from hallucinations." 700 In other words, memory had to be linked to lived
experience; retained and transmitted through generations through a complex
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698 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities
699 Francis Yates, The Art of Memory (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, )
web of social relations. For many of the current inhabitants of the city center,
and its previous owners, the end of the war and the start of reconstruction did
not signify an erasure of the war and a new beginning, but rather the beginning
of their own loss; that is the beginning of different kind of war. In a series of
interviews conducted by researcher Yasmin Arif into the impact of the
reconstruction project on the current residents of the downtown, recurring
tropes of loss and desertion at the end of the war rebound. In the words of Abu
Fouad, " For us the older generation who grew up together, no matter what
will happen to the Burj now, we don't care. What we care is for is the years
that were gone from our lives- and now after the war- we look back and realize
that all the places that we remember are no longer there- they are a desert land
now." His wife continues, "... there was war but it was safe [here]... it was
very stable... When you look around now, you see only destruction and
despair... there is no one anymore. The people that you talked to will also
have gone by the end of the month. I am here today, but I don't know if I will
be here tomorrow."701
In these instances, individual memories and acts of remembrance intertwine in
complicated and unpredictable ways with the declared need to "forget" the
war, to erase it from collective existence. Lebanon's history is isolated in the
project to the temporal/topographic sites of institutional significance,
transformed into the nation's sites of memory; sites which according to Pierre
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700 Maurice Halbswachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968)
701 Yasmin Arif, Presentation on Research Findings, (Beirut; Center for Behavioral Studies,
American University of Beirut, 1997). This theme of loss and disorientation brought about by
Nora, emerge when there is a perceived break with the past, whilst the politics
of everyday city life are totally eradicated. History and memory are
represented as purely temporal and chronological rather than spatial and
relational. In other words, rather than conducting what de Certeau terms as the
"historicity of history which links interpretive practice to social praxis" and
which allows the inclusion of issues which do not necessarily have the
character of an event, history is used to privilege particular readings of
political identity and national subjectivity as "real." Arrival into this "national"
history, as represented in the project erases not only the past of the viewer but
also that of alternative communal histories. "I am here today but I don't know
if I will be tomorrow." By insisting that memory was fixed in the landscape,
the plan ignored the immutability of all cultural artifacts.
However, knowing the past is no longer, if it ever was, confined to the
compulsory time frames of national historiography- the reality is that the
nation is not, if it ever was, the site or frame for memory and national history
is no longer the measure of what people know of their past. Official attempts
to channel memories constantly face the intangible and unexpected surfacing
of the past not only in individual narratives but also in the form of haunting, in
the return of the ghost which as Golding points out only comes into play when
memory cannot recall the violent event it has been subjected to.702 What could
the turn to the supernatural and the emergence of the ghost around the Mamluk
the post-war reconstruction of the center is echoed in novels of the period (see for example
Hoda Barakat's The Tiller of the Waters, (Beirut: Dar el Nahar Press, 1998).
70-_ Avery Golding, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (London,
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).
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mausoleum, in the intercise of the city center and in the midst of the
demolition, represent but the ghost's insistence on justice by bringing into
view the thousands of "displaced" for whom no place could be found in the
project? Can one not read this act perhaps as a symbolic protest against a
program that was extending the politics of exclusion enacted by warring
faction during the war into the reconstruction and reconciliation process? For,
as Derrida suggests, to speak of ghosts is to also address the questions of
inheritance and of different generations. 7 3 Leaving aside for the moment,
Hizbu'llah's political interest at the time in establishing a territorial foothold in
the city center, the wide scale currency of the ghost in the city, especially
amongst the inhabitants of the southern suburbs, epitomizes the furtive and
ungraspable visibility of the invisible, a demand for justice and ethics from
both the future and the past by the ghost, which "begins by coming back."704
Read from this perspective, this event can be interpreted as both a rejection of
the politics of suppression and denial that underlined postwar reconstruction
attitudes as well as an assertion of a communal narrative, which went
unrecognized in a project that made a mockery of the city's social memory, of
national and pre-national formations, and of rights and claims to the city.
Architecture here emerges as precisely the nexus through which the
contradictory politics of territorial restitution and ambivalent loss inherent to
the site reveals something beyond the imaginary of its constructions. In other
73Jaques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, The Work of Mourning and the New
International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 21
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words, the primacy of what is repressed is given form through the visibility of
the invisible. The coming of the ghost condemns these "visions" of future
Beirut that can only envision the "other" as the antithesis to their own
productions, to a perpetual and ritualistic confrontation with this very same
alterity. In this instance, the return of the ghost around the Mamluk monument,
itself made visible though the destruction of the war, recasts the role of
architecture as a constitutive rather than reflective moment in the construction
of specific identity politics. It brings into play, in the words of Foucault, the
possibility of a discourse in which "the double articulation of the history of
individuals upon the unconscious of culture, and of the historicity of those
cultures upon the unconscious of individuals" a discourse through which the
possibilities for political and cultural analysis emerges.70 5 It also raises a series
of' questions about the possibility of knowing history, which within the
narrative of post-civil war [re]construction is a deeply ethical dilemma that
contains within it the unremitting problem of how not to betray the past, in this
instance a past of violent sectarian conflict.
These questions and this incident drive us to rethink the location of the city in
memory and its role in the process of defining modernity and national identity.
By virtue of its historical and topographic position, Beirut's city's center
inaugurated a crisis of representation for successive post-war governments- for
many to possess its image, was tantamount to possessing the future (and
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704This particular narrative and the visual and discursive forms it took are very influenced by
the particular history of the Shi'a community with the different ruling powers, be they
ottoman, French or Lebanese.
history) itself. In this sense this project became emblematic of an ambiguous
kind of political imagery. On the one hand, in the absence of a clearly defined
national identity, the project strove to construct an ideal space for a post-war
society redefined selectively and along singular class lines. Through
representations the architect tried to present the reconstruction project as a
critical complement to the viewer's own identity by removing and repairing
the menacing alterity of the war. All references, both visual and verbal to war
related issues were removed. On the other hand, the imagery attempted to re-
confirm the political "center's" territorial re-possession of the site and thus
secure a "secular" vantage point liberated from the binds of religious
affiliation that underwrite political participation as well as the public and
private spheres pointed to in the beginning. Through the selective
displacement of citizens, or their removal from view, the state reclaimed the
process of constituting national and political identities from within the heart of
the capital city. The physical destruction of the city and its long
[re]construction become forms of collective therapy in which the "death" of
the city- its "cleansing" -so to speak is meant to rid the nation of memories of
the multitude of deaths that continue to haunt its making. Despite the promise
of a new beginning that this slate of emptiness created by the project offered,
the development of the downtown today represents a purified, ideal space for a
neo-liberal phantasm that remains unable to reconcile the multiple needs of a
pluralistic, un-integrated and difficult to manage society. While transitory,
neurotic and furtive cohabitation is occurring, namely in tightly packed
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705 Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, (New York:
Vintage Books Edition, 1973), 379
commercial spaces narrowly focused on consumption and over indulgent in
tacky historical allusions often to stores and names of the pre-war era. These
have yet to open the way for more a more substantive project of social
reconciliation in the city.
Furthermore, this double articulation of territorial restitution and ambivalent
loss is more clearly reflected in the literature and recent film productions
where the pervasive sense of loss and disorientation that Beirut induces in this
post-war era is evoked over and over again. Whether through literature or the
films and documentaries of the city emerges as a place of resonance in which
and through which the absence of a historical project in sociological and
political terms- that is efforts to come to terms with the civil war and the
place/role of the city in that war- is explored. From themes of rural/urban
confrontation which dominated pre-war literature,706 much of these novels
today use individual biographies, personal narratives, and the micro patterns of
daily life to reflect on the inanity of the war, its incomprehensibility so as to
recover the city and its historical memory. As the main character in one of
Rashid el Daeef's 1995 novel, Dear Mr. Kawabata, states at the beginning of
the novel: "it seems to me with the beginning of the war ... that my mouth
became filled with ants, and my lips were sewn tightly together, as one would
sew a deep wound only with a solid strap... and I became convinced, with the
war still in the beginning, that only hallucinations can accurately describe this
intractable situation." This hallucinatory condition is then extended through
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the narrators'/author's reflections on the post-war city that climax, with his
declarations that he hates history.7 7
Young filmmakers have also begun to explore the futility of the war, the place
of the city in the social memory of the war, and its post-war recovery, using
varied personal narratives, constructed biographies and individual memories.
For example, in Around the Pink House, Joreish and Haji Touma use the story
of an old 19th century house inhabited by a family of squatters (or displaced
individuals) to reflect on the ways in which physical reconstruction is fast
outpacing social reconciliation in the city. Raad on the other hand, uses
multimedia presentations, that create individual, fictional documentations of
the civil war in the form of personal notebooks, diaries, home videos, personal
testimonies, photographs and archives, presented in a live performance, to
question the means through which historical narratives are constructed;
namely "How does one witness the passing of an extremely violent
present?"708 Urging us to consider his own constructions as "hysterical
706 The novels of Hanan el Sheikh, Hikayat Zahra, (The Story of Zahra) (Beirut: 1975), and
Hasan Daoud Benayat Mathilde (Mathilde's House), (Beirut, 1983) are exemplary in this
respect. See Hashim Sarkis Beiru Beirut
707 Written as a letter to a Japanese friend, the author and the narrator exchange places
constantly, as his meandering through the post-war city, lead him through reflections on
history, politics, memory, the relationship between the past and the future, and between places
and the events that take place on them. Rashid el Daeef, Dear Mr. Kawabata, (Beirut: Riad el
Rayyes, 2001).
70E Raad's usually presents his work in a multimedia/performance entitled The Loudest
Muttering is Over: Case Studies from the Atlas Group Archive. It includes several fake short
documentaries The Dead Weight of a Quarrel Hangs a three-part video project: Missing
Lebanese Wars, Secrets in the Open Sea and Miraculous Beginnings recently renamed I think
it would be better if I could Weep (2000), Hostage: The Bachar Tapes. This body of work,
according to Raad is to be read as "hysterical symptoms" of sorts, that "investigate the
possibilities and limits of writing a history of the Lebanese wars (1975-1991)." See also Sarah
Roger in Parachute, 2002.
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symptoms," Raad slips inbetween historical and fictional narrations, creatively
using different means to continuously dislocate the drone of official accounts
of the war such as statistics, chronologies, reports etc. that ultimately try to
explain the at once immediate yet removed "events" of the war. Consequently,
whilst disrupting repeatedly the notion of any complete historical explanation
of the war, the act of memory is firmly relocated within individual narratives
and accounts of the physical objects that testify to/witnessed the war (such as a
trace of make, year and color of cars used as car bombs during the war). As
Raad puts it "these projects do not document what happened, but what can be
imagined, what can be said, what can be taken for granted, what can appear as
rational, sayable, thinkable about wars."
Whose City is this anyway?
That the war was catastrophic for the Lebanese is undisputed, but the legacy
of incomprehensibility, which lies at the heart of that catastrophe has yet to
be recognized. In the absence of any open and public discourse on the
constitutive role of the civil war and on questions of national history and
individual memory, the state's actions are pre-empted by the ghostly specters
of sectarian bloodshed, which seem more real today than 12 years ago when
the war ostensibly ended. By focusing their efforts on the reconstruction of
the capital city, and simply "letting the dead be dead" successive post-war
Lebanese governments effectively re-asserted the hegemonic role of the city
as the geographic local and of the economy as the symbolic terrain for
identifying national identity. In this context, rights to the city are re-
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interpreted from within the logic of post war reconstruction that evokes an
international role for the city rather than a process of reconciliation that turns
the city inwards- onto its own territory.
Moreover, as Cathy Caruth suggests, "history like trauma, is never simply
one's own,... history is precisely the way we are implicated in each other's
traumas."709 Liberating the city from the binds that tie it to its reality does not
necessarily release it from responsibility towards its citizens; a responsibility,
which was further elided in Elyssar, the real estate project, proposed for the
southern suburbs of the city. Unlike Solidere the area of Elyssar houses
around 10,000 families or 50,000 individuals many of whom are war
displaced populations or lower income for whom the area provides the only
affordable housing. Settled in waves of population movements that preceded
the war, the settlement sits today on one of the most valuable real estate in
the city; namely the only remaining full stretch of sandy beach at the
southern entrance of the city. However this area was also a source of historic
contention rooted in different interpretations over property rights and
political confrontations between rival deputies. Without going into much
details many of the inhabitants who settled in the area either as a result of
rural-urban migration prior to the war or as a result of war displacement
believed that the they had legal access to musha' lands owned by the
municipality. Clinging on to Ottoman interpretations of property they argued
that as members of the community they has a legal right to "share" in the
709 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma Narrative and History, (London and
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 24
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land. The political confrontations in the 1950's and the legal resolution
imposed further confused the issues.710
Figure 50: Ouzai, 1990 (author's photographs)
With the end of the war, the same entity that designed the city center; that is
Dar el Handasah, commissioned by Oger Liban the company owned by
prime minister Hariri drew up a new development scheme for the area that
entailed the eradication of the settlement, its replacement with high end
hotels and luxury tourist facilities and the re-displacement of its inhabitants
into an especially constructed housing project across the highway from the
planned tourist zone.711When questioned about the extremely high projected
densities the architect responsible project responded with "c'est J'urbanism
de guerre.,,712Due to the resistance of local populations and local militias,
specifically Hizbu'llah the project was never implemented.713
The proposals made for the southern suburbs, under the guise of Elyssar,
were based on a particular definition of citizenship; one which needs to be
710 See Charafeddine, Secteur "lilegaux"; Yahya Forbidden Spaces; Clerc Le Project Elyssar.
The latter contains the specifics of the court case and its resolution.
7Il See Yahya ibid; Harb Politiques Urbaines; Clerc ibid.
712 Private Interview, May 1997.
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understood from within two perspectives. The first is the urban history of
this area as a historic site of contention, and more recently as a place of
refuge for many war displaced and lower income with no other space in the
city. In its myriad alleyways and haphazard building, the area is at one and
the same time most visible emblem of the chaos and the tragedy of
Lebanon's civil wars. The second is the history of the Shi'a community in
Lebanon and its relationship to the Lebanese state in the past 58 years. From
this perspective all design proposals for this part of the city, dubbed initially
as the project for the "liberation of the coastline," and all negotiations over
its future are part and parcel for a redefinition of urban citizenship; one
which includes diverse forms of identification with Lebanon as a nation, and
Beirut as a city. (See section I, Part 2)
The coupling of the state and private capital in Beirut has produced a powerful
discourse that acts upon the urban space and population, but its historicism
fails to grapple with the challenge that cities pose. By this I mean the issue of
spatiality that the city highlights. Not only is the urban built environment
defined by its position as a nodal point in the geographical landscape of
capital, the very organization of the city as society entails spatial divisions and
relations, not distinctions between different stages in the march of history.
What sets middle-class neighborhoods apart from slums is not time but space;
not just physical space but also the space of power. One manifestation of the
problem that the historicist discourse encounters in dealing with the socio-
713 This became part of the larger territorial conflicts between the state and Hizbu'llah and
Arnal who wanted to retain control over the area. See Yahya ibid; Harb ibid; Clerc, ibid
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spatial organization of the city is that despite the promise of a new beginning
that this slate of emptiness created by the project offered, the development of
the downtown today represents a purified, ideal space for a neo-liberal
phantasm that remains unable to reconcile the multiple needs of a pluralistic,
un-integrated and difficult to manage society. While transitory cohabitation is
occurring, namely in congested commercial spaces these have yet to open the
way for more a more substantive project of social reconciliation in the city. As
a recent study on around 2,000 car users indicates most of those using the city
are people living within its immediate vicinity. Furthermore, a large majority
of' residences are currently occupied by expatriate populations that visit the
city periodically.7 4
The center's current failure to act as a national space should not be held
against it. Another manifestation of this historicist discourse is the problem
posed of the 'unintended city' that is "the city that was never part of the formal
'master plan' but always implicit in it". This unintended city consists of the
large and still growing number of poor who are housed in the informal
settlements and poorly organized areas in Beirut's various suburbs; inhabitants
who provide the cheap labor and services without which the "official" city
could not survive. Exploited and disenfranchised, their existence cannot be
acknowledged by the official city as part of its self. Viewed from the lens of
postwar reconstruction and to a certain extent modernization, this displaced
714 For example around 60% of the newly constructed apartments along the seafront were sold
to foreign expatriates especially from the Gulf. Of the remaining 40% many belong to
Lebanese expatriates who live elsewhere for a good portion of the year. (Private Interview,
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and evicted, mass of Lebanon's growing urban poor refuses to "bow out of
history." They continue to exhibit an tenacious will to occupy large spaces in
the public domain. This refusal to "bow out of history" points to a general
problem intrinsic to the nation-state's historicist discourse of modernization -
the inability of its linear narrative to accommodate the spatiality of historical
processes, the uncomfortable coexistence of the modern and the 'obsolete,' the
intrusion of the rural in the urban, the combined emergence of official and
unintended cities. The city's historical geography of power, culture, and
society resists its representation as evolution and development. This
problematic suggests a slippage between nation and the citizen- while center
was projected as the material site for enacting the nation, the suburbs were/are
billed as the antithesis of the nation, external to the new definition of
citizenship and located on the outskirts of both the center and the city. In this
sense the suburbs came to embody all that the nation is not at the same
moment that the Ibn Arraq mausolem challenged however fleetingly the
slippage between the nation and the citizen and the center as the material site
for enacting the nation.
Solidere Marketing Division, May 2004).; See Maha Yahya "Memories of War, Memories of
Reconstruction" forhcoming in Urbanistas, CCCB. Barcelona, 2005
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By Way of Some Concluding
Remarks
This dissertation has weaved through a variety of different narratives that
produce the city and continue to haunt its making. The main problems it has
grappled with are the contradictions inherent to Lebanese national identity
making, established under a colonial mantra, and the concomitant
superimposition of a capital city on its own antithesis, the cosmopolitan port
city. It has shown how these conditions, particular to Beirut have produced a
situation of urban and architectural impossibility, where architecture attempted
to register the continuities that could not be established within the urban
landscape of the city. This urban impossibility demanded a turn to the visual
whereby the national iconography of mandate Beirut became an eclectic mix
of cosmopolitan orientalism, organic nationalism and a tectonic modernism.
These have resulted in a landscape of promise, dotted as it is with ruptured
plans and emasculated structures, where the incompleteness of each project
opens up space for a new process of negotiation, for new modes of identity
making, for alternative historical trajectories. Examining post-war Beirut
demonstrated the extent to which colonial politics continue to underlie
contemporary approaches to the city and the extent to which the city continues
to function within this historical imperative.
From this perspective, Beirut raises certain questions such as can a city be too
modern or too cosmopolitan for its host nation. Does it subvert the whole
412
project of producing a uniform national culture by creating a conflict between
primordial [religious] nationalism and cosmopolitan modernism? Some have
argued that this is what brought fifteen years of civil war into the city.
However, this kind of perspective denies that nationalism in and of itself is a
very modern (violent) project both ideologically and in practice and very often
fused through national development projects. It also rejects that the forms of
"socializing" individuals in the forms of national belonging are in and of
themselves unevenly spread over a single national terrain. In the process of
juxtaposing all the different projects synchronically and diachronically, a
series of questions are raised about the notions of center and periphery or the
rural and urban. The permeability of spaces and their constant appropriation
and mutations also questions the viability of discussing city boundaries,
especially in places such as Lebanon where the city is the country.
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Appendix Igeography of historic experience
beirut 1830-1943715
1520
Ottoman rule established over Beirut.
1750
Younes Gebaily, known as Abu Askar, founded the first printing press, the
Imprimerie St. George in Beirut.
1830
Beirut was a small fortified town that covered no more than 570 meters from the
harbor to its southern gate and 370 meters from its eastern shore to its Western portal.
The central core of the city was built around its historic port flanked by two towers
while Its old fortifications, dated back at least to the 10th century. Population was
6,000.
1831-1840
Beirut is established as the political center of Mohammed Ali of Egypt's expansion
into the Ottoman Empire (1831-1840) under the leadership of Mahmoud Nami Bey,
who in 1826 was part of the first Egyptian mission to France to promote the
establishment of a future Egyptian bureaucracy. Two diwans or administrative
councils are established: one for public health and another for commerce, allowing
Beiruti's to participate directly and for the first time in the management of their city.
(This form of governance itself was introduced in Egypt during the Napoleonic
invasion of the area). It becomes the principle platform for the local bourgeoisie,
namely the traders and land owning elite to administer the city and direct its future
development. A local police force is also created.
Foreign consulates began to arrive in Beirut. The first, the French consulate was
already there in 1822, but only became as first rank office in 1833. The British
consulate was established during the same years. In 1832 there was an American
consular representative in Beirut and in 1836 an American consul. By the mid 1840 a
number of other consulates had either been set up or upgraded: Russia, Austria,
Prussia, Sardinia, Tuscany, Spain, Naples, Holland, Greece.
This growing interest in Beirut was reflected in the infrastructural improvements
sponsored by foreign governments. The Beirut port is enlarged and cleaned and a
quarantine area (later becomes known as Qarantina) is created to the east of the port.
The viaduct form Nahr el Kalb, north of Beirut is also extended. By 1840, Beirut's
population had grown to 15,000. It was also reflected in the arrival of foreign
missions: first the Jesuits in 1831 followed by the American in 1834. The wife of one
of those missionaries, Sarah Smith, establishes the first girl's school in the Ottoman
Empire in the following year. Not to be outdone, the Jesuits, already established in
Ghazir, set up a boy's school in Beirut. Another boy's school already existed in the
city center, created in 1835 by the Greek Catholic archbishop Binyamin.
715Details of this section were assembled from Fawaz, 1983; Buheiry, 1986; Rbeiz, 1986;
Hallak, 1987; Tah el Wali, 1993; Khalaf & Sarkis, 1993; Saliba, 1988; Nalbantoglu, 1988,
Hanssen, 2001
414
In 1835 steam navigation is introduced into the Mediterranean leading to a massive
increase in the maritime activity of the different ports around its basin. In the same
year, the American Mission move their printing press, known as the American Press
from Malta to Beirut. In 1841 they begin to use new characters in their printing
techniques.
In 1839, the first set of tanzimat were issued in the Hatti -i-Serif by Sultan
Abdelmejid. These were designed to halt economic decline and to reassert the
empire's direct military and political control over the territories.
In 1840 the first known photograph of Beirut is taken by Frederic Goupil-Fesquet.
1840-1852
In 1840, Beirut, is reconquered by the Ottomans with the help of the British fleet. A
series of 'modernization' and urban rehabilitation projects are launched. Diverse
hotels, or locandas are constructed in this period. The first in 1843 by an Italian from
M alta; Locanda Antonio Bianiki, and then Locanda Habib Rizk (a local from
Choueifat on the outskirts of Beirut). In 1849 the Europe Hotel, where Gustave
Flaubert is reputed to have stayed at the turn of the century, is built near the port.
Many of these hotels were to become legendary, such as the Hotel de L'Orient in the
cultural history of Lebanon. The growth of these hotels also formed the basis for a
nascent industry, which, after Lebanese independence, would with other service
industries come to account for two thirds of the Lebanese economy.
In 1847, Butrus al Bustani and Al Yaziji, establish a cultural society: al-Jam'iyya al
Suriyya (the Syrian Society). In the same year, the Jesuits set up the Imprimerie
Caltholique in Beirut. In 1848 Maroun Naccache translates and publishes for the first
time L'Avare of Moliere.
1853
The Grand S6rail, meaning the palace of the ruler, is built by the architect Bishara
Afendi, as a military barracks or a kushlak under Sultan Abd el Majid on the hill
overlooking the city. Initially the site of Roman stadium, destroyed in the 6th century,
it became in the 17th century the site of a Shihabi palace that was demolished by
Ahmed el Jazzar in the 1776. In 1861, a military hospital is added, and in 1879 a
clock tower is constructed by a local architect Yusuf (Joseph) Aftimous to mark the
25th anniversary of his ascension the sultanate. During the French Mandate (1919-
1943), the Grand Serrail becomes the headquarters of the Mandate authorities while
the military hospital becomes the Ministry of Justice. In 1992 the hospital was
rehabilitated and is now used as the Council for Development and Reconstruction.
The first travel guide of the orient is published in France; an 1104 page volume of
L'ltineraire descriptifs, historique et archeologique de L'Orient covering Malta,
Greece, European Turkey and Asia, Egypt, Syria and Palestine by Adolphe Joanne
and Emile Isambert, written in 1853 and published in 1861 by Hachette et Cie. It was
reissued in 1882 as Itineraire de L'Orient, Syrie, Palestine.
1856
Ottoman Tanzimat or administrative reforms are introduced into the city with the
explicit aim of centralizing the administration. These included the legislation of rents
or mortgage systems, the seizure of property, the giving away of land (inheritance)
and a new system of taxation. In most cities municipal councils were also established.
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Under the system of "capitulations," struck between the Ottoman authorities and
various European governments to regulate Ottoman debt, foreign trading communities
were granted various concessions and provided with commercial and juridical
privileges in the empire. A branch of the Ottoman bank, designed by Yusuf Aftimous,
is also established in Beirut to oversee Imperial affairs. French capital controlled the
investments of the bank in the Levant while the bank, a key negotiator in many
development projects, would intervene on behalf of French investors. A central
Ottoman postal service also opens in Beirut.
1857-1863
Beirut-Damascus road was constructed by a French company, the 'Societe Imperiale
de La route de Beyrouth a Damas.' Starting from the Burj area in the city center, this
highway introduced rapid communication with the hinterland. The construction of this
road is often quoted by historians as the single most important reason for the
establishment of Beirut as the main port to the Eastern Mediterranean. By facilitating
trade between the port and the hinterland this road ensured the domination of Beirut.
In 1858 the first Arabic periodical, Hadiqat al-Akhbar, edited by Khalil Khoury is
established.
In 1860, Beirut became the first city in Bilad al Sham to open a telegraph station.
However, due to a mandatory connection via Aleppo, the first telegraph would not be
sent out until Feb. 1, 1863.
In 1862, three hairs from the beard of the prophet Mohamed were donated to Beirut
by the Ottoman Sultan. These were to be placed in one of the mosques in recognition
of the city's position as one of the gates of the Ka'aba- that is as the starting point on
the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca.
With the flood of emigrants from the civil war in the Mountains, and its prosperity
under Mohammed Ali, Beirut begins to outgrow its walls. Between 1861-1867, under
the auspices of Dawud Pasha, the Wali of Beirut (1861-1868), the streets of the city
are widened to accommodate the carriages of the Damascus-Beirut highway while
others (often private) construction activity such as the 1860 building of Khan Antoin
Bek takes place in the city center. By 1863, the city's population reaches 70,000.
In the same year, (1863) the first newspaper of the city "Hadiqat Al-Akhbar," was
published and within twenty years there were more than two dozen journals and
newspapers in circulation; what Buheiry terms as "the pillars of the Nahda or cultural
renaissance in the region."
1865
The provinces of Saida and Damascus are merged into one supra -province. Beirut
loses its status as the provincial seat of the governor of Sayda. All administrative
offices are dismantled and moved to Damascus.
Learning of this decision, local Beiruti notables and religious figures sent scores of
cross-denominational petitions to the Porte begging the sultan to make Beirut a
provincial capital. The imperial government was invited to assume direct rule of the
city to facilitate its growth and prosperity. Damascenes responded with counter
petitions begging the port to ignore the insolent demands of the Beirutis.
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1866
American missionary activity which dated back to 1820, establish in 1862 the Syrian
Protestant College, now known as the American University of Beirut under the
presidency of Daniel Bliss (1866-1913). Initially located in a small house in Zokak el
Blat, the college finally moved to its present location in 1873, when the clock tower
building was finished. In 1834 a small school for girls was also created by a Mrs.
Smith, the wife of one of the missionaries. In the same year a the evangelical printing
press was also conceived, which undertook publication in Arabic as well as English.
1867
Beirut municipality is created, designed by Yusuf Aftimous. The first president is
Fakhri Beik. In 1892 Mehi el Din Hemadeh is elected and then reelected to a second
term in 1899. The engineer was Yusuf Khayat.
1870
The imperial parliament is created in Istanbul establishing an immediate forum for
provincial grievances to be heard. Beirut delegates raised their demands that the city
be transformed into the capital of a coastal province that would stretch from Acre to
Tripoli, thus overlapping with the boundaries of ancient Phoenicia "Finikye vilayeti
namiyle." (see Hanssen, Fin de Siecle, p. 74).
A private waterworks company was created by a French investor, M. Tenvin, with
Ottoman Bank capital and British government investment.
1873
Under the auspices of Rustum Pasha, a public garden in Hazmieh is constructed for
popular festivals and performances. Commoners dressed in native clothes were
excluded.
In Istanbul, The Principles of Ottoman Architecture is published for the International
Exhibition held in Vienna. This book, written in Ottoman, French and German, was
the first to attempt to codify Ottoman architecture through aesthetic principles, and to
derive its theory from history. Since no written history existed until then, the book
undertook the writing of that history as well. Also for the first time, links are made
between national Ottoman identity, and Ottoman architecture.
1874
The Palace of Prince Fakhreddine is demolished by Ottoman authorities along with
the tower (al Borj el Kabir).
1875
French St. Joseph University is established by French Jesuits vying for influence over
locals with American missionaries. Jesuit activity in Beirut had already led to the
creation of a school in 1843, as well as a printing press (the Catholic press) in 1847,
which was to become one of the largest publishing houses in the country.
1878
The Maqasid society is founded; a Muslim Sunni benevolent institution whose goal
was to promote modern education. This association continues to be very active
running schools, charities and orphanages. Dominated by the Al Salam family, one of
the most socially and political prominent Beiruti families, this association, like most
others of its kind in Beirut, is based in sectarian affiliation.
417
1882
The school of Fine Arts, modeled after the Beaux Arts in Paris, is established in
Istanbul.
1883
A commission of inquiry is dispatched by Sultan Abdul Hamid to assess French
activities in the region. The commission recommended that the province be
subdivided in two with a coastal Vilaya headed by Beirut and an interior province
centered in Damascus.
The Petit S6rail is constructed by the Ottomans on the North side of the Place des
Canons. Initially it was to become the headquarters for the Ottoman Vilaya in 1888.
By 1926, with the establishment of the first Lebanese constitution the building
becomes the official headquarters of successive Lebanese presidents. It was destroyed
in 1950 to make way for a parking lot.
1884
In 1884, the Borj square was created over what were the garden of the Palace of
Prince Fakhreddine. This was the first major public square/garden in the city. Initially
it was known as the Hamidiyah square in reference to Sultan Abdul Hamid the
second. In 1908 with the coming of the young Turks to power, it was renamed union
or Freedom Square (al wehda or al huriyyah). After the hanging of Arab nationalists
by the Young Turks in 1915 and 1916, it became known as Martyr's square. It was
also called the Place des Cannons by the French, as well as the Borj (transliterates into
tower) square by the Lebanese, in reference to the tower that used to exist on its site.
In the pre-war era (1975) this square and the area surrounding it was considered as the
cultural, social, economic and political hub of the country as well as the one public
space in the city where anonymous public interaction was possible. Consequently,
during the war, this area was the first site to be marginalized by the militias. It was
transformed into the "Green line" of Beirut, dividing the city in two. At the same
time, it persisted in the imagination of most Beirutis as the symbol of national
reconciliation. In the current post-war era, this space was immediately targeted for
large scale urban intervention. Current reconstruction proposals have eradicated what
was left of the city's previous heritage in an attempt to symbolize changed power
relations and create a new vision for future Beirut and Lebanon.
1885
Beirut's population reaches 100,000.
1887
The Council of Ministers and Kamil Pasha, the grand vizir (prime minister), and a
former provincial official in Damascus, Beirut and Jerusalem are commissioned by
the Sultan to devise a plan for the re-organization of the province of Syria.
1888
Beirut becomes the administrative center of a new Ottoman Vilaya, bearing its name,
which encompassed in addition to the Lebanese coastal regions, the northern half of
Palestine including the ports of Akka and Haifa as well as a considerable stretch of
Syria's coastline and hinterland, including the port of Latakia (now known as
Ladhiqiyya). Split from the mountains, it was placed under direct Ottoman control.
Beirut was firmly established as the cultural, intellectual, and information center of
the country and the principal entrepot of goods and political currents of the area.
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1890-1907
Port was expanded by the Compagnie Imperiale du Port, owned by Yusuf Efendi
Mutran and financed by French capital in which M. Tenvin was also involved. A
Beirut train station was completed near the port in 1895 by a British- Ottoman
company. An ever-expanding and sophisticated network of economic, cultural, and
political relations with Europe and America and the rest of the Arab world was taking
place. With its modem communications and infrastructure network, colonies of
foreign businessmen and colleges, which attracted students from all over the area
settled in the city. At the same time, during the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
the city experienced a marked expansion in banking, money - lending, and allied
services to take care of emigrant remittances, sericulture, the import and growing
transit trade, speculation in international stocks and shares, and ventures in real estate
and agricultural land. In 1900, the Ottoman department store Orzodi Bek opens in
Beirut. In 1901, a covered market place is built, while in 1907 the Arts et Metiers
school is completed as are the Sanayeh gardens. French influence in the economic,
educational, and political spheres was paramount.
1908
The Young Turk revolution (the Committee of Union and Progress, or CUP) occurs in
Istanbul. Beirut becomes the leading center of political reform movements of the Arab
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. As the Young Turks pressed for centralization and
the turkification of all provinces in the empire, the reform movements in Beirut
demanded decentralization.
On August 15th, The Society of Ottoman Architects and Engineers is established in
Istanbul.
1909
The first tram lines are set in Beirut, and put into service.
1911
The electric factory is built by the tramway company.
1912
Beirut is shelled by the Italian fleet, during an Ottoman-Italian confrontation over
Italy's invasion of Libya. The eventual Ottoman-Italian treaty angers local population
who interpret it as a weak betrayal of the Libyans. Damage of the grain silos during
the bombardment contributes to the famine of World War I.
1913
The Young Turks establish a dictatorship in Istanbul. An Arab congress is convened
in Paris. Its purpose was to clarify Arab national demands for decentralization. In a
meeting with the French Foreign Office, the splits within different visions for the
future Lebanon appeared within the Beirut delegation as some mainly Christian
members demanded an independent Lebanon separate from the Ottoman Empire.
1914
World War I begins. Beirut is unified with the Mutasarrifiya of Mount Lebanon.
First cinema (also used as a theater), known, Tiatro Faransiyah, or the French theater,
built by Dr. Henin.
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1915
Azmy Bey, the Wali of Beirut (previously the head of the police force in Istanbul and
then the Wali of Tripoli) initiates a modernization scheme for the city center of Beirut.
Various suqs were destroyed along with the specializations they enclosed as well as
the consulates of Belgium and Holland. These transformations have to be seen within
the larger framework of municipal changes inspired particularly by the Tanzimat in
which the privatization of property was a principle tenant and which led to a new
form of production of space based primarily upon a novel distinction between private
and public property.
Construction of the Palais des Pins (1915-1918) is initiated by Azmy Bey. Conceived
as an upper class club, with projections rooms. Alfred Bey Sursok is given lease to the
lot, and entrusted with the construction process, which was to also include a casino
and a hippodrome (engineer, Bahjat Abdelnour-1916-1918). The interior and exterior
decorations of the Casino were designed by Sursok himself. Architects included
Amine Abdelnour, Hussein al Ahdab, Yusuf Aftimous and Marroun Gammach6. Rue
Allenby was to be diverted to connect to this palace. During the mandate, the palace
and the region surrounding became the hub of French institutions.
Armenian refugees escaping Ottoman prosecution arrive in Lebanon, marking a trend,
which would continue to this day. One third of Beirut's population perishes due to
famine and locust attacks on crops.
1916
Arab nationalists are executed (by hanging) in the Place des Canons (1916).
1918
World War I ends. Ottoman troops withdraw from the Levant. A short lived Arab
state is proclaimed under Prince Faycal. He is defeated by French troops at the battle
of Maysaloun.
1919
After the signing of the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1919, the Ottoman Levant was
divided between French or British mandates. Both modern day Lebanon and Syria
were placed under a French mandate. The Bank of Syria and Lebanon replaces the
Ottoman bank.
According to French documents, an American commission, the Crane Commission,
finds that Christians and Jews in Lebanon are in favor of French control of Lebanon,
whilst Muslims are divided between those advocating outright autonomy and others in
favor of American or British mandate.
1920
On 31 August, the administrative setup of both the Vilaya of Beirut and those of
Mount of Lebanon as well as general and local administrative organs are dismantled.
On September 1st, the creation of Greater Lebanon with Beirut as the capital is
declared by General Gouraud, the French High commissioner at the time, from the
steps of the Pine palace (Palais des Pins). Transformed into the residence of the
French High Commissioner "Ottoman" motifs are dismantled. In June of 1941, during
the Vichy reign over the area in WWII, the palace is bombarded by Allied forces.
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1921
On April 21, the independence of Greater Lebanon is confirmed. An "International"
Beirut Fair is held in the city center, on the sites demolished by the Ottomans as well
as in the Place des Cannons. Modeled after the Casablanca fair which, took place in
1915, Beirut's fair was both commercial and political. Maarad street (which
transliterates into exhibition street) acquired its name as a result of the fair.
1922
Demolition of the Shamssedine Mosque and the old Khans for the Place de l'Etoile.
The final outlines for French mandate over Syria and Lebanon are drawn up. This text
is proclaimed on Sept. 29, 1923.
1923
The first commission of tourism is created.
1925
Administrative re-organization of the Republic of Greater Lebanon. Municipalities,
Sandjaks and Cazas are replaced, the districts replaced.
In December a reunion of the nationalist party in Beirut occurs (Riad and Khaireddine
el Ahdab assist). A unifying, anti-mandatory campaign takes place in Tripoli (Hamid
Karame, Saida (Riad el Solh) and Beirut.
1925
The first international conference on archaeology in Syria and Palestine takes place on
April 4-13, in Beirut and was covered by the Revue Biblique and L'Asie Francaise.
1926
Lebanese constitution is declared. The first Lebanese president, Alfred Naccache, is
elected and he takes office in the Petit S6rail. Joseph (Yusuf) Aftimus is appointed
Minister of Public works.
Reports in the popular press, Le Damad, that Mr. De Jouvnel promised Ahmed Namy
Bey, Husni Barazi and Youssef Hakim to support their demands for a re-unified Syria
and Lebanon. (French sources)
Censorship is re-established through decree 137 and 146 (Feb. 23 and 26). In June, 11
journals are suspended by French authorities: Chafak, Ikbal, Reveil, Chark, Sida el
Watan, Habbit, Syrie, Orient, Jawayeb, Ahrar, al Ahrar al Mousawara, and 3 by
Lebanese authorities; Al Maarad, Al Bark, and Orient.
1927
The Grand Theater is built by Jacques Tabet at the end of Rue Maarad, on the site of
the el Manzar el Jamil Cinema (The Beautiful Sight), a favorite attraction for popular
movies and plays. As a theatre it caters primarily to a French speaking audience. As a
result, initial plans to link the Palais des Pins to the city center are no longer feasible.
The Bir Hassan airport is built.
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1929
The parliament revises the constitution on the 2 7th of April. 23 deputies sign a motion
of no-confidence in the cabinet which resigns the same day.
New interstate commission to look into property laws demanded by the French high
commissioner. The new property law is promulgated on Nov. 12, 1930 under decree
3339 to replace the 1858 land code initiated by the Ottoman tanzimat. Absolute
freedom over the use of private property is granted. As a result of these changes, the
apartment block was created and became the single most pervasive type in the city. In
contemporary Beirut, it includes office spaces, residences, as well as religious and
administrative function. Examining this block, involves a discussion of social
formations and architectural expressions. In this particular case the dichotomy
between rent laws administered by the state and property laws administered by the
various religious institutions in the country, provided an interesting space for
negotiating between differential identities. During the war this bipolarity in the
administration of property opened up a middle ground in which the bond between
meaning and place were unraveled to individual adjustments/survival to the violence.
The French High Commission publishes a guide to tourism in Lebanon.
1930-1933
Construction of the Etoile and Lebanese parliament in the city center are completed.
Rene Danger is invited to submit a master plan for the city of Beirut. The plan is
never approved by the government. However, his proposed building code, a direct
adoption of the French building code, is enacted in 1932.
The national Museum is built by French authorities in cooperation with the local
municipality. The Hotel St. George is commissioned by the Societe des Grands Hotel
des Mandats. It is designed and constructed by architect Antoine Tabet (1930-1931), a
student of August Perret. Beirut's population estimated by IRFED to have doubled in
10 years is now 300,000.
1932
The Lebanese constitution is suspended.
Danger Plan - The earliest plans for Beirut were drawn up by F. Danger in 1932 at a
time when Lebanon was still under French mandate. It was the first comprehensive
attempt to take into consideration the climatic, geological, human and geographic
factors into account. This plan was neither approved nor implemented. The main
contribution of this plan ranged from the determination of the major axes of
circulation: Beirut- Tripoli; Beirut-Sidon; Beirut-Damascus, to setting the zoning
coefficient and densities of occupation as well as proposing residential quarters
planned in the spirit of garden cities. It also recommended the installation and
location of all the necessary utilities (parks, transport facilities, sewers and garbage
disposals) and for the first time the idea that plans for Beirut should consider adjacent
villages on the outskirts of Beirut such as Chiyah, Borj el Barajneh etc... was
proposed.
The Building Code - Instituted by the French mandate authorities and amended four
times by different Lebanese governments, this code remained the principle guide to
the growth of Beirut until 1963. It provides for specific requirements such as
construction and occupancy permits. It deals with the overall envelope within which a
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building must be contained such as the distance between the facade of the building
and the limit of the land (a minimum of four meters to insure a clear view to permit
the opening of windows for ventilation and light); set backs from both the road and
neighbors, plot ratios specifying coefficients of surface and total exploitation; the
appearance of buildings and their structural safety; subdivision of land; parking space;
penalties etc... At the same time, it follows that despite the stringency of most of
these regulations transgressions were built up overnight. Moreover detection was not
considered much of a threat due to the smallness of the fines and the corruption of
most municipalities where a small bribe to a municipal clerk took care of the problem.
As a result the benefits of such actions outweighed the problems. This only serves to
highlight the pervasive passivity of Lebanese citizens towards the general shape of
their city as well as the quality of its public spaces. For example, one of the many
amendments to the building code passes by parliament in 1954 allowed a maximum
of 9 floors per building. Like most other zoning regulations this law was ignored by
many owners who not only added additional floors but transformed ground floors into
shops and filled in courtyards with new constructions.
1934
The Delahalle Plan for Beirut, which suggests Phoenician architecture for a re-
organized Place des Canons is published in the Revue du Liban.
1935
Controversy over the question of Lebanese history and the nature of Lebanese identity
formally materializes through a school book co-authored by Zaki Nakkash and Omar
Farroukh, both teachers at the Maqasid College. In this book, titled Tarikh Suriyah wa
Lubnan (The history of Syria and Lebanon), the officially sanctioned version of
history, which many considered an anathema molded to serve Christian and
specifically Maronite interest in the country, was challenged. Lebanon's history was
rewritten in terms which emphasized it's position as part of larger Arab context. In
reaction, the Lebanese Christian establishment, allegedly working with the French
high commissioner, entrusted the task of writing another book to Asad Rustum and
Fuad Afram al- Bustani (the first was the chair of the near eastern history at the
American University of Beirut and the second taught Arabic at the St. Joseph
university). Their efforts culminated in Mujaz Tarikh Lubnan (or Pr6cis of the History
of Lebanon) published in 1937 in which a special history of Lebanon, as one that is
separate and distinct from it's Arab surroundings is emphasized. Interestingly enough,
the history of Lebanon in the "post war" atmosphere of "reconciliation," is
undergoing under yet another revision, which, is to eliminate any episode deemed
offensive to any of the communities in the country!
Construction of the parliament is completed.
1939-1940
World War II breaks out. French mandate in Lebanon and Syria comes under the
control of Vichy forces who had taken over Paris.
1941-1943
The Free French promise Lebanese independence.
Michel Ecochard is invited to propose plans for Beirut as well as other cities in
Lebanon.
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1943
Lebanon gains independence on Nov. 22, the deadline given by General Spears to the
French to meet British demands to release Lebanese prisoners and admit Lebanese
independence.
The National Pact is made between the political elite of the different sects in the
country.
1947
The Cenacle Libanais is established by Michel Chiha as a forum for enlightened
political discussion and through which differences in political opinion may be ironed
out through rational debate for the sake of common national interest.
1948
Ecochard Plan- The following plan to be commissioned was the Ecochard plan in
1948. This plan was extremely detailed. It's major feature was its recommendation
that the planning of Beirut should go beyond it's administrative boundaries to include
the area stretching from Nahr el-Mot in the North to the Ouzai in the South. It
provided for the main access arteries suggesting a commercial ring around the city
centre and creating a link between Achrafieh and Ras Beirut. This plan also contained
a complete study for the protection of the natural sites including an intensive survey
of' existing open spaces and gardens and all the valuable trees that should be
preserved. It proposed twelve zones in Beirut (commercial, industrial and residential)
of' varying densities; civic centers, location of industries, housing for workers, popular
housing, and all other categories of dwellings from middle income to luxury as well
as indicating the present location of the airport . Needless to say the plan was not
approved.
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Appendix II
Modernizing Beirut: Between the Ottomans and the French
Timeline for the demolition of Beirut's city center and the construction of the Etoile71 6
1 March 1331-1 March 1332 (1915) 717
March 22
Jamal Pasha gives a verbal order to the Wali of Beirut to open and expand the roads
of Suq el Haddadine and Suq el Khammamir and the road of Jacob's gate up to 20
meters.
March 24
Jamal Pasha's verbal order is transmitted to the municipality as a decision of the
Vilaya, no. 362.
The municipality decides that since this project will serve the expansion of the city, it
organization and its progress and growth or modernization, the project is to be
implemented as quickly as possible. Accordingly, the owners are to be compensated
in two ways: the rich will be given the money once the municipality can afford it
while the poor will be paid immediately. Construction is to begin on Thursday,
owners are to be notified and preliminary paperwork for the expropriation is to begin
immediately. The first to go will be Suq el Haddadine- according to the map drawn up
by Nathif Bey al Khalidy the architect/engineer of the Vilaya and Bishara Effendi al
Muhandes (the architect/engineer) of the municipality. It is to be implemented
according to the expropriation laws of the municipality of Istanbul- Yusuf Aftimous,
along with Michel Effendi Trad, Omar Effendi Daouk, Haj Mohamed Effendi
Tayyara, Nasseem Effendi Matar, Saeddine Effendi el Ghandour are appointed to the
expropriations commission to estimate the prices of the properties and proper
compensation. As is the norm, remains of demolition are to be sold under another
municipal commission composed of al Haj Salim Effendi Arab, Antoine Effendi Arab
and Hussein Effendi Tayyara.
March 27
Decision to expropriate Suq el Haddadine is taken by the municipality
April 15
The municipality decides to negotiate with the owners of properties on either side of
soak el Fashkah and Suq el Haddadine to estimate their properties and pay them by
mortgaging some of its own properties especially the four stores it owns to the West
of the governmental Srail. Owners will also be given 6% in return for denying them
of their income from the rent of their shops.
716 The reconstitution of this project included primary research in the French archives,
Municipal Archives, Lebanese National Archives, Parliament Minutes of Meetings, the
cadastre, local papers and private memoirs as well as readings of secondary literature.
717 The dates for the Ottoman period follow the Islamic calendar year which begins in March of
the Gregorian calendar. In other words, March 1, 1331of the Islamic calendar corresponds to
March 14, 1915 of the Gregorian calendar.
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August 15
Decision by the municipality to begin construction of a new Halles by order of the
Vilaya. A commission is created composed of Haj Salim Effendi al Bawab, Omar
Effendi al Daouk, and Nouri Bey assistant to the Vilaya's engineer. Emile Khacho
who drew up the construction plans is asked to execute the project.
October 8
Decision by the municipality to expand the road of Suq el Khammamir and
implemented almost immediately.
November 2
Remains of the demolitions of the suqs are to be sold through public auction on
November 6th
Nov. 16
Based on the order of Jamal Pasha the map presented by the municipal engineer to
extend a road between Khan Fakhri Bey to Locanda Bassoul is approved by the
municipal council.
January 10
Emile Khacho is paid 25 Ottoman Gold coins for the design of the Halles.
February 24
Architect is asked to present a plan for the Suqs of Sagha (Jewelry) and Harir (silk) to
turn them into a Halles for the sale of meat, vegetables and fish.
1 March 1332-1 March 1333 (1916)
March 11
Municipal decision to demolish Suqs of Sagha (Jewelry) and Harir (silk) for the
Halles.
September 5
The municipality decides to create a commission to for the demolition of expropriated
properties in suq el Haddadine, Khamamir, Derkeh and al Rasif and the construction
of new warehouses and shops as well as a shelter for the poor in the same area. The
commission is comprised of Omar el Daouk, Haj Mohamed, effendi Tayara, and
Nessim Effendi Matar. The new constructions are to be sold through public auction.
Yusuf Aftimous appointed as the head architect.
September 15
Plan to expand the road between suq el Haddadine and Suq el Khamamir carried out
by engineer Durfler to 10 meters (rather than the original 15 meters) approved by the
municipal council.
February 15
Engineer Navalian replaces Durfler who is sick with Typhoid fever.
1919-1920
July 31, 1920- Individuals are allowed to rent out small areas in demolished streets to
sell their wares- and they build small wooden structures to do so. The municipality
gives them until September to remove these structures.
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In the same session the municipality decides to create Suq el Bazerkan in Bab Idriss.
Sept 17, 1920 The appointed administrator decides to annul the municipal council -
an alternative one is elected comprising of current members of the municipality and
local notables.
April 15, 1921
The Beirut Fair is launched by the French high commission with the help of the
municipality in the areas demolished during WWI and in Martyr's square. Al Maarad
(Exhibition) street acquires its name from that event.
August-October 1923
Municipality constructs a number of stores to the South-East of Fosch streets. These
along with their air rights are subsequently sold through public auction.
April 26, 1926-
First presentation of the etoile project to the municipal council. The preliminary
design is accepted by the municipality. The plan also includes a suggestion to open a
road to martyr's square and to the Palace of Justice through Rue Allenby.
1929
Madiros Altounian is commissioned to design the parliament building.
June 3, 1931
Mr. Michel Abed, a Lebanese expatriate living in Mexico donates to the municipality
the money to construct a clock tower. The design is to be picked from several models
and is to be placed in a public square. The municipality decides to place it in the place
de L'Etoile.
October 21, 1931
The letter of Michel Effendi al Abed (Sept. 16) is discussed in the municipal meeting.
Upon arrival in Mexico city he drew up two potential images for the clock tower he is
donating and asks the municipality to choose the one to be constructed. The
municipality picks one design and decides to inform him.
Sept. 24, 1932
The designs for the Abed Clock Tower competition are submitted. Both Yusuf
Aftimous and Mr. Michel Abed are on the jury. Rene Danger and Madiros Altounian
are amongst the participants. Altounian wins the competition.
Nov. 22, 1932
Michel Abed and the clock maker inform the municipality that they are undertaking
several changes to the clock. According to their design the clock should have 1) 5
bells, 2) moving dolls over every face, 3) a golden rooster a meter and a half tall that
flutters its wings three times, raises its head three times and crows three times every
hour. The architect accepts first proposition and rejects the rest that they will destroy
the design of the building and are not related to local history or culture nor to oriental
taste.
January 24, 1939
Letter from municipal consultant dated January 2 0th presenting the final plan for the
Etoile and asking to borrow a million Lebanese Liras for its finalization. A committee
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formed of Eugene Turel? Farid Trad, Elias Jadon, Eli Khayat, Bahij Takeiddine is
created to oversee the project.
April 5, 1939
Summary of the municipal consultant's report on the planning of the Etoile which
outlined some of the major problems that the municipality is facing; namely a chaotic
expropriation process which has left many plots either in the hand of their original
owners or in joint ownership with the municipality.
The report then goes on to suggest various solutions appropriate for the resolution of
this issue. These are that lots that are jointly owned should be expropriated by the
municipality- and then sold once the roads have been designed according to the plan
that has been approved. As such the municipality can then give the government the
land it wants in exchange for forgiveness of the municipal debt. However since the
municipality cannot spend money on this expropriation including the organization of
the roads and the creation of sewage lines, pavements and electrical extensions unless
it gets an appropriate advance or loan, the bank of Syria and Lebanon has agreed to
give the municipality a loan of one million LSL for 10 years. The money will be used
to
1) pay back the municipal bonds that were previously issued (those whose owners
refuse to exchange them with the newly issued bonds of 5 _ interest instead of 6%
interest)
2) build municipal halles
3) spend on expropriations so long as the loan and the income from the land that is
sold will be used to complete the planning of the Etoile and will only be used
incrementally according to need- also the loan and the costs should not be
included in the general budget but rather they should have an independent budget.
The municipality agrees with the report- accepting the proposal will
1) Rid the municipality of its debt to the government and allow it to deliver the land
within the allocated 30 months.
2) Guarantees the planning of the Etoile and the sale of its land as well as the
hygiene and health aimed for the city as well as the growth and architectural
beauty aspired to.
The municipality decides to inform the government and get the necessary decree
form parliament- (check minutes of parliament)
April 18, 1939
A list of lots that are to be expropriated and the new estimates of costs is prepared.
There is a 25% increase in the estimated price of the lots.
November 7, 1939
The new plan presented by Farid Trad on October 2 0 th includes adjustments to some
of the planned roads in the Etoile- the suggested amendments are meant to ease traffic
movements. The Public Works Committee is asked to look onto them.
January 11, 1940
Discussions in the municipal minutes indicate that two different project were
presented for the Etoile; one from the architectural committee and one from Farid
Trad. According to the report, while implementing the former plan would cost the
municipality less money, the latter is closer to the needs of the planning needs of the
city and its "desired beauty." The general architect is asked to study the two plans and
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present an alternative that incorporates the best features of each plan. A new plan was
submitted by the architect on January 9, 1940 (no. 4159) that makes rue Fakhreddine
16 meters rather than 20 meters and maintains a separate plan for the Eastern section
of this zone. The new plan also maintains all original modifications, which address
reductions in street sizes (mainly in the Western area) as well as the creation of new
roads, and the cancellation of other roads. The same approach is to be implemented in
the eastern section of this zone. The plan is now found to be more in harmony with
the plan of the Etoile whilst catering to urgent needs of increasing road sizes to make
them more amenable to movement. Decisions taken are:
1) Western side planning approved
2) Rue Fakhreddine is to be made 16 m wide,
3) Eastern side planning also approved
4) Expropriations in blue area will be carried out after the end of the final plan
5) The municipality will commence immediately with the necessary expropriations
to plan the area between Rue Cappucine, Rue Weygand, Rue Emir Bechir and Rue
Conte de Martel (Al Maarad) which is basically the other side of the Etoile and Rue
Fakhreddine (see Map ).
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Appendix III
Municipal Finances and Expropriations in 1931
A report by the municipal accountant regarding the municipality's finances
summarized the situation as follows: Until the end of 1931 indicated that owners
whose properties had been expropriated in 1915, many of whom were issued with
IOU's were still waiting to be compensated. Consequently, municipal debt had been
steadily increasing. Decree 1106 promulgated on January 30, 1922, accepted the
expropriations and compelled the municipality to the pay the IOU's, which had lost a
substantial percentage of their value due to the deteriorating economic situation, at the
rate of 185 Syrian korsh per Ottoman Lira. It also set annual percentage on these
IOU's at 7% per year beginning in May 1921. However, due to its dire economic
situation, the municipality was unable to pay off its debts until 1924 when it took out
a loan form the Algerian Real Estate Bank in two installments of 300,000 Syrian liras
and began to construct buildings that it subsequently sold along with other pieces of
land. The gain accrued from these sales was used to pay off these IOU's. In 1928, the
municipality took out another loan from the Bank of Syria and Lebanon of 10,000
English pounds which was changed in 1930 to 50,000 Syrian liras. In 1930 it took out
another loan from the same bank of 1 million Syrian liras, and announced to those
with municipal bonds or IOU's to present themselves to be paid. Furthermore, due to
the planning of the etoile and the rest of the suqs the municipality had to expropriate
additional properties that were not expropriated during the war and it paid for them
either in cash or in IOU's in Gold Ottoman Coins. In short in sum what has been paid
by the municipality for the expropriations is summarized in the following table.
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MUNICIPAL BUDGET FOR EXPROPRIATIONS (1 91-930
SyriarLebanese Turkish Lira Ottoman Gol
Liras (SLL) (TL) Liras(OGL)
MUNICIPAL EXPENSES
Interest on Expropriation IOU's 3943E 77
Consumption of Expropriation Debt 2.38915 49
Cost of Demolitions 76382 1
Cost of Buildina Construction 5059'7
ConsumDtion of Algerian Real Estate Bank Det 1 4O)69
TOTAL PAYMENTS UNTIL 1930 :S505183
MUNICIPAL REVENUE
Price for Plots and Buildings 1.924184 66
Alaerian Real Estate Bank Loan 20GD00
Bank of Lebanon and Syria Loan 50000
Bank of Lebanon and Syria Loan 1,00(00Q
TOTAL 317416G
Extra Budget Needed for Exprop¢iftKience
between income and revenue of Exprobriation 33 68 7
IOU's
IOU's ISSUED DURING WWI
IOU's issued unti930 89Y44D3
Paid 8650314
Remainina 2794fi9
OR (1 TL at 8LL) 1 690
IOU's FOR NEW EXPROPRIATIONS
IOU's issued unti930 21 4827
Paid 189 06)2
Remaining 2207$5
OR (I OGL at55 vrian Korh 12143
Total Payments for IOU's Owed by Municipdlity 1731.01
TO BE PAID BY THE MUNICIPALITY FOR
EXPROPRIATIONS
Extra Budget Needed for Expropifitrence
between income and revenue of ExDrobriation 334860 7
Value of Unpaid IOU's 173 2:1
Left from Algerian Real Estate Bank Loan 1 2(00
Advance Payment from Bank of Lebanon and yria 5000
Loan from Bank of Lebanon and Syria 1.00(D00
TOTAL 1.683_8218
ASSETS FROM EXPROPRIATIONS
Pronerties sold but payments not collected 21 D00
Price foird ancdth municipal Buildinas 273)00
Price for Pronerties on Rue Fakhr(lJWn2) 66(D00
Price for Properties on the Elt4liW2) 88000
Price for Properties in Souk Dab0cD2) 20D00
Price for Properties in Souk BdeW!n2) 24000
Total 1,46Z)D00
DIFFERENCE 22.987
GENERAL MUNICIPAL FINANCES
Balance of Payment for IOU's 173 23D1
Balance of Alaerian Real Estate Bank Loan 1 61450
Advance Payment from Bank of Lebanon a, ;vria 5 000
Loan from Bank of Lebanon andvtInianterdst 1.46 50
Works 29 7159
TOTAL OWED BY THE MUNICIPALITY 21 5Z90;0
Appendix IV
Miscellaneous Indicators Of Growth In Beirut: 1923-1929
1889 1923 1929
Hotels 15 35 62
Restaurants 6 21 32
Caf6s 22 26
Travel Agencies 6 10
Shops for Travel Goods 6 11
Advertising Agencies 2 7
Clearing Agencies(Customs) 14 24
Insurance Companies 26 45
Banks 244 52
Credit and Exchange Houses 20 43
Lawyers 12 86 111
Real Estate Brokers 17 21
Doctors 31 164 239
Architect-Engineers 13 57
Negotiators(Industrial) 210 324
Negotiators(Commissionaires) 164 194
Printing Presses 13 23 27
Cinemas 6 10
Table 1 (Source: Khouri's
& 1929 in Buheiry, 1987.)
Al Jami'a for 1889 figures and Gedeon's Dalil for 1923
Economic Growth
Between independence in 1943 and the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, with the
exclusion of 1967 which witnessed the first Arab/Israeli war, annual real growth in
Lebanon averaged 7.2 percent with a rate of up to 13 percent and 12 percent from
1968 and 1972. During this period of time the exchange rate of the American Dollar
was at LL3.03 with a corresponding inflation of 3.7 percent. Despite the fact that
Lebanon was a non oil producing country its per capita income like that of Iraq, an oil
producing country was in 1974, $1,189, the highest in the Arab world with the
exception of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya all of which produce oil. In the early
seventies, Lebanon also had the widest range of produced and exported agricultural
commodities in the Arab world, the widest range of manufactured goods (with the
exception of Egypt and Algeria) as well as the most liberal private enterprise set-up
and "laissez-faire" government policy (Sayigh 1978). In socio-economic terms, a
survey of the position of developing countries in 1970, by Harbison, Maruhnick and
Resnick, reported Lebanon, together with Iraq and Peru, to have made the highest
jump in rank with regard to the human resource development. Simultaneously,
Lebanon ranked first in the indices of economic, cultural and health development, life
expectancy, high-level manpower, demographic indicators and educational effort
(though it shared the latter with Egypt and Iraq). In actual fact in 1962, Lebanon had
the highest adult-literacy rate of 89 percent, where 93 percent of the male population
and 86 percent of the female population was literate.
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Appendix V
Charles Conn: L'Art Phenicien
Images included in Charles Conn's L'Art Phenicien
None of these images are titled and no captions, explanations or sources
accompany the drawings.
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Sample of the work of some of the artists who participated in the 1939
New York World Exposition
Cesar Gemaye11898-1958
Debke Traditional Dance (undated)
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Marie Hadad (1885-1973)
Bedouin (undated)
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Appendix VI
Antoine Tabet
Biography
& Translation of his Article
The Art of Building, Its Influence and the Factors that Influence It
Antoine Tabet was born in 1907 in the village of Behamdoun (Mount Lebanon), to a
family of six boys and two girls. His father George Tabet, was a mechanic who was in
charge of a factory of silk production in the village of Shibaniyah. Due to financial
constraints and the size of the family, George Tabet would send his children to school
one after the other to obtain their school diplomas. Despite the delay, Antoine Tabet
managed to complete six years of high school in three years. He then joined the Ecole
Sup6rieure d'Ingtnieurs in Beirut to study Architecture.
In 1926, at nineteen years of age, Antoine Tabet graduated and left for Paris. There
met the surrealist artist Andre Lotte. Through Lotte's wife Tabet was introduced to
August Perret in whose office he commenced working. Two years later, having
received a diploma in architecture from the Ecole des Beaux Arts in Paris, Tabet went
back to Lebanon. Upon arrival, Tabet immediately became active in local cultural and
political events. He established contact with the Lebanese surrealists, George
Shehade, George Naccache, Henri Ceree and Gabriel Bonnor, all of whom had
adopted the French language as their medium of communication. Under the acronym
of A.B.C. they published the first and only edition of a literary supplement to the daily
Newspaper L'Orient. The nihilistic visions of the group caused a public outcry.
Threatened by a large number of possible subscription cancellations, the editors of
L'Orient discontinued the supplement.
However, Tabet's architectural practice did not suffer. Within five years of his return
Tabet had already designed and built two of the most important hotels in the Middle
East; the St George (1930-1931) in Beirut, and the Orient Palace (1931) in Damascus.
In both structures Tabet pioneered the use of reinforced concrete in the Middle East.
The Orient Palace was the first building in Syria which used reinforced concrete for
large openings (more than 10m long). The classical rationalism for which Perret was
renown is fairly evident in the exterior facades of both buildings.7 5 Furthermore,
despite the growth of his political activism, Tabet maintained his commitment to the
practice of architecture. In 1930 Tabet had joined an alliance of architects and
engineers which boasted a hundred members. In 1951 it was formally transformed
into the Association of Architects and Engineers, a government institution of which he
was elected as both vice president and president for several years. Tabet also went on
to build a beer factory in the suburbs of Beirut in the spirit of the Bauhaus (similar to
AEG) (1934), the Lycee for girls in Beirut (1938), the Hekmeh (Sagesse) school in
Beirut (1938), the convent of Kaslik (1949), the Union building in Beirut (1950), the
church of St. Anthony in Rmeily (1953) a housing complex in Hazmieh (1958) as
well as the ministry of justice. His architecture was one of constant evolution and
715 It is not clear whether August Perret, Tabet's mentor provided input on the project. A letter
by Tabet to Perret has a site map of the hotel attached to it with a request of advice. However
Perret's response was burnt along with the rest of Tabet's archived during the Lebanese civil
war.
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change for, according to Mroue, Tabet believed that "maintaining normative rules
arrests the development of art." (Mroue, 1964: 42)
Politically, Tabet established contact with the Arab Nationalists; Saadallah el Jaberi,
Abdel Hamid Karami71 6, and Raid el Solh7 17 and became active in the independence
movement.71 8 The influence of Solh's politics, described by some as "...the leading
Sunni to advocate the notion of 'Lebanonising Muslims' in return for 'Arabising
Christians'(el Khazen, 1991:35) can be visibly traced through his writings.
Moreover, Tabet's political commitments superseded national boundaries and grew to
encompass the struggle against both the Nazi and Fascist movement each of which
had found a limited resonance in the Arab world. National resistance was effectively
conjoined with a world wide struggle against Nazism and Fascism as well as
colonialism. Mroue, in his short biography of Tabet relays a small anecdote to
illustrate the extent of Tabet's commitment to his political beliefs. During this period,
he states, around 90% of the local companies in both Syria and Lebanon, were
working with Antoine Tabet. He would design their buildings, earning a net payment
of around 80,000LL. With the outbreak of the Spanish civil war, political affiliations
and beliefs, were rendered even more crucial.7 9 All were required to take up a stance
either with its national front or its fascist camp. Tabet along with most of his friends
belonged in the nationalist camp. Subsequently Tabet was asked to choose between
80,OOOLL or changing his affiliations. The next day, Mroue continues, Tabet proudly
informed his friends that with no hesitation, he had "spit on 80,000LL". He was
unwilling to change his plans regardless of financial gains or losses (Mroue, 1964:
43).
Tabet's experience with the Spanish civil war, claims Mroue, further strengthened his
political commitments and his wishes to direct his struggle according to revolutionary
and scientific basis. In 1935 he joined the Syrian-Lebanese communist party and was
appointed the secretary general to the Organization for the Struggle Against Nazism
and Fascism in Lebanon and Syria. In 1936, according to his son Jad, Antoine Tabet
went back to learn classical Arabic, and which he was to use consistently for the rest
of his life. This dichotomy over the use of language was intimately tied into the
political struggles raging within the region. In 1941, Tabet along with Omar
Fakhouri7 2 0 and others founded the communist magazine Al Tarik, of which he was
the editor in chief. This magazine would later win an honorary prize for peace from
716 He was the former Qadi of Tripoli and the mot influential proponent of a unity with Syria.
More importantly, he was also a key figure in the opposition to the drafting of the Lebanese
constitution and pressured other Sunni notables to boycott the event. He, along with el Solh,
were both associates of the Syrian National bloc.
717Solh is generally known as the first Lebanese prime minister. However, he was also an
active participant in the Lebanese administrative council during the French Mandate. He was
also a key figure in the transformation of Muslim Sunni attitudes towards an independent
Lebanon. Initially opposed to the concept of Greater Lebanon which came in direct conflict
with Arab Nationalism and which was represented by unity and independence with Syria,
many moderate Sunnis came to accept and even support Lebanese independence. This
culminated in the National Pact of 1943.
718 By the mid 1930,s Jabri, Karami and Solh belonged to the latter camp.
719 It seems that the Spanish civil war formed a benchmark in local politics.
720 Coauthor of the controversial history book published in 1935 that advocated an Arab
identity for Lebanon.
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the Council for World Peace. In 1943 Tabet also participated in the national
conference for independence. With the end of W.W.II, the threat of nuclear disaster to
the world at large had become more evident. Tabet, at the behest of the nuclear
physicist Fredrich Jolio Kouri, helped in the founding of the World Peace movement
in Paris and then Prague in 1949. He believed in its commitments and never ceased,
through this organization to support independence struggles in Asia and Latin
America. He was a member of its board of directors as well as the president for the
Lebanese National Council for Peace. Moreover, with the demise of fascism and
Nazism following the end of the war, the Organization for the Struggle against
Nazism and Fascism in Lebanon and Syria was transformed into the Association for
Culture and Friendship between Lebanon and the Soviet Union and in which Tabet
was a principle participant. In 1960, Tabet received the Lenin medallion for peace.
Tabet passed away in Moscow on May 16, 1964 of a heart attack.
The Art of Building; its Influence and the Factors Influencing it.
March 31, 1943
The president of the Organization for the Struggle Against Nazism and Fascism in
Lebanon and Syria, the architect Antoine Tabet, was commissioned to write this paper
within a series of public talks conducted by various Lebanese intellectuals. The author
however, refused to deliver this paper due to a disagreement around the language of
presentation amongst other things, as will be evident within the text.
We have, embedded in this move, the move away from classical Arabic to the local
dialect, is an ideology7 21 which we will state in broad outline.
Whomever, returns to the history of Arabic literature and its language, will find that
the difference between the language used for speech in daily activities and that used
for writing, as well as the difference between various dialects is an old phenomenon.
Arabic as a language in this sense is no different from French or English.
But the wide gulf between the local dialect and classical Arabic, and between
different dialects in all of the Arabic regions only occurred after centuries of cultural
dissolution. This gulf is therefore the result of historical decline and a sign of the
abasement of cultural, economic, political and social life.
We notice however, that with the advancement in transportation and thus closer ties
between the various Arab regions, that there is a growing historic proclivity for a
closer conjoining between local dialects and classical Arabic.
Refusal to use classical Arabic today is therefore a stance against a clear and ongoing
historic activity and this is the least that one can say.
As for the claim that the local dialect is richer than classical Arabic and more
malleable for verbal communication. It is a superficial judgment because the apparent
richness of the local dialect lies in its ability to deal with mundane daily activities. But
its weaknesses are invariably exposed when it tries to deal with profound thoughts
and the world of higher education and intellect.
72
'The word used here is Math'hab which also means religion or belief.
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As for its beauty and rhythmic sounds, we leave the people to decide for themselves,
for they speak and understand the local dialect, and even if they do not understand the
classical, their musical taste and intelligence will lead them to enjoy listening to
classical Arabic more than the local dialect.
Therefore, rejecting classical Arabic, is inexcusable. It is a shrewd tactic to draw
attention or a veil of ulterior motives. It is known that the aims of classical Arabic
cannot be achieved by one or two people, for great historic changes of this kind will
not be dictated to by one or two lecturers. If that were the case we would have used
the strength of lectures to bring about miracles in the service of transformations that
are more important than the rebellion against classical Arabic. 22
Ladies and Gentleman
I would like to begin my talk by apologizing for my usage of classical Arabic as a
mode of speech and I believe this apology is necessary since my colleagues, in this
lecture series, all of whom are well known poets and writers, used the spoken dialect
to deliver their fantastic artistic narrations.
Yo)u may also be amazed that the architect, who is the furthest away from writing and
literature, is the most diligent in choosing a form of communication many believe to
be autocratic not popular even though the Mouhandess especially the architect has to
be democratic and popular because he is the one most in need of popular support and
the help of laborers to articulate his ideas and art.
But there are a few remarks I would like to make as an introduction to what I am
about to talk about:
Some believe that popular literature and popular art23, should naturally, even if only
in their mode of articulation, be plebeian. They also believe that a large portion of the
population only understand one mode of communication; that of the local dialect. As
for us, our beliefs are diametrically opposed, we believe that the populace is careful to
maintain its literary heritage and international intellectual discussion and more than
understands them. Even if often they cannot express themselves in an articulate
manner. This is not so strange since erudition and scholarship has until now been
confined to a small group of people.
However, if sometimes popular literature, especially poetry, invoke a level of
admiration, this proves of the ability of the populace-despite their primitive modes of
expression-to have an intuitive and prolific understanding of art, literature and
intellect. It is not our duty to imitate this populace by addressing it in its own
language, thus we may establish a certain closeness with our nationals and
polity.O4 0n the contrary, it is our duty, as the children of this populace, to educate our
722The word used here means both switch and revolution: Inkilab
7'31 believe Tabet is including architecture in this category.
7 4In Arabic, Ummatina which comes from the word Umma or mother; it was often used be
Arab nationalists to describe the Arab world as one populace as in Ummatina al Arabiyya.
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people so that they may refine their modes of expression and thus produce wonderful
art, literature and theory.7 25
As an example, I can use one of my own experiences. For three weeks I have been
visiting the National Museum for professional reasons.726 I have come out with a
series of observations which may seem a little strange to you at first, but which are
very natural for a careful researcher.
It became apparent to me that the museum lacked visitors throughout the days when
the minimal entrance fee is required. However, on Saturday afternoons, it is crowded
with visitors when access to the museum is free of charge. I do not need to tell you
that all of the Saturday visitors are from the general populace and farmers that come
from nearby villages while those groups that do not visit the museum and who do not
feel the same enthusiasm for going are those whom we have wrongly grown used to
calling, the sophisticated elite of the nation.
I do not think that I need to belabor the point. There is however an observation that
may astound you. As for me I do not think that these are grounds for wonder since I
believe it to be a natural event: this observation is that visitors to the National
Museum are from the working people who were very careful to learn the history of
every ancient piece they see, as well as understand the different forces that led to its
production. They were also careful to observe these different pieces, and by
comparing them to each other they were able to come out with true exact and precise
conclusions.
You might be questioning, and you would be right, the relevance of this long
introduction. We have come here to learn about architecture and not to a debate
between local dialects and classical Arabic. As for me I believe that the issue of
expression bears a firm relationship to my topic, as it does to other forms of art.
Let us for example take two buildings that look like each other in both sections and
details. And how abundant is this similarity between our Lebanese Arabic house and
our modem house, since our architects have thankfully maintained what they could of
the interior organization of old houses, especially the Dar or Divan and these are the
heart of our homes- What is it that we like in one building and protest in the other but
the forms of expression, that is: the size of external windows and exits, the type of
material, the way it is made, the height of its floors and the decoration on its walls.72 7
The issue is then that of expression, and this is critical to our subject matter even if it
is not everything, and thus not enough to create a masterpiece.
Expression itself is not enough. There must be something which is being expressed,
something that is both valuable and ultimate. This means that simple statements or
action are not enough. There must be something worth stating or acting, that is: the
725Fabet here uses the word Fikr which means though or intellect; In Arabic it is also used in
reference to philosophical writing, or any other form which may be considered as intellectual.
726 Mihna in Arabic normally implies job. There is however, a certain personlization of this
word to which I could not find an equivalent in English.
7271 would like to find out whether there was any debate which linked the shape of the
'modem' house to any particular political ideology. Because of the Western inclinations of
many Lebanese nationalists, the existence of such arguments may well be possible.
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question is also one of need that must be achieved and fulfilled, and the architect is
the one who can solve the housing problem in an easy and adequate manner, thus
achieving the required in an obviously original manner, since perfect art is the
ultimate balance between the what is required, the way in which the requirements are
fulfilled and the manner in which they are expressed.
There is also a greater danger in circumscribing art in general in tight regional forms
of expressing our thoughts and our needs. And this mistake is the result of a general
misunderstanding of regionalism in general.
We have grown used to enjoying our beautiful Lebanese Arabic architecture, but we
rarely question its birthplace and the history of its evolution.
Who has not thought of those other artists and constructors and the beauty of that
material- the beauty of our stone, of lively colors that has been found for generations.
Who has not thought about the forces that have prompted the iron will and superior
intellect that has created all that makes up our current cultural heritage.
Some people think that expressing the genius of a nation takes place in a similar way
throughout the ages, And that different artistic styles are but narrations put together by
one nation, which remains itself the same, secure in just one image of its own civic
identity through the its different periods of development and throughout generations.
But all current historic and scientific discoveries have proved in a manner which
brooks no argument that: artistic production, and all human endeavor, is an expression
of the civic development of a particular polity (Umma) in a specific era, and that civic
society is but the logical culmination for the development of the intellect and the
growth of knowledge from which human intellect has emerged and which experience
made possible through the cooperation, the extinction and the intermarriage of
different peoples.72
Artistic production is also a materialistic representation of different lifestyles, the
types of material it is made of reflects the degree to which craftsmanship was
developed, and the natural circumstance in which it was made, even pure climatic
conditions.
And the history of comparison between the art of Arabic architecture, and that of the
Western world (and this what we are trying to draw in broad outline today) will help
us explain this idea further:
Modern work that the French scientist Daniel Schlombergh created- and which
through research, enabled the reconstruction of part of the Western Heir palace (or
Heirat of Damascus) will help us explain the birthplace of Arabic art which has
remained obscure until now or inadequately studied. These pieces of work clearly
showed how the Arabs began at the onset of the eighth century (shortly after the
Hutra 729)_ to be affected in their first buildings, by different old civilizations, even the
temporally remotest of these civilizations, and how they transformed these old styles
in their own manner, and marked it with their own characters, and created from it,
7 l' he word used here is (Sho'oub) which refers to both local populace as well as a singular
nation when the name of that nation is attached to it.
729 The reference here is to the prophet Mohammed's exodus form Mecca to Medina.
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later on- a special style which is different form the older styles yet similar to it at the
same time.
And that is how we see in the mosaics of the palace, the influence of the Phoenicians,
the Greeks, the Romans, the Tadmurians and the Byzantiums.
The reason is that the Arabs came from the desert, at the beginning of Islam, and the
only cultural heritage they had was a linguistic and poetic heritage at which they
excelled. They found in the places they settled traces and different remnants of
foreign construction which they began imitating, with no care for its origins because,
the speed of their progress", and transit from nomadic life to civilization, forced
them to quickly construct houses and thus use what they found ready or almost ready.
The old columns which the Arabs found were the first things they used of these
foreign buildings, and they used them in any way they could, even if the capital of the
column was sometimes used as the base, but they used to mix it with their own
material, and their own modernized7 3' ways, as a "live" unit of their structural
components. And instead of building above them Roman arches, they constructed flat
roofs above the interior courtyards of the houses.
These Moslems who were driven by their new beliefs to open32 up extensive terrain,
were craving for relaxation and peace inside houses that were shaded by trees and
decorated with plants. As for their external walls, they remained naked like bastions.
But the new religion and excitement which filled up the hearts of the Arabs following
their first conquests, soon resulted in fertile fruits, as the Arab in his genius spread a
new life from the edges of the Arab island, to the Piryaneh mountains. It would only
be a short period of time before the oasis and the white cities, of singing gardens,
graced the coast of the Mediterranean with minarets which challenge the sky.
The subject of building was affected by this Islamic expansion and Islamic revolution,
so that the round arch stood high and the onion dome rose with that arch.
But these topics which were transformed from one material to the other, at the hands
of talented men, used to give different results and expressions.
And these changes in the progress of new art was registering the beginning of a birth,
in the true sense of the word, since a new architectural art was born which acquired a
life independent of the elements which formed its beginning and it was liberated from
static rules frozen in past systems.
At the same time, in view of this progress, their emerged in Western Europe another
growth.
Charlemagne, in his genius was able to make of the government an organized unity
which had disappeared from Europe with the end of the Roman era. He wanted to
7 3 Trhe word used is Fotouh which is usually associated with conquest, expansion, as well as
the spreading of a civilization. When transliterated into English, it simply means opening.
73 1The word here is Mostahdatha which implied both the extrapolation of a technique from a
pre existing one and its modernization.
732Again the word is Foutouh..
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bring to life older arts, especially roman art whose remains could still be seen but in
which the artery of life had subsided.
At that time, Roman art was no longer amenable to the demands of life and to
progress and could not provide Western artists with the tools to accomplish this goal.
However, Charlemagne had established links with the Arab Khalifah Haroun el
Rashid and created an alliance with the two Arabic governments in Sorqatah and
Hishqah and was thus able to adopt a lot of things from the Arabs who had achieved a
high level [of sophistication] in science, math and the art of building.
If the Western emperor had brought from Rome men of literature and music, he
turned to Spain and Syria for mathematicians and architects.? 3 Arab art was at that
time at its peak, thus it was not strange that Western artists would crown their early
achievements with Arab remains built with fantastic material and high art, as the
scholar Deel states; those "Arab relics accurately express logic". Actually, as the
scholar Sauvaget believes, it was perfectly natural, because where beautiful stones are
found, an art and a way of building which are harmonious with its material must be
found. And as the West is the heir to Greek logic, it was forced to exhibit its
architectural relics in a clear and simple manner.
There is no doubt that, that was a moment of transformation for the Western city
where the Roman and Arabic seeds were shed between races734 which had their own
particular aptitudes, so that they produced an art which was neither Roman nor
Arabic, but was an art which was nurtured by different currents, and was then
required to grow independently from its origins and to extend its branches to the areas
from which it obtained its seeds.
And of these different influences to which Western art was subjected, the direct and
indirect Arabic constituents and which were derived from the art produced by the
Christians in Spain in 10th and 11th centuries, used to appear clearly.
Initially Arabic influence on Western art appeared in the replacement of wooden roofs
with stone. And then the altar in various churches was made hollow in a manner
similar to the mohrab in the Islamic mosque. Arabic influence also appeared clearly in
the arches Boey cathedral and which were compose of multiple circles, as well as in
its colored stones, in its dome inspired by the Islamic art of Andalus, and in the
wooden doors which were decorated with Qufy calligraphy.
And these influences appear conspicuously in most of the larger buildings that were
constructed at the time. But we also find in these buildings the freedom and the
transformations which characterized Arabic art in its initial stages. Here also we find
that the logic and the materials which formed these buildings was liberated from the
structure of direct influences to create a new art.
And this art reached its peak in the 10th century as if the whole world- as
contemporary scientist Raoul Glaber states, had shed, in a general consensus, its old
clothes to put on a pure, white dress.
7 33 Banaeen could be translated as both master builders as well as architects. It is derived from
the word binaa which means to build.
734 Sho'oub in modem Arabic refers also to nation, race as well as ethnic groups. In this case I
believe race, or different populations is the most apt translation.
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And this art lead in turn to the birth of gothic art, which expressed in a different way,
new circumstances and needs since with it different nation groups grew as well as
various worker associations which led to a profound transformation in the history of
architecture.
The liberation of cities from feudalism used to justify, I could say, even demand, the
improvement of all public buildings and their expansion. Thus the church became,
more than any other time, the home of the people, as much as it was the house of god,
and Cathedrals were used as much for general public meetings as they were used for
worship.
The new way of building, which escaped from the control of both feudal lords and
monks became the logical end to the research and experimentations which Western
architects undertook at the beginning of the middle ages. This new direction prodded
the art of design to life.735
And this advanced art embodied by gothic architecture, was an artistic expression of
the economic rather than religious need for expansion which followed Crusader
conquests.
For a long time it was rumors spread that the Crusader wars had a profound influence
on the art of the West because of what they carried back with them from their
adventures in the east. In my opinion this was only true of the secondary arts such as
the making of fabric, glass and bronze.
That is because Western art possessed a rich variety of expressions and thus was more
fit to give rather than take.
And when Western art was taken back to its place of origin, rich with three centuries
of experience, it was free to transmit to Arabic art, especially around the
Mediterranean, with its idea and manner of building, various examples which could
inspire it anew.
One glance at the Arabic buildings of the islands of Rhodes and Cyprus, and the coast
of Syria, is enough for us to see Western influences, especially Gothic influence, in
the design and organization of windows, and in the engravings as well.
And these influences which passed through solid Arabic art, and which affirmed its
liveliness, increased the affluence of our region and lead to the birth of a style of
building specific to the Lebanese and Syrian coast.
And so we see that regional style, in our country, as in the rest of the world, is the
result of a multitude of different factors, the formation of which was the influence of
all civilizations, peoples and generations. It also adopted in each region a particular
character determined by the laws of time and place.
It is wrong then to limit the idea of regionalism, in its isolationist expression, since
such an action would be proof of organisms which had carried out its mission and
735Here he actually juxtaposes life to being static. For the purposes of translation I rephrased
his sentence.
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could no longer grow or rejuvenate, and it thus closes in upon itself and awaits its
dissolution.
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